[EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

[Richard Lung]

The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.


For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of elections that
there is no consistently democratic electoral system: the impossibility
supposition.

That supposition implies some conception (albeit non-existent) of a
consistently derived right election result.

If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even to judge
that there is a trade-off between electoral systems.

Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a standard by
which electoral systems can be judged for their democratic consistency.

It follows that the election result will only be as consistent as the
electoral system, and there is no pre-conceivably right election result,
because that presupposes a perfection not given to science as a
progressive pursuit.

[Brian Olson]

I kinda don't accept this paradox. Just to compare the form of a election
method paradox statement: Arrow's theorem was that given a set of desired
properties and the constraint of rankings ballots, those set of desirable
properties could not all be simultaneously fulfilled. One can almost
trivially step outside of that paradox by eliminating the constraint of the
rankings ballot.

My model of understanding people and elections is a utilitarian one. A
person derives some amount of utility from the outcome of an election and
everyone is apportioned the same share of utility which we might count as
0..1 or -1..1 . These model persons can be summed up and and a global
social utility calculated. The ideal election method perfectly knows every
person and elects the true global social utility maximizing candidate. This
sounds an awful lot like score voting. But then we have to start to
complicate the model with imperfect knowledge of a voter's utility, the
imperfect expression of that on a ballot, strategic ballot casting rather
than honest, messy computation and practical administration issues of
running an election in the real world, and so on. So we might wind up with
a best practical method that isn't just simple score voting.

But I still believe there is a pragmatic 'best' method, we have techniques
for evaluating that, and we should do this and put something up in the real
world. Personally I'll take a rankings ballot that's Condorcet counted with
any cycle resolution method as 'good enough' and practically applicable;
and tinkering around the edges for a slightly better method is fun
mathematical curiosity but I'd also like to get some laws passed.

What do you think of my model statement?
Is there a more formal statement of limitations you were heading towards?

Post by Richard Lung
The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of elections that
there is no consistently democratic electoral system: the impossibility
supposition.
That supposition implies some conception (albeit non-existent) of a
consistently derived right election result.
If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even to judge that
there is a trade-off between electoral systems.
Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a standard by
which electoral systems can be judged for their democratic consistency.
It follows that the election result will only be as consistent as the
electoral system, and there is no pre-conceivably right election result,
because that presupposes a perfection not given to science as a progressive
pursuit.
--
Richard Lung.http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
E-books <https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085E-books> in epub format:https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[Richard Lung]

Brian Olson,

Where we differ is that I do not see ranked choice as a constraint.
Single order choice, the x-vote is the constraint on ranked voting as a
multiple-order choice.
The problem with election methods, practical and theoretical is that
they impose constraints on the voters freedom of choice, in one way or
another, and so are that much less true election methods.
(A minor example, the classic objections to cumulative voting seem to
apply to some apprently modern versions or variations.)

When Condorcet and Borda, disagreed on the best way to conduct a count
of preference voting, Laplace decided in favor of Borda. (I grant you
that Condorcet has information value, when weighted. But I am not well
informed on this approach and know of no convincing reason why it should
be adopted or how you would persuade the public of that.) JFS Ross
explained that Laplace favored Method Borda because higher preferences
were more important and should count more. The Gregory method removes
the objection to Borda of "later harm." This is the direction I have
followed (weighted count of ranked choice), following on from where Meek
method STV leaves off.

Richard Lung

Post by Brian Olson
I kinda don't accept this paradox. Just to compare the form of a
election method paradox statement: Arrow's theorem was that given a
set of desired properties and the constraint of rankings ballots,
those set of desirable properties could not all be simultaneously
fulfilled. One can almost trivially step outside of that paradox by
eliminating the constraint of the rankings ballot.
My model of understanding people and elections is a utilitarian one. A
person derives some amount of utility from the outcome of an election
and everyone is apportioned the same share of utility which we might
count as 0..1 or -1..1 . These model persons can be summed up and and
a global social utility calculated. The ideal election method
perfectly knows every person and elects the true global social utility
maximizing candidate. This sounds an awful lot like score voting. But
then we have to start to complicate the model with imperfect knowledge
of a voter's utility, the imperfect expression of that on a ballot,
strategic ballot casting rather than honest, messy computation and
practical administration issues of running an election in the real
world, and so on. So we might wind up with a best practical method
that isn't just simple score voting.
But I still believe there is a pragmatic 'best' method, we have
techniques for evaluating that, and we should do this and put
something up in the real world. Personally I'll take a rankings ballot
that's Condorcet counted with any cycle resolution method as 'good
enough' and practically applicable; and tinkering around the edges for
a slightly better method is fun mathematical curiosity but I'd also
like to get some laws passed.
What do you think of my model statement?
Is there a more formal statement of limitations you were heading towards?
The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of elections
that there is no consistently democratic electoral system: the
impossibility supposition.
That supposition implies some conception (albeit non-existent) of
a consistently derived right election result.
If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even to
judge that there is a trade-off between electoral systems.
Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a standard
by which electoral systems can be judged for their democratic
consistency.
It follows that the election result will only be as consistent as
the electoral system, and there is no pre-conceivably right
election result, because that presupposes a perfection not given
to science as a progressive pursuit.
--
Richard Lung.
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com <http://www.voting.ukscientists.com>
https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience <https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience>
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[Brian Olson]

Compared to a rankings ballot, a ratings ballot contains more information
about a voter's preference or utility for the available choices.
I can say
A > B > C > D
or I can say with more detail
A = 1.0; B = 0.9; C = 0.1; D = 0.0

If there is more information available, it is possible for an election
algorithm to use that information and more accurately represent the voters
and find the greater global utility winner.

If we had a specially insightful rational bayesian voting populace we might
ask them for their confidence interval of how sure they are are about each
choice and get more information still.
A = 1.0 (e=.3); B = 0.9 (e=.1), C = 0.1 (e=0.5), D = 0.0 (e=0.1)

And then we'd work out an election algorithm to maximize the expected value
of the global utility over the known voter utility distributions.

Post by Richard Lung
Brian Olson,
Where we differ is that I do not see ranked choice as a constraint. Single
order choice, the x-vote is the constraint on ranked voting as a
multiple-order choice.
The problem with election methods, practical and theoretical is that they
impose constraints on the voters freedom of choice, in one way or another,
and so are that much less true election methods.
(A minor example, the classic objections to cumulative voting seem to
apply to some apprently modern versions or variations.)
When Condorcet and Borda, disagreed on the best way to conduct a count of
preference voting, Laplace decided in favor of Borda. (I grant you that
Condorcet has information value, when weighted. But I am not well informed
on this approach and know of no convincing reason why it should be adopted
or how you would persuade the public of that.) JFS Ross explained that
Laplace favored Method Borda because higher preferences were more important
and should count more. The Gregory method removes the objection to Borda of
"later harm." This is the direction I have followed (weighted count of
ranked choice), following on from where Meek method STV leaves off.
Richard Lung
I kinda don't accept this paradox. Just to compare the form of a election
method paradox statement: Arrow's theorem was that given a set of desired
properties and the constraint of rankings ballots, those set of desirable
properties could not all be simultaneously fulfilled. One can almost
trivially step outside of that paradox by eliminating the constraint of the
rankings ballot.
My model of understanding people and elections is a utilitarian one. A
person derives some amount of utility from the outcome of an election and
everyone is apportioned the same share of utility which we might count as
0..1 or -1..1 . These model persons can be summed up and and a global
social utility calculated. The ideal election method perfectly knows every
person and elects the true global social utility maximizing candidate. This
sounds an awful lot like score voting. But then we have to start to
complicate the model with imperfect knowledge of a voter's utility, the
imperfect expression of that on a ballot, strategic ballot casting rather
than honest, messy computation and practical administration issues of
running an election in the real world, and so on. So we might wind up with
a best practical method that isn't just simple score voting.
But I still believe there is a pragmatic 'best' method, we have techniques
for evaluating that, and we should do this and put something up in the real
world. Personally I'll take a rankings ballot that's Condorcet counted with
any cycle resolution method as 'good enough' and practically applicable;
and tinkering around the edges for a slightly better method is fun
mathematical curiosity but I'd also like to get some laws passed.
What do you think of my model statement?
Is there a more formal statement of limitations you were heading towards?

Post by Richard Lung
The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of elections that
there is no consistently democratic electoral system: the impossibility
supposition.
That supposition implies some conception (albeit non-existent) of a
consistently derived right election result.
If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even to judge that
there is a trade-off between electoral systems.
Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a standard by
which electoral systems can be judged for their democratic consistency.
It follows that the election result will only be as consistent as the
electoral system, and there is no pre-conceivably right election result,
because that presupposes a perfection not given to science as a progressive
pursuit.
--
Richard Lung.http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
E-books <https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085E-books> in epub format:https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

--
Richard Lung.http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
E-books in epub format:https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience

[robert bristow-johnson]

so many discussions here are more arcane than i can grok.  but i can grok most of this.


---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

From: "Brian Olson" <***@bolson.org>

Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 4:31 pm

To: "Richard Lung" <***@ukscientists.com>

Cc: "EM" <election-***@lists.electorama.com>

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post by Brian Olson
Compared to a rankings ballot, a ratings ballot contains more information
about a voter's preference or utility for the available choices.
I can say
A > B > C > D
or I can say with more detail
A = 1.0; B = 0.9; C = 0.1; D = 0.0
If there is more information available, it is possible for an election
algorithm to use that information and more accurately represent the voters
and find the greater global utility winner.

but voters can skew that information quantitatively and, if they want to be tactical, insincerely.
how does the voter know that by rating Candidate B with 0.9 and not lower, that he is not helping this candidate beat his favorite, Candidate A?  maybe it should be 0.8.  or
0.5.
while Score voting requires too much information from the voters (making them act as a trained expert and consider quantitatively how candidates should be rated as if they are an Olympic ice skating judge) and while Approval doesn't get enough information from voters (does not
differentiate preference between two "approved" candidates), there has always been the problem of either Score voting or Approval voting facing the voter about what to do with their second choice (Candidate B).  how much juice should the voter give to Candidate B if they want B to
beat C but do not want B to beat A?  (and for Approval, the question is, having the same concern, shall the voter "approve" B or not?)


Score and Approval cannot answer that question in any simple manner.  but with Ranked-Choice the answer is clear.
and the other problem with Score is the "One-Person-One-Vote" standard.  if i really, really, really like Candidate A over Candidate B and you only sorta like B
over A by just a little bit, it should not matter to what disparate degree we like our candidates.  your vote for B should weigh just as much as my vote for A, even if my excitement for A exceeds your excitement for B.  that's what "one-person-one-vote" means.
i still just
do not get why Score and Approval (in application to governmental elections) have the following they do have.
bestest,
r b-j

Post by Brian Olson
If we had a specially insightful rational bayesian voting populace we might
ask them for their confidence interval of how sure they are are about each
choice and get more information still.
A = 1.0 (e=.3); B = 0.9 (e=.1), C = 0.1 (e=0.5), D = 0.0 (e=0.1)
And then we'd work out an election algorithm to maximize the expected value
of the global utility over the known voter utility distributions.

 
and, except for making examples to show how a system breaks (like a Proof by Contradiction in mathematics), i just cannot see how judging the comparative value of systems with simulated assumptions is helpful.  there are not enough simulated cases to be able to consider how any
system will work under all conditions.
 

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
Brian Olson,
Where we differ is that I do not see ranked choice as a constraint. Single
order choice, the x-vote is the constraint on ranked voting as a
multiple-order choice.
The problem with election methods, practical and theoretical is that they
impose constraints on the voters freedom of choice, in one way or another,
and so are that much less true election methods.
(A minor example, the classic objections to cumulative voting seem to
apply to some apprently modern versions or variations.)
When Condorcet and Borda, disagreed on the best way to conduct a count of
preference voting, Laplace decided in favor of Borda. (I grant you that
Condorcet has information value, when weighted. But I am not well informed
on this approach and know of no convincing reason why it should be adopted
or how you would persuade the public of that.) JFS Ross explained that
Laplace favored Method Borda because higher preferences were more important
and should count more. The Gregory method removes the objection to Borda of
"later harm." This is the direction I have followed (weighted count of
ranked choice), following on from where Meek method STV leaves off.
Richard Lung
I kinda don't accept this paradox. Just to compare the form of a election
method paradox statement: Arrow's theorem was that given a set of desired
properties and the constraint of rankings ballots, those set of desirable
properties could not all be simultaneously fulfilled. One can almost
trivially step outside of that paradox by eliminating the constraint of the
rankings ballot.
My model of understanding people and elections is a utilitarian one. A
person derives some amount of utility from the outcome of an election and
everyone is apportioned the same share of utility which we might count as
0..1 or -1..1 . These model persons can be summed up and and a global
social utility calculated. The ideal election method perfectly knows every
person and elects the true global social utility maximizing candidate. This
sounds an awful lot like score voting. But then we have to start to
complicate the model with imperfect knowledge of a voter's utility, the
imperfect expression of that on a ballot, strategic ballot casting rather
than honest, messy computation and practical administration issues of
running an election in the real world, and so on. So we might wind up with
a best practical method that isn't just simple score voting.
But I still believe there is a pragmatic 'best' method, we have techniques
for evaluating that, and we should do this and put something up in the real
world. Personally I'll take a rankings ballot that's Condorcet counted with
any cycle resolution method as 'good enough' and practically applicable;
and tinkering around the edges for a slightly better method is fun
mathematical curiosity but I'd also like to get some laws passed.
What do you think of my model statement?
Is there a more formal statement of limitations you were heading towards?

Post by Richard Lung
The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of elections that
there is no consistently democratic electoral system: the impossibility
supposition.
That supposition implies some conception (albeit non-existent) of a
consistently derived right election result.
If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even to judge that
there is a trade-off between electoral systems.
Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a standard by
which electoral systems can be judged for their democratic consistency.
It follows that the election result will only be as consistent as the
electoral system, and there is no pre-conceivably right election result,
because that presupposes a perfection not given to science as a progressive
pursuit.
--
Richard Lung.http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
E-books <https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085E-books> in epub format:https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience

--
Richard Lung.http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
E-books in epub format:https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience

--
r b-j                  ***@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

[Brian Olson]

I was speaking only of ballots, and and in the abstract that *some* election
algorithm could take that information and make a good outcome of it.

I don't favor raw Score summation. It's strategy prone. For choices where
my honest vote might be [1.0, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0.0] I should probably
vote strategically [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0].

And if you don't like that and the varying vote power depending on how you
vote: I have a system for you!
"Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings" (IRNR)
Each ballot is normalized so that all ballots have the same magnitude. The
modified ballots are summed, and the choice with the lowest sumarry rating
is disqualified. Each ballot is then normalized again as if the
disqualified choice was not there, redistributing the vote across the
choices in proportion to the original ballot. The new modified ballots are
summed and the process is repeated until there are two choices remaining
and one choice wins over the other.

I think this works better with an honest ballot in the case where you like
some choice more than another 'just a little bit' or by whatever margin.

/Brian


On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 1:02 AM, robert bristow-johnson <

so many discussions here are more arcane than i can grok. but i can grok
most of this.
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 4:31 pm
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post by Brian Olson
Compared to a rankings ballot, a ratings ballot contains more information
about a voter's preference or utility for the available choices.
I can say
A > B > C > D
or I can say with more detail
A = 1.0; B = 0.9; C = 0.1; D = 0.0
If there is more information available, it is possible for an election
algorithm to use that information and more accurately represent the

voters

Post by Brian Olson
and find the greater global utility winner.

but voters can skew that information quantitatively and, if they want to
be tactical, insincerely.
how does the voter know that by rating Candidate B with 0.9 and not lower,
that he is not helping this candidate beat his favorite, Candidate A?
maybe it should be 0.8. or 0.5.
while Score voting requires too much information from the voters (making
them act as a trained expert and consider quantitatively how candidates
should be rated as if they are an Olympic ice skating judge) and while
Approval doesn't get enough information from voters (does not differentiate
preference between two "approved" candidates), there has always been the
problem of either Score voting or Approval voting facing the voter about
what to do with their second choice (Candidate B). how much juice should
the voter give to Candidate B if they want B to beat C but do not want B to
beat A? (and for Approval, the question is, having the same concern, shall
the voter "approve" B or not?)
Score and Approval cannot answer that question in any simple manner. but
with Ranked-Choice the answer is clear.
and the other problem with Score is the "One-Person-One-Vote" standard.
if i really, really, really like Candidate A over Candidate B and you only
sorta like B over A by just a little bit, it should not matter to what
disparate degree we like our candidates. your vote for B should weigh just
as much as my vote for A, even if my excitement for A exceeds your
excitement for B. that's what "one-person-one-vote" means.
i still just do not get why Score and Approval (in application to
governmental elections) have the following they do have.
bestest,
r b-j

Post by Brian Olson
If we had a specially insightful rational bayesian voting populace we

might

Post by Brian Olson
ask them for their confidence interval of how sure they are are about

each

Post by Brian Olson
choice and get more information still.
A = 1.0 (e=.3); B = 0.9 (e=.1), C = 0.1 (e=0.5), D = 0.0 (e=0.1)
And then we'd work out an election algorithm to maximize the expected

value

Post by Brian Olson
of the global utility over the known voter utility distributions.

and, except for making examples to show how a system breaks (like a Proof
by Contradiction in mathematics), i just cannot see how judging the
comparative value of systems with simulated assumptions is helpful. there
are not enough simulated cases to be able to consider how any system will
work under all conditions.

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
Brian Olson,
Where we differ is that I do not see ranked choice as a constraint.

Single

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
order choice, the x-vote is the constraint on ranked voting as a
multiple-order choice.
The problem with election methods, practical and theoretical is that

they

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
impose constraints on the voters freedom of choice, in one way or

another,

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
and so are that much less true election methods.
(A minor example, the classic objections to cumulative voting seem to
apply to some apprently modern versions or variations.)
When Condorcet and Borda, disagreed on the best way to conduct a count

of

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
preference voting, Laplace decided in favor of Borda. (I grant you that
Condorcet has information value, when weighted. But I am not well

informed

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
on this approach and know of no convincing reason why it should be

adopted

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
or how you would persuade the public of that.) JFS Ross explained that
Laplace favored Method Borda because higher preferences were more

important

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
and should count more. The Gregory method removes the objection to

Borda of

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
"later harm." This is the direction I have followed (weighted count of
ranked choice), following on from where Meek method STV leaves off.
Richard Lung
I kinda don't accept this paradox. Just to compare the form of a

election

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
method paradox statement: Arrow's theorem was that given a set of

desired

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
properties and the constraint of rankings ballots, those set of

desirable

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
properties could not all be simultaneously fulfilled. One can almost
trivially step outside of that paradox by eliminating the constraint of

the

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
rankings ballot.
My model of understanding people and elections is a utilitarian one. A
person derives some amount of utility from the outcome of an election

and

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
everyone is apportioned the same share of utility which we might count

as

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
0..1 or -1..1 . These model persons can be summed up and and a global
social utility calculated. The ideal election method perfectly knows

every

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
person and elects the true global social utility maximizing candidate.

This

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
sounds an awful lot like score voting. But then we have to start to
complicate the model with imperfect knowledge of a voter's utility, the
imperfect expression of that on a ballot, strategic ballot casting

rather

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
than honest, messy computation and practical administration issues of
running an election in the real world, and so on. So we might wind up

with

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
a best practical method that isn't just simple score voting.
But I still believe there is a pragmatic 'best' method, we have

techniques

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
for evaluating that, and we should do this and put something up in the

real

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
world. Personally I'll take a rankings ballot that's Condorcet counted

with

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
any cycle resolution method as 'good enough' and practically applicable;
and tinkering around the edges for a slightly better method is fun
mathematical curiosity but I'd also like to get some laws passed.
What do you think of my model statement?
Is there a more formal statement of limitations you were heading

towards?

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of elections that
there is no consistently democratic electoral system: the impossibility
supposition.
That supposition implies some conception (albeit non-existent) of a
consistently derived right election result.
If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even to judge

that

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
there is a trade-off between electoral systems.
Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a standard by
which electoral systems can be judged for their democratic consistency.
It follows that the election result will only be as consistent as the
electoral system, and there is no pre-conceivably right election

result,

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
because that presupposes a perfection not given to science as a

progressive

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
pursuit.
--
Richard Lung.http://www.voting.ukscientists.com

https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
E-books <https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085E-books> in

epub format:https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
--
Richard Lung.http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:https://plus.google.com/

106191200795605365085

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
E-books in epub format:https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/

democracyscience
--
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[robert bristow-johnson]

---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

From: "Brian Olson" <***@bolson.org>

Date: Fri, June 23, 2017 8:35 am

To: "EM" <election-***@lists.electorama.com>

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post by Brian Olson
I was speaking only of ballots, and and in the abstract that *some* election
algorithm could take that information and make a good outcome of it.

No, we should not make the voters cook up that information.  all we should ask the voters is "whom do you prefer A or B?"  and "if you can't get your favorite, whom is your next
preference?"

Post by Brian Olson
I don't favor raw Score summation. It's strategy prone.

of course it is.  scoring is strategy prone if you use the scores in *any* algorithm other than simple ranking.  and then don't use scores.  just rank.

Post by Brian Olson
  For choices where
my honest vote might be [1.0, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0.0] I should probably
vote strategically [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0].

but then you're not helping your first choice beat your second or third choice.

Post by Brian Olson
And if you don't like that and the varying vote power depending on how you
vote: I have a system for you!
"Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings" (IRNR)
Each ballot is normalized so that all ballots have the same magnitude.

pfffft!  way too complicated.

Post by Brian Olson
The
modified ballots are summed, and the choice with the lowest sumarry rating
is disqualified. Each ballot is then normalized again as if the
disqualified choice was not there, redistributing the vote across the
choices in proportion to the original ballot. The new modified ballots are
summed and the process is repeated until there are two choices remaining
and one choice wins over the other.
I think this works better with an honest ballot in the case where you like
some choice more than another 'just a little bit' or by whatever margin.

 
no reason to use that over Condorcet (with a simple method to deal with cycles, ranked-pairs is still a lot easier to explain than Schulze and they pick the same winner if there are 3 in the Smith set, so let's use the simpler method)
 


--
 


r b-j                  ***@audioimagination.com
 


"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

[Richard Lung]

I also have found it hard to believe that Score voting and Approval
voting are taken seriously.
There is a tradition of cumulative voting in one of the states, that,
not surprisingly, would not have compared badly with FPTP.
An American political science association uses Approval Voting. I take
that choice in itself to be a form of strategic voting. Neither looking
too bad with FPTP, nor looking too good, in the eyes of (gerrymandering)
politicians.

Richard Lung.

Post by robert bristow-johnson
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
Date: Fri, June 23, 2017 8:35 am
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post by Brian Olson
I was speaking only of ballots, and and in the abstract that *some*

election

Post by Brian Olson
algorithm could take that information and make a good outcome of it.

No, we should not make the voters cook up that information. all we
should ask the voters is "whom do you prefer A or B?" and "if you
can't get your favorite, whom is your next preference?"

Post by Brian Olson
I don't favor raw Score summation. It's strategy prone.

of course it is. scoring is strategy prone if you use the scores in
*any* algorithm other than simple ranking. and then don't use scores.
just rank.

Post by Brian Olson
For choices where
my honest vote might be [1.0, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0.0] I should probably
vote strategically [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0].

but then you're not helping your first choice beat your second or third choice.

Post by Brian Olson
And if you don't like that and the varying vote power depending on

how you

Post by Brian Olson
vote: I have a system for you!
"Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings" (IRNR)
Each ballot is normalized so that all ballots have the same magnitude.

pfffft! way too complicated.

Post by Brian Olson
The
modified ballots are summed, and the choice with the lowest sumarry

rating

Post by Brian Olson
is disqualified. Each ballot is then normalized again as if the
disqualified choice was not there, redistributing the vote across the
choices in proportion to the original ballot. The new modified

ballots are

Post by Brian Olson
summed and the process is repeated until there are two choices remaining
and one choice wins over the other.
I think this works better with an honest ballot in the case where

you like

Post by Brian Olson
some choice more than another 'just a little bit' or by whatever margin.

no reason to use that over Condorcet (with a simple method to deal
with cycles, ranked-pairs is still a lot easier to explain than
Schulze and they pick the same winner if there are 3 in the Smith set,
so let's use the simpler method)
--
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[f***@snkmail.com]

Post by robert bristow-johnson
but voters can skew that information quantitatively and, if they want to
be tactical, insincerely.

...and even when *everyone* votes tactically, rated systems still
outperform ranked systems.

http://electology.org/sites/default/files/comparing_voting_m
ethods_simplicity_group_satisfaction.png

https://electology.github.io/vse-sim/vse.html

"Tactical Score Voting may be, in practice, more likely to elect a
Condorcet winner (when one exists) than real Condorcet methods."
https://electology.org/tactical-voting-basics

if i really, really, really like Candidate A over Candidate B and you only

Post by robert bristow-johnson
sorta like B over A by just a little bit, it should not matter to what
disparate degree we like our candidates.

Yes, it absolutely should. That's the fundamental flaw in ranked ballots:
preference rankings can't be meaningfully compared between individuals. If
there are 2 voters and 2 candidates, and the ballots are:

1: A > B
2: B > A

you can't tell who the winner should be, but if their true feelings are

1. loves A and hates B
2. loves B and likes A

the obviously correct winner is A.

The goal of a voting system is to choose the candidate who best represents
the population / whose opinions are closest to the centroid of the
population's opinions / who, winning, would maximize the happiness of the
population. Ranked ballots destroy information that's needed to find this
winner.

Post by robert bristow-johnson
I don't favor raw Score summation. It's strategy prone. For choices where
my honest vote might be [1.0, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0.0] I should probably
vote strategically [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0].

... in which case it devolves into Approval Voting, which... is still
pretty good.

Anyway, this is only your optimal strategy if you know exactly what
everyone else is voting. In reality, polls have uncertainty (e.g. November
2016), and ratings ballots allow you to hedge your bets based on the
likelihood of different outcomes.

And if you don't like that and the varying vote power depending on how you

Post by robert bristow-johnson
vote: I have a system for you!
"Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings" (IRNR)

Do you think this has a benefit over SRV/STAR?

Post by robert bristow-johnson
No, we should not make the voters cook up that information. all we should
ask the voters is "whom do you prefer A or B?" and "if you can't get your
favorite, whom is your next preference?"

Utility information is the information that's naturally in voters' brains.
Ranking ballots force them to "quantize" it into discrete steps which
distort the underlying reality. If a voter's true feelings are:

A: Love
B: Like
C: Hate
D: Hate
E: Hate
F: Hate
G: Hate

a ranking ballot forces them to vote something like

A: 1
B: 2
C: 3
D: 4
E: 5
F: 6
G: 7

amplifying small preferences into large ones and making it look like they
approve of C 5/7ths as much as they approve of A. When you combine this
across many voters, C is going to get much more power than they actually
deserve.

"The majority judgement experiment proves that the model on which the
theory of social choice and voting is based is simply not true: voters do
not have preference lists of candidates in their minds. Moreover, forcing
voters to establish preference lists only leads to inconsistencies,
impossibilities and incompatibilities." https://hal.archives-ouvertes.
fr/hal-00243076

"Thus, the discrimination forced by rankings lessened the validity of
rankings among participants who did not freely differentiate between
values. In other words, our findings indicate that ratings may have more
predictive validity than rankings, perhaps because the latter force
participants to sometimes make unimportant and/or inconsequential (and
hence invalid) distinctions between similarly regarded values. ... value
ranking forces people to make distinctions that they would not otherwise
make" http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15324834basp1802_4

"cardinal (utility-based) preferences are embedded into the space of
ordinal preferences. This often gives rise to a distortion in the
preferences, and hence in the social welfare of the outcome."
http://procaccia.info/papers/distortion.cia06.pdf

no reason to use that over Condorcet (with a simple method to deal with

Post by robert bristow-johnson
cycles, ranked-pairs is still a lot easier to explain than Schulze and they
pick the same winner if there are 3 in the Smith set, so let's use the
simpler method)

Condorcet systems are too complicated for real-life use in governmental
elections, and much simpler cardinal systems produce the same or better
outcomes in practice.

(Though the goal should be to find the most-approved Utilitarian Winner,
not the most-preferred Condorcet Winner, but they are the same in most
cases. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406815000518)

Post by robert bristow-johnson
I also have found it hard to believe that Score voting and Approval voting
are taken seriously.

and I find it hard to believe that people are still seriously arguing about
which ranked, majoritarian voting methods meet which mathematical criteria,
when rated utilitarian voting methods exist, and are accepted to work just
fine in every other context in which they are used.

[robert bristow-johnson]

---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

From: ***@snkmail.com

Date: Fri, June 23, 2017 9:57 pm

To: election-***@electorama.com

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post by f***@snkmail.com

Post by robert bristow-johnson
but voters can skew that information quantitatively and, if they want to
be tactical, insincerely.

...and even when *everyone* votes tactically, rated systems still
outperform ranked systems.

i don't believe it.  and simulations will not persuade me.

Post by f***@snkmail.com
http://electology.org/sites/default/files/comparing_voting_m
ethods_simplicity_group_satisfaction.png
https://electology.github.io/vse-sim/vse.html
"Tactical Score Voting may be, in practice, more likely to elect a
Condorcet winner (when one exists) than real Condorcet methods."
https://electology.org/tactical-voting-basics

yeah, i've heard that one before (perhaps even from Warren, whom i respect).  
as if the Anglicans will out-Catholic the Catholics.

Post by f***@snkmail.com

Post by robert bristow-johnson
if i really, really, really like Candidate A over Candidate B and you only
sorta like B over A by just a little bit, it should not matter to what
disparate degree we like our candidates.

Yes, it absolutely should.

 
that is a fundamental value statement that stands in opposition of the core democratic value that every person's vote should count equally.
known as "One-person-one-vote".

Post by f***@snkmail.com
preference rankings can't be meaningfully compared between individuals. If
1: A > B
2: B > A
you can't tell who the winner should be, but if their true feelings are
1. loves A and hates B
2. loves B and likes A
the obviously correct winner is A.

no, if voter 1 prefers A and voter 2 prefers B, the two voters have equal franchise in a governmental election in a democracy.  we must not pigeon-hole voter 2 and ask them to reflect on the strength of their preference so that when the say
"oh, i only sorta like B over A a little", then the bossy, pushy, entitled voter 1 gets their way and voter 2 will start to resent being vulnerable and honest about things and will learn to be more polemic about things in the future.  that's the problem with elections gone bad (like
Burlington Vermont's IRV of 2009), when voters realize they've been punished for how they voted, there is voter regret and cynicism and people are literally encouraged to be more polarized.

Post by f***@snkmail.com
The goal of a voting system is to choose the candidate who best represents
the population / whose opinions are closest to the centroid of the
population's opinions

no.  the goal of a voting system in a democracy is to determine, reflect, and implement the will of the majority of citizens, all with equal franchise.  letting a minority rule sets up all sorts of incentive for strategic voting.

Post by f***@snkmail.com
/ who, winning,

would maximize the happiness of the

Post by f***@snkmail.com
population. Ranked ballots destroy information that's needed to find this
winner.

consider a two-candidate election.  it's just between A and B.
i don't think you'll get any mileage for the idea that B should be elected when more voters prefer A.
Condorcet is the only natural way to extend the principle of equal franchise to each voter and
their preferences to a multi-candidate, single-winner election.
we do *not* want to trouble voters with a perceived need to vote tactically (because they know their opponents will vote tactically and they don't wanna be chumps). we don't even to trouble voters to *fairly* rate candidates.
 all we should ask them is "who do you wanna win?"  and then "if you can't get that candidate you want to win, *then* whom else would you want to win?"  it should be simple and fair.

--
r b-j                  ***@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

[Toby Pereira]

Given the possibility of a Condorcet paradox, the will of the majority becomes an incoherent notion. If A is preferred by a majority to B, then in a two-candidate election, then A should win under a majority system. But introduce candidate C, and B could end up winning, even though by majority logic, A is a better candidate than B.
Obviously you know all about Condorcet paradoxes, but if you think that the majority criterion is some sort of absolute, then you are left with no option but to say that in some elections, A is a better winner than B, B a better winner than C, and C a better winner than A. And this makes no sense.
You can also end up with winners hardly anyone wants. If there are two polarising candidates each with strong support and a complete unknown, you could have the following ballots:
49 voters: A>C>B49 voters: B>C>A2 voters: C>A>B
It could be that the score ballots (out of 10) would be:
49: A=10, C=1, B=049: B=10, C=1, A=02: C=2, A=1, B=0
C is the Condorcet winner.
There's no way I'd accept that a C victory is the best result because of blind adherence to some sort of majority principle under all circumstances. This is not to say that Condorcet methods are necessarily bad, but just that there are elections when they would produce what I would consider to be the wrong result. And in this situation, very wrong.
Toby

From: robert bristow-johnson <***@audioimagination.com>
To: election-***@electorama.com
Sent: Saturday, 24 June 2017, 3:52
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.


no.  the goal of a voting system in a democracy is to determine, reflect, and implement the will of the majority of citizens, all with equal franchise.  letting a minority rule sets up all sorts of incentive for strategic voting.

[robert bristow-johnson]

---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

From: "Toby Pereira" <***@yahoo.co.uk>

Date: Sat, June 24, 2017 2:10 pm

To: "***@audioimagination.com" <***@audioimagination.com>

"election-***@electorama.com" <election-***@electorama.com>

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Given the possibility of a Condorcet paradox, the will of the majority becomes an incoherent notion. If A is preferred by a majority to B, then in a two-candidate election, then A should win under a majority system. But introduce candidate C, and B could end up winning, even though by

majority logic, A is a better candidate than B.

Obviously you know all about Condorcet paradoxes, but if you think that the majority criterion is some sort of absolute, then you are left with no option but to say that in some elections, A is a better winner than B, B a better winner than C, and C a better winner than A. And this makes no

sense.
of course a cycle is a paradox.  i am also convinced that cycles will be rare.  but they *could* happen on a rare occasion and we need rules set down in advance for how to deal with that contingency.

49 voters: A>C>B
49 voters: B>C>A
2 voters: C>A>B
49: A=10, C=1, B=0
49: B=10, C=1, A=0
2: C=2, A=1, B=0

big unrealistic assumptions made here (more likely the 2 voters on the bottom will jack their C preference up to 10 rather than throw away their vote - this is why i am unpersuaded by simulations or hypotheticals dreamed up like this).  how do voters know how to quantify the degree of their
preference?

C is the Condorcet winner.

as he/she/ should be (ignoring the hypothesized ratings and looking at just the rankings).  it's exaggerated, but this is very similar to the Burlington 2009 election that had a clear Condorcet winner whom was not elected with IRV.  lot's of people,
both Republican on the right and Progressive on the left, felt that the Democrat candidate was an acceptable compromise candidate (and marked their ballots as such) and many (but not enough) Democrats preferred the Democrat candidate over the other two.

There's no way I'd accept that a C victory is the best result because of blind adherence to some sort of majority principle under all circumstances.

why not?  51% think that C is better than B and 51% think that C is better than A.  

it's a close election, but even if it's close, we still award the victory to the candidate most preferred, even if preferred by a small margin.

This is not to say that Condorcet methods are necessarily bad, but just that there are elections when they would produce what I would consider to

be the wrong result.
so will IRV.  so will FPTP.  so do multi-winner elections picking the highest "vote-getters".
i presume that Arrow knew what he was writing about.

And in this situation, very wrong.

nope.



--
r b-j                  ***@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

[Richard Lung]

"i presume that Arrow knew what he was writing about."

At least he recognised the necessity of ranked choices.
Simply from the point of view of scientific measurement, there is no
question that both order (in the vote) and proportion (in the count) are
essential to an accurate electoral system. They are indeed essential in
the arts and sciences and civilised society in general. (Of which
politics is but dubiously a part.)


Richard Lung.

Post by robert bristow-johnson
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
Date: Sat, June 24, 2017 2:10 pm
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post by Toby Pereira
Given the possibility of a Condorcet paradox, the will of the

majority becomes an incoherent notion. If A is preferred by a majority
to B, then in a two-candidate election, then A should win under
a majority system. But introduce candidate C, and B could end up
winning, even though by majority logic, A is a better candidate than B.

Post by Toby Pereira
Obviously you know all about Condorcet paradoxes, but if you think

that the majority criterion is some sort of absolute, then you are
left with no option but to say that in some elections, A is a better
winner than B, B a better winner than C, and C a better winner than A.
And this makes no sense.
of course a cycle is a paradox. i am also convinced that cycles will
be rare. but they *could* happen on a rare occasion and we need rules
set down in advance for how to deal with that contingency.

Post by Toby Pereira
You can also end up with winners hardly anyone wants. If there are

two polarising candidates each with strong support and a complete

Post by Toby Pereira
49 voters: A>C>B
49 voters: B>C>A
2 voters: C>A>B
49: A=10, C=1, B=0
49: B=10, C=1, A=0
2: C=2, A=1, B=0

big unrealistic assumptions made here (more likely the 2 voters on the
bottom will jack their C preference up to 10 rather than throw away
their vote - this is why i am unpersuaded by simulations or
hypotheticals dreamed up like this). how do voters know how to
quantify the degree of their preference?

Post by Toby Pereira
C is the Condorcet winner.

as he/she/ should be (ignoring the hypothesized ratings and looking at
just the rankings). it's exaggerated, but this is very similar to the
Burlington 2009 election that had a clear Condorcet winner whom was
not elected with IRV. lot's of people, both Republican on the right
and Progressive on the left, felt that the Democrat candidate was an
acceptable compromise candidate (and marked their ballots as such) and
many (but not enough) Democrats preferred the Democrat candidate over
the other two.

Post by Toby Pereira
There's no way I'd accept that a C victory is the best result

because of blind adherence to some sort of majority principle under
all circumstances.
why not? 51% think that C is better than B and 51% think that C is
better than A.
it's a close election, but even if it's close, we still award the
victory to the candidate most preferred, even if preferred by a small
margin.

Post by Toby Pereira
This is not to say that Condorcet methods are necessarily bad, but

just that there are elections when they would produce what I would
consider to be the wrong result.
so will IRV. so will FPTP. so do multi-winner elections picking the
highest "vote-getters".
i presume that Arrow knew what he was writing about.

Post by Toby Pereira
And in this situation, very wrong.

nope.
--
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
----
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttp://electorama.com/em for list info

[Toby Pereira]

The score ballots I gave were what the voters see as their honest ballots, not necessarily what they'd actually give. Sorry if that wasn't clear. So with that in mind, you can see that the Condorcet winner (C) is a complete nobody. It could be that most voters have very little idea who C is, but just put them ahead of their less preferred of the two main candidates because they have an "anyone but" mentality about them. So yes, electing C would be bad in this case.
I'm also aware that there are situations where other election methods give poor results. This wasn't an attack on Condorcet methods or a case for any particular method over any other. It was an attack on the view that the majority principle should be viewed as some sort of absolute that follows directly from "one person one vote".
Toby

From: robert bristow-johnson <***@audioimagination.com>
To: "election-***@electorama.com" <election-***@electorama.com>
Sent: Sunday, 25 June 2017, 0:12
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.



---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
From: "Toby Pereira" <***@yahoo.co.uk>
Date: Sat, June 24, 2017 2:10 pm
To: "***@audioimagination.com" <***@audioimagination.com>
"election-***@electorama.com" <election-***@electorama.com>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Given the possibility of a Condorcet paradox, the will of the majority becomes an incoherent notion. If A is preferred by a majority to B, then in a two-candidate election, then A should win under a majority system. But introduce candidate C, and B could end up winning, even though bymajority logic, A is a better candidate than B.
Obviously you know all about Condorcet paradoxes, but if you think that the majority criterion is some sort of absolute, then you are left with no option but to say that in some elections, A is a better winner than B, B a better winner than C, and C a better winner than A. And this makes nosense.of course a cycle is a paradox.  i am also convinced that cycles will be rare.  but they *could* happen on a rare occasion and we need rules set down in advance for how to deal with that contingency.
49 voters: A>C>B
49 voters: B>C>A
2 voters: C>A>B
49: A=10, C=1, B=0
49: B=10, C=1, A=0
2: C=2, A=1, B=0

big unrealistic assumptions made here (more likely the 2 voters on the bottom will jack their C preference up to 10 rather than throw away their vote - this is why i am unpersuaded by simulations or hypotheticals dreamed up like this).  how do voters know how to quantify the degree of theirpreference?

C is the Condorcet winner.as he/she/ should be (ignoring the hypothesized ratings and looking at just the rankings).  it's exaggerated, but this is very similar to the Burlington 2009 election that had a clear Condorcet winner whom was not elected with IRV.  lot's of people,both Republican on the right and Progressive on the left, felt that the Democrat candidate was an acceptable compromise candidate (and marked their ballots as such) and many (but not enough) Democrats preferred the Democrat candidate over the other two.
There's no way I'd accept that a C victory is the best result because of blind adherence to some sort of majority principle under all circumstances.why not?  51% think that C is better than B and 51% think that C is better than A.  

it's a close election, but even if it's close, we still award the victory to the candidate most preferred, even if preferred by a small margin.>This is not to say that Condorcet methods are necessarily bad, but just that there are elections when they would produce what I would consider tobe the wrong result.so will IRV.  so will FPTP.  so do multi-winner elections picking the highest "vote-getters".i presume that Arrow knew what he was writing about.

And in this situation, very wrong.nope.

--r b-j                  ***@audioimagination.com"Imagination is more important than knowledge."----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[f***@snkmail.com]

Post by Brian Olson

Post by f***@snkmail.com
...and even when *everyone* votes tactically, rated systems still
outperform ranked systems.

i don't believe it. and simulations will not persuade me.

Well, what would it take to persuade you, then? I linked to studies of
real people, too.

that is a fundamental value statement
Sure

Post by Brian Olson
that stands in opposition of the core democratic value that every person's
vote should count equally.
known as "One-person-one-vote".

No, your "one vote" is your ballot of information about how you feel about
the candidates, and it has just as much weight as everyone else's.

People use the same argument to campaign against ranked-choice systems, you
know.

http://www.lifezette.com/polizette/one-man-one-vote-under-assault-in-maine/

Post by Brian Olson
and voter 2 will start to resent being vulnerable and honest about things
and will learn to be more polemic about things in the future.

Voter 2 will be happy with the results of the election, since they only
sorta liked B over A a little, anyway.

Post by Brian Olson
that's the problem with elections gone bad (like Burlington Vermont's IRV
of 2009), when voters realize they've been punished for how they voted,
there is voter regret and cynicism and people are literally encouraged to
be more polarized.

Yes, and utilitarian voting systems reduce polarization by choosing
moderate candidates that have high approval ratings across the entire
electorate.

Majoritarian systems choose polarizing candidates who have the support of a
majority, even if the minority hates them.

no. the goal of a voting system in a democracy is to determine, reflect,

Post by Brian Olson
and implement the will of the majority of citizens, all with equal
franchise. letting a minority rule sets up all sorts of incentive for
strategic voting.

Of course we should not let minorities rule over majorities, but we should
not let majorities rule over minorities, either. Majoritarianism is a form
of tyranny, "might makes right". Single-winner elections should choose the
candidate who is the best representative of *everyone*, not just a stronger
faction.

consider a two-candidate election. it's just between A and B.

Post by Brian Olson
i don't think you'll get any mileage for the idea that B should be elected
when more voters prefer A.

If the electorate would be happier with B winning, then B should be the
winner, even if a greater number of voters prefer A. The preferences are
unequal in strength; arbitrarily assigning equal weight to them is invalid.

"Suppose you and a pair of friends are looking to order a pizza. You, and

Post by Brian Olson
one friend, really like mushrooms, and prefer them over all other vegetable
options, but you both also really, really like pepperoni. Your other friend
also really likes mushrooms, and prefers them over all other options, but
they're also vegetarian. What one topping should you get?
Clearly the answer is mushrooms, and there is no group of friends worth
calling themselves such who would conclude otherwise. It's so obvious that
it hardly seems worth calling attention to. So why is it, that if we put
this decision up to a vote, do so many election methods, which are
otherwise seen as perfectly reasonable methods, fail? Plurality, top-two
runoffs, instant runoff voting, all variations of Condorcet's method, even
Bucklin voting; all of them, incorrectly, choose pepperoni."

https://leastevil.blogspot.com/2012/03/tyranny-of-majority-weak-preferences.html

We need to stop thinking in terms of "who gets to push around whom", and
start thinking in terms of "what's the best choice for everyone".

Post by Brian Olson
Sure, simulations aren't real humans. Opinions stuck in opposition,
someone ought to do a proper psychology experiment. Devise a methodology,
do a test, get people to {rank, rate} {5,10, 20} things in a subject they
{know well, know poorly} and figure out the quality of information gotten
out of people, and ask them how they felt about how much work they had to
do to put into this.

Well, psychologists do experiments on human opinion regularly. When they
use a ranked-choice system, they call it an "ipsative" measure. When a
score-based system (the Likert scale), they call it a "normative" measure.
It's understood that rankings cannot meaningfully be compared between
individuals; only ratings can.


"In summary, one may state that scores originally obtained as ipsative
measures may legitimately be employed only for purposes of intraindividual
comparisons. Normative measures may be employed for either interindividual
or intraindividual comparisons."
http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1971-01501-001

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Likert_scale


I also linked to some studies earlier, showing improved predictive validity
of ratings over rankings. Ranked-choice ballots tend to be biased by the
order in which the choices are presented, demonstrating that not all of the
forced rankings are meaningful.

"Early Krosnick research ("Maximizing Questionnaire Quality", 1999) saw
ranking questions as having greater predictive validity, but a number of
studies since, include his own later research, show rating questions as
having greater validity (Krosnick, Thomas, and Shaeffer, 2003; Maio, Roese,
Seligman, Katz, 1996)."
http://blog.verint.com/ranking-questions-vs-rating-questions

Post by Brian Olson
i presume that Arrow knew what he was writing about.

Well, after mathematically proving that all ranked-choice voting systems
are flawed, Arrow became a fan of score voting, and evaluating voting
systems by their actual outcomes. :)

*CES: Do you have any particular preferences or ideas as far as how voting

Post by Brian Olson
methods should be evaluated in the future? Or, do you think there are
certain things we should look at in trying to figure out what voting
methods we should push?*
Dr. Arrow: Well, I’m a little inclined to think that score systems where
you categorize in maybe three or four classes probably (in spite of what I
said about manipulation) is probably the best. And that is to look at the
outcomes and see if everybody says, “well, that seems intuitively a
reasonable outcome given the inputs.” And some of these studies have been
made. In France, [Michel] Balinski has done some studies of this kind which
seem to give some support to these scoring methods.

https://electology.org/podcasts/2012-10-06_kenneth_arrow

[robert bristow-johnson]

---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

From: ***@snkmail.com

Date: Fri, June 30, 2017 10:21 pm

To: election-***@electorama.com

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post by f***@snkmail.com

Post by robert bristow-johnson

Post by f***@snkmail.com

if i really, really, really like Candidate A over Candidate B and you only>>>> sorta like B over A by just a little bit, it should not matter to what
disparate degree we like our candidates.

Yes, it absolutely should.

 

Post by f***@snkmail.com

Post by robert bristow-johnson
that is a fundamental value statement
that stands in opposition of the core democratic value that every person's
vote should count equally.
known as "One-person-one-vote".

No, your "one vote" is your ballot of information about how you feel about
the candidates, and it has just as much weight as everyone else's.

not when the voter finds out that expressing their "true feelings" about the candidates reduces that voter's effectiveness to elect the candidate he/she prefers.

Post by f***@snkmail.com
People use the same argument to campaign against ranked-choice systems, you
know.
http://www.lifezette.com/polizette/one-man-one-vote-under-assault-in-maine/

people can use all sorts of arguments.  doesn't say that the arguments are valid.
 

Post by f***@snkmail.com

Post by robert bristow-johnson
and voter 2 will start to resent being vulnerable and honest about things
and will learn to be more polemic about things in the future.

Voter 2 will be happy with the results of the election, since they only
sorta liked B over A a little, anyway.

no, Voter 2 will find out that they didn't get the candidate they preferred **solely** because the other voter was more polarized and got their preference solely because of that polarization.
you are giving Voter 2 a reason (and a burden) for
them to vote tactically to prevent their franchise from being diluted.  Voter 2 (and all of the other voters) will have to think long and hard how highly they want to rate Candidate A (their second choice).

Post by f***@snkmail.com

Post by robert bristow-johnson
that's the problem with elections gone bad (like Burlington Vermont's IRV
of 2009), when voters realize they've been punished for how they voted,
there is voter regret and cynicism and people are literally encouraged to
be more polarized.

Yes, and utilitarian voting systems reduce polarization by choosing
moderate candidates that have high approval ratings across the entire
electorate.
Majoritarian systems choose polarizing candidates who have the support of a
majority, even if the minority hates them.

Post by robert bristow-johnson
no. the goal of a voting system in a democracy is to determine, reflect,
and implement the will of the majority of citizens, all with equal
franchise. letting a minority rule sets up all sorts of incentive for
strategic voting.

Of course we should not let minorities rule over majorities, but we should
not let majorities rule over minorities, either.

 
there is a difference between "rule" and "rights".  in a democracy, we **do** let majorities rule, but limit that rule with a well-established foundation of rights for **everyone** including the minority.



but it's **solely** the majority that gets to decide who is elected to office.

Post by f***@snkmail.com
Majoritarianism is a form of tyranny, "might makes right".

no, tyranny and "might makes right" equates *power* with "right".  but the issue is "who rules"?  tyranny does not equate "majority" with "who rules".
 but democracies do.
 

Post by f***@snkmail.com
Single-winner elections should choose the
candidate who is the best representative of *everyone*, not just a stronger
faction.

the name we normally use for that "stronger faction" is the majority of the electorate.

Post by f***@snkmail.com

Post by robert bristow-johnson
consider a two-candidate election. it's just between A and B.
i don't think you'll get any mileage for the idea that B should be elected
when more voters prefer A.

If the electorate would be happier with B winning, then B should be the
winner, even if a greater number of voters prefer A.

this is the most silly, self-contradicting statement you've made so far.
in a two-candidate race, if more voters prefer A to B, then candidate B should not be elected.

Post by f***@snkmail.com
The preferences are unequal in

strength;
and that means the marked ballots were unequal in strength.  no one wants the strength of their vote diluted.  everyone wants as much franchise as any other.

Post by f***@snkmail.com
arbitrarily assigning equal weight to them is invalid.

it is not arbitrary to assign every voters'
vote equal strength.  it's a very old principle of equality of franchise.
 

Post by f***@snkmail.com

Post by robert bristow-johnson
"Suppose you and a pair of friends are looking to order a pizza. You, and
one friend, really like mushrooms, and prefer them over all other vegetable
options, but you both also really, really like pepperoni. Your other friend
also really likes mushrooms, and prefers them over all other options, but
they're also vegetarian. What one topping should you get?

it's not a governmental election.  in life people negotiate and make compromises and self-sacrifice (for the common good) all the time.  but in a democracy, we are all given equal
 
what's gonna
happen with score-voting in governmental elections where the stakes are high is that the polemic supporters and activists will know to max out the effectiveness of their vote (for their candidate) by maxing out their score for their candidate.  the chumps that are told "oh, you can mark
your preferences to whatever degree your heart desires" will find out that they are chumps and that their voice was diluted for marking their ballots sincerely.  they will not repeat that mistake in the following elections.  when everyone (or nearly everyone) bullet rates their
favorite with a "10" and the scores are added, the result is the same as Plurality but scaled up by 10.
the voter is in the polls to represent their *own* political interests.  not someone else's political interests.  Score voting and Approval voting are fundamentally
flawed (for contentious high-stakes governmental elections) because these systems present to the voter an immediate problem for them to decide how they will score (or how they will approve) their second choice and possibly their third choice.  but ranked ballots don't have that
problem.
 

--
r b-j                  ***@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Post by f***@snkmail.com
Of course we should not let minorities rule over majorities, but we
should not let majorities rule over minorities, either. Majoritarianism
is a form of tyranny, "might makes right". Single-winner elections
should choose the candidate who is the best representative of
*everyone*, not just a stronger faction.

Has that actually happened? I often see Range advocates say that
following the rule of majority leads to a tyranny of the majority, but
I've not often seen that happen in reality.

For that matter, were tyranny of the majority true, democracy itself
should degenerate into a system where the 51% plunders the 49%, but that
rarely happens either. So something must be going on to keep the
worst-case analysis from coming to fruition.

There have, of course, been times where a larger group has oppressed a
smaller one, as I imagine RangeVoting's "kill the jews" example is
supposed to bring to mind. But in both Nazi Germany and racist states in
the US, it's not too much of a stretch to imagine that the people doing
the oppressing would feel righteous enough about it to vote Approval-style.

Post by f***@snkmail.com
Well, psychologists do experiments on human opinion regularly. When
they use a ranked-choice system, they call it an "ipsative" measure.
When a score-based system (the Likert scale), they call it a "normative"
measure. It's understood that rankings cannot meaningfully be compared
between individuals; only ratings can.
"In summary, one may state that scores originally obtained as ipsative
measures may legitimately be employed only for purposes of
intraindividual comparisons. Normative measures may be employed for
either interindividual or intraindividual comparisons."
http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1971-01501-001
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Likert_scale

But note also, from the same Wikipedia page:

"Whether individual Likert items can be considered as interval-level
data, or whether they should be treated as ordered-categorical data is
the subject of considerable disagreement in the literature,[10][11] with
strong convictions on what are the most applicable methods. This
disagreement can be traced back, in many respects, to the extent to
which Likert items are interpreted as being ordinal data."

That is to say, it's not clear whether the Likert scale is a Range scale
or an MJ scale.

Post by f***@snkmail.com
Well, after mathematically proving that all ranked-choice voting systems
are flawed, Arrow became a fan of score voting, and evaluating voting
systems by their actual outcomes. :)
*CES: Do you have any particular preferences or ideas as far as how
voting methods should be evaluated in the future? Or, do you think
there are certain things we should look at in trying to figure out
what voting methods we should push?*
Dr. Arrow: Well, I’m a little inclined to think that score systems
where you categorize in maybe three or four classes probably (in
spite of what I said about manipulation) is probably the best. And
that is to look at the outcomes and see if everybody says, “well,
that seems intuitively a reasonable outcome given the inputs.” And
some of these studies have been made. In France, [Michel] Balinski
has done some studies of this kind which seem to give some support
to these scoring methods.
https://electology.org/podcasts/2012-10-06_kenneth_arrow

The method Balinski was experimenting with was MJ, not Range, and "three
or four classes" sounds more like MJ than Range. Unlike Range, MJ passes
Majority. So it's not evident that this statement supports not letting
the majority rule.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[Brian Olson]

​> ​i don't believe it. and simulations will not persuade me.

Sure, simulations aren't real humans. Opinions stuck in opposition, someone
ought to do a proper psychology experiment. Devise a methodology, do a
test, get people to {rank, rate} {5,10, 20} things in a subject they {know
well, know poorly} and figure out the quality of information gotten out of
people, and ask them how they felt about how much work they had to do to
put into this.

If people can rate 5 things they barely know about well enough, great.
Maybe people can tolerate *rating* 20 things for topics they know well, but
for more vague subjects *ranking* 10 things or more is easier on their
minds.

That's just my guess of about how it might go.
Then maybe the question would be how do we think actual elections will go?
Single seat elections will usually have 2-5 candidates? (but some rare
times 20+ ?)
Multi seat elections will have 5-20 candidates or more?

[Richard Lung]

I do agree that quantitative counts are better than qualitative counts
of "greater than". How much quantitative measurement extracted from the
voting data (rather than imposed on it) is a simple way to assess a
voting method's efficiency. Sooner or later, tho, the method has to
resort to less precisely based decisions of greater or lesser. This, by
the way, proves or shows that election results are generally
probabilistic rather than deterministic, and therefore cannot be
decisively judged by deductive standards of electoral efficiency (like
social choice theory).
My own election method (Binomial Transferable Vote) does not resort to
elimination of candidates during the count, to avoid a more or less
arbitrary plurality count (greater than) decision.
Richard Lung.

Post by Brian Olson
I was speaking only of ballots, and and in the abstract that
/some/ election algorithm could take that information and make a good
outcome of it.
I don't favor raw Score summation. It's strategy prone. For choices
where my honest vote might be [1.0, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0.0] I should
probably vote strategically [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0].
And if you don't like that and the varying vote power depending on how
you vote: I have a system for you!
"Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings" (IRNR)
Each ballot is normalized so that all ballots have the same magnitude.
The modified ballots are summed, and the choice with the lowest
sumarry rating is disqualified. Each ballot is then normalized again
as if the disqualified choice was not there, redistributing the vote
across the choices in proportion to the original ballot. The new
modified ballots are summed and the process is repeated until there
are two choices remaining and one choice wins over the other.
I think this works better with an honest ballot in the case where you
like some choice more than another 'just a little bit' or by whatever
margin.
/Brian
On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 1:02 AM, robert bristow-johnson
so many discussions here are more arcane than i can grok. but i
can grok most of this.
---------------------------- Original Message
----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off
paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 4:31 pm
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post by Brian Olson
Compared to a rankings ballot, a ratings ballot contains more

information

Post by Brian Olson
about a voter's preference or utility for the available choices.
I can say
A > B > C > D
or I can say with more detail
A = 1.0; B = 0.9; C = 0.1; D = 0.0
If there is more information available, it is possible for an

election

Post by Brian Olson
algorithm to use that information and more accurately represent

the voters

Post by Brian Olson
and find the greater global utility winner.

but voters can skew that information quantitatively and, if they
want to be tactical, insincerely.
how does the voter know that by rating Candidate B with 0.9 and
not lower, that he is not helping this candidate beat his
favorite, Candidate A? maybe it should be 0.8. or 0.5.
while Score voting requires too much information from the voters
(making them act as a trained expert and consider quantitatively
how candidates should be rated as if they are an Olympic ice
skating judge) and while Approval doesn't get enough information
from voters (does not differentiate preference between two
"approved" candidates), there has always been the problem of
either Score voting or Approval voting facing the voter about what
to do with their second choice (Candidate B). how much juice
should the voter give to Candidate B if they want B to beat C but
do not want B to beat A? (and for Approval, the question is,
having the same concern, shall the voter "approve" B or not?)
Score and Approval cannot answer that question in any simple
manner. but with Ranked-Choice the answer is clear.
and the other problem with Score is the "One-Person-One-Vote"
standard. if i really, really, really like Candidate A over
Candidate B and you only sorta like B over A by just a little bit,
it should not matter to what disparate degree we like our
candidates. your vote for B should weigh just as much as my vote
for A, even if my excitement for A exceeds your excitement for B.
that's what "one-person-one-vote" means.
i still just do not get why Score and Approval (in application to
governmental elections) have the following they do have.
bestest,
r b-j

Post by Brian Olson
If we had a specially insightful rational bayesian voting

populace we might

Post by Brian Olson
ask them for their confidence interval of how sure they are are

about each

Post by Brian Olson
choice and get more information still.
A = 1.0 (e=.3); B = 0.9 (e=.1), C = 0.1 (e=0.5), D = 0.0 (e=0.1)
And then we'd work out an election algorithm to maximize the

expected value

Post by Brian Olson
of the global utility over the known voter utility distributions.

and, except for making examples to show how a system breaks (like
a Proof by Contradiction in mathematics), i just cannot see how
judging the comparative value of systems with simulated
assumptions is helpful. there are not enough simulated cases to
be able to consider how any system will work under all conditions.

Post by Brian Olson
On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:47 PM, Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
Brian Olson,
Where we differ is that I do not see ranked choice as a

constraint. Single

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
order choice, the x-vote is the constraint on ranked voting as a
multiple-order choice.
The problem with election methods, practical and theoretical is

that they

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
impose constraints on the voters freedom of choice, in one way

or another,

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
and so are that much less true election methods.
(A minor example, the classic objections to cumulative voting

seem to

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
apply to some apprently modern versions or variations.)
When Condorcet and Borda, disagreed on the best way to conduct

a count of

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
preference voting, Laplace decided in favor of Borda. (I grant

you that

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
Condorcet has information value, when weighted. But I am not

well informed

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
on this approach and know of no convincing reason why it should

be adopted

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
or how you would persuade the public of that.) JFS Ross

explained that

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
Laplace favored Method Borda because higher preferences were

more important

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
and should count more. The Gregory method removes the objection

to Borda of

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
"later harm." This is the direction I have followed (weighted

count of

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
ranked choice), following on from where Meek method STV leaves off.
Richard Lung
I kinda don't accept this paradox. Just to compare the form of

a election

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
method paradox statement: Arrow's theorem was that given a set

of desired

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
properties and the constraint of rankings ballots, those set of

desirable

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
properties could not all be simultaneously fulfilled. One can

almost

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
trivially step outside of that paradox by eliminating the

constraint of the

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
rankings ballot.
My model of understanding people and elections is a utilitarian

one. A

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
person derives some amount of utility from the outcome of an

election and

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
everyone is apportioned the same share of utility which we

might count as

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
0..1 or -1..1 . These model persons can be summed up and and a

global

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
social utility calculated. The ideal election method perfectly

knows every

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
person and elects the true global social utility maximizing

candidate. This

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
sounds an awful lot like score voting. But then we have to start to
complicate the model with imperfect knowledge of a voter's

utility, the

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
imperfect expression of that on a ballot, strategic ballot

casting rather

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
than honest, messy computation and practical administration

issues of

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
running an election in the real world, and so on. So we might

wind up with

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
a best practical method that isn't just simple score voting.
But I still believe there is a pragmatic 'best' method, we have

techniques

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
for evaluating that, and we should do this and put something up

in the real

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
world. Personally I'll take a rankings ballot that's Condorcet

counted with

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
any cycle resolution method as 'good enough' and practically

applicable;

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
and tinkering around the edges for a slightly better method is fun
mathematical curiosity but I'd also like to get some laws passed.
What do you think of my model statement?
Is there a more formal statement of limitations you were

heading towards?

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:30 AM, Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems

paradox.

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of

elections that

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
there is no consistently democratic electoral system: the

impossibility

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
supposition.
That supposition implies some conception (albeit non-existent)

of a

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
consistently derived right election result.
If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even to

judge that

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
there is a trade-off between electoral systems.
Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a

standard by

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
which electoral systems can be judged for their democratic

consistency.

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
It follows that the election result will only be as consistent

as the

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
electoral system, and there is no pre-conceivably right

election result,

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
because that presupposes a perfection not given to science as

a progressive

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
pursuit.
--
Richard Lung.http://www.voting.ukscientists.com

<http://www.voting.ukscientists.com>

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in

pdf:https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
<https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085>

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung

Post by Richard Lung
E-books <https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085E-books

<https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085E-books>> in epub
format:https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience
<https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience>

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
--
Richard Lung.http://www.voting.ukscientists.com

<http://www.voting.ukscientists.com>

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in

pdf:https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
<https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085>

Post by Brian Olson

Post by Richard Lung
E-books in epub

format:https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience
<https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience>
--
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[Richard Lung]

Ah yes, the old criticism against cumulative voting (made for instance
by Enid Lakeman) is relevant here. Cumulative votes count against each
other.
I suppose the basic objection is that voters cannot be also their own
counters, because that is a function of peoples combined votes, not of
individual voters.

BTW I didn't answer your previous question about a formal basis for my
election method. It is based on work by SS Stevens on the scales of
measurement, published in "Science" in the 1940s. Long ago, when I was
a young man, Unesco gave me a copyright for this.
Richard Lung.

Post by Brian Olson
Compared to a rankings ballot, a ratings ballot contains more
information about a voter's preference or utility for the available
choices.
I can say
A > B > C > D
or I can say with more detail
A = 1.0; B = 0.9; C = 0.1; D = 0.0
If there is more information available, it is possible for an election
algorithm to use that information and more accurately represent the
voters and find the greater global utility winner.
If we had a specially insightful rational bayesian voting populace we
might ask them for their confidence interval of how sure they are are
about each choice and get more information still.
A = 1.0 (e=.3); B = 0.9 (e=.1), C = 0.1 (e=0.5), D = 0.0 (e=0.1)
And then we'd work out an election algorithm to maximize the expected
value of the global utility over the known voter utility distributions.
Brian Olson,
Where we differ is that I do not see ranked choice as a
constraint. Single order choice, the x-vote is the constraint on
ranked voting as a multiple-order choice.
The problem with election methods, practical and theoretical is
that they impose constraints on the voters freedom of choice, in
one way or another, and so are that much less true election methods.
(A minor example, the classic objections to cumulative voting seem
to apply to some apprently modern versions or variations.)
When Condorcet and Borda, disagreed on the best way to conduct a
count of preference voting, Laplace decided in favor of Borda. (I
grant you that Condorcet has information value, when weighted. But
I am not well informed on this approach and know of no convincing
reason why it should be adopted or how you would persuade the
public of that.) JFS Ross explained that Laplace favored Method
Borda because higher preferences were more important and should
count more. The Gregory method removes the objection to Borda of
"later harm." This is the direction I have followed (weighted
count of ranked choice), following on from where Meek method STV
leaves off.
Richard Lung

Post by Brian Olson
I kinda don't accept this paradox. Just to compare the form of a
election method paradox statement: Arrow's theorem was that given
a set of desired properties and the constraint of rankings
ballots, those set of desirable properties could not all be
simultaneously fulfilled. One can almost trivially step outside
of that paradox by eliminating the constraint of the rankings ballot.
My model of understanding people and elections is a utilitarian
one. A person derives some amount of utility from the outcome of
an election and everyone is apportioned the same share of utility
which we might count as 0..1 or -1..1 . These model persons can
be summed up and and a global social utility calculated. The
ideal election method perfectly knows every person and elects the
true global social utility maximizing candidate. This sounds an
awful lot like score voting. But then we have to start to
complicate the model with imperfect knowledge of a voter's
utility, the imperfect expression of that on a ballot, strategic
ballot casting rather than honest, messy computation and
practical administration issues of running an election in the
real world, and so on. So we might wind up with a best practical
method that isn't just simple score voting.
But I still believe there is a pragmatic 'best' method, we have
techniques for evaluating that, and we should do this and put
something up in the real world. Personally I'll take a rankings
ballot that's Condorcet counted with any cycle resolution method
as 'good enough' and practically applicable; and tinkering around
the edges for a slightly better method is fun mathematical
curiosity but I'd also like to get some laws passed.
What do you think of my model statement?
Is there a more formal statement of limitations you were heading towards?
On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:30 AM, Richard Lung
The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of
elections that there is no consistently democratic electoral
system: the impossibility supposition.
That supposition implies some conception (albeit
non-existent) of a consistently derived right election result.
If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even
to judge that there is a trade-off between electoral systems.
Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a
standard by which electoral systems can be judged for their
democratic consistency.
It follows that the election result will only be as
consistent as the electoral system, and there is no
pre-conceivably right election result, because that
presupposes a perfection not given to science as a
progressive pursuit.
--
Richard Lung.
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com <http://www.voting.ukscientists.com>
https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience <https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience>
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
for list info

--
Richard Lung.
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com <http://www.voting.ukscientists.com>
https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085 <https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085>
https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience <https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience>

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Post by Richard Lung
The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of elections that
there is no consistently democratic electoral system: the impossibility
supposition.
That supposition implies some conception (albeit non-existent) of a
consistently derived right election result.
If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even to judge
that there is a trade-off between electoral systems.
Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a standard by
which electoral systems can be judged for their democratic consistency.
It follows that the election result will only be as consistent as the
electoral system, and there is no pre-conceivably right election result,
because that presupposes a perfection not given to science as a
progressive pursuit.

I don't think that's quite right. Impossibility proofs like Arrow's
generally say something along this vein:

- Here are some properties that it seems reasonable that all voting
methods should have (IIA etc for Arrow; strategy resistance and
determinism for Gibbard).

- But as long as the method is of a certain form (ordinal for Arrow,
pretty much every method for Gibbard), it's impossible to have all of these.

- Thus we're in a bind, because we'd like to have all of them.

It is then possible to construct subsets that you can have: e.g.
dictatorship gives you all the properties in Arrow's theorem except for
non-dictatorship; random pair gives you all the properties except
determinism, and so on).

You could measure any given election against the measures, even though
it's impossible to attain all of them. For instance, to measure how
strategy resistant a given method is for a given election, you could
determine how many ways there are for voters in favor of some party X to
alter their votes so that X wins instead of whoever won. The fact that
it's impossible to make a method completely resistant to strategy
doesn't make it impossible to measure how far the system is from
attaining (impossible) perfection.

In a similar vein for something like Bayesian Regret, no method would
have a BR of zero, and so no method can attain perfection. But the
actual BR might still be of interest.

The trick, if there is one, is in that the impossibility proofs don't
specify in detail what a hypothetical perfect method would look like,
only some properties it should reasonably satisfy; and then as long as
it's possible to show that the properties can't all be satisfied, we
know that there can't be a perfect system.

There is one way that "there is no objective trade-off" is correct,
however. Suppose we have two methods:

A is very vulnerable to voter strategy (compromising, burial) but not to
candidate strategy (cloning);
B is the other way around.

Which one is the better method? If we can't have both, then that depends
on the situation. There's a boundary beyond which you can't improve some
quality without giving up some other quality, but which point to pick
along that boundary depends on the context, or what the use the method
is being put to.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[Richard Lung]

No doubt you are safe in not thinking that is quite right.
An electoral system that does not get beyond majority counting, even if
it employs ranked choice, (as characterised of Arrow theorem in
Democracy and New Technology, by Iain McClean) is never going to achieve
anything like satisfactory representation. It is a hang-over of
monarchism, the notion that democracy is about winners and losers.
Democracy and science are about consensus.

Richard Lung.

Post by Kristofer Munsterhjelm

Post by Richard Lung
The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of elections that
there is no consistently democratic electoral system: the impossibility
supposition.
That supposition implies some conception (albeit non-existent) of a
consistently derived right election result.
If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even to judge
that there is a trade-off between electoral systems.
Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a standard by
which electoral systems can be judged for their democratic consistency.
It follows that the election result will only be as consistent as the
electoral system, and there is no pre-conceivably right election result,
because that presupposes a perfection not given to science as a
progressive pursuit.

I don't think that's quite right. Impossibility proofs like Arrow's
- Here are some properties that it seems reasonable that all voting
methods should have (IIA etc for Arrow; strategy resistance and
determinism for Gibbard).
- But as long as the method is of a certain form (ordinal for Arrow,
pretty much every method for Gibbard), it's impossible to have all of these.
- Thus we're in a bind, because we'd like to have all of them.
It is then possible to construct subsets that you can have: e.g.
dictatorship gives you all the properties in Arrow's theorem except
for non-dictatorship; random pair gives you all the properties except
determinism, and so on).
You could measure any given election against the measures, even though
it's impossible to attain all of them. For instance, to measure how
strategy resistant a given method is for a given election, you could
determine how many ways there are for voters in favor of some party X
to alter their votes so that X wins instead of whoever won. The fact
that it's impossible to make a method completely resistant to strategy
doesn't make it impossible to measure how far the system is from
attaining (impossible) perfection.
In a similar vein for something like Bayesian Regret, no method would
have a BR of zero, and so no method can attain perfection. But the
actual BR might still be of interest.
The trick, if there is one, is in that the impossibility proofs don't
specify in detail what a hypothetical perfect method would look like,
only some properties it should reasonably satisfy; and then as long as
it's possible to show that the properties can't all be satisfied, we
know that there can't be a perfect system.
There is one way that "there is no objective trade-off" is correct,
A is very vulnerable to voter strategy (compromising, burial) but not
to candidate strategy (cloning);
B is the other way around.
Which one is the better method? If we can't have both, then that
depends on the situation. There's a boundary beyond which you can't
improve some quality without giving up some other quality, but which
point to pick along that boundary depends on the context, or what the
use the method is being put to.

--
Richard Lung.
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
E-books in epub format:
https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience

----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[robert bristow-johnson]

---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

From: "Richard Lung" <***@ukscientists.com>

Date: Wed, July 5, 2017 3:46 am

To: "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" <***@t-online.de>

Cc: "EM" <election-***@lists.electorama.com>

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post by Richard Lung
No doubt you are safe in not thinking that is quite right.
An electoral system that does not get beyond majority counting, even if
it employs ranked choice, (as characterised of Arrow theorem in
Democracy and New Technology, by Iain McClean) is never going to achieve
anything like satisfactory representation. It is a hang-over of
monarchism, the notion that democracy is about winners and losers.
Democracy and science are about consensus.

democracy is about social choices somehow made or shared with the people who are enfranchised stakeholders (like citizens or eligible permanent residents).  so somehow we get all 120 million Americans in some virtual room and decide, with
some algorithm that is a function of each voter's choice, a winner is chosen in such a way that best expresses the will of these voters.
 
Richard, we know you are a cheerleader for IRV and that's fine.  Have you heard about jurisdictions that adopted IRV, used it, and later
repealed IRV?




--
r b-j                  ***@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

[Richard Lung]

Some little misunderstanding here. I have never, in over 40 years
supported IRV, much less cheered for it, as could even be grasped from
the message you quote. And so have never taken any particular interest
in its adoption or discarding. Ranked choice or preference voting is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for a scientific and democratic
election system.

Richard |Lung.

Post by robert bristow-johnson
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
Date: Wed, July 5, 2017 3:46 am
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post by Richard Lung
No doubt you are safe in not thinking that is quite right.
An electoral system that does not get beyond majority counting, even if
it employs ranked choice, (as characterised of Arrow theorem in
Democracy and New Technology, by Iain McClean) is never going to achieve
anything like satisfactory representation. It is a hang-over of
monarchism, the notion that democracy is about winners and losers.
Democracy and science are about consensus.

democracy is about social choices somehow made or shared with the
people who are enfranchised stakeholders (like citizens or eligible
permanent residents). so somehow we get all 120 million Americans in
some virtual room and decide, with some algorithm that is a function
of each voter's choice, a winner is chosen in such a way that best
expresses the will of these voters.
Richard, we know you are a cheerleader for IRV and that's fine. Have
you heard about jurisdictions that adopted IRV, used it, and later
repealed IRV?
--
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
----
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttp://electorama.com/em for list info

[robert bristow-johnson]

 
my sincere and profuse apologies, Richard.
i read your posts wrong and perhaps conflated someone else's words with yours.
I am sorry, Richard.  i hope my retraction here suffices to correct the record.
bestest regards,
robert




---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

From: "Richard Lung" <***@ukscientists.com>

Date: Wed, July 5, 2017 2:14 pm

To: ***@audioimagination.com

Cc: "EM" <election-***@lists.electorama.com>

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post by Richard Lung
Some little misunderstanding here. I have never, in over 40 years
supported IRV, much less cheered for it, as could even be grasped from
the message you quote. And so have never taken any particular interest
in its adoption or discarding. Ranked choice or preference voting is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for a scientific and democratic
election system.
Richard |Lung.

Post by robert bristow-johnson
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility
theorems paradox.
Date: Wed, July 5, 2017 3:46 am
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post by Richard Lung
No doubt you are safe in not thinking that is quite right.
An electoral system that does not get beyond majority counting, even if
it employs ranked choice, (as characterised of Arrow theorem in
Democracy and New Technology, by Iain McClean) is never going to achieve
anything like satisfactory representation. It is a hang-over of
monarchism, the notion that democracy is about winners and losers.
Democracy and science are about consensus.

democracy is about social choices somehow made or shared with the
people who are enfranchised stakeholders (like citizens or eligible
permanent residents). so somehow we get all 120 million Americans in
some virtual room and decide, with some algorithm that is a function
of each voter's choice, a winner is chosen in such a way that best
expresses the will of these voters.
Richard, we know you are a cheerleader for IRV and that's fine. Have
you heard about jurisdictions that adopted IRV, used it, and later
repealed IRV?
--
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
----
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttp://electorama.com/em for list info

--
Richard Lung.
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience

--
 


r b-j                  ***@audioimagination.com
 


"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

[robert bristow-johnson]

---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

From: "Richard Lung" <***@ukscientists.com>

Date: Wed, July 5, 2017 3:46 am

To: "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" <***@t-online.de>

Cc: "EM" <election-***@lists.electorama.com>

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post by Richard Lung
No doubt you are safe in not thinking that is quite right.
An electoral system that does not get beyond majority counting, even if
it employs ranked choice, (as characterised of Arrow theorem in
Democracy and New Technology, by Iain McClean) is never going to achieve
anything like satisfactory representation. It is a hang-over of
monarchism, the notion that democracy is about winners and losers.
Democracy and science are about consensus.

democracy is about social choices somehow made or shared with the people who are enfranchised stakeholders (like citizens or eligible permanent residents).  so somehow we get all 120 million Americans in some virtual room and decide, with
some algorithm that is a function of each voter's choice, a winner is chosen in such a way that best expresses the will of these voters.
 
Richard, we know you are a cheerleader for IRV and that's fine.  Have you heard about jurisdictions that adopted IRV, used it, and later
repealed IRV?




--
r b-j                  ***@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

[Ken B]

Post by robert bristow-johnson
Have you heard about jurisdictions that adopted IRV, used it, and
later repealed IRV?

= = = = =
[KB] Other than Burlington VT, there were New York City, Ann Arbor MI,
and Hopkins MN, to name three. In all of the latter, the repeal was
political, not based on substance or policy.
- Ken Bearman, Minneapolis MN

----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[robert bristow-johnson]

---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

From: "Ken B" <***@isd.net>

Date: Wed, July 5, 2017 10:56 am

To: election-***@lists.electorama.com

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post by Ken B

Post by robert bristow-johnson
Have you heard about jurisdictions that adopted IRV, used it, and
later repealed IRV?

= = = = =
[KB] Other than Burlington VT, there were New York City, Ann Arbor MI,
and Hopkins MN, to name three. In all of the latter, the repeal was
political, not based on substance or policy.

 
well, it's *always* political if it's about policy.  that's sorta common root word.
again, my point, that FairVote seems to not want to consider, is that every time IRV (*however* it's called, and FairVote's name change does not change the flawed mechanics) fails to elect the
Condorcet winner, there is trouble that reflects poorly on voting system reform *and* ranked-choice voting and *even* *more* *so* with the mislabeling of IRV to RCV.
that's why i am sorta pissed at FV and Rob Richie for advocating a name change for superficial marketing reasons, rather than
advocating fixing the product they are selling for the purpose of voting system reform.
IRV fails and people will blame the ranked ballot.  It will take at least generation (i think at least 20 years and we're only 8 years in) for enough people to forget, for the problems with FPTP to
rear their heads again, and enough new voters will suggest RCV to fix the problems that FPTP demonstrated.  we'll need another election where the minority GOP wins because of a split vote between the two liberal parties   in Vermont, about 32 months ago, we had an election for *Governor*
that had a questionable outcome where it was the GOP that was screwed.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vermont_gubernatorial_election,_2014#Results_5 
but that was still not enough to motivate a call for reform.  i am sorta resigned that FPTP will be with us forever, due partly
to the failure of IRV in 2009.



--
r b-j                  ***@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."