[EM] New election system in Hungary

[Magosányi Árpád]

Hi,

Please help, it is really important!

We are in the process of designing the new election system of Hungary. A
strong movement is emerging for that purpose, and there is a high chance
that even if we fail at first, everything we say will be influental for the
future of our election system.

Our team have came out with a proposal as a basis of discussion between the
parties (most of them will be participating). It is designed to be not too
shockingly new. My role is to propose an ideal system, for the following
tactical communication reasons:
- show how the current system is fscked up compared to an ideal one
- pressure politicians to agree on something in which they could be
successful based on their instinctive behaviour
Andt he long term communication goal is of course to put good election
methods on the political agenda. In case of the ruling party not accepting
the compromise proposal of parties (almost certain), most probably sizeable
factions of the resistance will nominate the ideal system as the core issue
we are fighting for.

Our proposal as basis of discussion is a purely party list system, with
proportional representation and no entry threshold.

I would like to propose something within this framework as the ideal
system, with the same results from the game theory standpoint, as
preferential Condorcet for a commitee:
- The winnig strategy for candidates is collaboration
- The winning strategy for voters is honest voting
- In the long run there is no two-party system

Also, I would like to have easy ballots.

What I have came up with, and why:

Each voter can nominate one party for the election. Nomination needs active
participation from the voter (phisically walking in to a government
office), to make strategic nomination hard. The 20 parties with the highest
number of nominations will be in the ballot.

There is a ballot for parties, and there is a ballot for candidates of each
party.

The party ballot is a cumulative voting ballot, where six votes can be
allocated, and at most 3 can be given to one party.

The candidate ballot is also a kind of cumulative one: the voter can
indicate at most 10 approvals, and at most 5 disapprovals (for a 200-member
list).

The results from candidate ballots are computed using shulze method, and
ties are broken using the order of names (the preference indicated by the
nominating party).

The result from party list ballot is computed by first creating a pairwise
defeat table, where
- the cell in the row of the party will contain the number of wins over the
other candidate
- in case of tie, both cells receive +0,5

The sums of each row are computed, and seats are allocated based on them.

Regarding the candidate list, it is a condorcet method, with a bit more
constrained ballot, but based on the size of the constituency (10M) and
human behaviour, I think that the constraint should not change anything.

My understanding is that the party list method is somewhere between range
voting and condorcet, with a very simplified ballot. As condorcet comes
with the above game theory results, and in range voting majority condorcet
is strategically forced, I feel that this method should also have the same
game theory results.

But I don't want to base such a proposal on feelings, but rather on
mathematical proof.
Please advise me on how to work it out: what are the results I can build my
proof on?
If there are flaws in this system, what sould be the alternative?

[f***@snkmail.com]

Post by Magosányi Árpád
The candidate ballot is also a kind of cumulative one: the voter can
indicate at most 10 approvals, and at most 5 disapprovals (for a 200-member
list).
The results from candidate ballots are computed using shulze method

I'm confused. How do you calculate Schulze results from approval ballots?

[Jameson Quinn]

Before you jump straight into designing mechanisms, it's important to be
clear about what you're looking for: the values you want the method to
fulfill. On that matter, you've said the method should be:

1. not too shockingly new
2. "proportional representation...
3. ...and no entry threshold"
4. The winning strategy for candidates is collaboration
5. The winning strategy for voters is honest voting
6. In the long run there is no two-party system

In the end, you're definitely going to have to compromise to at least some
degree on points 1, 4, and 5.

I'd also like to know more about #3 and #6. I understand that recently
Hungary's effective number of parties has been just under 2, and that from
that perspective increasing the number sounds like a great idea. But in my
opinion, the ideal ENP is between 3 and 4. That gives enough room for new
parties to grow and for once-major ones to die out, but still gives
incentives for building coalition-based parties able to articulate the
interests of more than one group of society.

I'd urge you to take a look at GOLD voting
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting>
(further discussion here
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting>
and here
<https://medium.com/@jameson.quinn/worthwhile-nah-this-canadian-voting-initiative-is-golden-d93717a88221>).
I don't think this is an ideal system for your use case; it was designed as
a proposal for replacing FPTP, primarily in places like Canada, US, and UK.
But some of the mechanisms it uses are actually quite powerful building
blocks for a PR method. In particular, it:

- Uses an STV-like mechanism as an underlying process.
- This is a familiar, well-understood mechanism, yet it's easy to add
flexible vote transfer mechanics on top.
- Offers delegation to a candidate's pre-declared list
- this gives a great combination of simplicity and voting power.
- Makes delegation optional; voters can use an open-list-like voting
style if they prefer
- This prevents political insiders from getting unearned
horse-trading power to effectively set the party list order through
back-room deals.
- Eliminates candidates with inadequate direct support before they can
receive transfers
- This helps prevent tiny splinter parties from getting more than one
seat, without wasting votes (or incentivizing favorite betrayal)
for those
inclined to support such splinter parties.
- Simplifies ballots by explicitly listing only local candidates,
leaving non-local candidates as a write-in option

By using these mechanisms, GOLD voting does quite well on points 2, 4, 5,
and 6 above; reasonably on point 1; and is arguably OK even on point 3.

I think that by recombining mechanisms like these, you'll be able to build
something that will have better appeal for the average voter. You don't
want the instructions on the ballot to end up more complicated than the
rules for Settlers of Catan (with the Cities and Knights expansion). GOLD's
instructions ("Choose one candidate or write one in, then if you wish you
may choose one of the two transfer methods") are about the limit of
complication you should be going for.

All in all, I'd be happy to hear more about your group and your plans for
making a difference in Hungary. I'm certainly rooting for you.

Post by Magosányi Árpád
Hi,
Please help, it is really important!
We are in the process of designing the new election system of Hungary. A
strong movement is emerging for that purpose, and there is a high chance
that even if we fail at first, everything we say will be influental for the
future of our election system.
Our team have came out with a proposal as a basis of discussion between
the parties (most of them will be participating). It is designed to be not
too shockingly new. My role is to propose an ideal system, for the
- show how the current system is fscked up compared to an ideal one
- pressure politicians to agree on something in which they could be
successful based on their instinctive behaviour
Andt he long term communication goal is of course to put good election
methods on the political agenda. In case of the ruling party not accepting
the compromise proposal of parties (almost certain), most probably sizeable
factions of the resistance will nominate the ideal system as the core issue
we are fighting for.
Our proposal as basis of discussion is a purely party list system, with
proportional representation and no entry threshold.
I would like to propose something within this framework as the ideal
system, with the same results from the game theory standpoint, as
- The winnig strategy for candidates is collaboration
- The winning strategy for voters is honest voting
- In the long run there is no two-party system
Also, I would like to have easy ballots.
Each voter can nominate one party for the election. Nomination needs
active participation from the voter (phisically walking in to a government
office), to make strategic nomination hard. The 20 parties with the highest
number of nominations will be in the ballot.
There is a ballot for parties, and there is a ballot for candidates of
each party.
The party ballot is a cumulative voting ballot, where six votes can be
allocated, and at most 3 can be given to one party.
The candidate ballot is also a kind of cumulative one: the voter can
indicate at most 10 approvals, and at most 5 disapprovals (for a 200-member
list).
The results from candidate ballots are computed using shulze method, and
ties are broken using the order of names (the preference indicated by the
nominating party).
The result from party list ballot is computed by first creating a pairwise
defeat table, where
- the cell in the row of the party will contain the number of wins over
the other candidate
- in case of tie, both cells receive +0,5
The sums of each row are computed, and seats are allocated based on them.
Regarding the candidate list, it is a condorcet method, with a bit more
constrained ballot, but based on the size of the constituency (10M) and
human behaviour, I think that the constraint should not change anything.
My understanding is that the party list method is somewhere between range
voting and condorcet, with a very simplified ballot. As condorcet comes
with the above game theory results, and in range voting majority condorcet
is strategically forced, I feel that this method should also have the same
game theory results.
But I don't want to base such a proposal on feelings, but rather on
mathematical proof.
Please advise me on how to work it out: what are the results I can build
my proof on?
If there are flaws in this system, what sould be the alternative?
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[Magosányi Árpád]

Post by Jameson Quinn
Before you jump straight into designing mechanisms, it's important to be
clear about what you're looking for: the values you want the method to
1. not too shockingly new
2. "proportional representation...
3. ...and no entry threshold"
4. The winning strategy for candidates is collaboration
5. The winning strategy for voters is honest voting
6. In the long run there is no two-party system
In the end, you're definitely going to have to compromise to at least some
degree on points 1, 4, and 5.

#1 is not a requirement in my work. There are two proposals: one is a basis
for discussion for parties, which should be conservative, the second is an
ideal system as the proposal of the movement, which can bring in anything
new, but if possible should build on the previous one. I am talking about
the later now.

Post by Jameson Quinn
I'd also like to know more about #3 and #6. I understand that recently
Hungary's effective number of parties has been just under 2, and that from
that perspective increasing the number sounds like a great idea. But in my
opinion, the ideal ENP is between 3 and 4. That gives enough room for new
parties to grow and for once-major ones to die out, but still gives
incentives for building coalition-based parties able to articulate the
interests of more than one group of society.

#3 is about the need to give opportunity for new parties. #6 is based on
our experience with Duverger's law: our political system quickly became a
two-party system, and even that collapsed due to the underlying positive
feedback loop. We now have a monoparty authoritarian regime, shockingly
similar to communist dictatorships, but the style of political
communication is even more ill. That communication style fucks up our
everyday life.

This is why we put emphasis on the game theory part: we need collaborative
behaviour from politicians, honesty from voters, and a rich political
palette.
As the stakes are high, we want these properties to be mathematically
proven. One way of proving it (and a hint in the search) is to trace it
back to the method, which have these properties proven: Condorcet.
Unfortunately Condorcet is primarily a single seat method, and does not
have a party list version. Though it does have a version for committees,
which can help in the proof.

Post by Jameson Quinn
I'd urge you to take a look at GOLD voting
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting>
(further discussion here
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting>
and here
).

I don't think this is an ideal system for your use case; it was designed as

Post by Jameson Quinn
a proposal for replacing FPTP, primarily in places like Canada, US, and UK.
But some of the mechanisms it uses are actually quite powerful building
- Uses an STV-like mechanism as an underlying process.
- This is a familiar, well-understood mechanism, yet it's easy to
add flexible vote transfer mechanics on top.
- Offers delegation to a candidate's pre-declared list
- this gives a great combination of simplicity and voting power.
- Makes delegation optional; voters can use an open-list-like voting
style if they prefer
- This prevents political insiders from getting unearned
horse-trading power to effectively set the party list order through
back-room deals.
- Eliminates candidates with inadequate direct support before they can
receive transfers
- This helps prevent tiny splinter parties from getting more than
one seat, without wasting votes (or incentivizing favorite betrayal) for
those inclined to support such splinter parties.
- Simplifies ballots by explicitly listing only local candidates,
leaving non-local candidates as a write-in option
By using these mechanisms, GOLD voting does quite well on points 2, 4, 5,
and 6 above; reasonably on point 1; and is arguably OK even on point 3.

Any proof or at least reasoning for #4,#5 and #6 ?

Post by Jameson Quinn
I think that by recombining mechanisms like these, you'll be able to build
something that will have better appeal for the average voter. You don't
want the instructions on the ballot to end up more complicated than the
rules for Settlers of Catan (with the Cities and Knights expansion). GOLD's
instructions ("Choose one candidate or write one in, then if you wish you
may choose one of the two transfer methods") are about the limit of
complication you should be going for.
All in all, I'd be happy to hear more about your group and your plans for
making a difference in Hungary. I'm certainly rooting for you.

The agenda is something like this:

- parties give their inputs until aug 10.
- agreement on a system until sep 20
- the new system is legislated until oct 23
If the ruling party does not meet with the last milestone (and we now they
won't), we will force the change through nonviolent civil disobedience.
There are a lot of activities around learning and teaching these methods,
and building movements for this purpose. These are very interesting times
in Hungary. And we need all help.

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Post by Magosányi Árpád

Post by Jameson Quinn
Before you jump straight into designing mechanisms, it's important
to be clear about what you're looking for: the values you want the
1. not too shockingly new
2. "proportional representation...
3. ...and no entry threshold"
4.
The winning strategy for candidates is collaboration
5.
The winning strategy for voters is honest voting
6.
In the long run there is no two-party system
In the end, you're definitely going to have to compromise to at
least some degree on points 1, 4, and 5.

#1 is not a requirement in my work. There are two proposals: one is a
basis for discussion for parties, which should be conservative, the
second is an ideal system as the proposal of the movement, which can
bring in anything new, but if possible should build on the previous one.
I am talking about the later now.

I think the thing that comes closest to the properties above would be
Schulze STV, though it's candidate based, not party based.

1. may not be satisfied all that well (Schulze STV is from somewhere
between 2000 and 2010; I'm not sure of the exact year).

2. It provides proportional representation since it passes Droop
proportionality - and it is Condorcet in the single-winner case.

3. It's not party based, so there are no thresholds.

4. Is probably not completely satisfied, but since Schulze STV satisfies
weak invulnerability to Hylland free riding, there shouldn't be much of
a risk of coordinated vote-management behavior.

5. For the same reason, there shouldn't be much risk of uncoordinated
vote-management behavior, either.

6. Since Schulze STV reduces to LR-Droop when everybody bullet votes for
a party, and D'Hondt (which is closest to Droop among the divisor
methods) don't lead to two-party rule, Schulze STV should also be safe.

Any candidate-based method can be turned into a party list method by
just replacing a party with every candidate in that party in order. E.g.
if the parties are A, B, C, and their lists are A1 A2 A3, B1 B2 B3, C1
C2 C3, then a vote of

A>B>C

becomes

A1>A2>A3>B1>B2>B3>C1>C2>C3.

Schulze STV is very complex, however, which could make it less
attractive for practical use.

Alternatively, you could use Sainte-Laguë or modified Sainte-Laguë with
leveling seats or (even better) biproportional apportionment. Modified
with leveling seats seems to work pretty well in the Scandinavian
countries, and in my opinion, replacing leveling seats with
biproportional representation would only improve the outcome.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[Jameson Quinn]

Post by Magosányi Árpád

Post by Jameson Quinn
Before you jump straight into designing mechanisms, it's important to be
clear about what you're looking for: the values you want the method to
1. not too shockingly new
2. "proportional representation...
3. ...and no entry threshold"
4. The winning strategy for candidates is collaboration
5. The winning strategy for voters is honest voting
6. In the long run there is no two-party system
In the end, you're definitely going to have to compromise to at least
some degree on points 1, 4, and 5.

#1 is not a requirement in my work. There are two proposals: one is a
basis for discussion for parties, which should be conservative, the second
is an ideal system as the proposal of the movement, which can bring in
anything new, but if possible should build on the previous one. I am
talking about the later now.

Post by Jameson Quinn
I'd also like to know more about #3 and #6. I understand that recently
Hungary's effective number of parties has been just under 2, and that from
that perspective increasing the number sounds like a great idea. But in my
opinion, the ideal ENP is between 3 and 4. That gives enough room for new
parties to grow and for once-major ones to die out, but still gives
incentives for building coalition-based parties able to articulate the
interests of more than one group of society.

#3 is about the need to give opportunity for new parties.

There are two different questions here, which I think you're collapsing
into one, because traditional methods usually give the same answer to both:

- Does a small (new) party have an opportunity to win seats?
- Can a small (new) party get its fair share of votes without hurting
its interests? In other words, is voting for a small offshoot party, rather
than the closest larger party, strategically neutral, without risk of
vote-splitting/spoiled elections?

In my opinion, it's important that the answer to the second question(s) be
"no", but that does not extend to the first question.

How does this work in GOLD voting? Say that the major parties are Orange
and Purple, and that Blue is a smaller party similar to Purple. As long as
Blue candidates ensure that Purple comes before Orange in their predeclared
delegation order, voters can safely give delegated votes to Blue
candidates. If Blue support is concentrated on a few candidates, then those
candidates can win fair and square. But if Blue support is diffuse, then it
could happen that all the Blue candidates get eliminated up-front because
none are in the top two locally. Still, those Blue votes were not wasted;
they not only help Purple win more seats, but they even help ensure that
it's the bluest of those Purple candidates who get those seats.

In the long run, these dynamics would allow the Blue party to grow
organically, and even to eventually supplant the Purple party if they
convince the majority of Purple's voters that they are a better choice.

Contrast that with, say, MMP with a 5% threshold. Under that method, if
Blue is below the threshold, all the Blue votes are simply wasted. Purple
politicians will tell Blue voters not to throw away their votes on Blue,
and the organic growth of the Blue party will be stifled. Orange could even
disingenuously fund various different versions of Blue parties — Navy,
Azure, Cobalt, etc. — in order to deliberately hamper the Purple party.

Post by Magosányi Árpád
#6 is based on our experience with Duverger's law: our political system
quickly became a two-party system, and even that collapsed due to the
underlying positive feedback loop. We now have a monoparty authoritarian
regime, shockingly similar to communist dictatorships, but the style of
political communication is even more ill. That communication style fucks up
our everyday life.

Yes, I definitely agree with you here: the only thing that's worse than a
2-party monopoly is the 1-party state that it can collapse into, and even
the most cursory understanding of Hungarian politics shows that you guys
are suffering from those problems about as badly as anyone. But the
question is: do you want to go as far as possible from a 1-party situation,
to an Israel-style situation where no one party has even 25%? Or would you
rather settle on a medium path, with 2 or 3 parties in each size category
"large" (25-40%), "small"(10-24%), and "tiny"(1-9%)? In my opinion, running
from one extreme to the other is not a good way to solve the problem.

Post by Magosányi Árpád
This is why we put emphasis on the game theory part: we need collaborative
behaviour from politicians, honesty from voters, and a rich political
palette.
As the stakes are high, we want these properties to be mathematically
proven. One way of proving it (and a hint in the search) is to trace it
back to the method, which have these properties proven: Condorcet.

I definitely understand wanting ironclad proofs. And there is some degree
to which that's attainable. But you'll never get all the way. For instance,
Gibbard-Satterthwaite shows that no deterministic, non-dictatorial method
avoids strategic ("dishonest") incentives for voters entirely.

Generally, then, instead of showing that a given method "promotes honesty",
you try to show that it doesn't promote a particular, problematic, version
of dishonesty. The discussion above about GOLD, unlike MMP, not having a
certain problem with wasted votes and spoiled elections is one example of
that kind of argument. This can be based on proof, on rigorous statistical
analysis and monte carlo simulations, or just on a thorough strategic
analysis. I would even say that of those three, proofs tend to be the least
convincing for me, because in order for a proof to work you almost always
need to restrict the problem and/or make assumptions in ways that are
questionable.

In particular: Condorcet methods have NOT been shown to universally promote
honesty from voters or collaboration from candidates. In terms of scenarios
like chicken dilemma, whether or not a method is Condorcet compliant
doesn't even tell you that much one way or another about its strategic
properties, and there are certainly Condorcet methods that are not as good
at promoting honesty as something like 3-2-1 (empirically) or SODA
(provably). But all of that is single-winner, and of limited applicability
to the PR cases you're interested in anyway.

Unfortunately Condorcet is primarily a single seat method, and does not

Post by Magosányi Árpád
have a party list version. Though it does have a version for committees,
which can help in the proof.

Post by Jameson Quinn
I'd urge you to take a look at GOLD voting
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting>
(further discussion here
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Geographic_Open_List/Delegated_(GOLD)_voting>
and here
).

I don't think this is an ideal system for your use case; it was designed

Post by Jameson Quinn
as a proposal for replacing FPTP, primarily in places like Canada, US, and
UK. But some of the mechanisms it uses are actually quite powerful building
- Uses an STV-like mechanism as an underlying process.
- This is a familiar, well-understood mechanism, yet it's easy to
add flexible vote transfer mechanics on top.
- Offers delegation to a candidate's pre-declared list
- this gives a great combination of simplicity and voting power.
- Makes delegation optional; voters can use an open-list-like voting
style if they prefer
- This prevents political insiders from getting unearned
horse-trading power to effectively set the party list order through
back-room deals.
- Eliminates candidates with inadequate direct support before they
can receive transfers
- This helps prevent tiny splinter parties from getting more than
one seat, without wasting votes (or incentivizing favorite betrayal) for
those inclined to support such splinter parties.
- Simplifies ballots by explicitly listing only local candidates,
leaving non-local candidates as a write-in option
By using these mechanisms, GOLD voting does quite well on points 2, 4, 5,
and 6 above; reasonably on point 1; and is arguably OK even on point 3.

Any proof or at least reasoning for #4,#5 and #6 ?

#4: promotes party collaboration

This is largely because of the pre-elimination phase, which as discussed
above, disfavors smaller parties without a geographic nucleus, except in
cases of a high-profile candidate who can pull in many votes from outside
of their district. Since these parties will still get votes, their
predeclared preference order will have real clout. That means that
politicians from larger parties will have a strong incentive to listen to
the interests of smaller parties, especially if they are relatively
compatible ideologically to begin with.

#5: promotes honest voting

There are actually two ways in which votes can fall short of honest
expressiveness: strategy and laziness. GOLD's ballot simplicity helps
enormously with the laziness problem; by making it relatively easy to cast
an expressive ballot, it makes it more common.

As for strategy... well, like any voting method, GOLD is subject to some
strategy. In particular, as with many PR methods, free-riding can be an
issue. But free riding is an essentially self-limiting problem; it works
exactly insofar as you are in the minority who's doing it, but as soon as
everyone is trying to do it, it doesn't work at all. Furthermore, GOLD's
ballot format makes free riding difficult to pull off even in the best of
circumstances. So I don't see that as a major concern. And really, I think
that as minor as it is, other strategic issues are even smaller. If I were
voting in a GOLD election, I would vote honestly, even in the kind of
manichean good-versus-pure-evil situation that would make me inclined to be
strategic under many other voting methods (including Condorcet).

Again, I encourage you to think beyond just criteria and proofs. I've done
that stuff — my unpublished proof that SODA is monotonic is the longest
voting criterion passage proof that I, as a serious student of the
literature, am aware of — but I think that when it comes to proportional
methods, pragmatics of the ballot format and comprehensibility of the
process can be more important than passing abstruse criteria.

Post by Magosányi Árpád

Post by Jameson Quinn
I think that by recombining mechanisms like these, you'll be able to
build something that will have better appeal for the average voter. You
don't want the instructions on the ballot to end up more complicated than
the rules for Settlers of Catan (with the Cities and Knights expansion).
GOLD's instructions ("Choose one candidate or write one in, then if you
wish you may choose one of the two transfer methods") are about the limit
of complication you should be going for.
All in all, I'd be happy to hear more about your group and your plans for
making a difference in Hungary. I'm certainly rooting for you.

- parties give their inputs until aug 10.
- agreement on a system until sep 20
- the new system is legislated until oct 23
If the ruling party does not meet with the last milestone (and we now they
won't), we will force the change through nonviolent civil disobedience.
There are a lot of activities around learning and teaching these methods,
and building movements for this purpose. These are very interesting times
in Hungary. And we need all help.
I'm definitely rooting for you!

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Post by Magosányi Árpád

Post by Jameson Quinn
Before you jump straight into designing mechanisms, it's important
to be clear about what you're looking for: the values you want the
1. not too shockingly new
2. "proportional representation...
3. ...and no entry threshold"
4.
The winning strategy for candidates is collaboration
5.
The winning strategy for voters is honest voting
6.
In the long run there is no two-party system
In the end, you're definitely going to have to compromise to at
least some degree on points 1, 4, and 5.

#1 is not a requirement in my work. There are two proposals: one is a
basis for discussion for parties, which should be conservative, the
second is an ideal system as the proposal of the movement, which can
bring in anything new, but if possible should build on the previous one.
I am talking about the later now.

I forgot to mention: it's sometimes argued that party list methods
without thresholds are vulnerable to very weak parties (single-issue
parties even) getting a kingmaker position.

One way to alleviate that is to give a majoritarian bonus -- according
to a method that finds a candidate with broad support, like Condorcet
does. So e.g. if you have a parliament of 200 seats, instead of just
having a 2% threshold, give four seats to the party elected by a
Condorcet method when the whole nation's party list votes are fed to
that method.

The advantage of using a good single-winner method instead of just using
something like, say, D'Hondt instead of Sainte-Laguë for the party list
aspect, is that the bonus goes to the center, not to the largest parties.

This, of course, requires that the voters use ranked ballots for the
party list elections so that the majoritarian method has anything to go
by. Thus it's not all that good without a ranked method for the
proportional election, since there wouldn't be much of an incentive by
the voters to fully rank their ballots.

A similar idea can be found here:
https://www.accuratedemocracy.com/e_ler.htm
----
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[Richard Lung]

Hello Magosányi Árpád,
My father came from your part of the world (annexed by Romania after
WW1) but my out-look on election method is a world away from yours and
this election methods group, which usually over-looks my posts! These
views of mine are essentially in the tradition of John Stuart Mill.
Nevertheless, I hope wou will look at my book, "Scientific Method of
Elections, or the simpler "Peace-making Power-sharing" which starts with
the Canadian Citizens Assemblies. Not to mention the less methodical and
more theoretical: Science is Ethics as Electics.
They are linked from my "Democracy Science" page.

Richard Lung.

Post by Magosányi Árpád
Hi,
Please help, it is really important!
We are in the process of designing the new election system of Hungary.
A strong movement is emerging for that purpose, and there is a high
chance that even if we fail at first, everything we say will be
influental for the future of our election system.
Our team have came out with a proposal as a basis of discussion
between the parties (most of them will be participating). It is
designed to be not too shockingly new. My role is to propose an ideal
- show how the current system is fscked up compared to an ideal one
- pressure politicians to agree on something in which they could be
successful based on their instinctive behaviour
Andt he long term communication goal is of course to put good election
methods on the political agenda. In case of the ruling party not
accepting the compromise proposal of parties (almost certain), most
probably sizeable factions of the resistance will nominate the ideal
system as the core issue we are fighting for.
Our proposal as basis of discussion is a purely party list system,
with proportional representation and no entry threshold.
I would like to propose something within this framework as the ideal
system, with the same results from the game theory standpoint, as
- The winnig strategy for candidates is collaboration
- The winning strategy for voters is honest voting
- In the long run there is no two-party system
Also, I would like to have easy ballots.
Each voter can nominate one party for the election. Nomination needs
active participation from the voter (phisically walking in to a
government office), to make strategic nomination hard. The 20 parties
with the highest number of nominations will be in the ballot.
There is a ballot for parties, and there is a ballot for candidates of
each party.
The party ballot is a cumulative voting ballot, where six votes can be
allocated, and at most 3 can be given to one party.
The candidate ballot is also a kind of cumulative one: the voter can
indicate at most 10 approvals, and at most 5 disapprovals (for a
200-member list).
The results from candidate ballots are computed using shulze method,
and ties are broken using the order of names (the preference indicated
by the nominating party).
The result from party list ballot is computed by first creating a
pairwise defeat table, where
- the cell in the row of the party will contain the number of wins
over the other candidate
- in case of tie, both cells receive +0,5
The sums of each row are computed, and seats are allocated based on them.
Regarding the candidate list, it is a condorcet method, with a bit
more constrained ballot, but based on the size of the constituency
(10M) and human behaviour, I think that the constraint should not
change anything.
My understanding is that the party list method is somewhere between
range voting and condorcet, with a very simplified ballot. As
condorcet comes with the above game theory results, and in range
voting majority condorcet is strategically forced, I feel that this
method should also have the same game theory results.
But I don't want to base such a proposal on feelings, but rather on
mathematical proof.
Please advise me on how to work it out: what are the results I can
build my proof on?
If there are flaws in this system, what sould be the alternative?
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[Richard Lung]

Hello again Magosányi Árpád,

This is a postscript to my previous email, because you are on such a
tight schedule.

Appearances can be deceiving and the important thing for you as an
adviser is to make people aware of the realities, make what of them as
they will.

Many electoral reformers think that party list systems, especially a
hybrid system like the German Mixed Member Proportional system is the
wave of the future. I think that's still the sort of system in Hungary,
isn't it?
But there are some academic straws in the wind, coming from Europe
itself that suggest change. Namely the peer-reviewed research into
strategic voting in party list systems, as recently studied by Annika
Freden.
Eventually, maybe not in my lifetime, because I am old, Europe is going
to rediscover that the inventor of proportional representation, the
Danish mathematician Carl Andrae was right in appreciating that
preference voting is a corollary of proportional counting.
Evidently, there is a good chance that Scotland will go over completely
to this system, also developed by Thomas Hare, which he called the
Single Transferable Vote. STV was recommended to replace MMP (called the
Additional Member System there) by the Richard report for the Welsh
assembly.)

In my book, Scientific Method of Elections, I explain how STV is,
essentially speaking, How To Do It. By contrast, it so happens that MMP
is How Not To Do It.
If elections are not to be sham contests: Political contestants cannot
be their own referees.

from
Richard Lung.



Hello Magosányi Árpád,
My father came from your part of the world (annexed by Romania after
WW1) but my out-look on election method is a world away from yours and
this election methods group, which usually over-looks my posts! These
views of mine are essentially in the tradition of John Stuart Mill.
Nevertheless, I hope wou will look at my book, "Scientific Method of
Elections, or the simpler "Peace-making Power-sharing" which starts with
the Canadian Citizens Assemblies. Not to mention the less methodical and
more theoretical: Science is Ethics as Electics.
They are linked from my "Democracy Science" page.

Richard Lung.

Post by Magosányi Árpád
Hi,
Please help, it is really important!
We are in the process of designing the new election system of Hungary.
A strong movement is emerging for that purpose, and there is a high
chance that even if we fail at first, everything we say will be
influental for the future of our election system.
Our team have came out with a proposal as a basis of discussion
between the parties (most of them will be participating). It is
designed to be not too shockingly new. My role is to propose an ideal
- show how the current system is fscked up compared to an ideal one
- pressure politicians to agree on something in which they could be
successful based on their instinctive behaviour
Andt he long term communication goal is of course to put good election
methods on the political agenda. In case of the ruling party not
accepting the compromise proposal of parties (almost certain), most
probably sizeable factions of the resistance will nominate the ideal
system as the core issue we are fighting for.
Our proposal as basis of discussion is a purely party list system,
with proportional representation and no entry threshold.
I would like to propose something within this framework as the ideal
system, with the same results from the game theory standpoint, as
- The winnig strategy for candidates is collaboration
- The winning strategy for voters is honest voting
- In the long run there is no two-party system
Also, I would like to have easy ballots.
Each voter can nominate one party for the election. Nomination needs
active participation from the voter (phisically walking in to a
government office), to make strategic nomination hard. The 20 parties
with the highest number of nominations will be in the ballot.
There is a ballot for parties, and there is a ballot for candidates of
each party.
The party ballot is a cumulative voting ballot, where six votes can be
allocated, and at most 3 can be given to one party.
The candidate ballot is also a kind of cumulative one: the voter can
indicate at most 10 approvals, and at most 5 disapprovals (for a
200-member list).
The results from candidate ballots are computed using shulze method,
and ties are broken using the order of names (the preference indicated
by the nominating party).
The result from party list ballot is computed by first creating a
pairwise defeat table, where
- the cell in the row of the party will contain the number of wins
over the other candidate
- in case of tie, both cells receive +0,5
The sums of each row are computed, and seats are allocated based on them.
Regarding the candidate list, it is a condorcet method, with a bit
more constrained ballot, but based on the size of the constituency
(10M) and human behaviour, I think that the constraint should not
change anything.
My understanding is that the party list method is somewhere between
range voting and condorcet, with a very simplified ballot. As
condorcet comes with the above game theory results, and in range
voting majority condorcet is strategically forced, I feel that this
method should also have the same game theory results.
But I don't want to base such a proposal on feelings, but rather on
mathematical proof.
Please advise me on how to work it out: what are the results I can
build my proof on?
If there are flaws in this system, what sould be the alternative?
----
Election-Methods mailing list - seehttp://electorama.com/em for list info

[VoteFair]

...
If there are flaws in this system, what should be the alternative?

Overall I am impressed by what you have designed! Yet I suggest the
following refinement to what you propose:

* For the party-list ballot -- which I assume is different for each
political party -- I suggest that each candidate's name appear next to
two ovals, one labeled "Approve" and the other labeled "Disapprove". If
neither oval is marked, or if both ovals are marked, the ranking is
regarded as "Neutral". (Spoiled ballots would only occur when it is not
clear whether an oval is marked or unmarked.) The result is a
three-level ranking.

* This three-level ranking would be counted using any Condorcet method.
Very importantly the software must handle ties at any level. (My
VoteFair popularity ranking software on GitHub can handle this, and yes,
it can rank 200 candidates, although only the top-ranked candidates are
confirmed to match Condorcet-Kemeny results in the extremely unlikely
case where there is circular ambiguity [also called the
"rock-paper-scissors" situation].)

* Your description mentions using fractional/decimal vote counts, but
they are not needed if you are using a Condorcet method that fully ranks
all the candidates, and which allows multiple candidates to be tied at
any ranking level. (My VoteFair ranking software handles this, and any
good implementation of the Condorcet-Schultze method should do so too.)

* As far as I know, the best voting strategy is for a voter to heavily
use the Approve and Disapprove categories, and use the Neutral category
for the remaining candidates. In other words, a voter is wasting their
vote if they only mark a few candidates as Approved or Disapproved.

* If multiple candidates are tied and the limit for that party's won
seats occurs within that tie, the tie would be broken by the party's
ranking of the candidates. There are fairer ways to resolve such a tie,
but this approach gives the impression that the party has some influence
on the results. In reality this might affect only a seat or two for
each party. Ties at other ranking levels do not need to be resolved
because each group of tied candidates win seats if they are more popular
than the threshold level, or they don't win seats if they are less
popular than the threshold level.

* Most importantly, notice that there is no limit as to how many
candidates can be marked as Approved, and no limit as to how many
candidates can be marked as Disapproved. Voting methods that require
such constraints are especially vulnerable to strategic voting!!

* This ballot approach is simpler than the one you describe, which makes
it easier to learn to mark, and virtually eliminates spoiled ballots.
In contrast, the ballot type you describe would result in very many
spoiled ballots.

* As for the proportional winning of seats by party, I suggest that you
use the recommendation from Kristofer Munsterhjelm regarding awarding
some extra seats to the party that ranks highest according to the
Condorcet ranking of political-party preferences (where the cumulative
ballot can be interpreted as a ranking based on the number of ovals marked).

It is possible that I have misunderstood the method you are proposing,
in which case I might be overlooking something. If so, please clarify.

I realize that what you are doing is very challenging. After all,
combining proportional results with Condorcet counting is a new frontier.

But I don't want to base such a proposal on feelings, but rather on
mathematical proof.
Please advise me on how to work it out: what are the results I can build
my proof on?

I think your desire for mathematical proofs will NOT be of interest to
most voters and most politicians. The remainder of this message
contains some more compelling concepts for supporting your electoral reform.

... My role is to propose an ideal system, for the
- show how the current system is fscked up compared to an ideal one

The failure of both single-mark ballots (with plurality counting) and
non-Condorcet methods (such as instant-runoff voting) is conveyed with
just nine voters in this scenario:

4 voters prefer A > C > B

3 voters prefer B > C > A

2 voters prefer C > B > A

In this example the single-mark ballot (plurality) winner is A, and the
instant-runoff winner is B, and the Condorcet winner is C. Notice that
the Condorcet winner is discarded in the first round of instant-runoff
voting. And notice that the plurality winner is actually the least
popular candidate. As has been pointed out to me by an election-method
reform advocate in Canada, this is an example that can be explained
while doing the counting on the fingers of both hands.

- pressure politicians to agree on something in which they could be
successful based on their instinctive behaviour

Here are some motivation-related insights:

* The number of political parties is not as important as who controls
them -- the voters or the biggest campaign contributors. The use of a
Condorcet method increases voter influence, which decreases money influence.

* The biggest unfairness in all major "democracies" is that money is
used to control political parties in ways that override what the voters
prefer. This can occur only because those democracies use vote-counting
methods that can be exploited to control each political party. (And
typically the biggest campaign contributions come from a few people who
(both directly and indirectly) give money to candidates in MORE THAN ONE
political party.) In other words, when flawed voting methods are used,
contributions of money (not votes) control political parties.

* When politics is controlled by the biggest campaign contributors, the
result is corruption in the form of customers and clients being
essentially forced (through legal means) to buy (pharmaceutical
products, genetically modified foods, insurance, legal assistance, etc.,
often at excessive prices) from the businesses that are owned by those
biggest campaign contributors.

* The result of corruption is a weak economy. Better elections will
lead to less corruption, which will lead to a stronger economy. This
was dramatically demonstrated when the United States cut off control
from Britain; and the current bad economy here in the U.S. occurs
because the biggest campaign contributors have learned how to control
primary elections, which unfairly fail to ask voters to provide more
information than just a single choice in each race.

* Everybody wants economic prosperity. That overrides all other
political issues, including most religious issues.

* Storytime: When the inventor of an electric motor in Britain was asked
by a government official what advantage it provided, the inventor said
"you can tax it!" He got the investment money he requested.

* If the economic pie is being divided to give a few insiders bigger
slices of the economic pie, that leaves less economic pie for everyone
else, namely the majority of voters.

OK, the last few points may not be relevant to your election-reform
efforts, yet I think it's useful to keep a clear perspective about
what's really going on.

Good luck!!

If you have further questions, just ask!

Richard Fobes

Hi,
Please help, it is really important!
We are in the process of designing the new election system of Hungary. A
strong movement is emerging for that purpose, and there is a high chance
that even if we fail at first, everything we say will be influental for
the future of our election system.
Our team have came out with a proposal as a basis of discussion between
the parties (most of them will be participating). It is designed to be
not too shockingly new. My role is to propose an ideal system, for the
- show how the current system is fscked up compared to an ideal one
- pressure politicians to agree on something in which they could be
successful based on their instinctive behaviour
Andt he long term communication goal is of course to put good election
methods on the political agenda. In case of the ruling party not
accepting the compromise proposal of parties (almost certain), most
probably sizeable factions of the resistance will nominate the ideal
system as the core issue we are fighting for.
Our proposal as basis of discussion is a purely party list system, with
proportional representation and no entry threshold.
I would like to propose something within this framework as the ideal
system, with the same results from the game theory standpoint, as
- The winnig strategy for candidates is collaboration
- The winning strategy for voters is honest voting
- In the long run there is no two-party system
Also, I would like to have easy ballots.
Each voter can nominate one party for the election. Nomination needs
active participation from the voter (phisically walking in to a
government office), to make strategic nomination hard. The 20 parties
with the highest number of nominations will be in the ballot.
There is a ballot for parties, and there is a ballot for candidates of
each party.
The party ballot is a cumulative voting ballot, where six votes can be
allocated, and at most 3 can be given to one party.
The candidate ballot is also a kind of cumulative one: the voter can
indicate at most 10 approvals, and at most 5 disapprovals (for a
200-member list).
The results from candidate ballots are computed using shulze method, and
ties are broken using the order of names (the preference indicated by
the nominating party).
The result from party list ballot is computed by first creating a
pairwise defeat table, where
- the cell in the row of the party will contain the number of wins over
the other candidate
- in case of tie, both cells receive +0,5
The sums of each row are computed, and seats are allocated based on them.
Regarding the candidate list, it is a condorcet method, with a bit more
constrained ballot, but based on the size of the constituency (10M) and
human behaviour, I think that the constraint should not change anything.
My understanding is that the party list method is somewhere between
range voting and condorcet, with a very simplified ballot. As condorcet
comes with the above game theory results, and in range voting majority
condorcet is strategically forced, I feel that this method should also
have the same game theory results.
But I don't want to base such a proposal on feelings, but rather on
mathematical proof.
Please advise me on how to work it out: what are the results I can build
my proof on?
If there are flaws in this system, what sould be the alternative?

----
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[Toby Pereira]

I meant to reply to this sooner, but as I mentioned in a reply about Jameson Quinn's GOLD method, the method I described here https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/electionscience/aP7ybKMb1zs/giaYAh6wAwAJ would arguably work well. It's a proportional mixed-member method. And while I talk about score voting there, it could be just as easily used with the simpler approval voting. I also discuss the method in this video 

you can see the simplicity of the score ballot at 2:33 and the approval ballot at 12:10.
Toby



From: Magosányi Árpád <***@gmail.com>
To: Election-***@lists.electorama.com
Sent: Tuesday, 4 July 2017, 10:54
Subject: [EM] New election system in Hungary

Hi,

Please help, it is really important!

We are in the process of designing the new election system of Hungary. A strong movement is emerging for that purpose, and there is a high chance that even if we fail at first, everything we say will be influental for the future of our election system.

Our team have came out with a proposal as a basis of discussion between the parties (most of them will be participating). It is designed to be not too shockingly new. My role is to propose an ideal system, for the following tactical communication reasons:
 - show how the current system is fscked up compared to an ideal one
 - pressure politicians to agree on something in which they could be successful based on their instinctive behaviour
Andt he long term communication goal is of course to put good election methods on the political agenda. In case of the ruling party not accepting the compromise proposal of parties (almost certain), most probably sizeable factions of the resistance will nominate the ideal system as the core issue we are fighting for.

Our proposal as basis of discussion is a purely party list system, with proportional representation and no entry threshold.

I would like to propose something within this framework as the ideal system, with the same results from the game theory standpoint, as preferential Condorcet for a commitee:
- The winnig strategy for candidates is collaboration
- The winning strategy for voters is honest voting
- In the long run there is no two-party system

Also, I would like to have easy ballots.

What I have came up with, and why:

Each voter can nominate one party for the election. Nomination needs active participation from the voter (phisically walking in to a government office), to make strategic nomination hard. The 20 parties with the highest number of nominations will be in the ballot.

There is a ballot for parties, and there is a ballot for candidates of each party.

The party ballot is a cumulative voting ballot, where six votes can be allocated, and at most 3 can be given to one party.

The candidate ballot is also a kind of cumulative one: the voter can indicate at most 10 approvals, and at most 5 disapprovals (for a 200-member list).

The results from candidate ballots are computed using shulze method, and ties are broken using the order of names (the preference indicated by the nominating party).

The result from party list ballot is computed by first creating a pairwise defeat table, where
- the cell in the row of the party will contain the number of wins over the other candidate
- in case of tie, both cells receive +0,5

The sums of each row are computed, and seats are allocated based on them.

Regarding the candidate list, it is a condorcet method, with a bit more constrained ballot, but based on the size of the constituency (10M) and human behaviour, I think that the constraint should not change anything.

My understanding is that the party list method is somewhere between range voting and condorcet, with a very simplified ballot. As condorcet comes with the above game theory results, and in range voting majority condorcet is strategically forced, I feel that this method should also have the same game theory results.

But I don't want to base such a proposal on feelings, but rather on mathematical proof.
Please advise me on how to work it out: what are the results I can build my proof on?
If there are flaws in this system, what sould be the alternative?

----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info