[EM] Searching for references

[Stéphane Rouillon]

Hi,

I do not know if Forest Simmons or Rob Lanphier are still active on this list, however it should be the best place to find some help.
I am searching for specific references:
1) a site with 5 single-winner methods that lead to 5 different winners (from a personal website of a university teacher, Syracuse maybe),
anyone knows it?
2) typical references for approval, Concorcet, range and median single-winner methods.
3) typical literature reference for the latest attempts to generalize each of these to multi-winner proportional methods.

Thanks for any hint...
Stéphane Rouillon.

Envoyé de mon iPhone
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[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Post by Stéphane Rouillon
Hi,
I do not know if Forest Simmons or Rob Lanphier are still active on this list, however it should be the best place to find some help.
1) a site with 5 single-winner methods that lead to 5 different winners (from a personal website of a university teacher, Syracuse maybe),

RangeVoting's 6-methods-6-answers page
http://rangevoting.org/PuzzKjqAns2.html references one Joe Malkevitch.
Some more searching leads to
http://www.jdawiseman.com/papers/electsys/conundrum.html and then to
https://www.york.cuny.edu/~malk/tidbits/tidbit-elections.html (note,
unusual notation).

Post by Stéphane Rouillon
2) typical references for approval, Concorcet, range and median single-winner methods.

Here are some, not exhaustive a list:

Median: Majority judgement: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5hhhg1

Approval voting:
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/approval-voting/7CE5DEEE235794B0B12F76ADAE621482

Condorcet: the Schulze method:
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4 or
http://m-schulze.9mail.de/schulze1.pdf

Condorcet: Ranked Pairs (margins), also defines independence from
clones: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00433944

Condorcet: Maximize Affirmed Majorities (Ranked Pairs/wv):
http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~seppley/

Condorcet: Kemeny:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20026529?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

Condorcet: Kemeny is NP-hard:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304397505005785

Condorcet: Strategy resistant Condorcet-IRV hybrids:
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=12954393981869601543

An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes:
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.9.1.3
gives short descriptions of Plurality, SNTV, Approval, top-two runoff,
STV, Coombs, Borda (based on the pairwise matrix), Copeland, a method
called Minimum Violations, Ranked Pairs, Minmax, Kemeny,
Keener/Kendall-Wei (eigenvalue/pagerank), and a method called the Jech
method.

Post by Stéphane Rouillon
3) typical literature reference for the latest attempts to generalize each of these to multi-winner proportional methods.

And some of these:

The Quota Borda system: https://philpapers.org/rec/DUMVP-2

Lots of STV variants, ends by explaining CPO-STV:
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.9.1.27

CPO-STV in greater detail:
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FA%3A1005082925477

Phragmén and Thiele methods (multiwinner approval and a ranked version
used in Sweden): https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.08826

More on Phragmén and Thiele:
https://aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI17/paper/view/14757
Includes references to 1890s papers by the two.

Minimax approval (consensus multiwinner method):
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-007-9165-x or
https://hal.inria.fr/docs/00/11/90/26/PDF/AN6LAMSADE_77-104.pdf

Schulze STV: http://m-schulze.9mail.de/schulze2.pdf see citations for
Schulze's out of journal work at
https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=wGVUJ7sAAAAJ

Schulze's STV-MMP proposal: http://m-schulze.9mail.de/schulze4.pdf (see
above for cites)

I'm not aware of any published papers generalizing MJ/Bucklin to
multiwinner, or any mentioning proportional/reweighted range voting.
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[Stéphane Rouillon]

Thanks a lot for all the pointers...

Envoyé de mon iPhone

Post by Stéphane Rouillon
Hi,
I do not know if Forest Simmons or Rob Lanphier are still active on this list, however it should be the best place to find some help.
1) a site with 5 single-winner methods that lead to 5 different winners (from a personal website of a university teacher, Syracuse maybe),

RangeVoting's 6-methods-6-answers page http://rangevoting.org/PuzzKjqAns2.html references one Joe Malkevitch. Some more searching leads to http://www.jdawiseman.com/papers/electsys/conundrum.html and then to https://www.york.cuny.edu/~malk/tidbits/tidbit-elections.html (note, unusual notation).

Post by Stéphane Rouillon
2) typical references for approval, Concorcet, range and median single-winner methods.

Median: Majority judgement: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5hhhg1
Approval voting: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/approval-voting/7CE5DEEE235794B0B12F76ADAE621482
Condorcet: the Schulze method: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-010-0475-4 or http://m-schulze.9mail.de/schulze1.pdf
Condorcet: Ranked Pairs (margins), also defines independence from clones: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00433944
Condorcet: Maximize Affirmed Majorities (Ranked Pairs/wv): http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~seppley/
Condorcet: Kemeny: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20026529?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Condorcet: Kemeny is NP-hard: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304397505005785
Condorcet: Strategy resistant Condorcet-IRV hybrids: https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=12954393981869601543
An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.9.1.3
gives short descriptions of Plurality, SNTV, Approval, top-two runoff, STV, Coombs, Borda (based on the pairwise matrix), Copeland, a method called Minimum Violations, Ranked Pairs, Minmax, Kemeny, Keener/Kendall-Wei (eigenvalue/pagerank), and a method called the Jech method.

Post by Stéphane Rouillon
3) typical literature reference for the latest attempts to generalize each of these to multi-winner proportional methods.

The Quota Borda system: https://philpapers.org/rec/DUMVP-2
Lots of STV variants, ends by explaining CPO-STV: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.9.1.27
CPO-STV in greater detail: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FA%3A1005082925477
Phragmén and Thiele methods (multiwinner approval and a ranked version used in Sweden): https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.08826
More on Phragmén and Thiele: https://aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI17/paper/view/14757
Includes references to 1890s papers by the two.
Minimax approval (consensus multiwinner method): https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-007-9165-x or https://hal.inria.fr/docs/00/11/90/26/PDF/AN6LAMSADE_77-104.pdf
Schulze STV: http://m-schulze.9mail.de/schulze2.pdf see citations for Schulze's out of journal work at https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=wGVUJ7sAAAAJ
Schulze's STV-MMP proposal: http://m-schulze.9mail.de/schulze4.pdf (see above for cites)
I'm not aware of any published papers generalizing MJ/Bucklin to multiwinner, or any mentioning proportional/reweighted range voting.
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[Richard Lung]

Hello,
Looked at the 6 single-winner methods, given by Kristofer. It's similar
to the 5 methods given in Beyond Numeracy by von Paulos. Except that
Approval Voting is added. Most ingenious, except Approval Voting and
range Voting (not one of the 6 methods) are inefficient because the
votes count against each other and don't specify order of importance. 
The other methods more or less inefficient by degree of ranking
information the method offers. That is the real issue behind the puzzle.
Not a puzzle at all really, just different degrees of information, in
different methods producing different results. It mystifies me why
intelligent people like von Paulos or the social choice theory industry
should believe this puzzle demonstrates an "Impossibility" theorem.
The joke of it is that in the von Paulos case, if you weight the
Condorcet pairing, this gives accurate enough information to agree with
Borda method, the two most informative methods. I presume weighted
Condorcet is the Kenemy method. I just followed good statistical
practise of weighting data suitably. So much for "Impossibility" theorem!

Apologies for sel-advertising but hope shortly to publish a method that
works equally for single vacancies and multiple vacancies. I mentioned
it in a recent post to Jameson Quin. It is much too information-rich for
the usual illogicalities associated with premature exclusion of
candidates, the source of the 5 different winners mischief.

Thankyou for saying once that you agreed with me. It may have been on
this very issue, mentioned in the past.
Yours sincerely,
Richard Lung.

Post by Stéphane Rouillon
Hi,
I do not know if Forest Simmons or Rob Lanphier are still active on this list, however it should be the best place to find some help.
1) a site with 5 single-winner methods that lead to 5 different winners (from a personal website of a university teacher, Syracuse maybe),
anyone knows it?
2) typical references for approval, Concorcet, range and median single-winner methods.
3) typical literature reference for the latest attempts to generalize each of these to multi-winner proportional methods.
Thanks for any hint...
Stéphane Rouillon.
Envoyé de mon iPhone
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

--
Richard Lung.
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
E-books in epub format:
https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience


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