Discussion:
[EM] Quota rule (also new user asking about Wiki situation and such)
J***@sanasepot.fi
2018-04-08 11:33:31 UTC
Permalink
Greetings!
If you want, I can introduce myself and my reasons to be here. But now
to the point.

You surely know the quota rule in PR voting: if a party gets
theoretically 7.362 seats, then it should actually get 7 or 8 seats,
nothing else.

If we stick to this rule, it brings about a binary choice: either lower
or upper value. In the extremely rare case that a party really gets an
integer amount of seats, it of course gets exactly that.

This choice makes lots of things easier. I already introduced one
concept at
https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/2714982/enforcing-quota-in-any-proportional-voting-system-frunction-box#_=_

The idea is roughly that you convert your chosen method (that usually
means a divisor one) into pseudo-Hamilton method. I'm aware that this
retains some of the paradoxes, because it's unavoidable. But at least we
have curbed the quota violations, and in most cases the problems with
Hamilton for free. Meaning that if there were no quota violations in the
pure method in this election, then we have in effect used the pure
method.

---

The second idea is a benchmark for PR voting systems. If you happened to
have some party with the integer amount of seats, then the problem could
be reduced: you take away the party and its seats, and recalculate. I
call this system requota: it takes away the party closest to an integer
and iterates that until all the seats are determined. This is not meant
to be an actual voting method. For example, if there were two parties
close to half a seat, then the bigger of them would get the seat.
Theoretically that makes sense, but fairness demands that either they
are both included or both excluded.

However, the same general idea can be used as a metavoting: choose three
methods, for example Jefferson, Webster and Hamilton. Determine the
seats with all of them. If they all agree on some parties, those party
seats are considered canon and removed from the next round. This is
iterated until either all the seats were removed or all of the rest are
in dispute. In case of dispute, we take the majority choice (two methods
agree).

---

The requota system would need more explaining. Is Electowiki still in
regular use, and do you think I should get an account and add this stuff
there?
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
2018-04-23 08:52:30 UTC
Permalink
Post by J***@sanasepot.fi
Greetings!
If you want, I can introduce myself and my reasons to be here. But now
to the point.
Welcome :-)

As for your suggestions, I'm probably not the right one to ask, because
I prefer population pair monotonicity to quota. The rangevoting.org page
on apportionment methods also suggests that Webster only very rarely
gets quota wrong, so I'd just go with it; I don't think the added
complexity is worth it.
Post by J***@sanasepot.fi
The idea is roughly that you convert your chosen method (that usually
means a divisor one) into pseudo-Hamilton method. I'm aware that this
retains some of the paradoxes, because it's unavoidable. But at least we
have curbed the quota violations, and in most cases the problems with
Hamilton for free. Meaning that if there were no quota violations in the
pure method in this election, then we have in effect used the pure method.
Could you describe the pseudo-Hamilton method in more detail? I don't
quite get how it works.
Post by J***@sanasepot.fi
The requota system would need more explaining. Is Electowiki still in
regular use, and do you think I should get an account and add this stuff
there?
It's been kind of idle lately (just check its latest changes list). But
there's nothing to lose by adding your method to it, so why not?
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
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