[EM] Resume: Proportional multi-winner ranked voting methods -

[steve bosworth]

Hi Armondo,
In response to your kind thanks below, I would still like to point out that in contrast to Associational Proportional Representation (APR), the "proportional multi-winner Condorcet [method] in very large magnitude constituencies" which you currently seem to prefer would still "waste" some citizen's votes both quantitatively and qualitatively. Also, each of the Condorcet methods for counting the votes is much more difficult for ordinary citizens to understand.
What do you think?
Steve

Today's Topics:

1. Resume: Proportional multi-winner ranked voting methods -
guidelines? (Armando)

Message: 1
Date: Sun, 21 May 2017 20:10:09 -0600
From: Armando <***@anche.no>
To: election-***@lists.electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Resume: Proportional multi-winner ranked voting methods
- guidelines?
Message-ID: <9E82038C-45B7-4BBF-88D8-***@anche.no>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8

I want to thank you everybody for your useful and attentive comments, although I remained silent I read everything. I?m glad to have found this mailing list, very interesting discussions.
In these months I continued discussing about these themes in my organization.
After reading your reflections, actually I think that any proportional multi-winner Condorcet (different from traditional STV) in very large magnitude constituencies (more similar too original Hare idea) should not be affected by the various problems you mentioned and satisfy my original question. Soon I?ll send you some more questions, since you are so kind.

Meanwhile I?ll be thankful for any advice of further readings if you have.
Best regards,
Armando Pitocco

[Mat Danaher]

Hi all don't comment on this list much but has anyone got any examples of
condorcet multi winner variants being used in real life?

It is something I'm interested in and am think about making a case for
using it for a grant awarding trust to decide projects to support... the
method only has to be understood by trustees who are all fairly astute and
patient people.

Thanks and all the best

Mat

Post by steve bosworth
Hi Armondo,
In response to your kind thanks below, I would still like to point out
that in contrast to Associational Proportional Representation (APR), the
"proportional multi-winner Condorcet [method] in very large magnitude
constituencies" which you currently seem to prefer would still "waste"
some citizen's votes both quantitatively and qualitatively. Also, each of
the Condorcet methods for counting the votes is much more difficult for
ordinary citizens to understand.
What do you think?
Steve
1. Resume: Proportional multi-winner ranked voting methods -
guidelines? (Armando)
Message: 1
Date: Sun, 21 May 2017 20:10:09 -0600
Subject: [EM] Resume: Proportional multi-winner ranked voting methods
- guidelines?
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
I want to thank you everybody for your useful and attentive comments,
although I remained silent I read everything. I?m glad to have found this
mailing list, very interesting discussions.
In these months I continued discussing about these themes in my organization.
After reading your reflections, actually I think that any proportional
multi-winner Condorcet (different from traditional STV) in very large
magnitude constituencies (more similar too original Hare idea) should not
be affected by the various problems you mentioned and satisfy my original
question. Soon I?ll send you some more questions, since you are so kind.
Meanwhile I?ll be thankful for any advice of further readings if you have.
Best regards,
Armando Pitocco
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[VoteFair]

Alas, vote-counting methods that are easy to explain tend to be
simplistic. In contrast, fairer vote-counting methods tend to be more
difficult to explain. This applies to multi-winner methods as well as
single-winner methods.

In the world of single-winner methods, the classic example is that
instant-runoff voting is easy to explain, but produces less-fair results
compared to pairwise-counting (Condorcet) methods, which are more
difficult to explain.

As for "examples of condorcet multi winner variants being used in real
life," it's difficult to find real-use examples of multi-winner methods
of any kind that use more than single-mark ballots.

Expressed another way, the switch from single-mark ballots to multi-mark
ballots (approval, 1-2-3, or score type) shifts from simplistic
vote-counting methods to more-difficult-to-explain methods -- without
even considering the complication of switching from single-winner to
multi-winner results.

Richard Fobes

Post by Mat Danaher
Hi all don't comment on this list much but has anyone got any examples
of condorcet multi winner variants being used in real life?
It is something I'm interested in and am think about making a case for
using it for a grant awarding trust to decide projects to support... the
method only has to be understood by trustees who are all fairly astute
and patient people.
Thanks and all the best
Mat
Hi Armondo,
In response to your kind thanks below, I would still like to point
out that in contrast to Associational Proportional Representation
(APR), the "proportional multi-winner Condorcet [method] in very
large magnitude constituencies" which youcurrently seem to prefer
would still "waste" some citizen's votes both quantitatively and
qualitatively. Also, each of the Condorcet methods for counting the
votes is much more difficult for ordinary citizens to understand.
What do you think?
Steve
1. Resume: Proportional multi-winner ranked voting methods -
guidelines? (Armando)
Message: 1
Date: Sun, 21 May 2017 20:10:09 -0600
Subject: [EM] Resume: Proportional multi-winner ranked voting methods
- guidelines?
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
I want to thank you everybody for your useful and attentive
comments, although I remained silent I read everything. I?m glad to
have found this mailing list, very interesting discussions.
In these months I continued discussing about these themes in my organization.
After reading your reflections, actually I think that any
proportional multi-winner Condorcet (different from traditional STV)
in very large magnitude constituencies (more similar too original
Hare idea) should not be affected by the various problems you
mentioned and satisfy my original question. Soon I?ll send you some
more questions, since you are so kind.
Meanwhile I?ll be thankful for any advice of further readings if you have.
Best regards,
Armando Pitocco
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
--
Sent from my iPhone apologies for spelling and brevity
----
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----
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[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Post by Mat Danaher
Hi all don't comment on this list much but has anyone got any examples
of condorcet multi winner variants being used in real life?

A mathematics society is using Schulze STV:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_STV#Use_of_Schulze_STV.
Unfortunately, the method is very complex indeed.

Post by Mat Danaher
It is something I'm interested in and am think about making a case for
using it for a grant awarding trust to decide projects to support... the
method only has to be understood by trustees who are all fairly astute
and patient people.

Condorcet multiwinner methods are in general very complex. So I can
think of three ways to resolve this:

- Use a complex Condorcet multiwinner method and rely on precedent, i.e.
that the others who're using it know what they're doing. (In this case,
the mathematics society.)

- Use a simple method that hasn't been used in practice yet. I would
suggest my repeated random Condorcet method, see
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2017-February/001358.html,
as that's the simplest Condorcet multiwinner method I can think of.

- Use a multiwinner method that's not Condorcet or STV but has real
world use. E.g. reweighted range voting, used by the Oscars for visual
effects: http://rangevoting.org/RRV.html#oscar
https://www.oscars.org/sites/oscars/files/89aa_rules.pdf#page=32
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[Juho Laatu]

It is something I'm interested in and am think about making a case for using it for a grant awarding trust to decide projects to support...

If the granted awards can have different size, then we might consider also methods where the seats may have different weights. If the grants may be awarded to same applicants at different times (years?), then the method might cover also the history of awarded grants to this one applicant.

No need the make it this complex, I'm just thinking of different possible approaches to proportionality. Maybe, if you have a need to take this kind of considerations into account.

Juho



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[Armando]

Online the aforementioned mathematicians society use Schulze-stv in real life.
There is a website that let you manage and calculate the vote: https://modernballots.com <https://modernballots.com/>
Whit this site you can also produce a proportionally ordered list, if you need seats have different weight.

Other website using a proportionally Condorcet system is http://civs.cs.cornell.edu <http://civs.cs.cornell.edu/>

Post by Juho Laatu

It is something I'm interested in and am think about making a case for using it for a grant awarding trust to decide projects to support...

If the granted awards can have different size, then we might consider also methods where the seats may have different weights. If the grants may be awarded to same applicants at different times (years?), then the method might cover also the history of awarded grants to this one applicant.
No need the make it this complex, I'm just thinking of different possible approaches to proportionality. Maybe, if you have a need to take this kind of considerations into account.
Juho
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[Armando]

Post by steve bosworth
In response to your kind thanks below, I would still like to point out that in contrast to Associational Proportional Representation (APR), the "proportional multi-winner Condorcet [method] in very large magnitude constituencies" which you currently seem to prefer would still "waste" some citizen's votes both quantitatively and qualitatively.

I’ve found your explication of APR
http://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/61PGaAbe/em-no-wasted-votes <http://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/61PGaAbe/em-no-wasted-votes>
Maybe I didn’t understand, however the main feature is that MPs’ votes have different weight. It implies a different view of assembly. In Italy you should change Constitution.
Actually I prefer that all MPs have the same dignity, and would like to find a system where assemblies represent globally all electors.

[Mat Danaher]

Hi everyone thanks for the useful and interesting responses.

Juho in particular raises an interesting point - yes the grants can be
different amounts and you're right we could factor magnitude of the grant
into the initial calculation - historically the trustees have all known
each other and have used consensus on everything - however last year they
couldn't reach consensus so agreed some form of majority voting could be
implemented for when consensus can't be achieved, they know I am an
organisation and decision making "geek" so asked me to find solutions...

I've got some reading to do!

Mat

Post by steve bosworth
In response to your kind thanks below, I would still like to point out
that in contrast to Associational Proportional Representation (APR), the
"proportional multi-winner Condorcet [method] in very large magnitude
constituencies" which you currently seem to prefer would still "waste"
some citizen's votes both quantitatively and qualitatively.
I’ve found your explication of APR
http://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/61PGaAbe/em-no-wasted-votes
Maybe I didn’t understand, however the main feature is that MPs’ votes
have different weight. It implies a different view of assembly. In Italy
you should change Constitution.
Actually I prefer that all MPs have the same dignity, and would like to
find a system where assemblies represent globally all electors.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[Juho Laatu]

Here are some more thoughts on grant allocation methods with varying grant sizes.

First one very simple method. All trustees propose an ideal allocation of grants. The total sum of money that is to be allocated is divided in n parts of equal size (n = number of trustees). Each part is allocated to projects as proposed by the corresponding trustee. These allocations are summed together to find the total amount of grants to each project.

Then a method that provides results that are quite similar (not the same) but is very "Condorcet style". Let's take CPO-STV as our starting point. In Electorama (http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/CPO-STV) the comparison of a pair of options is described as follows.

1. Eliminate all candidates who are not in either outcome.
2. Transfer excess votes from candidates who are in both outcomes.
3. The number of pairwsie votes for an outcome is equal to the sum of votes for the candidates in that outcome.

Let's replace that part with the following algorithm.

1. Each vote (Vi) allocates some sum of money (Vij) to each candidate/project (Cj)
2. Both compared options (allocations), O1 and O2, are similarly allocations of money (O1j, O2j) to each candidate
3. For each vote and each candidate, the amount of guaranteed money is Gij = min(Vij, O1j, O2j)
4. The remaining strength of each vote is ( 1 - (sum over j of Gij) / all_money )
5. Vote Vi supports O1 (with the remaining strength) if ( sum over j of abs( Vij - O1j ) ) < ( sum over j of abs( Vij - O2j ) )
6. Vote Vi supports O2 (with the remaining strength) if ( sum over j of abs( Vij - O2j ) ) < ( sum over j of abs( Vij - O1j ) )

There may be any kind of restrictions on what kind of allocations are "legal". Only such options (O) will be considered. There could be e.g. limitations on the smallest and largest sum that can be allocated to a project, or on the number of supported projects, or maybe only amounts divisible by 1000 would be allowed. Votes need not, but could follow the same rules.

The method uses some Condorcet method to pick the best option (O), just like CPO-STV. Since the number of different options is large, it may be good to use some Condorcet method that can evaluate options locally, like Minmax that can evaluate one option by comparing it to some other strong options. The proposed method is quite straight forward, so it is not difficult to find local optimums (best options when compared to some known other option). Simple heuristics/algorithms that can search local optimums and compare only them (without listing and comparing all possible options) may provide good results. An alternative approach is to compare all those options that different people / interest groups propose as possible outcomes of the method (within agreed time limits, e.g. 1h after latest best identified option). I'm not sure yet on how efficient one can be with respect to finding the global optimum.

In addition to using a Condorcet method to find the best option (as in CPO-STV), the method is Condorcet-like also e.g. so that if all money is to be allocated to a single project, the method picks the project that is the Condorcet winner, when rankings are derived from the given ratings (= money allocations).

I didn't cover any strategic voting related aspects. I instead assumed that although the trustees disagree on how the grants should be allocated, they are not so competitive that they would try to cheat the method (in order to force an outcome that they personally like more than the fair result produced by the algorithm).

Juho



P.S. I made a small Excel (actually Mac Numbers) file to test the behaviour of the comparison algorithm (available via email on request).

Post by Mat Danaher
Hi everyone thanks for the useful and interesting responses.
Juho in particular raises an interesting point - yes the grants can be different amounts and you're right we could factor magnitude of the grant into the initial calculation - historically the trustees have all known each other and have used consensus on everything - however last year they couldn't reach consensus so agreed some form of majority voting could be implemented for when consensus can't be achieved, they know I am an organisation and decision making "geek" so asked me to find solutions...
I've got some reading to do!
Mat

Post by steve bosworth
In response to your kind thanks below, I would still like to point out that in contrast to Associational Proportional Representation (APR), the "proportional multi-winner Condorcet [method] in very large magnitude constituencies" which you currently seem to prefer would still "waste" some citizen's votes both quantitatively and qualitatively.

I’ve found your explication of APR
http://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/61PGaAbe/em-no-wasted-votes <http://election-methods.electorama.narkive.com/61PGaAbe/em-no-wasted-votes>
Maybe I didn’t understand, however the main feature is that MPs’ votes have different weight. It implies a different view of assembly. In Italy you should change Constitution.
Actually I prefer that all MPs have the same dignity, and would like to find a system where assemblies represent globally all electors.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em <http://electorama.com/em> for list info
--
Sent from my iPhone apologies for spelling and brevity
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info