[EM] The tree is known by its fruits.

[Richard Lung]

The tree is known by its fruits.

So, election methods cannot be perfect. Whoever said they could? This
superficial conclusion has caused immense mischief to the improvement of
election methods. The Plant report eagerly seized on it, to justify
digging their heels in, or dumping, half a dozen dud voting systems on
the British public. New Zealandtook their cue from Plant, in their Royal
Commission on election systems. And now Canadais blithely following.

Imperfection is in the voters knowledge of who to elect. They must act
on imperfect information. And their choices must be probabilities. An
election is a statistical summation with margins of error. Election
method is improved by further marginalising the errors. Imperfection is
not a conclusion about election methods, it is a premise, on which they
are founded.

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Post by Richard Lung
The tree is known by its fruits.
So, election methods cannot be perfect. Whoever said they could? This
superficial conclusion has caused immense mischief to the improvement of
election methods. The Plant report eagerly seized on it, to justify
digging their heels in, or dumping, half a dozen dud voting systems on
the British public. New Zealandtook their cue from Plant, in their Royal
Commission on election systems. And now Canadais blithely
following.
Imperfection is in the voters knowledge of who to elect. They must act
on imperfect information. And their choices must be probabilities. An
election is a statistical summation with margins of error. Election
method is improved by further marginalising the errors. Imperfection is
not a conclusion about election methods, it is a premise, on which they
are founded.

This all seems to be a matter of politics, as it were. The imperfection
of voting methods mean that you have to choose which is best based on
what behavior and criteria you value.

Similarly, the kind of people who have a vested interest in the status
quo can adjust their arguments to fit a desired conclusion (instead of
the other way around). That there's no perfect method gives enough
wiggle room to say "but it just so happens that Plurality is the best
according to what I consider important, which has nothing to do with the
fact that Plurality got me here to begin with".
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[robert bristow-johnson]

---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] The tree is known by its fruits.

From: "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" <***@t-online.de>

Date: Sun, October 8, 2017 8:21 am

To: "Richard Lung" <***@ukscientists.com>

"EM" <election-***@lists.electorama.com>

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post by Kristofer Munsterhjelm

Post by Richard Lung
The tree is known by its fruits.
So, election methods cannot be perfect. Whoever said they could?

...

Post by Kristofer Munsterhjelm
This all seems to be a matter of politics, as it were. The imperfection
of voting methods mean that you have to choose which is best based on
what behavior and criteria you value.

one important criterion for an election system for public office is transparency in the process (which, in my opinion, requires precinct-summability but there *could* be a klunky way to have an equivalent transparency with STV or IRV, which is not really precinct summable).
another
important criterion for an election system for public office is enough simplicity in the tabulation procedure and the manner the winner is decided.  this is where i disagree with Rob Richie and FairVote about IRV (which now they have appropriated the term "Ranked-Choice Voting" (RCV)
for IRV, which bothers me).  I assert that Condorcet (which Condorcet is a secondary issue) is simpler than IRV and is more simply extends the most fundamental principles that voters expect to keep from the familiar FPTP elections, which is equal voting weight for every voter ("one person
one vote") and in the expected result of a Condorcet Winner, resolving the election exactly as would happen between the winner and *any* of the losers.
IRV will decide an election the same as Condorcet if the CW gets to the final round (is either in 1st or 2nd place in first-preference
votes).  IRV will successful avoid IIA (a spoiled election) if the spoiler really had no chance winning (but gets enough votes in a close election to change the winner among other candidates).  but when there are three candidate, all roughly equal in support before the election, where the
outcome of the election could plausibly go any of three (or more) ways, the IRV fails.  In Burlington 2009, one candidate was the initial Plurality Winner, another was the Condorcet Winner, another was the IRV winner.  but the Plurality Winner was the spoiler.  it was the conservative
minority in the city that experiences the failed promise that "they could vote for the candidate the principally want without worry of helping elect the candidate they hate the most."   IRV was repealed but if it hadn't, these conservatives would have to tell themselves that they
must choose between "Liberal" and "More Liberal", because if they vote #1 for the candidate they really like, then More Liberal gets elected.  now we're back to FPTP with a 40% minimum.
my major harping or critique i have with FairVote is not recognizing the damage to
the cause of election reform when the method they push so hard to get some jurisdiction to consider and adopt, that if the method suffers a major failure soon after adoption (for Burlington it was the second IRV election after adoption) and gets promptly repealed, that it will set back election
reform for at least a generation (you gotta get some of the people who were screwed by the IRV screwup to die or move away for a bunch of fresh voters to consider reform).  so we really should push the better ranked-choice voting method than IRV.
i s'pose with some, i am preaching to the
choir, but i am also pragmatic and i think that *pragmatically* Condorcet is a better sell than IRV.
it turns out that Santa Fe is struggling to get RCV implemented (the voters adopted it nearly a decade ago, but it hasn't been implemented) and FairVote is advocating in this case, and Rob was
very disappointed in me when an op-ed i wrote for them to be a little wary about terminology and what they mean by "RCV".  the op-ed is
here: http://www.santafenewmexican.com/opinion/my_view/looking-in-the-differences-in-ranked-choice-voting/article_77d7e472-6876-529b-acc9-ca7fffdcc896.html  .
i dunno, do you think that i helped the cause or hurt the cause of election reform with that piece?
--
r b-j
                 ***@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

[Richard Lung]

Going back to the original dispute between Condorcet and Borda, someone
no less than Laplace decided to adjudicate. (Rated one of the half dozen
most respected mathematicians in human history.) I've read the
discussion by JFS Ross (himself an engineer) in Elections and Electors.
He doesn't go into details but the jist seems to be, that in the
mathematical proof of Laplace, Borda was to be prefered, because he
takes into account the relative weight or importance of each order of
preference, whereas Condorcet treats them as all of equal weight.

However, since then, weighted Condorcet pairing was introduced. I don't
know how much difference it makes. Tho, I found, from an actual example,
that it agreed with Borda, in an election contrived to make 5 voting
systems disagree. This contradicted von Paulos: Beyond Numeracy,
justifying theorem Arrow. Hence, I acknowledge the information value of
weighted Condorcet pairing. But it was not the method I decided to
specialise in (which is a criticism).
Since then, Borda also has been superseded by the Gregory method of
weighting.

The simplest way round the Condorcet paradox with IRV is that it is less
of a problem with STV in multi-member constituencies, which are more
representative.
More-over, I have invented a method that does away with premature
exclusion of candidates altogether. (Binomial STV.)

Richard Lung.

Post by robert bristow-johnson
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] The tree is known by its fruits.
Date: Sun, October 8, 2017 8:21 am
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Post by Kristofer Munsterhjelm

Post by Richard Lung
The tree is known by its fruits.
So, election methods cannot be perfect. Whoever said they could?

...

Post by Kristofer Munsterhjelm
This all seems to be a matter of politics, as it were. The imperfection
of voting methods mean that you have to choose which is best based on
what behavior and criteria you value.

one important criterion for an election system for public office is
transparency in the process (which, in my opinion, requires
precinct-summability but there *could* be a klunky way to have an
equivalent transparency with STV or IRV, which is not really precinct
summable).
another important criterion for an election system for public office
is enough simplicity in the tabulation procedure and the manner the
winner is decided.  this is where i disagree with Rob Richie and
FairVote about IRV (which now they have appropriated the term
"Ranked-Choice Voting" (RCV) for IRV, which bothers me).  I assert
that Condorcet (which Condorcet is a secondary issue) is simpler than
IRV and is more simply extends the most fundamental principles that
voters expect to keep from the familiar FPTP elections, which is equal
voting weight for every voter ("one person one vote") and in the
expected result of a Condorcet Winner, resolving the election exactly
as would happen between the winner and *any* of the losers.
IRV will decide an election the same as Condorcet if the CW gets to
the final round (is either in 1st or 2nd place in first-preference
votes).  IRV will successful avoid IIA (a spoiled election) if the
spoiler really had no chance winning (but gets enough votes in a close
election to change the winner among other candidates).  but when there
are three candidate, all roughly equal in support before the election,
where the outcome of the election could plausibly go any of three (or
more) ways, the IRV fails.  In Burlington 2009, one candidate was the
initial Plurality Winner, another was the Condorcet Winner, another
was the IRV winner.  but the Plurality Winner was the spoiler.  it was
the conservative minority in the city that experiences the failed
promise that "they could vote for the candidate the principally want
without worry of helping elect the candidate they hate the most." 
 IRV was repealed but if it hadn't, these conservatives would have to
tell themselves that they must choose between "Liberal" and "More
Liberal", because if they vote #1 for the candidate they really like,
then More Liberal gets elected.  now we're back to FPTP with a 40%
minimum.
my major harping or critique i have with FairVote is not recognizing
the damage to the cause of election reform when the method they push
so hard to get some jurisdiction to consider and adopt, that if the
method suffers a major failure soon after adoption (for Burlington it
was the second IRV election after adoption) and gets promptly
repealed, that it will set back election reform for at least a
generation (you gotta get some of the people who were screwed by the
IRV screwup to die or move away for a bunch of fresh voters to
consider reform).  so we really should push the better ranked-choice
voting method than IRV.
i s'pose with some, i am preaching to the choir, but i am also
pragmatic and i think that *pragmatically* Condorcet is a better sell
than IRV.
it turns out that Santa Fe is struggling to get RCV implemented (the
voters adopted it nearly a decade ago, but it hasn't been implemented)
and FairVote is advocating in this case, and Rob was very disappointed
in me when an op-ed i wrote for them to be a little wary about
http://www.santafenewmexican.com/opinion/my_view/looking-in-the-differences-in-ranked-choice-voting/article_77d7e472-6876-529b-acc9-ca7fffdcc896.html
.
i dunno, do you think that i helped the cause or hurt the cause of
election reform with that piece?
--
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
----
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttp://electorama.com/em for list info

[Richard Lung]

Kristofer, you are repeating yourself! And you don't have my excuse of
old age. So, I refer you again to HG Wells: The Elements of
Reconstruction, 1916.
Most of his books are available from Project Gutenberg. I did a
bibliography, with quotes, on his election method writings. (in my book
Scientific Method of Elections). You think he was all politics and knew
nothing about science?
Science without a conscience is so far unscientific.
I have written another book on your complaint about the distinction
between science and politics: Science is Ethics as Electics.


Richard Lung.

Post by Kristofer Munsterhjelm

Post by Richard Lung
The tree is known by its fruits.
So, election methods cannot be perfect. Whoever said they could? This
superficial conclusion has caused immense mischief to the improvement of
election methods. The Plant report eagerly seized on it, to justify
digging their heels in, or dumping, half a dozen dud voting systems on
the British public. New Zealandtook their cue from Plant, in their Royal
Commission on election systems. And now Canadais blithely
following.
Imperfection is in the voters knowledge of who to elect. They must act
on imperfect information. And their choices must be probabilities. An
election is a statistical summation with margins of error. Election
method is improved by further marginalising the errors. Imperfection is
not a conclusion about election methods, it is a premise, on which they
are founded.

This all seems to be a matter of politics, as it were. The
imperfection of voting methods mean that you have to choose which is
best based on what behavior and criteria you value.
Similarly, the kind of people who have a vested interest in the status
quo can adjust their arguments to fit a desired conclusion (instead of
the other way around). That there's no perfect method gives enough
wiggle room to say "but it just so happens that Plurality is the best
according to what I consider important, which has nothing to do with
the fact that Plurality got me here to begin with".

--
Richard Lung.
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
E-books in epub format:
https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience

----
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