Discussion:
[EM] SARA voting: easier-to-describe MAS
Jameson Quinn
2016-10-22 22:24:05 UTC
Permalink
Support Accept Reject Abstain voting works as follows:


- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less and
supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.


This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further reduces
the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
Jameson Quinn
2016-10-23 13:52:24 UTC
Permalink
Here's a new definition of SARA
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Support_Accept_Reject_Abstain_voting>:

Support Accept Reject Abstain (SARA) voting is very similar to Majority
Acceptable Score voting
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Acceptable_Score_voting>, which
is the graded Bucklin <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Graded_Bucklin> method
which uses 3 grade levels <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3_grade_levels>and
breaks median ties using Score voting
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Score_voting>. SARA works as follows:

1. *Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain. Candidates get 2 points for each percent of "support"
and 1 point for each percent of "accept", for a total of 0-200 points.*
- *"Support" helps a candidate the most, "reject" hurts the most.
"Accept" helps less than support, and is good for helping a second-rate
candidate beat a third-rate one. "Abstain" helps a candidate avoid
elimination in step 3 but hurts them in steps 2 and 4; it's good for a
second-rate candidate when there's a first-rate one who can beat them, or
for a candidate you're not sure about.*
2. *Eliminate any candidates with under 50 points.*
- *50 points would be the score of a candidate supported by 1/4 or
accepted by 1/2. Anything less than that probably indicates a
lesser-known
candidate who got a lot of 'abstains'; eliminating them here ensures they
won't be the only candidate remaining after step 3.*
3. *Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that leaves
nobody.*
- *If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a
majority.*
4. *Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.*
- *This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.*



*...*

This does not pass the CD criterion; in the scenario (expressed as
Support>Accept>Abstain>Reject)

28: A>>B>C
27: B>>>AC (honest is B>>A>C)
45: C>>>AB

... the truncation by the B voters successfully elects B.

However, it does avoid a slippery slope. That is to say, in the above
scenario, even though A leads B by just one vote, a mere two strategic B
voters cannot elect B by truncating:

28: A>>B>C
2: B>>>AC
25: B>>A>C
45: C>>>AB

A wins, even though B would win with the analogous truncation in score or
Approval.

I think that this "no slippery slope" property is sufficient to give good
CD performance in the real world. If you assume that most other voters in
your faction will not be trying CD strategy, there is no incentive to try
it yourself, so the ball never gets rolling.

On the other hand, it can avoid center squeeze:

28: A>>B>C
27: B>>A>C
3: C>B>>A
42: C>>>AB

B, the CW, correctly wins.

If I'm right that this kind of system avoids CD strategy, the only
effective cognitive burden of this method is the decision between "accept"
and "abstain". You should "accept" a lesser evil against a greater evil;
you should "abstain" if you think that your favorite can win. This is, I
think, the minimum possible cognitive burden for a method that does well on
both CD and center squeeze; and it's distilled to its purest form.
Post by Jameson Quinn
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
Michael Ossipoff
2016-10-23 14:05:13 UTC
Permalink
Could you give a brief, precise definition of center squeeze?

Michael Ossipoff
Post by Jameson Quinn
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
----
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Jameson Quinn
2016-10-23 15:20:44 UTC
Permalink
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the plurality
loser. There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the
level of strategy necessary for the CW to win:

-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even under
honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere favorite.
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not. But
even if the do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom. The defensive strategies that work are
for the weaker wing to give the CW near-top score, and/or the CW faction to
give the stronger wing near-bottom score.
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But under
SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer; the strategy is
effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if the CW faction
cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy backfire here is
not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy has some chance of
winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic backfire is a good thing
if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if it actually occurs.
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump to
counteract SHOS.
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not defensively
plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to protect them
from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW is only barely
a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a successful defense in
this case. However, I think that very tightly-balanced situations like this
are not a large concern.)
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Could you give a brief, precise definition of center squeeze?
Michael Ossipoff
Post by Jameson Quinn
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
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----
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Michael Ossipoff
2016-10-24 18:17:05 UTC
Permalink
Post by Jameson Quinn
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
plurality loser.

So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
needed to protect the CWs's win.

Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle Cws
has the smallest faction.

And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or burial
vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more favorable to
finding vulnerability.

But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a distinction
about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in IRV, Benham,
and Woodall.

You wrote:

There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level of
strategy necessary for the CW to win:

(endquote)

Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side can't
take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter burial by
mere plumping.

No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.

As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even under
honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere favorite.

(endquote)

Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a matter of
which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.

That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.

If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.

Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years or
so.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.

(endquote)

Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet,
it's choosing socially better.

Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.

Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different result.

But I think IRV was repealed for more than that:

Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if that
were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
particular individual candidate you can.

CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing _among_
your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.

(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)

If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
important thing.

Approve (only) your top-set.

(More about that in my post yesterday)

But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason for voters in
Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.

When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past the
CWse.

Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having a
social agreement to that effect.

What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.

(You wrote):

But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.

(endquote)

In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.

In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.

The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.

(You wrote):

The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the CW
near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing near-bottom
score.

(endquote)

Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
should plump.

But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated above, &
in earlier posts.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But under
SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.

No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the
right answer in such a method.

With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail, depending
on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't win.

(You wrote):

; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if the
CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
it actually occurs.

Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable. ...especially
with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.

But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting the
best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump to
counteract SHOS.

Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank sincerely,
and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the election
of someone in your bottom-set.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)

(endquote)

That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on Bucklin
strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the lack of
CD enough to compete with the best methods.

Michael Ossipoff
Post by Jameson Quinn
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Could you give a brief, precise definition of center squeeze?
Michael Ossipoff
Post by Jameson Quinn
Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Post by Jameson Quinn
Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less and
supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Post by Jameson Quinn
Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for each
"accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Post by Jameson Quinn
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Post by Jameson Quinn
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C.Benham
2016-10-25 16:40:32 UTC
Permalink
When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
choosing socially better.
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he
does in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a
strategy problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
Mike,

Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
Smith//Approval (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.

A couple of somewhat relevant questions:

(1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?

(2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?

And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?
Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by
definition. But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still
wins. ...the right answer in such a method.
But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .
* Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
* Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are
acceptable, eliminate all who aren't.
* Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
"25%" figure looks arbitrary.

With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
Mono-add-Plump.

Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y
that is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do
nothing
but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is no
longer eliminated and wins.

Chris Benham
Post by Jameson Quinn
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
plurality loser.
So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive
strategy needed to protect the CWs's win.
Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a
middle Cws has the smallest faction.
And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or
burial vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more
favorable to finding vulnerability.
But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a
distinction about that except that it's part of the problem-examples
in IRV, Benham, and Woodall.
There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level
(endquote)
Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side
can't take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter
burial by mere plumping.
No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.
As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even
under honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere
favorite.
(endquote)
Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a
matter of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.
If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30
years or so.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
(endquote)
Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from
Condorcet, it's choosing socially better.
Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different result.
Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if
that were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't,
because electing from your top-set is usually more important than
electing the best particular individual candidate you can.
CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing
_among_ your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
important thing.
Approve (only) your top-set.
(More about that in my post yesterday)
But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a
majority who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason
for voters in Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid
approving past the expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower
your Pt.
When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past
the CWse.
Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having
a social agreement to that effect.
What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he
does in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a
strategy problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the
CW near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing
near-bottom score.
(endquote)
Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's
voters should plump.
But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated
above, & in earlier posts.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
...the right answer in such a method.
With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail,
depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs
doesn't win.
; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if
the CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a
strategy backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because
the strategy has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes
attempted. Strategic backfire is a good thing if it discourages the
strategy, but a bad thing if it actually occurs.
Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting
the best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on
Bucklin, because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir
voters don't plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to
deter burial, because the would-be buriers don't have better
information than the defenders have.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively
plump to counteract SHOS.
Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result
in the election of someone in your bottom-set.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW
to protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If
the CW is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top
for a successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
(endquote)
That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on
Bucklin strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh
the lack of CD enough to compete with the best methods.
Michael Ossipoff
Michael Ossipoff
2016-10-25 18:28:30 UTC
Permalink
(Replying farther down, after &&&&&&&&&&&&&&...)
Post by C.Benham
When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
choosing socially better.
Post by C.Benham
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
Post by C.Benham
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
Post by C.Benham
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Post by C.Benham
Mike,
Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
Smith//Approval (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.

(endquote)

Good point. Because Approval is a good method, then how can it be bad to
choose the Approval winner among the Smith-set?

Fine, but by sincere Approval's standard, is Smith//Approval as good as
just using Approval? Obviously not.

Approval, not Smith//Approval, elects the candidate in the most people's
top-set, when people vote the optimal strategy of approving (only) their
top-set.

Smith//Approval of course elects the CWv if there is one, instead of the
Approval winner.

Anyway, of course, if a ranking method is chosen, it's because the choice
is based on different goals or considerations:

Maybe people want to choose _among_ their top-set, maybe assuming
(incorrectly) that that won't increase the probability of electing from
their bottom-set.

Maybe, due to overcompromising tendency, or rivalry among similar parties,
voters need rankings, to avoid or mitigate their resulting voting-errors.

...justifying a rank method.

If a method meets MMC, and if a voter is majority-favored (MF), then s/he
can rank sincerely, & if hir mutual majority do so too, then the winner
will be in hir top-set.

In other words, s/he can choose among hir top-set in complete safety.

Smith//Approval & IRV meet MMC, and so they both offer that guarantee to a
MF voter.

So far, so good.

But wait...What if you aren't MF?

Then in Smith//Approval, what does it take to try to protect your top-set?

The CWs is likely to be in many top-sets, likely in yours. Good rank
methods have som protection for the CWs.

In an FBC method like Bucklin, you can effectively vote, Aporoval-style.
Top-voting one top-set member won't hurt another one.

In Smith//Approval, that's not so.

In methods with wv strategy, a CW's win isn't lost by truncation from one
side.

...& burial should be deterred if the CWs's voters plump.

...& if burial is done anyway, then that hands the win to the opposite
wing. If that's your wing, then that's better than the CWs.

Smith//Approval doesn't have wv strategy.

Bucklin, & wv- strategy methods, but not Smith//Approval, let the CWs's
voters protect the CWs by plumping.

By Approval standards, Smith//Approval isn't as good as Approval.

By ranking method goals & considerations, it isn't as good as Bucklin or
wv- strategy methods.

I don't know the answers to the 2 questions below. Replying farther down.
Post by C.Benham
(1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?
Post by C.Benham
(2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?
And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?
See above.

Michael Ossipoff
Post by C.Benham
Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition.
But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
Post by C.Benham
Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
...the right answer in such a method.
Post by C.Benham
But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .
Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
Post by C.Benham
Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less and
supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
Post by C.Benham
Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for each
"accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
Post by C.Benham
I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
"25%" figure looks arbitrary.
Post by C.Benham
With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
Mono-add-Plump.
Post by C.Benham
Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y that
is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do nothing
Post by C.Benham
but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is no
longer eliminated and wins.
Post by C.Benham
Chris Benham
Post by Jameson Quinn
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
plurality loser.
Post by C.Benham
So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
needed to protect the CWs's win.
Post by C.Benham
Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle
Cws has the smallest faction.
Post by C.Benham
And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or
burial vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more
favorable to finding vulnerability.
Post by C.Benham
But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a
distinction about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in
IRV, Benham, and Woodall.
Post by C.Benham
There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level of
(endquote)
Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side can't
take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter burial by
mere plumping.
Post by C.Benham
No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.
Post by C.Benham
As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.
Post by C.Benham
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even
under honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere
favorite.
Post by C.Benham
(endquote)
Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a matter
of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
Post by C.Benham
That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.
Post by C.Benham
If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
Post by C.Benham
Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years
or so.
Post by C.Benham
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
Post by C.Benham
(endquote)
Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from
Condorcet, it's choosing socially better.
Post by C.Benham
Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different result.
Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if that
were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
particular individual candidate you can.
Post by C.Benham
CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing
_among_ your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
Post by C.Benham
(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
important thing.
Post by C.Benham
Approve (only) your top-set.
(More about that in my post yesterday)
But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason for voters in
Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.
Post by C.Benham
When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past the
CWse.
Post by C.Benham
Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having a
social agreement to that effect.
Post by C.Benham
What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
Post by C.Benham
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
Post by C.Benham
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
Post by C.Benham
The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the
CW near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing
near-bottom score.
Post by C.Benham
(endquote)
Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
should plump.
Post by C.Benham
But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated
above, & in earlier posts.
Post by C.Benham
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
Post by C.Benham
No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the
right answer in such a method.
Post by C.Benham
With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail,
depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't
win.
Post by C.Benham
; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if
the CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
it actually occurs.
Post by C.Benham
Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
Post by C.Benham
But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting
the best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.
Post by C.Benham
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump
to counteract SHOS.
Post by C.Benham
Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the
election of someone in your bottom-set.
Post by C.Benham
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
Post by C.Benham
(endquote)
That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on
Bucklin strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the
lack of CD enough to compete with the best methods.
Post by C.Benham
Michael Ossipoff
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Michael Ossipoff
2016-10-25 18:51:22 UTC
Permalink
Ok, maybe you're right, & maybe, among Smith methods, Smith//Approval does
the best, in terms of choosing from the most top-sets.

In fact maybe, compared to other rank methods in general, it does best by
that standard.

I was comparing it to other rank-methods by a standard based on CWs (only
indirectly related to top-sets), ignoring the Approval in Smith//Approval.

Thanks for pointing that out. ...pointing out something I'd missed.

Michael Ossipoff
When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
choosing socially better.
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
Mike,
Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
Smith//Approval (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.
(1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?
(2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?
And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?
Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition.
But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
...the right answer in such a method.
But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
"25%" figure looks arbitrary.
With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
Mono-add-Plump.
Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y that
is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do nothing
but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is no
longer eliminated and wins.
Chris Benham
Post by Jameson Quinn
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
plurality loser.
So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
needed to protect the CWs's win.
Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle
Cws has the smallest faction.
And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or burial
vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more favorable to
finding vulnerability.
But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a distinction
about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in IRV, Benham,
and Woodall.
There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level of
(endquote)
Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side can't
take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter burial by
mere plumping.
No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.
As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even under
honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere favorite.
(endquote)
Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a matter
of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.
If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years
or so.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
(endquote)
Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet,
it's choosing socially better.
Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different result.
Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if that
were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
particular individual candidate you can.
CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing _among_
your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
important thing.
Approve (only) your top-set.
(More about that in my post yesterday)
But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason for voters in
Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.
When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past the
CWse.
Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having a
social agreement to that effect.
What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the CW
near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing near-bottom
score.
(endquote)
Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
should plump.
But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated above,
& in earlier posts.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the
right answer in such a method.
With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail,
depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't
win.
; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if the
CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
it actually occurs.
Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting the
best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump to
counteract SHOS.
Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the
election of someone in your bottom-set.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
(endquote)
That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on Bucklin
strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the lack of
CD enough to compete with the best methods.
Michael Ossipoff
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Michael Ossipoff
2016-10-25 18:55:48 UTC
Permalink
But MMPO's Weak CD remains as an advantage, because the chicken dilemma can
be a nuisance in Approval.

So MMPO isn't completely ruled out.

Michael Ossipoff
When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
choosing socially better.
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
Mike,
Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
Smith//Approval (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.
(1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?
(2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?
And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?
Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition.
But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
...the right answer in such a method.
But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
"25%" figure looks arbitrary.
With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
Mono-add-Plump.
Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y that
is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do nothing
but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is no
longer eliminated and wins.
Chris Benham
Post by Jameson Quinn
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
plurality loser.
So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
needed to protect the CWs's win.
Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle
Cws has the smallest faction.
And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or burial
vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more favorable to
finding vulnerability.
But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a distinction
about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in IRV, Benham,
and Woodall.
There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level of
(endquote)
Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side can't
take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter burial by
mere plumping.
No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.
As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even under
honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere favorite.
(endquote)
Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a matter
of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.
If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years
or so.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
(endquote)
Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet,
it's choosing socially better.
Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different result.
Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if that
were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
particular individual candidate you can.
CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing _among_
your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
important thing.
Approve (only) your top-set.
(More about that in my post yesterday)
But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason for voters in
Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.
When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past the
CWse.
Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having a
social agreement to that effect.
What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the best
particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the CW
near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing near-bottom
score.
(endquote)
Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
should plump.
But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated above,
& in earlier posts.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the
right answer in such a method.
With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail,
depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't
win.
; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if the
CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
it actually occurs.
Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting the
best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump to
counteract SHOS.
Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the
election of someone in your bottom-set.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
(endquote)
That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on Bucklin
strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the lack of
CD enough to compete with the best methods.
Michael Ossipoff
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Michael Ossipoff
2016-10-25 22:34:21 UTC
Permalink
Oops! Smith//Approval is disqualified by its FBC failure.

Michael Ossipoff
Post by Michael Ossipoff
But MMPO's Weak CD remains as an advantage, because the chicken dilemma
can be a nuisance in Approval.
So MMPO isn't completely ruled out.
Michael Ossipoff
When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
choosing socially better.
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
Mike,
Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
Smith//Approval (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.
(1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?
(2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?
And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?
Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition.
But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
...the right answer in such a method.
But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
"25%" figure looks arbitrary.
With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
Mono-add-Plump.
Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y that
is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do nothing
but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is no
longer eliminated and wins.
Chris Benham
Post by Jameson Quinn
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
plurality loser.
So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
needed to protect the CWs's win.
Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle
Cws has the smallest faction.
And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or
burial vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more
favorable to finding vulnerability.
But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a distinction
about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in IRV, Benham,
and Woodall.
There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level of
(endquote)
Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side can't
take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter burial by
mere plumping.
No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.
As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even
under honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere
favorite.
(endquote)
Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a matter
of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.
If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years
or so.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
(endquote)
Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from
Condorcet, it's choosing socially better.
Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different result.
Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if that
were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
particular individual candidate you can.
CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing _among_
your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
important thing.
Approve (only) your top-set.
(More about that in my post yesterday)
But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason for voters in
Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.
When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past the
CWse.
Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having a
social agreement to that effect.
What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the CW
near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing near-bottom
score.
(endquote)
Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
should plump.
But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated above,
& in earlier posts.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the
right answer in such a method.
With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail,
depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't
win.
; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if
the CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
it actually occurs.
Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting
the best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump
to counteract SHOS.
Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the
election of someone in your bottom-set.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
(endquote)
That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on
Bucklin strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the
lack of CD enough to compete with the best methods.
Michael Ossipoff
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Michael Ossipoff
2016-10-25 22:35:48 UTC
Permalink
Oops! Smith//Approval is disqualified by its FBC failure

Michael Ossipoff
Post by Michael Ossipoff
But MMPO's Weak CD remains as an advantage, because the chicken dilemma
can be a nuisance in Approval.
So MMPO isn't completely ruled out.
Michael Ossipoff
When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
choosing socially better.
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
Mike,
Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
Smith//Approval (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.
(1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?
(2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?
And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?
Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition.
But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
...the right answer in such a method.
But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
"25%" figure looks arbitrary.
With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
Mono-add-Plump.
Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y that
is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do nothing
but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is no
longer eliminated and wins.
Chris Benham
Post by Jameson Quinn
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
plurality loser.
So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
needed to protect the CWs's win.
Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle
Cws has the smallest faction.
And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or
burial vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more
favorable to finding vulnerability.
But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a distinction
about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in IRV, Benham,
and Woodall.
There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level of
(endquote)
Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side can't
take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter burial by
mere plumping.
No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.
As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even
under honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere
favorite.
(endquote)
Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a matter
of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.
If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30 years
or so.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
(endquote)
Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from
Condorcet, it's choosing socially better.
Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different result.
Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if that
were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
particular individual candidate you can.
CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing _among_
your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
important thing.
Approve (only) your top-set.
(More about that in my post yesterday)
But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason for voters in
Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.
When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past the
CWse.
Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having a
social agreement to that effect.
What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the CW
near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing near-bottom
score.
(endquote)
Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
should plump.
But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated above,
& in earlier posts.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins. ...the
right answer in such a method.
With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail,
depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't
win.
; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if
the CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
it actually occurs.
Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting
the best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump
to counteract SHOS.
Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the
election of someone in your bottom-set.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
(endquote)
That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on
Bucklin strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the
lack of CD enough to compete with the best methods.
Michael Ossipoff
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
C.Benham
2016-10-26 02:48:16 UTC
Permalink
You mean "disqualified" like all other Condorcet methods?

Chris Benham
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Oops! Smith//Approval is disqualified by its FBC failure
Michael Ossipoff
On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 2:55 PM, Michael Ossipoff
But MMPO's Weak CD remains as an advantage, because the chicken
dilemma can be a nuisance in Approval.
So MMPO isn't completely ruled out.
Michael Ossipoff
Post by Michael Ossipoff
When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from
Condorcet, it's choosing socially better.
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably
lose under "semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which
the stronger wing truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at
all. In Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from
both sides, as s/he does in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're
after the best particular candidate you can get. But you're
talking about a strategy problem that shouldn't concern
voters in Approval.
Mike,
Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
Smith//Approval (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.
(1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by
the smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?
(2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?
And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by
definition. But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the
wrong answer.
Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he
still wins. ...the right answer in such a method.
But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .
Post by Michael Ossipoff
* Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each
candidate. Default is abstain.
* Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50%
or less and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any
candidates are acceptable, eliminate all who aren't.
* Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1
point for each "accept", and half a point for each
"abstain". Highest points wins.
I still hate default being anything other than
bottom/"reject", and the "25%" figure looks arbitrary.
With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
Mono-add-Plump.
Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other
candidate Y that is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding
some ballots that do nothing
but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that
now Y is no longer eliminated and wins.
Chris Benham
Post by Michael Ossipoff
On Oct 23, 2016 8:21 AM, "Jameson Quinn"
Post by Jameson Quinn
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW
is the plurality loser.
So it refers to a special case of the problem of the
defensive strategy needed to protect the CWs's win.
Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is
when a middle Cws has the smallest faction.
And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for
truncation or burial vulnerability, I use such an example,
because it seems more favorable to finding vulnerability.
But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a
distinction about that except that it's part of the
problem-examples in IRV, Benham, and Woodall.
There are different levels of the problem, characterized by
(endquote)
Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one
side can't take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's
voters can deter burial by mere plumping.
No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than
sincerely in methods with wv strategy.
As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or
general pairwise-count methods.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to
win even under honesty, the weaker of the two wings must
betray their sincere favorite.
(endquote)
Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's
more a matter of which wing candidate is preferred by the
CWs's voters.
That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if
you're majority-favored.
If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't
in a mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no
better than Plurality.
Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the
past 30 years or so.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not
win under "honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do
not, they should not.
(endquote)
Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently
from Condorcet, it's choosing socially better.
Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a
different result.
Approval let's people protect the CWs, without
favorite-burial, if that were what they want to do. ...and
I suggest that it isn't, because electing from your top-set
is usually more important than electing the best particular
individual candidate you can.
CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about
choosing _among_ your top-set, to elect the best particular
candidate you can.
(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it
is the important thing.
Approve (only) your top-set.
(More about that in my post yesterday)
But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having
a majority who'd prefer a different result, then that could
be a reason for voters in Approval to slightly modify their
voting to avoid approving past the expected CWs (CWse).
...though that would lower your Pt.
When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of
approving past the CWse.
Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your
wing-faction having a social agreement to that effect.
What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably
lose under "semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which
the stronger wing truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at
all. In Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from
both sides, as s/he does in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're
after the best particular candidate you can get. But you're
talking about a strategy problem that shouldn't concern
voters in Approval.
The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to
give the CW near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the
stronger wing near-bottom score.
(endquote)
Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can
get. Then obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs,
and the CWs's voters should plump.
But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons
stated above, & in earlier posts.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by
definition. But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the
wrong answer.
No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still
wins. ...the right answer in such a method.
With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or
fail, depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either
way, the CWs doesn't win.
; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and
backfires if the CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing.
Note that even a strategy backfire here is not in my opinion
a "good" result; because the strategy has some chance of
winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic backfire
is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad
thing if it actually occurs.
Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal
of getting the best individual candidate you can get, wv
strategy improves on Bucklin, because, even if people
misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't plump, the
mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial,
because the would-be buriers don't have better information
than the defenders have.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must
defensively plump to counteract SHOS.
Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you
rank sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then
that can result in the election of someone in your bottom-set.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does
not defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough
support to the CW to protect them from SHOS, without having
to rate them equal-top. (If the CW is only barely a CW, the
weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a successful defense
in this case. However, I think that very tightly-balanced
situations like this are not a large concern.)
(endquote)
That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an
improvement on Bucklin strategy, while keeping FBC, would be
major, & could outweigh the lack of CD enough to compete with
the best methods.
Michael Ossipoff
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
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Michael Ossipoff
2016-10-26 06:33:21 UTC
Permalink
MAM is fine for polls, especially if experience shows that voting is
sincere.

But official elections need FBC. Especially for current conditions, but in
general I consider it a basic requirement for official elections.

Michael Ossipoff
Right.
Condorcet tries for something ambitious, at the cost of something basic.
Michael Ossipoff
Post by C.Benham
You mean "disqualified" like all other Condorcet methods?
Chris Benham
Oops! Smith//Approval is disqualified by its FBC failure
Michael Ossipoff
Post by Michael Ossipoff
But MMPO's Weak CD remains as an advantage, because the chicken dilemma
can be a nuisance in Approval.
So MMPO isn't completely ruled out.
Michael Ossipoff
When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from Condorcet, it's
choosing socially better.
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
Mike,
Given my selection of quotes above, I find your negativity on
Smith//Approval (very similar to Max Covered Approval) a bit inconsistent.
(1)How often is a sincere Condorcet winner who is supported by the
smallest of three factions of voters the Approval winner?
(2) How often is the Approval winner not in the Smith set?
And so what is wrong with Condorcet//Approval?
Jameson:-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition.
But under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
Mike: No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
...the right answer in such a method.
But Winning Votes isn't a "CD-compliant method" .
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point
for each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
I still hate default being anything other than bottom/"reject", and the
"25%" figure looks arbitrary.
With the default rule as it is, it looks like the method fails
Mono-add-Plump.
Say the winner X has a lower point score than some other candidate Y
that is barely rejected by over 50%. Then adding some ballots that do
nothing
but "support" X could raise the 50% threshold enough so that now Y is
no longer eliminated and wins.
Chris Benham
Post by Jameson Quinn
Center squeeze occurs in 3-candidate election when the CW is the
plurality loser.
So it refers to a special case of the problem of the defensive strategy
needed to protect the CWs's win.
Certainly, in IRV, Benham, & Woodall, the main problem is when a middle
Cws has the smallest faction.
And, in other pairwise-count methods, when I test for truncation or
burial vulnerability, I use such an example, because it seems more
favorable to finding vulnerability.
But a CWs can lose without being smallest, and I don't make a
distinction about that except that it's part of the problem-examples in
IRV, Benham, and Woodall.
There are different levels of the problem, characterized by the level
(endquote)
Sure. I was saying that with wv strategy, truncation from one side
can't take the win from the CWs. ...& that the CWs's voters can deter
burial by mere plumping.
No need for the non-offensive wing to vote any less than sincerely in
methods with wv strategy.
As you know, that isn't so with other Condorcet versions or general
pairwise-count methods.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like IRV or plurality, in order for the CW to win even
under honesty, the weaker of the two wings must betray their sincere
favorite.
(endquote)
Well, it isn't so much the size of the wing factions. It's more a
matter of which wing candidate is preferred by the CWs's voters.
That's why I've been saying that IRV is fine for you if you're
majority-favored.
If the CWs's voters transfer the other way, then you aren't in a
mutual-majority, and then, for you, IRV is then no better than Plurality.
Many of us have been explaining that to Rob Richie for the past 30
years or so.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In systems like approval and score, the CW may or may not win under
"honesty" (however defined). Arguably, if they do not, they should not.
(endquote)
Correct. When sincerely-voted Approval chooses differently from
Condorcet, it's choosing socially better.
Sure, not choosing the CWs got IRV repealed in Burlington.
Not electing the CWs results in a majority who'd prefer a different result.
Approval let's people protect the CWs, without favorite-burial, if
that were what they want to do. ...and I suggest that it isn't, because
electing from your top-set is usually more important than electing the best
particular individual candidate you can.
CWs protection is more for rank methods, which are about choosing
_among_ your top-set, to elect the best particular candidate you can.
(But see my earlier post yesterday, about that.)
If you have a top-set, then, by definition, electing from it is the
important thing.
Approve (only) your top-set.
(More about that in my post yesterday)
But, if it turned out to be really important to avoid having a majority
who'd prefer a different result, then that could be a reason for voters in
Approval to slightly modify their voting to avoid approving past the
expected CWs (CWse). ...though that would lower your Pt.
When approving your top-set, you'd just stop short of approving past
the CWse.
Yesterday, too, I spoke of the possibility of your wing-faction having
a social agreement to that effect.
What you're saying doesn't contract what I've been saying.
But even if they do win under honesty, they will probably lose under
"semi-honest offensive strategy" (SHOS) in which the stronger wing
truncates the CW to equal-bottom.
(endquote)
In rank methods, we've been calling that offensive truncation.
In Approval, I don't regard it as an offensive strategy at all. In
Approval, the middle CWs doesn't need support from both sides, as s/he does
in general pairwise-count methods.
The larger wing isn't the one that needs the CWs, if you're after the
best particular candidate you can get. But you're talking about a strategy
problem that shouldn't concern voters in Approval.
The defensive strategies that work are for the weaker wing to give the
CW near-top score, and/or the CW faction to give the stronger wing
near-bottom score.
(endquote)
Both, if people are trying for the best candidate they can get. Then
obviously the smaller wing should support the CWs, and the CWs's voters
should plump.
But I don't suggest that goal for Approval, for the reasons stated
above, & in earlier posts.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In Condorcet systems, the CW wins under honesty by definition. But
under SHOS, any CD-compliant method gets the wrong answer.
No. In wv, a CWs isn't vulnerable to truncation. S/he still wins.
...the right answer in such a method.
With burial, a potentially successful buial can succeed or fail,
depending on whether the CWs's voters plump. Either way, the CWs doesn't
win.
; the strategy is effective if the CW faction plumps, and backfires if
the CW faction cooperates with the weaker wing. Note that even a strategy
backfire here is not in my opinion a "good" result; because the strategy
has some chance of winning, it will be sometimes attempted. Strategic
backfire is a good thing if it discourages the strategy, but a bad thing if
it actually occurs.
Yes, that's what makes Condorcet at least a bit questionable.
...especially with the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.
But it can probably be argued that, with rank methods' goal of getting
the best individual candidate you can get, wv strategy improves on Bucklin,
because, even if people misjudge who the CWs is, and so hir voters don't
plump, the mere threat of plumping could be enough to deter burial, because
the would-be buriers don't have better information than the defenders have.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In most basic Bucklin systems, the CW faction must defensively plump
to counteract SHOS.
Yes, in Bucklin, if you aren't majority-favored, and if you rank
sincerely, and if the CWs's voters don't plump, then that can result in the
election of someone in your bottom-set.
Post by Jameson Quinn
-In a system like SARA, in most cases, even if the CW does not
defensively plump, the weaker wing can give enough support to the CW to
protect them from SHOS, without having to rate them equal-top. (If the CW
is only barely a CW, the weak wing may have to rate equal-top for a
successful defense in this case. However, I think that very
tightly-balanced situations like this are not a large concern.)
(endquote)
That makes me sit up & take notice, because such an improvement on
Bucklin strategy, while keeping FBC, would be major, & could outweigh the
lack of CD enough to compete with the best methods.
Michael Ossipoff
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Jameson Quinn
2016-10-25 20:07:17 UTC
Permalink
I've tweaked the wording for SARA again. The only substantive changes in
outcome from this new wording is the change from "50 points or more" to
"more than 50 points".

Here's the latest wording, in 3 steps:

Support Accept Reject Abstain (SARA) works as follows:

1. *Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain. Candidates get 2 points for each percent of "support"
and 1 point for each percent of "accept", for a total of 0-200 points.*
- *"Support" the best candidates (perhaps a quarter of them),
"reject" the worst (perhaps half of them). "Accept" and "abstain" are for
the ones in the high middle range. For those, "accept" if you
want to help
them beat somebody worse, and "abstain" if you could live with
them but are
hoping for somebody better.*
2. *Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that leaves no
candidates with over 50 points.*
- *If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a
majority. But this shouldn't end up defaulting to a candidate
who couldn't
at least get accepted by over 1/2 or supported by over 1/4 (as in, a
majority subfaction of a divided majority, such as Nashville
voters in the
example below).*
3. *Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.*
- *This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.*
Post by Jameson Quinn
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
Michael Ossipoff
2016-10-25 22:41:03 UTC
Permalink
Jameson--

You said that SARA does particularly well by VSE.

But VSE is: (winner's SU)/(average SU among candidates)

...where SU is social utility.

...which is some constant minus BR.

But I've just told why BR is no good as a measure of the rightness or
goodness of an outcome.

Take a dollar from a homeless man and give it to a billionaire? That's a
negative change, because changes in greater disutilities are more important

Michael Ossipoff.
Post by Jameson Quinn
I've tweaked the wording for SARA again. The only substantive changes in
outcome from this new wording is the change from "50 points or more" to
"more than 50 points".
1. *Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain. Candidates get 2 points for each percent of "support"
and 1 point for each percent of "accept", for a total of 0-200 points.*
- *"Support" the best candidates (perhaps a quarter of them),
"reject" the worst (perhaps half of them). "Accept" and "abstain" are for
the ones in the high middle range. For those, "accept" if you want to help
them beat somebody worse, and "abstain" if you could live with them but are
hoping for somebody better.*
2. *Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that leaves
no candidates with over 50 points.*
- *If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a
majority. But this shouldn't end up defaulting to a candidate who couldn't
at least get accepted by over 1/2 or supported by over 1/4 (as in, a
majority subfaction of a divided majority, such as Nashville voters in the
example below).*
3. *Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.*
- *This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.*
Post by Jameson Quinn
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
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Jameson Quinn
2016-10-26 12:31:53 UTC
Permalink
Michael, you're arguing that certain kinds of utility or disutility are
more important than others. As a human being with my own judgment and
morals, I'd agree with you. But it's not just impossible, but actively
counterproductive, to try to build that kind of judgment and morals into a
voting system. If a voting system weights certain kinds of ballots more,
sophisticated voters will strategically cast that kind of ballots, and
unsophisticated voters will be ignored.

VSE (aka BR) is, in fact, the right target to aim at. It does not include
any judgment or morals, but, by an argument similar to the Condorcet Jury
Theorem, in the long run it's got the best chance of agreeing with a system
with did. To take your specific example: there are a lot more homeless
people than billionaires, so in general a democratic election system will
(correctly) weight the preferences of homeless people above those of
billionaires. (And if the billionaires can successfully trick all the
homeless people into thinking they prefer a candidate who will actually
serve the billionaires, there's nothing the voting system per se can do
about that.)
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Jameson--
You said that SARA does particularly well by VSE.
But VSE is: (winner's SU)/(average SU among candidates)
...where SU is social utility.
...which is some constant minus BR.
But I've just told why BR is no good as a measure of the rightness or
goodness of an outcome.
Take a dollar from a homeless man and give it to a billionaire? That's a
negative change, because changes in greater disutilities are more important
Michael Ossipoff.
Post by Jameson Quinn
I've tweaked the wording for SARA again. The only substantive changes in
outcome from this new wording is the change from "50 points or more" to
"more than 50 points".
1. *Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain. Candidates get 2 points for each percent of "support"
and 1 point for each percent of "accept", for a total of 0-200 points.*
- *"Support" the best candidates (perhaps a quarter of them),
"reject" the worst (perhaps half of them). "Accept" and "abstain" are for
the ones in the high middle range. For those, "accept" if you want to help
them beat somebody worse, and "abstain" if you could live with them but are
hoping for somebody better.*
2. *Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that leaves
no candidates with over 50 points.*
- *If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a
majority. But this shouldn't end up defaulting to a candidate who couldn't
at least get accepted by over 1/2 or supported by over 1/4 (as in, a
majority subfaction of a divided majority, such as Nashville voters in the
example below).*
3. *Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.*
- *This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.*
Post by Jameson Quinn
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point for
each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
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Toby Pereira
2016-10-26 14:28:39 UTC
Permalink
Also, a given amount of money is worth more in utility to a poor person than a rich person, so Michael's analogy of taking a dollar from a homeless person and giving it to a billionaire doesn't work. I know he gave a previous example where the billionaire gets a yacht or something and it does get more debatable at that point.
But I don't think the maximum minimum utility is necessarily even the best principle to use anyway. There are good arguments for maximising average utility. If I am given 100 dollars, then there is an amount of money that I would gamble that for on a coin flip, or where I'd call them equivalent. Let's say I decide that I'd gamble it for anything more than 300 dollars. That's the same as me saying that for me the difference in utility between 0 and 100 dollars is the same as the difference between 100 and 300 dollars. It is also equivalent to saying that if there are two people with the same utility ratings as me, it's as good to give one of them 300 dollars as it is to give each of them 100 dollars. (Obviously you can argue about loss of utility through envy and perceived unfairness, but that's a separate issue - you don't need to tell the loser what happened.)
I have the same intuitions about rich/poor people, but you need a logically consistent framework as well as intuitions.


From: Jameson Quinn <***@gmail.com>
To: Michael Ossipoff <***@gmail.com>
Cc: "election-***@electorama.com" <election-***@electorama.com>
Sent: Wednesday, 26 October 2016, 13:31
Subject: Re: [EM] SARA voting: easier-to-describe MAS

Michael, you're arguing that certain kinds of utility or disutility are more important than others. As a human being with my own judgment and morals, I'd agree with you. But it's not just impossible, but actively counterproductive, to try to build that kind of judgment and morals into a voting system. If a voting system weights certain kinds of ballots more, sophisticated voters will strategically cast that kind of ballots, and unsophisticated voters will be ignored. 
VSE (aka BR) is, in fact, the right target to aim at. It does not include any judgment or morals, but, by an argument similar to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in the long run it's got the best chance of agreeing with a system with did. To take your specific example: there are a lot more homeless people than billionaires, so in general a democratic election system will (correctly) weight the preferences of homeless people above those of billionaires. (And if the billionaires can successfully trick all the homeless people into thinking they prefer a candidate who will actually serve the billionaires, there's nothing the voting system per se can do about that.)
2016-10-25 18:41 GMT-04:00 Michael Ossipoff <***@gmail.com>:

Jameson--

You said that SARA does particularly well by VSE.

But VSE is: (winner's SU)/(average SU among candidates)

...where SU is social utility.

...which is some constant minus BR.

But I've just told why BR is no good as a measure of the rightness or goodness of an outcome.

Take a dollar from a homeless man and give it to a billionaire? That's a negative change, because changes in greater disutilities are more important

Michael Ossipoff.
Michael Ossipoff
2016-10-26 18:47:18 UTC
Permalink
Post by Toby Pereira
Also, a given amount of money is worth more in utility to a poor person
than a rich person, so Michael's analogy of taking a dollar from a homeless
person and giving it to a billionaire doesn't work. I know he gave a
previous example where the billionaire gets a yacht or something and it
does get more debatable at that point.
Yes, I added that chance for that reason.
Post by Toby Pereira
But I don't think the maximum minimum utility is necessarily even the best
principle to use anyway. There are good arguments for maximising average
utility.
I haven't heard one. The argument below doesn't successfully show that.
Post by Toby Pereira
If I am given 100 dollars, then there is an amount of money that I would
gamble that for on a coin flip, or where I'd call them equivalent. Let's
say I decide that I'd gamble it for anything more than 300 dollars. That's
the same as me saying that for me the difference in utility between 0 and
100 dollars is the same as the difference between 100 and 300 dollars. It
is also equivalent to saying that if there are two people with the same
utility ratings as me, it's as good to give one of them 300 dollars as it
is to give each of them 100 dollars.
It results in the same total utility. To say that that means its just as
good, circularly assumes what you seek to show.

You haven't shown that giving one person $300 and giving the other person
nothing is as good as giving $100 to each. ...you've shown only that the
total utility is the same.

You can't justify taking a dollar away from a homeless man who badly needs
it, and giving another yacht to a billionaire.
Post by Toby Pereira
I have the same intuitions about rich/poor people, but you need a
logically consistent framework as well as intuitions.
I don't deny that logic can't apply to some ethical/moral questions. But
logic has nothing to do with the basis of ethical and moral choices.

The basis of ethics & morality is intuitive & subjective, not logical.

Michael Ossipoff

(I have no way to delete the text below)
Post by Toby Pereira
------------------------------
*Sent:* Wednesday, 26 October 2016, 13:31
*Subject:* Re: [EM] SARA voting: easier-to-describe MAS
Michael, you're arguing that certain kinds of utility or disutility are
more important than others. As a human being with my own judgment and
morals, I'd agree with you. But it's not just impossible, but actively
counterproductive, to try to build that kind of judgment and morals into a
voting system. If a voting system weights certain kinds of ballots more,
sophisticated voters will strategically cast that kind of ballots, and
unsophisticated voters will be ignored.
VSE (aka BR) is, in fact, the right target to aim at. It does not include
any judgment or morals, but, by an argument similar to the Condorcet Jury
Theorem, in the long run it's got the best chance of agreeing with a system
with did. To take your specific example: there are a lot more homeless
people than billionaires, so in general a democratic election system will
(correctly) weight the preferences of homeless people above those of
billionaires. (And if the billionaires can successfully trick all the
homeless people into thinking they prefer a candidate who will actually
serve the billionaires, there's nothing the voting system per se can do
about that.)
Jameson--
You said that SARA does particularly well by VSE.
But VSE is: (winner's SU)/(average SU among candidates)
...where SU is social utility.
...which is some constant minus BR.
But I've just told why BR is no good as a measure of the rightness or
goodness of an outcome.
Take a dollar from a homeless man and give it to a billionaire? That's a
negative change, because changes in greater disutilities are more important
Michael Ossipoff.
Toby Pereira
2016-10-27 09:29:30 UTC
Permalink
With the 300/100 dollar example, the gamble is the same as saying that two people would prefer to take a gamble so that one of them wins $301 and the other wins nothing than they both take $100 each guaranteed. Not all people would hold the same utility values, so that particular example wouldn't work for everyone, of course.
But in any case, a maxmin approach doesn't work because most people would take some sort of gamble like the above. Almost all pairs of people would take a coin flip gamble for $1000 rather than a guaranteed $1. Maxmin suggests that the $1 for each is better.
With the yacht example, it could be that even a whole yacht isn't sufficient to equal a dollar in the poor person's eyes. But there are real life examples a little bit like this anyway. Would you ban fairground rides? Each person who has a go on one has only a small increase in their overall lifetime utility for having a ride on one of these, and a very small proportion of people get injured or even killed on them. It would be very hard to justify their existence using any sort of maxmin approach, and most people seem to be taking more of an average utility approach when engaging in some sort of activity that comes with a small risk of injury.


From: Michael Ossipoff <***@gmail.com>
To: Toby Pereira <***@yahoo.co.uk>; "election-***@electorama.com" <election-***@electorama.com>
Sent: Wednesday, 26 October 2016, 19:47
Subject: Re: [EM] SARA voting: easier-to-describe MAS


On Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 10:28 AM, Toby Pereira <***@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:

Also, a given amount of money is worth more in utility to a poor person than a rich person, so Michael's analogy of taking a dollar from a homeless person and giving it to a billionaire doesn't work. I know he gave a previous example where the billionaire gets a yacht or something and it does get more debatable at that point.

Yes, I added that chance for that reason.
 


But I don't think the maximum minimum utility is necessarily even the best principle to use anyway. There are good arguments for maximising average utility.

I haven't heard one. The argument below doesn't successfully show that.

 

If I am given 100 dollars, then there is an amount of money that I would gamble that for on a coin flip, or where I'd call them equivalent. Let's say I decide that I'd gamble it for anything more than 300 dollars. That's the same as me saying that for me the difference in utility between 0 and 100 dollars is the same as the difference between 100 and 300 dollars. It is also equivalent to saying that if there are two people with the same utility ratings as me, it's as good to give one of them 300 dollars as it is to give each of them 100 dollars.

It results in the same total utility. To say that that means its just as good, circularly assumes what you seek to show.

You haven't shown that giving one person $300 and giving the other person nothing is as good as giving $100 to each. ...you've shown only that the total utility is the same.

You can't justify taking a dollar away from a homeless man who badly needs it, and giving another yacht to a billionaire.

 


I have the same intuitions about rich/poor people, but you need a logically consistent framework as well as intuitions.

I don't deny that logic can't apply to some ethical/moral questions. But logic has nothing to do with the basis of ethical and moral choices.

The basis of ethics & morality is intuitive & subjective, not logical.

Michael Ossipoff

(I have no way to delete the text below)
 




 
Michael Ossipoff
2016-10-27 18:25:14 UTC
Permalink
Not having that prize-dollar isn't great disutility. The situation most
likely is exactly as satisfactory for you with or without that dollar, and
that's why you're so willing to gamble it for $1000.

Taking the dollar from the homeless man is quite different. Then it's a
matter of going from bad to considerably more seriously bad. The loss of
his dollar is a lot more than your spending a dollar for a lottery-ticket,
when you don't really miss the loss of a dollar.

Spending your rent money on lottery tickets would be a better example.

The willingness of people to risk their lives on a fairground-ride says
something about how they rate the utilities of the disaster & the fun.
That's all it says. To each their own.

And the fact that the homeless man chose to be on the wrong end of the
economic system? ....Oh wait, he didn't choose it. Nor did he decide to
enter a lottery with a small probability of being a billionaire and a much
larger probability of being homeless. And when a lottery for high
probability of disaster in return for a tiny probability of a huge reward
is available, people very rarely take it.

People riding a fairground ride do enter a lottery for a tiny risk of
losing everything, for a small payoff. But people don't show willingness to
enter lotteries with a high probability of something really bad, in return
for a tiny probability of something extravagantly desirable. (Like spending
your rent money on lottery-tickets).

In the former case, the probability of disaster is small. In the latter
case, it's large.

It's a more than a little callous to say that hurting a homeless person to
help a billionaire is ok. But that's what BR-minimization or VSE
maximization, presented as a measure of social-rightness, says.

Lotteries are used to judge utilities. They don't say or imply what you're
trying to use them to say.

Michael Ossipoff


Michael Ossipoff
Post by Toby Pereira
With the 300/100 dollar example, the gamble is the same as saying that two
people would prefer to take a gamble so that one of them wins $301 and the
other wins nothing than they both take $100 each guaranteed. Not all people
would hold the same utility values, so that particular example wouldn't
work for everyone, of course.
But in any case, a maxmin approach doesn't work because most people would
take some sort of gamble like the above. Almost all pairs of people would
take a coin flip gamble for $1000 rather than a guaranteed $1. Maxmin
suggests that the $1 for each is better.
With the yacht example, it could be that even a whole yacht isn't
sufficient to equal a dollar in the poor person's eyes. But there are real
life examples a little bit like this anyway. Would you ban fairground
rides? Each person who has a go on one has only a small increase in their
overall lifetime utility for having a ride on one of these, and a very
small proportion of people get injured or even killed on them. It would be
very hard to justify their existence using any sort of maxmin approach, and
most people seem to be taking more of an average utility approach when
engaging in some sort of activity that comes with a small risk of injury.
------------------------------
*Sent:* Wednesday, 26 October 2016, 19:47
*Subject:* Re: [EM] SARA voting: easier-to-describe MAS
Also, a given amount of money is worth more in utility to a poor person
than a rich person, so Michael's analogy of taking a dollar from a homeless
person and giving it to a billionaire doesn't work. I know he gave a
previous example where the billionaire gets a yacht or something and it
does get more debatable at that point.
Yes, I added that chance for that reason.
But I don't think the maximum minimum utility is necessarily even the best
principle to use anyway. There are good arguments for maximising average
utility.
I haven't heard one. The argument below doesn't successfully show that.
If I am given 100 dollars, then there is an amount of money that I would
gamble that for on a coin flip, or where I'd call them equivalent. Let's
say I decide that I'd gamble it for anything more than 300 dollars. That's
the same as me saying that for me the difference in utility between 0 and
100 dollars is the same as the difference between 100 and 300 dollars. It
is also equivalent to saying that if there are two people with the same
utility ratings as me, it's as good to give one of them 300 dollars as it
is to give each of them 100 dollars.
It results in the same total utility. To say that that means its just as
good, circularly assumes what you seek to show.
You haven't shown that giving one person $300 and giving the other person
nothing is as good as giving $100 to each. ...you've shown only that the
total utility is the same.
You can't justify taking a dollar away from a homeless man who badly needs
it, and giving another yacht to a billionaire.
I have the same intuitions about rich/poor people, but you need a
logically consistent framework as well as intuitions.
I don't deny that logic can't apply to some ethical/moral questions. But
logic has nothing to do with the basis of ethical and moral choices.
The basis of ethics & morality is intuitive & subjective, not logical.
Michael Ossipoff
(I have no way to delete the text below)
------------------------------
Michael Ossipoff
2016-10-26 17:01:12 UTC
Permalink
Post by Jameson Quinn
Michael, you're arguing that certain kinds of utility or disutility are
more important than others.
A change in a large disutility is more important than the same change in a
small disutility.
Post by Jameson Quinn
As a human being with my own judgment and morals, I'd agree with you. But
it's not just impossible, but actively counterproductive, to try to build
that kind of judgment and morals into a voting system. If a voting system
weights certain kinds of ballots more, sophisticated voters will
strategically cast that kind of ballots, and unsophisticated voters will be
ignored.
Of course. That's why I'd only suggest D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp for a
completely honest and altruistic ideal utopian electorate. .

I like Score-Voting, and I completely agree with CES's advocacy of it,
along with Approval. But minimizing BR definitely isn't what justifies
Score.

As soon as you speak of the social rightness of BR minimization, then
you're already entering the realm of ideal morality & ethics. In that
realm, BR definititely isn't it, because, obviously, changes to a large
disutility are more important than changes to a small disutility.

Approval has a social optimization when people approve only their top-set.
Not utopian, but attainable with any electorate.

In Utopia, for specific action decisions, or maybe for some policy-choices,
we could do better with D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp. Approval would be fine for
electing a candidate or party.

But, because Utopia isn't here (and legitimate elections aren't here
either), then of course it isn't an essential thing to reach agreement on
now.
Post by Jameson Quinn
, but, by an argument similar to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in the long
run it's got the best chance of agreeing with a system with did.
Could you reword that?
Post by Jameson Quinn
To take your specific example: there are a lot more homeless people than
billionaires, so in general a democratic election system will (correctly)
weight the preferences of homeless people above those of billionaires.
Yes, so democracy, if we had it, would give a good result, even without
utopian altruism.
Post by Jameson Quinn
(And if the billionaires can successfully trick all the homeless people
into thinking they prefer a candidate who will actually serve the
billionaires, there's nothing the voting system per se can do about that.)
There's a lot that honest, open media can do about that. Billionaires'
media can & do convince people that Hillary, her corruption, her bad
policies, is the best they can get, but, that position wouldn't hold up at
all in a society in which the media are honest, open, participatory, &
agenda-free.

Anyway, when the elections are illegitimate due to unverifiable
vote-counting, there's no particular reason to believe that the voters and
how they vote have any role in public policy..

Michael Ossipoff

(I don't have a way to delete the text below)



's a negative change, because changes in greater disutilities are more
important

Michael Ossipoff.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Post by Jameson Quinn
I've tweaked the wording for SARA again. The only substantive changes in
outcome from this new wording is the change from "50 points or more" to
"more than 50 points".
1. *Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each
candidate. Default is abstain. Candidates get 2 points for each percent of
"support" and 1 point for each percent of "accept", for a total of 0-200
points.*
- *"Support" the best candidates (perhaps a quarter of them),
"reject" the worst (perhaps half of them). "Accept" and "abstain" are for
the ones in the high middle range. For those, "accept" if you want to help
them beat somebody worse, and "abstain" if you could live with them but are
hoping for somebody better.*
2. *Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that
leaves no candidates with over 50 points.*
- *If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a
majority. But this shouldn't end up defaulting to a candidate who couldn't
at least get accepted by over 1/2 or supported by over 1/4 (as in, a
majority subfaction of a divided majority, such as Nashville voters in the
example below).*
3. *Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.*
- *This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.*
Post by Jameson Quinn
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each candidate.
Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or less
and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are acceptable,
eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point
for each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Jameson Quinn
2016-10-26 17:07:14 UTC
Permalink
My overall point is that, while VSE does not directly and precisely measure
the true "goodness" of the election outcome, if done carefully and if
assumptions are varied, it gives us the best and least-biased measure we
have of that goodness. If you want to criticize it, propose an alternative
framework for evaluating voting systems.
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Post by Jameson Quinn
Michael, you're arguing that certain kinds of utility or disutility are
more important than others.
A change in a large disutility is more important than the same change in a
small disutility.
Post by Jameson Quinn
As a human being with my own judgment and morals, I'd agree with you. But
it's not just impossible, but actively counterproductive, to try to build
that kind of judgment and morals into a voting system. If a voting system
weights certain kinds of ballots more, sophisticated voters will
strategically cast that kind of ballots, and unsophisticated voters will be
ignored.
Of course. That's why I'd only suggest D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp for a
completely honest and altruistic ideal utopian electorate. .
I like Score-Voting, and I completely agree with CES's advocacy of it,
along with Approval. But minimizing BR definitely isn't what justifies
Score.
As soon as you speak of the social rightness of BR minimization, then
you're already entering the realm of ideal morality & ethics. In that
realm, BR definititely isn't it, because, obviously, changes to a large
disutility are more important than changes to a small disutility.
Approval has a social optimization when people approve only their top-set.
Not utopian, but attainable with any electorate.
In Utopia, for specific action decisions, or maybe for some
policy-choices, we could do better with D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp. Approval
would be fine for electing a candidate or party.
But, because Utopia isn't here (and legitimate elections aren't here
either), then of course it isn't an essential thing to reach agreement on
now.
Post by Jameson Quinn
, but, by an argument similar to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in the long
run it's got the best chance of agreeing with a system with did.
Could you reword that?
Post by Jameson Quinn
To take your specific example: there are a lot more homeless people than
billionaires, so in general a democratic election system will (correctly)
weight the preferences of homeless people above those of billionaires.
Yes, so democracy, if we had it, would give a good result, even without
utopian altruism.
Post by Jameson Quinn
(And if the billionaires can successfully trick all the homeless people
into thinking they prefer a candidate who will actually serve the
billionaires, there's nothing the voting system per se can do about that.)
There's a lot that honest, open media can do about that. Billionaires'
media can & do convince people that Hillary, her corruption, her bad
policies, is the best they can get, but, that position wouldn't hold up at
all in a society in which the media are honest, open, participatory, &
agenda-free.
Anyway, when the elections are illegitimate due to unverifiable
vote-counting, there's no particular reason to believe that the voters and
how they vote have any role in public policy..
Michael Ossipoff
(I don't have a way to delete the text below)
's a negative change, because changes in greater disutilities are more
important
Michael Ossipoff.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Post by Jameson Quinn
I've tweaked the wording for SARA again. The only substantive changes
in outcome from this new wording is the change from "50 points or more" to
"more than 50 points".
1. *Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each
candidate. Default is abstain. Candidates get 2 points for each percent of
"support" and 1 point for each percent of "accept", for a total of 0-200
points.*
- *"Support" the best candidates (perhaps a quarter of them),
"reject" the worst (perhaps half of them). "Accept" and "abstain" are for
the ones in the high middle range. For those, "accept" if you want to help
them beat somebody worse, and "abstain" if you could live with them but are
hoping for somebody better.*
2. *Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that
leaves no candidates with over 50 points.*
- *If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a
majority. But this shouldn't end up defaulting to a candidate who couldn't
at least get accepted by over 1/2 or supported by over 1/4 (as in, a
majority subfaction of a divided majority, such as Nashville voters in the
example below).*
3. *Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.*
- *This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.*
Post by Jameson Quinn
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each
candidate. Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or
less and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are
acceptable, eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point
for each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Michael Ossipoff
2016-10-26 18:29:11 UTC
Permalink
Post by Jameson Quinn
My overall point is that, while VSE does not directly and precisely
measure the true "goodness" of the election outcome, if done carefully and
if assumptions are varied, it gives us the best and least-biased measure we
have of that goodness.
It isn't a measure of goodness at all, as my homeless-man/billionaire
example shows.
.
Yes, D2, D3, Dexp & Dhyp are arbitrary.

Well, maybe D2 isn't so arbitrary, when it says that the importance of
changing a disutility is proportional to the magnitude of the disutility.

But D2, D3, Dexp & Dhyp all resemble what we know to be right. ...what we
intuitively and subjectively know to be right. And the basis of
ethics/morality _is_ intuitive and subjective.
Post by Jameson Quinn
If you want to criticize it, propose an alternative framework for
evaluating voting systems.
That's what I've been doing.

For one thing, I used D1, D2, D3, Dexp & Dhyp to evaluate the
election-result in Forest's example. They all choose candidate D in the
example., suggesting that D is the right choice by the best ethical/moral
standards.

Of course I claim that D1 isn't the good measure that the others are. If
the others agreed with eachother but not with D1, then I'd say that their
conclusion is the one that is right.

I've also been saying that voting systems should be evaluated according to
how little a voter needs insincere strategy to make hir best effort to
achieve what s/he wants to achieve.

I suggest that, if you have a top-set, then electing from that top-set is,
by the definition of a top-set, the most important voting-goal for you.

Though it does't match the "sincerity" definition that I use with criteria,
I suggest that top-voting one's top-set is sincere in a meaningful sense.

A lot of people want to vote _among_ their top-set too. I've been arguing
that, in general, doing so lowers their Pt (probability of electing from
their top-set), and is therefore suboptimal.

But I recognize that people might want rankings, or need them for reasons
that I've described in previous posts. In a method that strictly or
effectively meets MMC, a majority-favored (MF) voter can safely rank
sincerely, choosing among hir top-set, if the other members of hir
mutual-majority (MM) do so too.

But, for one thing, you can't always be sure if you're MF, and guessing
that you are must result in a suboptimal ballot.

For another thing, not everyone will be MF, and so that takes some of the
importance away from MMC.

These considerations take away the advantages of rank methods over Approval.

...except that there remains the fact that MMPO meets Weak CD, in addition
to FBC, and its Strong CD failure is mitigated by its deterrence of burial.

If you aren't MF, then ranking is suboptimal, so, in Bucklin or MMPO it
would be better to approval-vote, to equal-top-rank your top-set.

That's why I claim that FBC, so that top-voting one candidate won't undo
the benefit of top-voting another candidate, is necessary, based on the
above standards for evaluating voting-systems.

But, if some people will want to rank anyway, then it becomes desirable to
minimize the insincere strategy that they need, to elect from their
top-set, or just to elect the best individual candidate they can (which is
why they want to rank).

The CWs is the best individual candidate that they one can get. Also, the
CWs is maybe most likely (but certainly not necessarily) the candidate who
is in the most people's top-set. So, if you aren't MF, then at least it's
in your interest to elect the CWs.

So I've been evaluating methods according to how much insincere strategy is
needed to protect the CWs's win.

So yes, I've been proposing an alternative framework for evaluating
voting-systems.

Michael Ossipoff

(I don't have a way to delete the text below)
Post by Jameson Quinn
My overall point is that, while VSE does not directly and precisely
measure the true "goodness" of the election outcome, if done carefully and
if assumptions are varied, it gives us the best and least-biased measure we
have of that goodness.
It isn't a measure of goodness at all, as my homeless-man/billionaire
example shows.
.
Yes, D2, D3, Dexp & Dhyp are arbitrary.

Well, maybe D2 isn't so arbitrary, when it says that the importance of
changing a disutility is proportional to the magnitude of the disutility.

But D2, D3, Dexp & Dhyp all resemble what we know to be right. ...what we
intuitively and subjectively know to be right. And the basis of
ethics/morality _is_ intuitive and subjective.
Post by Jameson Quinn
If you want to criticize it, propose an alternative framework for
evaluating voting systems.
That's what I've been doing.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Post by Jameson Quinn
Michael, you're arguing that certain kinds of utility or disutility are
more important than others.
A change in a large disutility is more important than the same change in
a small disutility.
Post by Jameson Quinn
As a human being with my own judgment and morals, I'd agree with you.
But it's not just impossible, but actively counterproductive, to try to
build that kind of judgment and morals into a voting system. If a voting
system weights certain kinds of ballots more, sophisticated voters will
strategically cast that kind of ballots, and unsophisticated voters will be
ignored.
Of course. That's why I'd only suggest D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp for a
completely honest and altruistic ideal utopian electorate. .
I like Score-Voting, and I completely agree with CES's advocacy of it,
along with Approval. But minimizing BR definitely isn't what justifies
Score.
As soon as you speak of the social rightness of BR minimization, then
you're already entering the realm of ideal morality & ethics. In that
realm, BR definititely isn't it, because, obviously, changes to a large
disutility are more important than changes to a small disutility.
Approval has a social optimization when people approve only their
top-set. Not utopian, but attainable with any electorate.
In Utopia, for specific action decisions, or maybe for some
policy-choices, we could do better with D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp. Approval
would be fine for electing a candidate or party.
But, because Utopia isn't here (and legitimate elections aren't here
either), then of course it isn't an essential thing to reach agreement on
now.
Post by Jameson Quinn
, but, by an argument similar to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in the long
run it's got the best chance of agreeing with a system with did.
Could you reword that?
Post by Jameson Quinn
To take your specific example: there are a lot more homeless people than
billionaires, so in general a democratic election system will (correctly)
weight the preferences of homeless people above those of billionaires.
Yes, so democracy, if we had it, would give a good result, even without
utopian altruism.
Post by Jameson Quinn
(And if the billionaires can successfully trick all the homeless people
into thinking they prefer a candidate who will actually serve the
billionaires, there's nothing the voting system per se can do about that.)
There's a lot that honest, open media can do about that. Billionaires'
media can & do convince people that Hillary, her corruption, her bad
policies, is the best they can get, but, that position wouldn't hold up at
all in a society in which the media are honest, open, participatory, &
agenda-free.
Anyway, when the elections are illegitimate due to unverifiable
vote-counting, there's no particular reason to believe that the voters and
how they vote have any role in public policy..
Michael Ossipoff
(I don't have a way to delete the text below)
's a negative change, because changes in greater disutilities are more
important
Michael Ossipoff.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Post by Jameson Quinn
I've tweaked the wording for SARA again. The only substantive changes
in outcome from this new wording is the change from "50 points or more" to
"more than 50 points".
1. *Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each
candidate. Default is abstain. Candidates get 2 points for each percent of
"support" and 1 point for each percent of "accept", for a total of 0-200
points.*
- *"Support" the best candidates (perhaps a quarter of them),
"reject" the worst (perhaps half of them). "Accept" and "abstain" are for
the ones in the high middle range. For those, "accept" if you want to help
them beat somebody worse, and "abstain" if you could live with them but are
hoping for somebody better.*
2. *Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that
leaves no candidates with over 50 points.*
- *If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a
majority. But this shouldn't end up defaulting to a candidate who couldn't
at least get accepted by over 1/2 or supported by over 1/4 (as in, a
majority subfaction of a divided majority, such as Nashville voters in the
example below).*
3. *Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.*
- *This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.*
Post by Jameson Quinn
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each
candidate. Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or
less and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are
acceptable, eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point
for each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
take away some of the advantage of rank methods over Approval.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Post by Jameson Quinn
Michael, you're arguing that certain kinds of utility or disutility are
more important than others.
A change in a large disutility is more important than the same change in
a small disutility.
Post by Jameson Quinn
As a human being with my own judgment and morals, I'd agree with you.
But it's not just impossible, but actively counterproductive, to try to
build that kind of judgment and morals into a voting system. If a voting
system weights certain kinds of ballots more, sophisticated voters will
strategically cast that kind of ballots, and unsophisticated voters will be
ignored.
Of course. That's why I'd only suggest D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp for a
completely honest and altruistic ideal utopian electorate. .
I like Score-Voting, and I completely agree with CES's advocacy of it,
along with Approval. But minimizing BR definitely isn't what justifies
Score.
As soon as you speak of the social rightness of BR minimization, then
you're already entering the realm of ideal morality & ethics. In that
realm, BR definititely isn't it, because, obviously, changes to a large
disutility are more important than changes to a small disutility.
Approval has a social optimization when people approve only their
top-set. Not utopian, but attainable with any electorate.
In Utopia, for specific action decisions, or maybe for some
policy-choices, we could do better with D2, D3, Dexp or Dhyp. Approval
would be fine for electing a candidate or party.
But, because Utopia isn't here (and legitimate elections aren't here
either), then of course it isn't an essential thing to reach agreement on
now.
Post by Jameson Quinn
, but, by an argument similar to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in the long
run it's got the best chance of agreeing with a system with did.
Could you reword that?
Post by Jameson Quinn
To take your specific example: there are a lot more homeless people than
billionaires, so in general a democratic election system will (correctly)
weight the preferences of homeless people above those of billionaires.
Yes, so democracy, if we had it, would give a good result, even without
utopian altruism.
Post by Jameson Quinn
(And if the billionaires can successfully trick all the homeless people
into thinking they prefer a candidate who will actually serve the
billionaires, there's nothing the voting system per se can do about that.)
There's a lot that honest, open media can do about that. Billionaires'
media can & do convince people that Hillary, her corruption, her bad
policies, is the best they can get, but, that position wouldn't hold up at
all in a society in which the media are honest, open, participatory, &
agenda-free.
Anyway, when the elections are illegitimate due to unverifiable
vote-counting, there's no particular reason to believe that the voters and
how they vote have any role in public policy..
Michael Ossipoff
(I don't have a way to delete the text below)
's a negative change, because changes in greater disutilities are more
important
Michael Ossipoff.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Post by Jameson Quinn
I've tweaked the wording for SARA again. The only substantive changes
in outcome from this new wording is the change from "50 points or more" to
"more than 50 points".
1. *Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each
candidate. Default is abstain. Candidates get 2 points for each percent of
"support" and 1 point for each percent of "accept", for a total of 0-200
points.*
- *"Support" the best candidates (perhaps a quarter of them),
"reject" the worst (perhaps half of them). "Accept" and "abstain" are for
the ones in the high middle range. For those, "accept" if you want to help
them beat somebody worse, and "abstain" if you could live with them but are
hoping for somebody better.*
2. *Eliminate any candidates rejected by over 50%, unless that
leaves no candidates with over 50 points.*
- *If possible, the winner shouldn't be somebody opposed by a
majority. But this shouldn't end up defaulting to a candidate who couldn't
at least get accepted by over 1/2 or supported by over 1/4 (as in, a
majority subfaction of a divided majority, such as Nashville voters in the
example below).*
3. *Highest points wins. In case of a tie, fewest rejections wins.*
- *This finds the candidate with the widest and deepest support.*
Post by Jameson Quinn
- Voters can support, accept, reject, or abstain on each
candidate. Default is abstain.
- Call a candidate "acceptable" if they are rejected by 50% or
less and supported or accepted by over 25%. If any candidates are
acceptable, eliminate all who aren't.
- Give remaining candidates 2 points for each "support", 1 point
for each "accept", and half a point for each "abstain". Highest points wins.
This moves a bit away from the Bucklin roots of MAS, but it further
reduces the instability of cooperation in a CD scenario.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Jameson Quinn
2016-10-26 20:12:45 UTC
Permalink
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Post by Jameson Quinn
My overall point is that, while VSE does not directly and precisely
measure the true "goodness" of the election outcome, if done carefully and
if assumptions are varied, it gives us the best and least-biased measure we
have of that goodness.
It isn't a measure of goodness at all, as my homeless-man/billionaire
example shows.
OK, do you prefer the technical term "estimator"? I was trying to avoid
jargon, but that's what I meant.
Michael Ossipoff
2016-10-26 20:26:32 UTC
Permalink
Estimator is a better word. I included D1 (sincere Score) among the methods
by which I compared the candidates in Forest's example.

We might disagree on what voting system to use in Utopia. ...a situation
we aren't likely to have to deal with anytime soon.

I completely agree with, applaud and appreciate CES's advocacy of Approval
and Score. I appreciate the work that they do.

I consider Approval & Score the best methods.

...except that there's at least sometimes a case for using MMPO, because of
its CD.

Reasons to not propose MMPO:

* It has no use precedent.

* It has some strongly-felt criticisms that would have to be answered,
and which would give an advantage to opponents, who have more media-access
than reform-advocates have.

I suggest proposing Approval, Score, &/or Bucklin.

I suggest that the best initial proposal, to the public &/or an initiative
proposal committee, is a several-methods proposal that describes and
advocates several methods, offering them all as proposals

That proposal should include Approval, Score, & Buickliln.

...and maybe MMPO, only if you're willing to include, in the proposal, the
objections to MMPO, and the answers to them.

But maybe, because MMPO has no use-precedent, and because pairwise-count
methods have no use precedent, and because of the need to answer those
objections to MMPO, it might be better to leave MMPO out of the proposal,
even at the start.

Of course the familiar objections to Approval should be answered in the
proposal too. CES's website does a good job of that.

Michael Ossipoff
....
Post by Jameson Quinn
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Post by Jameson Quinn
My overall point is that, while VSE does not directly and precisely
measure the true "goodness" of the election outcome, if done carefully and
if assumptions are varied, it gives us the best and least-biased measure we
have of that goodness.
It isn't a measure of goodness at all, as my homeless-man/billionaire
example shows.
OK, do you prefer the technical term "estimator"? I was trying to avoid
jargon, but that's what I meant.
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