[EM] Voting method comparison tables

[Jameson Quinn]

I've made two voting method comparison tables
<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1bNu4eFc1DC-IzJQt9qbyGVay85l5vwTmehXWXiZNVE4/edit#gid=90844263>
— for multi-winner and single-winner methods. Unlike the "comparison of
electoral systems
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_electoral_systems>" table on
wikipedia, these are meant to focus on political practice more than theory.
Thus, in terms of methods, I leave out some possibilities if they're
redundant (eg, only one Condorcet method), overcomplicated, or unlikely to
be used in politics (eg, Borda). And in terms of the aspects I compare
methods on, I try to include practical considerations rather than just
abstract criteria. For instance, "simplicity" is one aspect, and instead of
"later no harm" I have "chicken dilemma".

There are 4 tabs in the sheet: emoticon and numeric versions of the table
for multi-winner and single-winner methods. In a few places the emoticons
and the numbers don't exactly correspond; I consider the numbers to be the
latest version. The methods in the left section are the ones I think are
discussed as reform proposals the most; the ones on the right are
interesting but IMO less-likely to be implemented in English-speaking
countries. In between the two sections is a column which briefly explains
what I meant by the aspect.

If you consider the various aspects as voters and the methods as
candidates, the winning methods (under basically any method used as the
"meta method") are 3-2-1 for single-winner, and GOLD for multi-winner. It
is, of course, not a coincidence that a table I made ends up favoring two
methods I've designed. But I don't think this is because the table is
biased; I think my ratings are pretty much fair and objective. Rather, it's
because the aspects on this table are the aspects I care about, and so when
I designed those two methods, I deliberately optimized them on these
aspects. In other words, it's the methods which are biased to actually *be*
good, not the table which is biased to falsely rate them as good.

Of course, plurality/FPTP is the loser on both tables. Another thing worth
noting is how poorly IRV does among single-winner methods. As compared to
FPTP, it gives just 1/6 of the benefits that 3-2-1 would. I find that ratio
plausible.

Still, I understand that other people here will view this table with some
skepticism, and will have plenty of points to debate. I welcome that
discussion; that's why I'm posting it here.

[Richard Lung]

Your table doen't come out in my browser. The Wikipedia comparison page
justifies the belief that election science has followed economics as the
dismal science. Where wealth and power are concerned, thought flounders.
It is not just that a classification is less potent than a
transformation, which is to say, for example, that Linnaeus preceded
Darwin. The elections classification itself is incoherent, being based
on arbitrary criteria, rather than the necessary attributes of all
elections and their extent of development.

from
Richard Lung.

Post by Jameson Quinn
I've made two voting method comparison tables
<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1bNu4eFc1DC-IzJQt9qbyGVay85l5vwTmehXWXiZNVE4/edit#gid=90844263>
--- for multi-winner and single-winner methods. Unlike the "comparison
of electoral systems
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_electoral_systems>" table
on wikipedia, these are meant to focus on political practice more than
theory. Thus, in terms of methods, I leave out some possibilities if
they're redundant (eg, only one Condorcet method), overcomplicated, or
unlikely to be used in politics (eg, Borda). And in terms of the
aspects I compare methods on, I try to include practical
considerations rather than just abstract criteria. For instance,
"simplicity" is one aspect, and instead of "later no harm" I have
"chicken dilemma".
There are 4 tabs in the sheet: emoticon and numeric versions of the
table for multi-winner and single-winner methods. In a few places the
emoticons and the numbers don't exactly correspond; I consider the
numbers to be the latest version. The methods in the left section are
the ones I think are discussed as reform proposals the most; the ones
on the right are interesting but IMO less-likely to be implemented in
English-speaking countries. In between the two sections is a column
which briefly explains what I meant by the aspect.
If you consider the various aspects as voters and the methods as
candidates, the winning methods (under basically any method used as
the "meta method") are 3-2-1 for single-winner, and GOLD for
multi-winner. It is, of course, not a coincidence that a table I made
ends up favoring two methods I've designed. But I don't think this is
because the table is biased; I think my ratings are pretty much fair
and objective. Rather, it's because the aspects on this table are the
aspects I care about, and so when I designed those two methods, I
deliberately optimized them on these aspects. In other words, it's the
methods which are biased to actually /be/ good, not the table which is
biased to falsely rate them as good.
Of course, plurality/FPTP is the loser on both tables. Another thing
worth noting is how poorly IRV does among single-winner methods. As
compared to FPTP, it gives just 1/6 of the benefits that 3-2-1 would.
I find that ratio plausible.
Still, I understand that other people here will view this table with
some skepticism, and will have plenty of points to debate. I welcome
that discussion; that's why I'm posting it here.
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