Discussion:
[EM] U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
Kevin Venzke
2016-09-08 04:52:01 UTC
Permalink
Hi Jameson,
MCA (the one with three slots) has the simpler description surely? If there's a majority preferred, elect the most preferred; else elect the most approved (least disapproved).
There is another method where you elect the approval winner unless there are multiple candidates with a majority, in which case preferred ratings break the "tie."
Your earlier message says "The winner is the non-disqualified candidate with the most approvals" but I assume this should say "most preferred."
So you are saying if nobody manages to get majority approval, you will only be using the top ratings and ignoring "acceptable" ratings? That is unusual; my instinct is that if we can't find a majority we should try to find votes to get as close as possible. There's a risk that you are collecting enough information to permit concluding e.g. that a simultaneous approval and Condorcet winner lost.
I don't see why you are making rules for unmarked candidates if your intended advantage is simplicity. I believe you explained why you have this to somebody else, so I won't ask you to repeat, but I wonder about the effect of the sentence that starts "And second." You're saying that if A has majority preferred+acceptable, but is not top two on preferred ratings, to count blanks as disapproved in hopes that this might remove A's majority approval (or rather, non-disapproval)? Aside from the weird Clone-Loser issue in having a top-two rule on a ratings ballot, it feels a little schizophrenic to me that you really want winners to have majority non-disapproval yet do not actually think it indicates a worthy candidate.
I tend to think we will be lucky if we can consistently get even one majority non-disapproved candidate in elections. In a U/P race with two major candidates, one of those is basically guaranteed to get the label penalty in the next race.
Kevin

De : Jameson Quinn <***@gmail.com>
À : EM <election-***@lists.electorama.com>; electionsciencefoundation <***@googlegroups.com>
Envoyé le : Mercredi 7 septembre 2016 12h59
Objet : Re: [EM] U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.

The main advantage of U/P voting over other systems like MJ or MCA is simplicity of description. So I'm going to try to describe it as simply as possible.
To vote, you rate each person running as "preferred", "acceptable", or "unacceptable". You can rate any number at each level.
If more than half of voters rate a person "unacceptable", that person can't win, unless the same is true of all the people running. Of those remaining, the winner is the one rated "preferred" by the most voters.
If you leave all three ratings blank for a candidate, that usually means the same as rating them "acceptable". There are two exceptions. First, if you made a mark to rate some candidates "acceptable", then the ones you didn't make any mark for are counted as "unacceptable". And second, if the two most-preferred candidates both can't win, because more than half of voters marked them "unacceptable", then candidates with no mark count as "unacceptable". That way, you don't end up letting a weak candidate win by mistake.
2016-09-06 13:17 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn <***@gmail.com>:

I've recently posted a few messages discussing a simple 3-level graded Bucklin method:

Ballot: For each candidate, you may rate them “preferred”, “acceptable”, or “unacceptable”. Any candidate, including an incumbent, who had gotten over 50% "unacceptable" in the prior election would have a note to that effect next to their name on the ballot. (In prior messages, I'd suggested not allowing them on the ballot. I now think that allowing them on, but with a note, would be better.)
Counting: For the current eIection, if some but not all candidates have a majority (50%+1) of “unacceptable” votes, then they are disqualified. The winner is the non-disqualified candidate with the most approvals. 
My new name for the above system is U/P voting. It stands for "unacceptable/preferred", and can be pronounced "up voting" for quick discussion; or "you pee voting" if necessary to avoid confusion.


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Jameson Quinn
2016-09-08 15:09:31 UTC
Permalink
Post by Kevin Venzke
Hi Jameson,
MCA (the one with three slots) has the simpler description surely? If
there's a majority preferred, elect the most preferred; else elect the most
approved (least disapproved).
Using parallel language to yours, here's U/P:

If there's a majority acceptable (minority unacceptable), elect the one of
those that's most preferred. Else elect the most preferred.

That's 4 words more complicated. You could do it in fewer than 4 extra
words if you really wanted.
Post by Kevin Venzke
There is another method where you elect the approval winner unless there
are multiple candidates with a majority, in which case preferred ratings
break the "tie."
Your earlier message says "The winner is the non-disqualified candidate
with the most approvals" but I assume this should say "most preferred."
So you are saying if nobody manages to get majority approval, you will
only be using the top ratings and ignoring "acceptable" ratings? That is
unusual; my instinct is that if we can't find a majority we should try to
find votes to get as close as possible. There's a risk that you are
collecting enough information to permit concluding e.g. that a simultaneous
approval and Condorcet winner lost.
Yes, this is possible. But consider the kind of scenario where it happens:

20: A>B
20: A,B
19: B
2: C>B
39: C

In this case A wins, even though B is approval and Condorcet winner. But I
find this kind of thing very implausible in practice; and if such a
pathology occurred, it would not be a horrible outcome. It's implausible
because the electorate above is bizarrely top-heavy in its ratings; except
for the C>B voters, who could make B win by voting C,B, in view of the fact
that C is a clear loser against A and B.

It's not a horrible outcome because a majority of the electorate is fine
with A, and there are more voters enthusiastic about A than about B.
Post by Kevin Venzke
I don't see why you are making rules for unmarked candidates if your
intended advantage is simplicity. I believe you explained why you have this
to somebody else, so I won't ask you to repeat, but I wonder about the
effect of the sentence that starts "And second." You're saying that if A
has majority preferred+acceptable, but is not top two on preferred ratings,
to count blanks as disapproved in hopes that this might remove A's majority
approval (or rather, non-disapproval)?
No. I'm saying that if the top two preferred are both disqualified, then
all blanks should count as "unacceptable", including for those top two.

Consider a scenario like the following:

48: A>...>B; C?
48: B>...>A; C?
1: A>...>C; B?
3: C>...>A,B

Both A and B are majority disqualified. So all the ? count as unacceptable,
C is disqualified, and A wins. If ? were acceptable, then C would win.

Contrast with:

48: A>...>B; C?
48: B>...>A; C?
1: A>...>C; B?
3: C>...>A; B?

Now, B is not majority disqualified, because the C voters explicitly
dislike A more. The ? count as acceptable, and B wins.
Post by Kevin Venzke
Aside from the weird Clone-Loser issue in having a top-two rule on a
ratings ballot,
The chances that one faction would go to all the trouble of a clone
campaign simply to get the uncertain advantage of guaranteeing that ?
counts as unacceptable... seems very remote to me.
Post by Kevin Venzke
it feels a little schizophrenic to me that you really want winners to have
majority non-disapproval yet do not actually think it indicates a worthy
candidate.
I think that majority explicit non-disapproval does indicate a worthy
candidate; and that majority implicit non-disapproval is better than
majority disapproval IF the candidate achieved sufficient scrutiny (which
we can assume is true for the two frontrunners). But I think that unless we
have evidence that a candidate got scrutinized, majority of combined
unacceptable or didn't-bother-rating is as bad as a majority of
unacceptable.
Post by Kevin Venzke
I tend to think we will be lucky if we can consistently get even one
majority non-disapproved candidate in elections.
I disagree. The people who hate both frontrunners in the current system are
louder than those who are OK with either; and in the current presidential
election, they might well be more numerous; but in the average election, I
think that "either one is acceptable" is more common than we might realize.

In a U/P race with two major candidates, one of those is basically
Post by Kevin Venzke
guaranteed to get the label penalty in the next race.
Note that in the current system, "you lost last time" usually means you
don't get to run again. Gore, Kerry, McCain, Romney... didn't run again
after being nominated. Clinton... waited a cycle. So this rule would mostly
matter only for those who won in a NOTA election (that is, one in which all
candidates had majority unacceptable). I think that there should be some
difference between "won with majority acceptable" and "won despite majority
unacceptable", and that a label penalty that the voters can choose to
ignore is not excessive.
Post by Kevin Venzke
Kevin
------------------------------
*Envoyé le :* Mercredi 7 septembre 2016 12h59
*Objet :* Re: [EM] U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
The main advantage of U/P voting over other systems like MJ or MCA is
simplicity of description. So I'm going to try to describe it as simply as
possible.
To vote, you rate each person running as "preferred", "acceptable", or
"unacceptable". You can rate any number at each level.
If more than half of voters rate a person "unacceptable", that person
can't win, unless the same is true of all the people running. Of those
remaining, the winner is the one rated "preferred" by the most voters.
If you leave all three ratings blank for a candidate, that usually means
the same as rating them "acceptable". There are two exceptions. First, if
you made a mark to rate some candidates "acceptable", then the ones you
didn't make any mark for are counted as "unacceptable". And second, if the
two most-preferred candidates both can't win, because more than half of
voters marked them "unacceptable", then candidates with no mark count as
"unacceptable". That way, you don't end up letting a weak candidate win by
mistake.
Ballot: For each candidate, you may rate them “preferred”, “acceptable”,
or “unacceptable”. Any candidate, including an incumbent, who had gotten
over 50% "unacceptable" in the prior election would have a note to that
effect next to their name on the ballot. (In prior messages, I'd suggested
not allowing them on the ballot. I now think that allowing them on, but
with a note, would be better.)
Counting: For the current eIection, if some but not all candidates have a
majority (50%+1) of “unacceptable” votes, then they are disqualified. The
winner is the non-disqualified candidate with the most approvals.
My new name for the above system is U/P voting. It stands for
"unacceptable/preferred", and can be pronounced "up voting" for quick
discussion; or "you pee voting" if necessary to avoid confusion.
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C.Benham
2016-09-08 19:20:05 UTC
Permalink
Post by Kevin Venzke
The main advantage of U/P voting over other systems like MJ or MCA is
simplicity of description. So I'm going to try to describe it as
simply as possible.
To vote, you rate each person running as "preferred", "acceptable", or
"unacceptable". You can rate any number at each level.
If more than half of voters rate a person "unacceptable", that person
can't win, unless the same is true of all the people running. Of those
remaining, the winner is the one rated "preferred" by the most voters.
C: By this definition, the U/P method uses a simple 3-slot ballot just
like MTA and MCA.
Post by Kevin Venzke
C: Again, I'd be interested in seeing a plausible example of when
U/P doesn't elect the Approval winner.
Easy.
20: A>>B>C
35: B>A>>C
45: C>>A=B
Threshold in approval is >>. In U/P, voters are as expressive as
possible.
C: On 3-slot ratings ballots, how are the 20 A supporters able to vote
one unapproved candidate above the other?
On the 3-slot ballots, they vote A>B. On the 2-slot ballots, they vote
A. These are perfectly consistent.
C: But above you are suggesting that U/P somehow uses a both a 2-slot
ballot and a 3-slot ballot. Which is it?

Actually it seems to me that the stripped-down 3-slot version (if
default rating is "Unacceptable") is actually the same method
as MTA. "Unacceptable" is just the inverse of "Approved". Any candidate
who doesn't get a majority "Unacceptable" score must
get a majority Approval score.

I prefer MTA's more positive wording. In U/P it seems as though the
middle rating slot doesn't do anything.
Post by Kevin Venzke
Any candidate, including an incumbent, who had gotten over 50%
"unacceptable" in the prior election would have a note to that effect
next to their name on the ballot. (In prior messages, I'd suggested
not allowing them on the ballot. I now think that allowing them on,
but with a note, would be better.)
C: Yes, that is far less draconian, a big improvement, and not a big
deal. I suppose there's nothing wrong with a bit of history.

Chris Benham
Jameson Quinn
2016-09-08 19:28:30 UTC
Permalink
C: Again, I'd be interested in seeing a plausible example of when U/P
Post by Kevin Venzke
doesn't elect the Approval winner.
Easy.
20: A>>B>C
35: B>A>>C
45: C>>A=B
Threshold in approval is >>. In U/P, voters are as expressive as possible.
C: On 3-slot ratings ballots, how are the 20 A supporters able to vote one
unapproved candidate above the other?
On the 3-slot ballots, they vote A>B. On the 2-slot ballots, they vote A.
These are perfectly consistent.
C: But above you are suggesting that U/P somehow uses a both a 2-slot
ballot and a 3-slot ballot. Which is it?
3 slots. Where and how do I suggest otherwise?
Actually it seems to me that the stripped-down 3-slot version (if default
rating is "Unacceptable") is actually the same method
as MTA. "Unacceptable" is just the inverse of "Approved". Any candidate
who doesn't get a majority "Unacceptable" score must
get a majority Approval score.
Not the same. In MTA, if no candidate is majority preferred and several are
majority approved/acceptable, the most approved wins; in U/P, the most
preferred wins. This is the only difference, aside from secondary issues
like ballot design. I believe U/P is better in this case as it makes a
chicken strategy harder to pull off successfully; a clean cliff rather than
a slippery slope.
C.Benham
2016-09-08 21:13:07 UTC
Permalink
C: But above you are suggesting that U/P somehow uses a both a 2-slot
ballot and a 3-slot ballot. Which is it?

J:3 slots. Where and how do I suggest otherwise?

C: I pasted in where you wrote (in a message you said I was free to send
J: "On the 3-slot ballots, they vote A>B. On the 2-slot ballots, they
vote A. These are perfectly consistent."
C: That was in response to me asking you how, in an example you gave,
how some voters were able to vote one
"unacceptable" candidate above another (they voted A>>B>C).

J: In MTA, if no candidate is majority preferred and several are
majority approved/acceptable, the most approved wins.

C: No, that is MCA.

MTA says that if the most top-rated candidate is top-rated by a majority
then s/he wins, otherwise if more than one candidate
is approved (voted above bottom) on a majority of ballots then the one
of them that is most top-rated wins, otherwise the most
approved candidate wins.

And I now notice that is that last clause that makes it different from
U/P. When no candidate is majority approved it can give
a different result.

I would say usually the Approval winner pairwise-beats the Top-Ratings
winner, and of course is more "broadly supported".

MTA (with default rating bottom) I think is my favourite of the methods
that fail Irrelevant Ballots.


Chris Benham
Post by Kevin Venzke
C: Again, I'd be interested in seeing a plausible example of
when U/P doesn't elect the Approval winner.
Easy.
20: A>>B>C
35: B>A>>C
45: C>>A=B
Threshold in approval is >>. In U/P, voters are as expressive
as possible.
C: On 3-slot ratings ballots, how are the 20 A supporters able to
vote one unapproved candidate above the other?
On the 3-slot ballots, they vote A>B. On the 2-slot ballots, they
vote A. These are perfectly consistent.
C: But above you are suggesting that U/P somehow uses a both a
2-slot ballot and a 3-slot ballot. Which is it?
3 slots. Where and how do I suggest otherwise?
Actually it seems to me that the stripped-down 3-slot version (if
default rating is "Unacceptable") is actually the same method
as MTA. "Unacceptable" is just the inverse of "Approved". Any
candidate who doesn't get a majority "Unacceptable" score must
get a majority Approval score.
Not the same. In MTA, if no candidate is majority preferred and
several are majority approved/acceptable, the most approved wins; in
U/P, the most preferred wins. This is the only difference, aside from
secondary issues like ballot design. I believe U/P is better in this
case as it makes a chicken strategy harder to pull off successfully; a
clean cliff rather than a slippery slope.
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Jameson Quinn
2016-09-08 21:39:21 UTC
Permalink
Post by C.Benham
C: But above you are suggesting that U/P somehow uses a both a 2-slot
ballot and a 3-slot ballot. Which is it?
J:3 slots. Where and how do I suggest otherwise?
J: "On the 3-slot ballots, they vote A>B. On the 2-slot ballots, they vote
A. These are perfectly consistent."
C: That was in response to me asking you how, in an example you gave, how
some voters were able to vote one
"unacceptable" candidate above another (they voted A>>B>C).
"On the 2-slot ballots" means "in the election as conducted under simple
approval".


And I now notice that is that last clause that makes it different from
Post by C.Benham
U/P. When no candidate is majority approved it can give
a different result.
I would say usually the Approval winner pairwise-beats the Top-Ratings
winner, and of course is more "broadly supported".
The point is to minimize the chance of this situation happening in the
first place; or, equivalently, to make it as strategically unstable as
possible. Taking the strategic pressure off of approvals (and thus putting
it onto top-ratings) is the way to do that. The more successful this rule
is in this purpose, the less often the rule will be invoked. (Rules with
this property are not uncommon in mechanism design.)
Kevin Venzke
2016-09-09 01:44:01 UTC
Permalink
Hi Jameson,

________________________________
Envoyé le : Jeudi 8 septembre 2016 10h09
Objet : [EM] Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
MCA (the one with three slots) has the simpler description surely? If there's a majority preferred, elect the most preferred; else
elect the most approved (least disapproved).
If there's a majority acceptable (minority unacceptable), elect the one of those that's most preferred. Else elect the most preferred.
That's 4 words more complicated. You could do it in fewer than 4 extra words if you really wanted.
Ok. Is it better than MCA?
So you are saying if nobody manages to get majority approval, you will only be using the top ratings and ignoring "acceptable" ratings?
That is unusual; my instinct is that if we can't find a majority we should try to find votes to get as close as possible. There's a
risk that you are collecting enough information to permit concluding e.g. that a simultaneous approval and Condorcet winner lost.
20: A>B
20: A,B
19: B
2: C>B
39: C
In this case A wins, even though B is approval and Condorcet winner. But I find this kind of thing very implausible in practice; and
if such a pathology occurred, it would not be a horrible outcome. It's implausible because the electorate above is bizarrely top-heavy
in its ratings; except for the C>B voters, who could make B win by voting C,B, in view of the fact that C is a clear loser against A
and B.
This specific thing is probably unlikely, but my general concern is that you might collect a bunch of middle slot ratings without
doing anything with them, and public might be able to speculate about whether it made sense.

I am not sure why you called the above scenario bizarrely top-heavy. It's a top-heavy method. I'm not too clear on when one should
be using the middle slot really.
It's not a horrible outcome because a majority of the electorate is fine with A, and there are more voters enthusiastic about A than
about B.
I don't see why you are making rules for unmarked candidates if your intended advantage is simplicity. I believe you explained why
you have this to somebody else, so I won't ask you to repeat, but I wonder about the effect of the sentence that starts "And second."
You're saying that if A has majority preferred+acceptable, but is not top two on preferred ratings, to count blanks as disapproved
in hopes that this might remove A's majority approval (or rather, non-disapproval)?
No. I'm saying that if the top two preferred are both disqualified, then all blanks should count as "unacceptable", including for
those top two.
Yes I got that, but those top two were already majority unacceptable, so it should make no difference, right?
Aside from the weird Clone-Loser issue in having a top-two rule on a ratings ballot,
The chances that one faction would go to all the trouble of a clone campaign simply to get the uncertain advantage of guaranteeing
that ? counts as unacceptable... seems very remote to me.
I won't dispute that, but not all clones are perfect clones, and not all are deliberately nominated. Usually the point of "top two"
is to identify the two strongest, and mutually exclusive blocs. It seems basic to me that you wouldn't want to use that particular
mechanism if they might not be different blocs.
it feels a little schizophrenic to me that you really want winners to have majority non-disapproval yet do not actually think it
indicates a worthy candidate.
I think that majority explicit non-disapproval does indicate a worthy candidate; and that majority implicit non-disapproval is
better than majority disapproval IF the candidate achieved sufficient scrutiny (which we can assume is true for the two frontrunners).
But I think that unless we have evidence that a candidate got scrutinized, majority of combined unacceptable or didn't-bother-rating
is as bad as a majority of unacceptable.
Sure, I just wish it seemed more organic.
I tend to think we will be lucky if we can consistently get even one majority non-disapproved candidate in elections.
I disagree. The people who hate both frontrunners in the current system are louder than those who are OK with either; and in the
current presidential election, they might well be more numerous; but in the average election, I think that "either one is acceptable"
is more common than we might realize.
Hmm... Voters who are OK with either? I have a lot of questions about that. Firstly do these voters really exist. And do they vote?
Would they be willing to put on the ballot that they are OK with either?
In a U/P race with two major candidates, one of those is basically guaranteed to get the label penalty in the next race.
Note that in the current system, "you lost last time" usually means you don't get to run again. Gore, Kerry, McCain, Romney... didn't
run again after being nominated. Clinton... waited a cycle. So this rule would mostly matter only for those who won in a NOTA
election (that is, one in which all candidates had majority unacceptable). I think that there should be some difference between "won
with majority acceptable" and "won despite majority unacceptable", and that a label penalty that the voters can choose to ignore is
not excessive.
We have a while to wait to see whether Clinton fits the mold of the others. But anyway, it sounds like your main intention is to
penalize candidates who actually won, not those who lost. That is more interesting than I was thinking.

Kevin
________________________________
Envoyé le : Mercredi 7 septembre 2016 12h59
Objet : Re: [EM] U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
The main advantage of U/P voting over other systems like MJ or MCA is simplicity of description. So I'm going to try to describe it as simply as possible.
To vote, you rate each person running as "preferred", "acceptable", or "unacceptable". You can rate any number at each level.
If more than half of voters rate a person "unacceptable", that person can't win, unless the same is true of all the people running. Of those remaining, the winner is the one rated "preferred" by the most voters.
If you leave all three ratings blank for a candidate, that usually means the same as rating them "acceptable". There are two exceptions. First, if you made a mark to rate some candidates "acceptable", then the ones you didn't make any mark for are counted as "unacceptable". And second, if the two most-preferred candidates both can't win, because more than half of voters marked them "unacceptable", then candidates with no mark count as "unacceptable". That way, you don't end up letting a weak candidate win by mistake.
Ballot: For each candidate, you may rate them “preferred”, “acceptable”, or “unacceptable”. Any candidate, including an incumbent, who had gotten over 50% "unacceptable" in the prior election would have a note to that effect next to their name on the ballot. (In prior messages, I'd suggested not allowing them on the ballot. I now think that allowing them on, but with a note, would be better.)
Counting: For the current eIection, if some but not all candidates have a majority (50%+1) of “unacceptable” votes, then they are disqualified. The winner is the non-disqualified candidate with the most approvals.
My new name for the above system is U/P voting. It stands for "unacceptable/preferred", and can be pronounced "up voting" for quick discussion; or "you pee voting" if necessary to avoid confusion.
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Jameson Quinn
2016-09-09 13:38:29 UTC
Permalink
Post by Kevin Venzke
Hi Jameson,
________________________________
Post by Jameson Quinn
Envoyé le : Jeudi 8 septembre 2016 10h09
Objet : [EM] Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
MCA (the one with three slots) has the simpler description surely? If
there's a majority preferred, elect the most preferred; else
Post by Jameson Quinn
elect the most approved (least disapproved).
If there's a majority acceptable (minority unacceptable), elect the one
of those that's most preferred. Else elect the most preferred.
Post by Jameson Quinn
That's 4 words more complicated. You could do it in fewer than 4 extra
words if you really wanted.
Ok. Is it better than MCA?
Yes. MCA is significantly more subject to chicken truncation strategy.

In discussion with C. Benham, I have realized that U/P is actually more
similar to MTA than I'd realized. In the terms above, MTA (Majority Top
Approval) is:

If there's a majority acceptable (minority unacceptable), elect the one of
those that's most preferred. Else elect the most acceptable.

So, U/P and MTA differ only when all candidates are majority unacceptable
AND the most preferred differs from the most acceptable. I think that this
situation is on the whole unlikely, and that when it occurs, it will
probably be due to strategy. Furthermore, it may enter into consideration
as a contrafactual, in which case it is by definition strategically
motivated.

I think MTA is more likely to get it "right" if the ballots are
unstrategic; but that U/P is more likely to get it "right" if the ballots
are strategic. Since, as I said, I think the latter is more likely, I think
U/P is better. Their simplicity is identical.

But I don't want to be "right" if it leads to me just arguing in my own
corner. I'd far rather choose a system that can get consensus from as many
theorists and activists as possible. That's why I continue to put approval
forward as the first reform option. I'm only working on discussing a
three-slot option in order to have a back-up suggestion for people who
object to approval because of the issues of non-expressive compromise
and/or chicken strategy (including concerns over spoilers; I think that in
approval, "spoiler" almost always refers to a chicken-type scenario.)

So I'd be happy to give up on U/P and embrace MTA if that would help build
a clearly broader consensus.

(One side advantage of U/P is that googling "MTA" is never going to send
you to a voting page.)
Post by Kevin Venzke
Post by Jameson Quinn
So you are saying if nobody manages to get majority approval, you will
only be using the top ratings and ignoring "acceptable" ratings?
Post by Jameson Quinn
That is unusual; my instinct is that if we can't find a majority we
should try to find votes to get as close as possible. There's a
Post by Jameson Quinn
risk that you are collecting enough information to permit concluding e.g.
that a simultaneous approval and Condorcet winner lost.
Post by Jameson Quinn
20: A>B
20: A,B
19: B
2: C>B
39: C
In this case A wins, even though B is approval and Condorcet winner. But
I find this kind of thing very implausible in practice; and
Post by Jameson Quinn
if such a pathology occurred, it would not be a horrible outcome. It's
implausible because the electorate above is bizarrely top-heavy
Post by Jameson Quinn
in its ratings; except for the C>B voters, who could make B win by voting
C,B, in view of the fact that C is a clear loser against A
Post by Jameson Quinn
and B.
This specific thing is probably unlikely, but my general concern is that
you might collect a bunch of middle slot ratings without
doing anything with them, and public might be able to speculate about
whether it made sense.
I am not sure why you called the above scenario bizarrely top-heavy. It's
a top-heavy method. I'm not too clear on when one should
be using the middle slot really.
It's a top-heavy method in that it focuses on top ratings. That does not
mean, I think, that it would lead to top-heavy ballots in which voters
tended to rate several candidates as preferred.
Post by Kevin Venzke
Post by Jameson Quinn
It's not a horrible outcome because a majority of the electorate is fine
with A, and there are more voters enthusiastic about A than
Post by Jameson Quinn
about B.
I don't see why you are making rules for unmarked candidates if your
intended advantage is simplicity. I believe you explained why
Post by Jameson Quinn
you have this to somebody else, so I won't ask you to repeat, but I
wonder about the effect of the sentence that starts "And second."
Post by Jameson Quinn
You're saying that if A has majority preferred+acceptable, but is not top
two on preferred ratings, to count blanks as disapproved
Post by Jameson Quinn
in hopes that this might remove A's majority approval (or rather,
non-disapproval)?
Post by Jameson Quinn
No. I'm saying that if the top two preferred are both disqualified, then
all blanks should count as "unacceptable", including for
Post by Jameson Quinn
those top two.
Yes I got that, but those top two were already majority unacceptable, so
it should make no difference, right?
Right. You are correct that the rule you're suggesting would lead to the
same winner, but it could lead to different official counts for the
non-winners.
Post by Kevin Venzke
Post by Jameson Quinn
Aside from the weird Clone-Loser issue in having a top-two rule on a
ratings ballot,
Post by Jameson Quinn
The chances that one faction would go to all the trouble of a clone
campaign simply to get the uncertain advantage of guaranteeing
Post by Jameson Quinn
that ? counts as unacceptable... seems very remote to me.
I won't dispute that, but not all clones are perfect clones, and not all
are deliberately nominated. Usually the point of "top two"
is to identify the two strongest, and mutually exclusive blocs. It seems
basic to me that you wouldn't want to use that particular
mechanism if they might not be different blocs.
Usually that's the point of "top two", but not in this case. In this case,
it's just a simple heuristic for "is there some non-dark-horse candidate
without majority unacceptable?" You could get the same effect in other ways:

- A quorum rule: non-votes for X count as "acceptable" iff over 50% of
voters have rated X explicitly.
- A partial rule: non-votes count as 0.55 of an "unacceptable" vote and
0.45 of an "acceptable" vote. That way, a dark horse would need "prefer" to
beat "unacceptable" by about 9% to win.

I'd consider either of the above to be fine, but my guess is that the "top
two" rule I've already enunciated is the most politically feasible. I think
rules like the two suggestions just above seem more arbitrary and strange.
Post by Kevin Venzke
Post by Jameson Quinn
it feels a little schizophrenic to me that you really want winners to
have majority non-disapproval yet do not actually think it
Post by Jameson Quinn
indicates a worthy candidate.
I think that majority explicit non-disapproval does indicate a worthy
candidate; and that majority implicit non-disapproval is
Post by Jameson Quinn
better than majority disapproval IF the candidate achieved sufficient
scrutiny (which we can assume is true for the two frontrunners).
Post by Jameson Quinn
But I think that unless we have evidence that a candidate got
scrutinized, majority of combined unacceptable or didn't-bother-rating
Post by Jameson Quinn
is as bad as a majority of unacceptable.
Sure, I just wish it seemed more organic.
If you have a better idea, please share. I wouldn't be surprised if we came
up with something better.
Post by Kevin Venzke
Post by Jameson Quinn
I tend to think we will be lucky if we can consistently get even one
majority non-disapproved candidate in elections.
Post by Jameson Quinn
I disagree. The people who hate both frontrunners in the current system
are louder than those who are OK with either; and in the
Post by Jameson Quinn
current presidential election, they might well be more numerous; but in
the average election, I think that "either one is acceptable"
Post by Jameson Quinn
is more common than we might realize.
Hmm... Voters who are OK with either? I have a lot of questions about
that. Firstly do these voters really exist. And do they vote?
Would they be willing to put on the ballot that they are OK with either?
Remember, this starts to matter in 3-way elections. The closest cases like
that in US presidential history are '92 and '96, with Perot. I think that
there were probably a non-trivial minority of "anybody but Perot" voters;
that is, people who would have voted something like Bush>Clinton>Perot or
Clinton>Bush>Perot in U/P. If those people outnumber the
Perot>...>Clinton,Bush people, then it's likely (guaranteed?) that one of
Clinton or Bush would get a majority acceptable.
Post by Kevin Venzke
Post by Jameson Quinn
In a U/P race with two major candidates, one of those is basically
guaranteed to get the label penalty in the next race.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Note that in the current system, "you lost last time" usually means you
don't get to run again. Gore, Kerry, McCain, Romney... didn't
Post by Jameson Quinn
run again after being nominated. Clinton... waited a cycle. So this rule
would mostly matter only for those who won in a NOTA
Post by Jameson Quinn
election (that is, one in which all candidates had majority
unacceptable). I think that there should be some difference between "won
Post by Jameson Quinn
with majority acceptable" and "won despite majority unacceptable", and
that a label penalty that the voters can choose to ignore is
Post by Jameson Quinn
not excessive.
We have a while to wait to see whether Clinton fits the mold of the
others. But anyway, it sounds like your main intention is to
penalize candidates who actually won, not those who lost. That is more
interesting than I was thinking.
Right. This is to satisfy the NOTA and term-limit supporters. Generally, I
oppose hardline proposals along those lines, but I think a compromise like
this could work.
Post by Kevin Venzke
Kevin
Post by Jameson Quinn
________________________________
Envoyé le : Mercredi 7 septembre 2016 12h59
Objet : Re: [EM] U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
The main advantage of U/P voting over other systems like MJ or MCA is
simplicity of description. So I'm going to try to describe it as simply as
possible.
Post by Jameson Quinn
To vote, you rate each person running as "preferred", "acceptable", or
"unacceptable". You can rate any number at each level.
Post by Jameson Quinn
If more than half of voters rate a person "unacceptable", that person
can't win, unless the same is true of all the people running. Of those
remaining, the winner is the one rated "preferred" by the most voters.
Post by Jameson Quinn
If you leave all three ratings blank for a candidate, that usually means
the same as rating them "acceptable". There are two exceptions. First, if
you made a mark to rate some candidates "acceptable", then the ones you
didn't make any mark for are counted as "unacceptable". And second, if the
two most-preferred candidates both can't win, because more than half of
voters marked them "unacceptable", then candidates with no mark count as
"unacceptable". That way, you don't end up letting a weak candidate win by
mistake.
Post by Jameson Quinn
I've recently posted a few messages discussing a simple 3-level graded
Ballot: For each candidate, you may rate them “preferred”, “acceptable”,
or “unacceptable”. Any candidate, including an incumbent, who had gotten
over 50% "unacceptable" in the prior election would have a note to that
effect next to their name on the ballot. (In prior messages, I'd suggested
not allowing them on the ballot. I now think that allowing them on, but
with a note, would be better.)
Post by Jameson Quinn
Counting: For the current eIection, if some but not all candidates have
a majority (50%+1) of “unacceptable” votes, then they are disqualified. The
winner is the non-disqualified candidate with the most approvals.
Post by Jameson Quinn
My new name for the above system is U/P voting. It stands for
"unacceptable/preferred", and can be pronounced "up voting" for quick
discussion; or "you pee voting" if necessary to avoid confusion.
C.Benham
2016-09-09 19:48:41 UTC
Permalink
Jameson and any interested others,

I remain strongly of the opinion that in any election method the default
rating/ranking should simply be
bottom-most, and I'm opposed to the gimmick that tries to stigmatise
some of the losers at the time of
the following election in the event that they contest it.

But those issues aside, I now rate U/P as not really any worse than MTA
and MCA.

Of those three, only U/P meets the Chicken Dilemma criterion.

http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion

And the recently discussed U/P bad example where it fails to elect a
candidate that is both most approved
and the Condorcet winner is shared by MTA.

30: A>B
25: B>A
05: C>B
40: C

Of the three methods, I agree that U/P is the most strategy-resistant
but also the one that is the least likely to elect a
voted Condorcet winner and the one that with sincere voting will likely
produce the lowest SU winner. With MCA the
reverse is true, and MTA is intermediate between the two in terms of
these behaviours.

In some ways I imagine that U/P would be the hardest to promote to the
wide public, because compared to the others
it looks like the middle-rating doesn't do anything and I doubt that you
want to bring up negative devious strategies
like "chicken" defection.

IBIFA also (along with MTA and MCA and MJ and MAM) fails CD, but, unlike
U/P, MTA, MCA, MJ, meets Irrelevant Ballots
Independence, absolutely dominates those methods in terms of Condorcet
consistency and is happy using ballots with many
more (than 3) ratings slots.

I don't share Jameson's hostility to IRV. Provided the voters are free
to strictly rank from the top however many or few
candidates as they wish (I don't favour allowing above-bottom
equal-ranking in IRV) and the eliminations are (at least in
effect) one-at-a-time, then I rate IRV as a good method, much better
than Top-Two Runoff and in my book the best of the
methods that strictly meets Later-no-Help.

And if we want something that meets Condorcet and CD, then "Benham" (the
name was coined by James Green-Armytage
in an article he wrote about IRV-Condorcet hybrid methods) is a very
good method. It is like IRV, but elects the CW and if there
isn't one checks for one among the remaining candidates before each
elimination and elects the first one to appear.

Of the promoted and other ok Condorcet methods, I think it is the only
one that has in common with IRV that a Condorcet
winner that can make the IRV top-two can't fall victim to a successful
Burial strategy.

Chris Benham



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Kevin Venzke
2016-09-10 19:32:27 UTC
Permalink
Hi Jameson,

________________________________
De : Jameson Quinn <***@gmail.com>
À : Kevin Venzke <***@yahoo.fr>
Cc : EM <election-***@lists.electorama.com>
Envoyé le : Vendredi 9 septembre 2016 8h38
Objet : Re: [EM] Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Post by Kevin Venzke
If there's a majority acceptable (minority unacceptable), elect the one of those that's most preferred. Else elect the most
preferred.
That's 4 words more complicated. You could do it in fewer than 4 extra words if you really wanted.
Ok. Is it better than MCA?
Yes. MCA is significantly more subject to chicken truncation strategy.
Hmm. In MCA, from the perspective of a (potentially) majority faction split between two candidates, MCA is identical to Approval,
so I understand that much.
Post by Jameson Quinn
In discussion with C. Benham, I have realized that U/P is actually more similar to MTA than I'd realized. In the terms above, MTA
If there's a majority acceptable (minority unacceptable), elect the one of those that's most preferred. Else elect the most acceptable.
Yes I mentioned this method but didn't call it MTA. I've called it MAFP outside of a ratings context. I think my wording shows how
we might hope it would be used:
"There is another method where you elect the approval winner unless there are multiple candidates with a majority, in which case
preferred ratings break the "tie.""

So, you use the middle slot when you calculate it's more likely you need to "vote against" that candidate in the tie, than "vote
for" him. That is a murky statement (because you do not know who is in the tie), but simple enough that I don't dislike MTA that
much. Functionally though I'm not sure how different it is from Approval.
Post by Jameson Quinn
So, U/P and MTA differ only when all candidates are majority unacceptable AND the most preferred differs from the most acceptable. I
think that this situation is on the whole unlikely, and that when it occurs, it will probably be due to strategy. Furthermore, it may
enter into consideration as a contrafactual, in which case it is by definition strategically motivated.
I think MTA is more likely to get it "right" if the ballots are unstrategic; but that U/P is more likely to get it "right" if the
ballots are strategic. Since, as I said, I think the latter is more likely, I think U/P is better. Their simplicity is identical.
Hmmmm. I would think and hope that voters would use strategy under MTA, so of course any resulting ballot set would be "due to
strategy." I don't think I would characterize U/P differently, though I think the strategy is harder to articulate.

It sounds like you're saying if this situation on the ballots arose, it would probably be "due to strategy" (regardless of which
method's strategies created it), and that U/P would resolve it better if it is due to strategy (i.e. U/P's strategy).

What do you make of these ballots:

43: A
24: B>C
23: C>B
10: D

Under MTA the B and C voters are being completely reasonable: They hope for majority approval but can still hope for a win if they
don't get it.

Strategy is less likely to produce these ballots under U/P because the B and C voters are taking a gamble. To get a similar outcome
they have to vote B=C. Anyone who doesn't is functionally defecting!
Post by Jameson Quinn
But I don't want to be "right" if it leads to me just arguing in my own corner. I'd far rather choose a system that can get consensus
from as many theorists and activists as possible. That's why I continue to put approval forward as the first reform option. I'm only
working on discussing a three-slot option in order to have a back-up suggestion for people who object to approval because of the issues
of non-expressive compromise and/or chicken strategy (including concerns over spoilers; I think that in approval, "spoiler" almost
always refers to a chicken-type scenario.)
So I'd be happy to give up on U/P and embrace MTA if that would help build a clearly broader consensus.
(One side advantage of U/P is that googling "MTA" is never going to send you to a voting page.)
I see. Yes, I have doubts about advocating Approval because it doesn't seem like a strict improvement, even if on balance it should
be a large "net" improvement.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Post by Kevin Venzke
Post by Kevin Venzke
So you are saying if nobody manages to get majority approval, you will only be using the top ratings and ignoring "acceptable"
ratings?
That is unusual; my instinct is that if we can't find a majority we should try to find votes to get as close as possible. There's
a
risk that you are collecting enough information to permit concluding e.g. that a simultaneous approval and Condorcet winner lost.
20: A>B
20: A,B
19: B
2: C>B
39: C
In this case A wins, even though B is approval and Condorcet winner. But I find this kind of thing very implausible in practice;
and
Post by Kevin Venzke
if such a pathology occurred, it would not be a horrible outcome. It's implausible because the electorate above is bizarrely top-heavy
in its ratings; except for the C>B voters, who could make B win by voting C,B, in view of the fact that C is a clear loser against A
and B.
This specific thing is probably unlikely, but my general concern is that you might collect a bunch of middle slot ratings without
doing anything with them, and public might be able to speculate about whether it made sense.
I am not sure why you called the above scenario bizarrely top-heavy. It's a top-heavy method. I'm not too clear on when one should
be using the middle slot really.
It's a top-heavy method in that it focuses on top ratings. That does not mean, I think, that it would lead to top-heavy ballots in which
voters tended to rate several candidates as preferred.
Well there are only 20% "anyone but C" voters here. They seem to be voting pretty reasonably to me.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Usually that's the point of "top two", but not in this case. In this case, it's just a simple heuristic for "is there some
- A quorum rule: non-votes for X count as "acceptable" iff over 50% of voters have rated X explicitly.
- A partial rule: non-votes count as 0.55 of an "unacceptable" vote and 0.45 of an "acceptable" vote. That way, a dark horse would
need "prefer" to beat "unacceptable" by about 9% to win.
I'd consider either of the above to be fine, but my guess is that the "top two" rule I've already enunciated is the most politically
feasible. I think rules like the two suggestions just above seem more arbitrary and strange.
Post by Kevin Venzke
Post by Kevin Venzke
it feels a little schizophrenic to me that you really want winners to have majority non-disapproval yet do not actually think it
indicates a worthy candidate.
I think that majority explicit non-disapproval does indicate a worthy candidate; and that majority implicit non-disapproval is
better than majority disapproval IF the candidate achieved sufficient scrutiny (which we can assume is true for the two frontrunners).
But I think that unless we have evidence that a candidate got scrutinized, majority of combined unacceptable or didn't-bother-rating
is as bad as a majority of unacceptable.
Sure, I just wish it seemed more organic.
If you have a better idea, please share. I wouldn't be surprised if we came up with something better.
I will keep it in mind, but I think you would make a model of some kind, that would say what makes us think that a given candidate got
scrutinized or not, and then "degree of scrutiny" would be part of a single formula.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Post by Kevin Venzke
Post by Kevin Venzke
I tend to think we will be lucky if we can consistently get even one majority non-disapproved candidate in elections.
I disagree. The people who hate both frontrunners in the current system are louder than those who are OK with either; and in the
current presidential election, they might well be more numerous; but in the average election, I think that "either one is acceptable"
is more common than we might realize.
Hmm... Voters who are OK with either? I have a lot of questions about that. Firstly do these voters really exist. And do they vote?
Would they be willing to put on the ballot that they are OK with either?
Remember, this starts to matter in 3-way elections. The closest cases like that in US presidential history are '92 and '96, with
Perot. I think that there were probably a non-trivial minority of "anybody but Perot" voters; that is, people who would have voted
something like Bush>Clinton>Perot or Clinton>Bush>Perot in U/P. If those people outnumber the Perot>...>Clinton,Bush people, then
it's likely (guaranteed?) that one of Clinton or Bush would get a majority acceptable.
Are we still talking about "the average election" at this point? You seem to say that a voter could be OK with both frontrunners
as long as there is, actually, a *third* contender. (If you say Perot does not need to be so strong as that, then I don't think
I would agree that there would be a lot of people who would actually vote that the two frontrunners are OK as long as they are
not this weaker candidate.)

Kevin
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C.Benham
2016-09-11 01:26:44 UTC
Permalink
Post by Kevin Venzke
43: A
24: B>C
23: C>B
10: D
Under MTA the B and C voters are being completely reasonable: They hope for majority approval but can still hope for a win if they
don't get it.
Strategy is less likely to produce these ballots under U/P because the B and C voters are taking a gamble. To get a similar outcome
they have to vote B=C. Anyone who doesn't is functionally defecting!
C: A very good example! Assuming MTA and MCA use Top Ratings scores
to break Approval ties, they both elect the Condorcet winner B.

U/P's under-use of the middle ratings slot means that it relies more on
its "majority disqualification" mechanism which seems to make it more
vulnerable to irrelevant ballots, as in the example.

Under U/P, without the irrelevant D ballots, A and D are disqualified
and B is the glorious winner. With them, B and C and D are disqualified
and (without needing
any others to be disqualified) A wins.

This causes me to reject U/P as clearly worse than MTA and MCA. Of the
three I (again) rate MTA as the least bad.

Chris Benham


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Jameson Quinn
2016-09-11 06:51:38 UTC
Permalink
43: A
Post by Kevin Venzke
24: B>C
23: C>B
10: D
Under MTA the B and C voters are being completely reasonable: They hope
for majority approval but can still hope for a win if they
don't get it.
Strategy is less likely to produce these ballots under U/P because the B
and C voters are taking a gamble. To get a similar outcome
they have to vote B=C. Anyone who doesn't is functionally defecting!
C: A very good example! Assuming MTA and MCA use Top Ratings scores to
break Approval ties, they both elect the Condorcet winner B.
But both could be shifted to C with a single C-only ballot, even if the B:C
ratio were 46:1 instead of 24:23.
U/P's under-use of the middle ratings slot means that it relies more on
its "majority disqualification" mechanism which seems to make it more
vulnerable to irrelevant ballots, as in the example.
Under U/P, without the irrelevant D ballots, A and D are disqualified and
B is the glorious winner. With them, B and C and D are disqualified and
(without needing
any others to be disqualified) A wins.
This causes me to reject U/P as clearly worse than MTA and MCA. Of the
three I (again) rate MTA as the least bad.
I think MTA is pretty darn good. I still prefer U/P.

I think that scenarios like the above are fundamentally pathological; any
possible winner has only minority approval, so that even assuming all
ballots are semi-honest, any of them could be a true Condorcet loser. Thus,
I believe that it's more important for a system to try to avoid scenarios
like the above, than to try to find a perfect winner in such a scenario. In
fact, in the related scenario:


43: A
40: B>C
6: C>B
1: C
10: D

... I think that a case can be made for either A or B. After all, they'd be
tied if we try to approximate Score by using truncatable Borda here. But no
serious case can be made for C or D, even though C wins MTA and MCA.

Anyway, I think U/P does a better job trying to discourage the kind of
strategy that would lead to a scenario like the above. And part of that is
the default rule which Chris has criticized.

One possible alternative default rule: ballots alternate between defaulting
to "acceptable" and to "unacceptable". Each ballot clearly states which
default it uses, and there is a place on the ballot to globally change that
default. (I doubt Chris will like this idea, but it is at least
straightforward, explicit, and easy to describe.)
Chris Benham
C.Benham
2016-09-11 20:05:47 UTC
Permalink
43: A
24: B>C
23: C>B
10: D
Post by Jameson Quinn
I think that scenarios like the above are fundamentally pathological;
any possible winner has only minority approval, so that even assuming
all ballots are semi-honest, any of them could be a true Condorcet loser.
C: I can't see anything "pathological" about the "scenario". The ballot
set can be taken at face value. Presumably the A and D supporters
simply aren't interested in any candidate
other than their favourites, while the B and C supporters form a tight
coalition. And B is the clearly voted Condorcet winner.

Just because you can imagine that with less truncation some other
candidate could have been the Condorcet winner doesn't mean that the
scenario is in any way "pathological".
Post by Jameson Quinn
J: Thus, I believe that it's more important for a system to try to
avoid scenarios like the above, than to try to find a perfect winner
in such a scenario.
But there isn't (or shouldn't be) anything difficult about finding "the
perfect winner" in the scenario. B is the plainly voted Condorcet
winner. An Approval-like method
might mistakenly elect the "similar" candidate C, but A and D are out.

And if I agreed that a system "should try to avoid" such a scenario, I
can't see how it could (allowing 4 candidates and using ballots with 3
or more ratings slots).
Post by Jameson Quinn
43: A
40: B>C
6: C>B
1: C
10: D
J:... I think that a case can be made for either A or B. After all,
they'd be tied if we try to approximate Score by using truncatable
Borda here. But no serious case can be made for C or D, even though C
wins MTA and MCA.
The pairwise-dominant B,C coalition is still intact. Without the
irrelevant D ballots it has more than half the votes. B is still the CW,
C is the most approved ("accepted", voted above bottom)
candidate. B is also more approved than A. That adds up to no case for A.
Post by Jameson Quinn
J: After all, they'd be tied if we try to approximate Score by using
truncatable Borda here
C: In my opinion that is a bizarre and very weak standard. Those methods
don't even meet Majority Favourite, and Borda has other problems.
Post by Jameson Quinn
J: But no serious case can be made for C or D, even though C wins MTA
and MCA.
C: C is the most approved candidate and pairwise beats all the others
except B, and all of B's supporters approved of C (which arguably
somewhat weakens any post-election complaint
they might make, since MTA and MCA are quasi-Approval methods that
aren't advertised as meeting the Condorcet criterion.)

Another 3-slot FBC method I think we should be comparing with these
three is 3-slot TTR,TR (aka" ICT"). The algorithm is probably too
complicated to interest Jameson
as a practical reform proposal, but it meets Chicken Dilemma and
"Majority Condorcet" and easily elects the CW in the recent examples.
Post by Jameson Quinn
J: One possible alternative default rule: ballots alternate between
defaulting to "acceptable" and to "unacceptable". Each ballot clearly
states which default it uses, and there is a place on the ballot to
globally change that default. (I doubt Chris will like this idea, but
it is at least straightforward, explicit, and easy to describe.)
I'm strongly of the view that the voters shouldn't have to bother
explicitly marking candidates they rate as unacceptable. I suggest a
ballot instruction something like:

"Among candidates you find acceptable, mark however many you like of
your favourites as Preferred and the rest as Acceptable".

However, if there was a concern that someone might get access to the
ballots after they're cast and before they are counted and alter some by
adding marks to
candidates the voters left unmarked, then that could be justification
(or a pretext) for a draconian Australian-style solution with a ballot
instruction like:

"Mark each candidate as one of Preferred, Acceptable, Unacceptable.
You must mark every candidate."

Then ballots that don't mark every candidate are declared "invalid" and
have no effect on the election result.

One more semi-sane alternative is to have a ballot instruction like the
Australian-style one but make the default "acceptable" under MTA and MCA
and "unacceptable"
under U/P but in each case with a weight of one half in the counting.
(But of course that doesn't completely remove the incentive for some
cheater to add marks to
ballots).

Chris Benham
Post by Jameson Quinn
43: A
24: B>C
23: C>B
10: D
They hope for majority approval but can still hope for a win
if they
don't get it.
Strategy is less likely to produce these ballots under U/P
because the B and C voters are taking a gamble. To get a
similar outcome
they have to vote B=C. Anyone who doesn't is functionally defecting!
C: A very good example! Assuming MTA and MCA use Top Ratings
scores to break Approval ties, they both elect the Condorcet winner B.
J: But both could be shifted to C with a single C-only ballot, even if
the B:C ratio were 46:1 instead of 24:23.
C: U/P's under-use of the middle ratings slot means that it
relies more on its "majority disqualification" mechanism which
seems to make it more
vulnerable to irrelevant ballots, as in the example.
Under U/P, without the irrelevant D ballots, A and D are
disqualified and B is the glorious winner. With them, B and C and
D are disqualified and (without needing
any others to be disqualified) A wins.
This causes me to reject U/P as clearly worse than MTA and MCA. Of
the three I (again) rate MTA as the least bad.
J: I think MTA is pretty darn good. I still prefer U/P.
I think that scenarios like the above are fundamentally pathological;
any possible winner has only minority approval, so that even assuming
all ballots are semi-honest, any of them could be a true Condorcet
loser. Thus, I believe that it's more important for a system to try to
avoid scenarios like the above, than to try to find a perfect winner
43: A
40: B>C
6: C>B
1: C
10: D
... I think that a case can be made for either A or B. After all,
they'd be tied if we try to approximate Score by using truncatable
Borda here. But no serious case can be made for C or D, even though C
wins MTA and MCA.
Anyway, I think U/P does a better job trying to discourage the kind of
strategy that would lead to a scenario like the above. And part of
that is the default rule which Chris has criticized.
One possible alternative default rule: ballots alternate between
defaulting to "acceptable" and to "unacceptable". Each ballot clearly
states which default it uses, and there is a place on the ballot to
globally change that default. (I doubt Chris will like this idea, but
it is at least straightforward, explicit, and easy to describe.)
Kevin Venzke
2016-09-13 00:22:12 UTC
Permalink
Hi Jameson,
I think it is a positive thing that the MTA B/C majority coalition can give their sincere preferences (!), while using the strategy they're expected to use (i.e. middle slot as tiebreaker given multiple majorities), without risk of this strategy backfiring. (Voters can accidentally elect the less preferred of B or C, but that is the inescapable chicken dilemma, I would say.)
I have some sympathy for your claim that C should not be able to win with few top ratings. But that sympathy is not tied to Borda counts, it is based on wanting to reduce the truncation incentive for the B voters. This, U/P does not really do, because the B>C voters would be taking a large risk that they are helping to put C (alone) over the threshold of majority approval.
So I don't think either of these ballot sets is likely under U/P, and it sounds like you agree with that and think it is good (because it deters a pathological ballot set)? Do you have a stance (or at least, see use in determining a stance) on how U/P voters in these scenarios should be voting?
Kevin

De : Jameson Quinn <***@gmail.com>
À : EM <election-***@lists.electorama.com>
Envoyé le : Dimanche 11 septembre 2016 1h51
Objet : [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.



2016-09-10 21:26 GMT-04:00 C.Benham <***@adam.com.au>:

On 9/11/2016 5:02 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:


43: A
24: B>C
23: C>B
10: D

Under MTA the B and C voters are being completely reasonable: They hope for majority approval but can still hope for a win if they
don't get it.

Strategy is less likely to produce these ballots under U/P because the B and C voters are taking a gamble. To get a similar outcome
they have to vote B=C. Anyone who doesn't is functionally defecting!


 C: A very good example!   Assuming MTA and MCA use Top Ratings scores to break Approval ties, they both elect the Condorcet winner B.


But both could be shifted to C with a single C-only ballot, even if the B:C ratio were 46:1 instead of 24:23. 

U/P's under-use of  the middle ratings slot means that it relies more on its "majority disqualification" mechanism which seems to make it more
vulnerable to irrelevant ballots, as in the example.

Under U/P, without the irrelevant D ballots, A and D are disqualified and B is the glorious winner. With them, B and C and D are disqualified and  (without needing
any others to be disqualified) A wins.

This causes me to reject U/P as clearly worse than MTA and MCA. Of the three I (again) rate MTA as the least bad.


I think MTA is pretty darn good. I still prefer U/P.
I think that scenarios like the above are fundamentally pathological; any possible winner has only minority approval, so that even assuming all ballots are semi-honest, any of them could be a true Condorcet loser. Thus, I believe that it's more important for a system to try to avoid scenarios like the above, than to try to find a perfect winner in such a scenario. In fact, in the related scenario:

43: A
40: B>C6: C>B
1: C
10: D

... I think that a case can be made for either A or B. After all, they'd be tied if we try to approximate Score by using truncatable Borda here. But no serious case can be made for C or D, even though C wins MTA and MCA.
Anyway, I think U/P does a better job trying to discourage the kind of strategy that would lead to a scenario like the above. And part of that is the default rule which Chris has criticized.
One possible alternative default rule: ballots alternate between defaulting to "acceptable" and to "unacceptable". Each ballot clearly states which default it uses, and there is a place on the ballot to globally change that default. (I doubt Chris will like this idea, but it is at least straightforward, explicit, and easy to describe.)


Chris Benham






----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Jameson Quinn
2016-09-13 01:37:42 UTC
Permalink
Here's a new proposed variant of U/P with a simple default:

Voters may rate each candidate as "unacceptable" (downvote), "preferred"
(upvote), or "acceptable" (neither). Default is neither.

Any candidate downvoted by most, or with fewer than half the max amount of
upvotes, is disqualified, unless that would disqualify everyone. The winner
is the remaining candidate with the most upvotes.

The "fewer than half the max" rule prevents dark-horse winners, without
resorting to strange defaults. It has no effect on a two-way chicken
dilemma. Though in theory it could affect an evenly-balanced three-way
chicken dilemma (in a four-way race), I think there's a negligible chance
that such a scenario would be so balanced.

I know that Chris doesn't like this method's violation of "irrelevant
ballots". Myself, I think that no voters are irrelevant; even if they don't
express an opinion between the two frontrunners, they may have one. (True,
they may not; but that's not the first assumption I'd make.)
Post by Kevin Venzke
Hi Jameson,
I think it is a positive thing that the MTA B/C majority coalition can
give their sincere preferences (!), while using the strategy they're
expected to use (i.e. middle slot as tiebreaker given multiple majorities),
without risk of this strategy backfiring. (Voters can accidentally elect
the less preferred of B or C, but that is the inescapable chicken dilemma,
I would say.)
I have some sympathy for your claim that C should not be able to win with
few top ratings. But that sympathy is not tied to Borda counts, it is based
on wanting to reduce the truncation incentive for the B voters. This, U/P
does not really do, because the B>C voters would be taking a large risk
that they are helping to put C (alone) over the threshold of majority
approval.
So I don't think either of these ballot sets is likely under U/P, and it
sounds like you agree with that and think it is good (because it deters a
pathological ballot set)? Do you have a stance (or at least, see use in
determining a stance) on how U/P voters in these scenarios should be voting?
Kevin
------------------------------
*Envoyé le :* Dimanche 11 septembre 2016 1h51
*Objet :* [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
43: A
24: B>C
23: C>B
10: D
Under MTA the B and C voters are being completely reasonable: They hope
for majority approval but can still hope for a win if they
don't get it.
Strategy is less likely to produce these ballots under U/P because the B
and C voters are taking a gamble. To get a similar outcome
they have to vote B=C. Anyone who doesn't is functionally defecting!
C: A very good example! Assuming MTA and MCA use Top Ratings scores to
break Approval ties, they both elect the Condorcet winner B.
But both could be shifted to C with a single C-only ballot, even if the
B:C ratio were 46:1 instead of 24:23.
U/P's under-use of the middle ratings slot means that it relies more on
its "majority disqualification" mechanism which seems to make it more
vulnerable to irrelevant ballots, as in the example.
Under U/P, without the irrelevant D ballots, A and D are disqualified and
B is the glorious winner. With them, B and C and D are disqualified and
(without needing
any others to be disqualified) A wins.
This causes me to reject U/P as clearly worse than MTA and MCA. Of the
three I (again) rate MTA as the least bad.
I think MTA is pretty darn good. I still prefer U/P.
I think that scenarios like the above are fundamentally pathological; any
possible winner has only minority approval, so that even assuming all
ballots are semi-honest, any of them could be a true Condorcet loser. Thus,
I believe that it's more important for a system to try to avoid scenarios
like the above, than to try to find a perfect winner in such a scenario. In
43: A
40: B>C
6: C>B
1: C
10: D
... I think that a case can be made for either A or B. After all, they'd
be tied if we try to approximate Score by using truncatable Borda here. But
no serious case can be made for C or D, even though C wins MTA and MCA.
Anyway, I think U/P does a better job trying to discourage the kind of
strategy that would lead to a scenario like the above. And part of that is
the default rule which Chris has criticized.
One possible alternative default rule: ballots alternate between
defaulting to "acceptable" and to "unacceptable". Each ballot clearly
states which default it uses, and there is a place on the ballot to
globally change that default. (I doubt Chris will like this idea, but it is
at least straightforward, explicit, and easy to describe.)
Chris Benham
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Kevin Venzke
2016-09-13 05:26:52 UTC
Permalink
Hi Jameson,
"Downvoted by most" means the candidate with the single greatest number of downvotes? This could be the (voted, unique) majority favorite couldn't it?
How does this violate "irrelevant ballots"? I must be misunderstanding it. Does "max amount of upvotes" mean 100% of the voters, or just the greatest number of upvotes that occurs?
I do like antiplurality mechanisms.
Kevin

De : Jameson Quinn <***@gmail.com>
À : Kevin Venzke <***@yahoo.fr>; electionsciencefoundation <***@googlegroups.com>
Cc : EM <election-***@lists.electorama.com>
Envoyé le : Lundi 12 septembre 2016 20h37
Objet : Re: [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.

Here's a new proposed variant of U/P with a simple default:
Voters may rate each candidate as "unacceptable" (downvote), "preferred" (upvote), or "acceptable" (neither). Default is neither.
Any candidate downvoted by most, or with fewer than half the max amount of upvotes, is disqualified, unless that would disqualify everyone. The winner is the remaining candidate with the most upvotes.
The "fewer than half the max" rule prevents dark-horse winners, without resorting to strange defaults. It has no effect on a two-way chicken dilemma. Though in theory it could affect an evenly-balanced three-way chicken dilemma (in a four-way race), I think there's a negligible chance that such a scenario would be so balanced.
I know that Chris doesn't like this method's violation of "irrelevant ballots". Myself, I think that no voters are irrelevant; even if they don't express an opinion between the two frontrunners, they may have one. (True, they may not; but that's not the first assumption I'd make.)
2016-09-12 20:22 GMT-04:00 Kevin Venzke <***@yahoo.fr>:

Hi Jameson,
I think it is a positive thing that the MTA B/C majority coalition can give their sincere preferences (!), while using the strategy they're expected to use (i.e. middle slot as tiebreaker given multiple majorities), without risk of this strategy backfiring. (Voters can accidentally elect the less preferred of B or C, but that is the inescapable chicken dilemma, I would say.)
I have some sympathy for your claim that C should not be able to win with few top ratings. But that sympathy is not tied to Borda counts, it is based on wanting to reduce the truncation incentive for the B voters. This, U/P does not really do, because the B>C voters would be taking a large risk that they are helping to put C (alone) over the threshold of majority approval.
So I don't think either of these ballot sets is likely under U/P, and it sounds like you agree with that and think it is good (because it deters a pathological ballot set)? Do you have a stance (or at least, see use in determining a stance) on how U/P voters in these scenarios should be voting?
Kevin

De : Jameson Quinn <***@gmail.com>
À : EM <election-***@lists. electorama.com>
Envoyé le : Dimanche 11 septembre 2016 1h51
Objet : [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.



2016-09-10 21:26 GMT-04:00 C.Benham <***@adam.com.au>:

On 9/11/2016 5:02 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:


43: A
24: B>C
23: C>B
10: D

Under MTA the B and C voters are being completely reasonable: They hope for majority approval but can still hope for a win if they
don't get it.

Strategy is less likely to produce these ballots under U/P because the B and C voters are taking a gamble. To get a similar outcome
they have to vote B=C. Anyone who doesn't is functionally defecting!


 C: A very good example!   Assuming MTA and MCA use Top Ratings scores to break Approval ties, they both elect the Condorcet winner B.


But both could be shifted to C with a single C-only ballot, even if the B:C ratio were 46:1 instead of 24:23. 

U/P's under-use of  the middle ratings slot means that it relies more on its "majority disqualification" mechanism which seems to make it more
vulnerable to irrelevant ballots, as in the example.

Under U/P, without the irrelevant D ballots, A and D are disqualified and B is the glorious winner. With them, B and C and D are disqualified and  (without needing
any others to be disqualified) A wins.

This causes me to reject U/P as clearly worse than MTA and MCA. Of the three I (again) rate MTA as the least bad.


I think MTA is pretty darn good. I still prefer U/P.
I think that scenarios like the above are fundamentally pathological; any possible winner has only minority approval, so that even assuming all ballots are semi-honest, any of them could be a true Condorcet loser. Thus, I believe that it's more important for a system to try to avoid scenarios like the above, than to try to find a perfect winner in such a scenario. In fact, in the related scenario:

43: A
40: B>C6: C>B
1: C
10: D

... I think that a case can be made for either A or B. After all, they'd be tied if we try to approximate Score by using truncatable Borda here. But no serious case can be made for C or D, even though C wins MTA and MCA.
Anyway, I think U/P does a better job trying to discourage the kind of strategy that would lead to a scenario like the above. And part of that is the default rule which Chris has criticized.
One possible alternative default rule: ballots alternate between defaulting to "acceptable" and to "unacceptable". Each ballot clearly states which default it uses, and there is a place on the ballot to globally change that default. (I doubt Chris will like this idea, but it is at least straightforward, explicit, and easy to describe.)


Chris Benham






----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info





----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
C.Benham
2016-09-13 10:28:20 UTC
Permalink
Kevin,

I take "downvoted by most" to mean down-voted by most of the voters,
meaning down-voted on more than half the ballots.

Your interpretation would be "the most downvoted".

Chris Benham
Post by Kevin Venzke
Hi Jameson,
"Downvoted by most" means the candidate with the single greatest
number of downvotes? This could be the (voted, unique) majority
favorite couldn't it?
How does this violate "irrelevant ballots"? I must be misunderstanding
it. Does "max amount of upvotes" mean 100% of the voters, or just the
greatest number of upvotes that occurs?
I do like antiplurality mechanisms.
Kevin
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Envoyé le :* Lundi 12 septembre 2016 20h37
*Objet :* Re: [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level
method.
Voters may rate each candidate as "unacceptable" (downvote),
"preferred" (upvote), or "acceptable" (neither). Default is neither.
Any candidate downvoted by most, or with fewer than half the max
amount of upvotes, is disqualified, unless that would disqualify
everyone. The winner is the remaining candidate with the most upvotes.
The "fewer than half the max" rule prevents dark-horse winners,
without resorting to strange defaults. It has no effect on a two-way
chicken dilemma. Though in theory it could affect an evenly-balanced
three-way chicken dilemma (in a four-way race), I think there's a
negligible chance that such a scenario would be so balanced.
I know that Chris doesn't like this method's violation of "irrelevant
ballots". Myself, I think that no voters are irrelevant; even if they
don't express an opinion between the two frontrunners, they may have
one. (True, they may not; but that's not the first assumption I'd make.)
Hi Jameson,
I think it is a positive thing that the MTA B/C majority coalition
can give their sincere preferences (!), while using the strategy
they're expected to use (i.e. middle slot as tiebreaker given
multiple majorities), without risk of this strategy backfiring.
(Voters can accidentally elect the less preferred of B or C, but
that is the inescapable chicken dilemma, I would say.)
I have some sympathy for your claim that C should not be able to
win with few top ratings. But that sympathy is not tied to Borda
counts, it is based on wanting to reduce the truncation incentive
for the B voters. This, U/P does not really do, because the B>C
voters would be taking a large risk that they are helping to put C
(alone) over the threshold of majority approval.
So I don't think either of these ballot sets is likely under U/P,
and it sounds like you agree with that and think it is good
(because it deters a pathological ballot set)? Do you have a
stance (or at least, see use in determining a stance) on how U/P
voters in these scenarios should be voting?
Kevin
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Envoyé le :* Dimanche 11 septembre 2016 1h51
*Objet :* [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
43: A
24: B>C
23: C>B
10: D
Under MTA the B and C voters are being completely
reasonable: They hope for majority approval but can still
hope for a win if they
don't get it.
Strategy is less likely to produce these ballots under U/P
because the B and C voters are taking a gamble. To get a
similar outcome
they have to vote B=C. Anyone who doesn't is functionally
defecting!
C: A very good example! Assuming MTA and MCA use Top Ratings
scores to break Approval ties, they both elect the Condorcet
winner B.
But both could be shifted to C with a single C-only ballot, even
if the B:C ratio were 46:1 instead of 24:23.
U/P's under-use of the middle ratings slot means that it
relies more on its "majority disqualification" mechanism which
seems to make it more
vulnerable to irrelevant ballots, as in the example.
Under U/P, without the irrelevant D ballots, A and D are
disqualified and B is the glorious winner. With them, B and C
and D are disqualified and (without needing
any others to be disqualified) A wins.
This causes me to reject U/P as clearly worse than MTA and
MCA. Of the three I (again) rate MTA as the least bad.
I think MTA is pretty darn good. I still prefer U/P.
I think that scenarios like the above are fundamentally
pathological; any possible winner has only minority approval, so
that even assuming all ballots are semi-honest, any of them could
be a true Condorcet loser. Thus, I believe that it's more
important for a system to try to avoid scenarios like the above,
than to try to find a perfect winner in such a scenario. In fact,
43: A
40: B>C
6: C>B
1: C
10: D
... I think that a case can be made for either A or B. After all,
they'd be tied if we try to approximate Score by using truncatable
Borda here. But no serious case can be made for C or D, even
though C wins MTA and MCA.
Anyway, I think U/P does a better job trying to discourage the
kind of strategy that would lead to a scenario like the above. And
part of that is the default rule which Chris has criticized.
One possible alternative default rule: ballots alternate between
defaulting to "acceptable" and to "unacceptable". Each ballot
clearly states which default it uses, and there is a place on the
ballot to globally change that default. (I doubt Chris will like
this idea, but it is at least straightforward, explicit, and easy
to describe.)
Chris Benham
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com>
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Jameson Quinn
2016-09-13 13:01:40 UTC
Permalink
Chris is correct. "by most" = "by a majority". Maximum is "*the* most".

Perhaps I should avoid that word, but I was trying to use small words, as
in Randall Munroe's "Thing Explainer".
Post by C.Benham
Kevin,
I take "downvoted by most" to mean down-voted by most of the voters,
meaning down-voted on more than half the ballots.
Your interpretation would be "the most downvoted".
Chris Benham
Hi Jameson,
"Downvoted by most" means the candidate with the single greatest number of
downvotes? This could be the (voted, unique) majority favorite couldn't it?
How does this violate "irrelevant ballots"? I must be misunderstanding it.
Does "max amount of upvotes" mean 100% of the voters, or just the greatest
number of upvotes that occurs?
I do like antiplurality mechanisms.
Kevin
------------------------------
*Envoyé le :* Lundi 12 septembre 2016 20h37
*Objet :* Re: [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level
method.
Voters may rate each candidate as "unacceptable" (downvote), "preferred"
(upvote), or "acceptable" (neither). Default is neither.
Any candidate downvoted by most, or with fewer than half the max amount of
upvotes, is disqualified, unless that would disqualify everyone. The winner
is the remaining candidate with the most upvotes.
The "fewer than half the max" rule prevents dark-horse winners, without
resorting to strange defaults. It has no effect on a two-way chicken
dilemma. Though in theory it could affect an evenly-balanced three-way
chicken dilemma (in a four-way race), I think there's a negligible chance
that such a scenario would be so balanced.
I know that Chris doesn't like this method's violation of "irrelevant
ballots". Myself, I think that no voters are irrelevant; even if they don't
express an opinion between the two frontrunners, they may have one. (True,
they may not; but that's not the first assumption I'd make.)
Hi Jameson,
I think it is a positive thing that the MTA B/C majority coalition can
give their sincere preferences (!), while using the strategy they're
expected to use (i.e. middle slot as tiebreaker given multiple majorities),
without risk of this strategy backfiring. (Voters can accidentally elect
the less preferred of B or C, but that is the inescapable chicken dilemma,
I would say.)
I have some sympathy for your claim that C should not be able to win with
few top ratings. But that sympathy is not tied to Borda counts, it is based
on wanting to reduce the truncation incentive for the B voters. This, U/P
does not really do, because the B>C voters would be taking a large risk
that they are helping to put C (alone) over the threshold of majority
approval.
So I don't think either of these ballot sets is likely under U/P, and it
sounds like you agree with that and think it is good (because it deters a
pathological ballot set)? Do you have a stance (or at least, see use in
determining a stance) on how U/P voters in these scenarios should be voting?
Kevin
------------------------------
*Envoyé le :* Dimanche 11 septembre 2016 1h51
*Objet :* [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
43: A
24: B>C
23: C>B
10: D
Under MTA the B and C voters are being completely reasonable: They hope
for majority approval but can still hope for a win if they
don't get it.
Strategy is less likely to produce these ballots under U/P because the B
and C voters are taking a gamble. To get a similar outcome
they have to vote B=C. Anyone who doesn't is functionally defecting!
C: A very good example! Assuming MTA and MCA use Top Ratings scores to
break Approval ties, they both elect the Condorcet winner B.
But both could be shifted to C with a single C-only ballot, even if the
B:C ratio were 46:1 instead of 24:23.
U/P's under-use of the middle ratings slot means that it relies more on
its "majority disqualification" mechanism which seems to make it more
vulnerable to irrelevant ballots, as in the example.
Under U/P, without the irrelevant D ballots, A and D are disqualified and
B is the glorious winner. With them, B and C and D are disqualified and
(without needing
any others to be disqualified) A wins.
This causes me to reject U/P as clearly worse than MTA and MCA. Of the
three I (again) rate MTA as the least bad.
I think MTA is pretty darn good. I still prefer U/P.
I think that scenarios like the above are fundamentally pathological; any
possible winner has only minority approval, so that even assuming all
ballots are semi-honest, any of them could be a true Condorcet loser. Thus,
I believe that it's more important for a system to try to avoid scenarios
like the above, than to try to find a perfect winner in such a scenario. In
43: A
40: B>C
6: C>B
1: C
10: D
... I think that a case can be made for either A or B. After all, they'd
be tied if we try to approximate Score by using truncatable Borda here. But
no serious case can be made for C or D, even though C wins MTA and MCA.
Anyway, I think U/P does a better job trying to discourage the kind of
strategy that would lead to a scenario like the above. And part of that is
the default rule which Chris has criticized.
One possible alternative default rule: ballots alternate between
defaulting to "acceptable" and to "unacceptable". Each ballot clearly
states which default it uses, and there is a place on the ballot to
globally change that default. (I doubt Chris will like this idea, but it is
at least straightforward, explicit, and easy to describe.)
Chris Benham
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
----
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No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2016.0.7797 / Virus Database: 4649/13003 - Release Date: 09/12/16
----
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C.Benham
2016-09-13 13:17:32 UTC
Permalink
And I took " the max amount of upvotes" to refer to the maximum number
of up-votes received by any candidate.

Chris Benham
Chris is correct. "by most" = "by a majority". Maximum is "*/the/* most".
Perhaps I should avoid that word, but I was trying to use small words,
as in Randall Munroe's "Thing Explainer".
Kevin,
I take "downvoted by most" to mean down-voted by most of the
voters, meaning down-voted on more than half the ballots.
Your interpretation would be "the most downvoted".
Chris Benham
Post by Kevin Venzke
Hi Jameson,
"Downvoted by most" means the candidate with the single greatest
number of downvotes? This could be the (voted, unique) majority
favorite couldn't it?
How does this violate "irrelevant ballots"? I must be
misunderstanding it. Does "max amount of upvotes" mean 100% of
the voters, or just the greatest number of upvotes that occurs?
I do like antiplurality mechanisms.
Kevin
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Envoyé le :* Lundi 12 septembre 2016 20h37
*Objet :* Re: [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple
3-level method.
Voters may rate each candidate as "unacceptable" (downvote),
"preferred" (upvote), or "acceptable" (neither). Default is neither.
Any candidate downvoted by most, or with fewer than half the max
amount of upvotes, is disqualified, unless that would disqualify
everyone. The winner is the remaining candidate with the most upvotes.
The "fewer than half the max" rule prevents dark-horse winners,
without resorting to strange defaults. It has no effect on a
two-way chicken dilemma. Though in theory it could affect an
evenly-balanced three-way chicken dilemma (in a four-way race), I
think there's a negligible chance that such a scenario would be
so balanced.
I know that Chris doesn't like this method's violation of
"irrelevant ballots". Myself, I think that no voters are
irrelevant; even if they don't express an opinion between the two
frontrunners, they may have one. (True, they may not; but that's
not the first assumption I'd make.)
Hi Jameson,
I think it is a positive thing that the MTA B/C majority
coalition can give their sincere preferences (!), while using
the strategy they're expected to use (i.e. middle slot as
tiebreaker given multiple majorities), without risk of this
strategy backfiring. (Voters can accidentally elect the less
preferred of B or C, but that is the inescapable chicken
dilemma, I would say.)
I have some sympathy for your claim that C should not be able
to win with few top ratings. But that sympathy is not tied to
Borda counts, it is based on wanting to reduce the truncation
incentive for the B voters. This, U/P does not really do,
because the B>C voters would be taking a large risk that they
are helping to put C (alone) over the threshold of majority
approval.
So I don't think either of these ballot sets is likely under
U/P, and it sounds like you agree with that and think it is
good (because it deters a pathological ballot set)? Do you
have a stance (or at least, see use in determining a stance)
on how U/P voters in these scenarios should be voting?
Kevin
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Envoyé le :* Dimanche 11 septembre 2016 1h51
*Objet :* [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
43: A
24: B>C
23: C>B
10: D
Under MTA the B and C voters are being completely
reasonable: They hope for majority approval but can
still hope for a win if they
don't get it.
Strategy is less likely to produce these ballots
under U/P because the B and C voters are taking a
gamble. To get a similar outcome
they have to vote B=C. Anyone who doesn't is
functionally defecting!
C: A very good example! Assuming MTA and MCA use Top
Ratings scores to break Approval ties, they both elect
the Condorcet winner B.
But both could be shifted to C with a single C-only ballot,
even if the B:C ratio were 46:1 instead of 24:23.
U/P's under-use of the middle ratings slot means that it
relies more on its "majority disqualification" mechanism
which seems to make it more
vulnerable to irrelevant ballots, as in the example.
Under U/P, without the irrelevant D ballots, A and D are
disqualified and B is the glorious winner. With them, B
and C and D are disqualified and (without needing
any others to be disqualified) A wins.
This causes me to reject U/P as clearly worse than MTA
and MCA. Of the three I (again) rate MTA as the least bad.
I think MTA is pretty darn good. I still prefer U/P.
I think that scenarios like the above are fundamentally
pathological; any possible winner has only minority approval,
so that even assuming all ballots are semi-honest, any of
them could be a true Condorcet loser. Thus, I believe that
it's more important for a system to try to avoid scenarios
like the above, than to try to find a perfect winner in such
43: A
40: B>C
6: C>B
1: C
10: D
... I think that a case can be made for either A or B. After
all, they'd be tied if we try to approximate Score by using
truncatable Borda here. But no serious case can be made for C
or D, even though C wins MTA and MCA.
Anyway, I think U/P does a better job trying to discourage
the kind of strategy that would lead to a scenario like the
above. And part of that is the default rule which Chris has
criticized.
One possible alternative default rule: ballots alternate
between defaulting to "acceptable" and to "unacceptable".
Each ballot clearly states which default it uses, and there
is a place on the ballot to globally change that default. (I
doubt Chris will like this idea, but it is at least
straightforward, explicit, and easy to describe.)
Chris Benham
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Jameson Quinn
2016-09-13 13:28:49 UTC
Permalink
Again, correct.
And I took " the max amount of upvotes" to refer to the maximum number of
up-votes received by any candidate.
Chris Benham
Chris is correct. "by most" = "by a majority". Maximum is "*the* most".
Perhaps I should avoid that word, but I was trying to use small words, as
in Randall Munroe's "Thing Explainer".
Post by C.Benham
Kevin,
I take "downvoted by most" to mean down-voted by most of the voters,
meaning down-voted on more than half the ballots.
Your interpretation would be "the most downvoted".
Chris Benham
Hi Jameson,
"Downvoted by most" means the candidate with the single greatest number
of downvotes? This could be the (voted, unique) majority favorite couldn't
it?
How does this violate "irrelevant ballots"? I must be misunderstanding
it. Does "max amount of upvotes" mean 100% of the voters, or just the
greatest number of upvotes that occurs?
I do like antiplurality mechanisms.
Kevin
------------------------------
*Envoyé le :* Lundi 12 septembre 2016 20h37
*Objet :* Re: [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level
method.
Voters may rate each candidate as "unacceptable" (downvote), "preferred"
(upvote), or "acceptable" (neither). Default is neither.
Any candidate downvoted by most, or with fewer than half the max amount
of upvotes, is disqualified, unless that would disqualify everyone. The
winner is the remaining candidate with the most upvotes.
The "fewer than half the max" rule prevents dark-horse winners, without
resorting to strange defaults. It has no effect on a two-way chicken
dilemma. Though in theory it could affect an evenly-balanced three-way
chicken dilemma (in a four-way race), I think there's a negligible chance
that such a scenario would be so balanced.
I know that Chris doesn't like this method's violation of "irrelevant
ballots". Myself, I think that no voters are irrelevant; even if they don't
express an opinion between the two frontrunners, they may have one. (True,
they may not; but that's not the first assumption I'd make.)
Hi Jameson,
I think it is a positive thing that the MTA B/C majority coalition can
give their sincere preferences (!), while using the strategy they're
expected to use (i.e. middle slot as tiebreaker given multiple majorities),
without risk of this strategy backfiring. (Voters can accidentally elect
the less preferred of B or C, but that is the inescapable chicken dilemma,
I would say.)
I have some sympathy for your claim that C should not be able to win with
few top ratings. But that sympathy is not tied to Borda counts, it is based
on wanting to reduce the truncation incentive for the B voters. This, U/P
does not really do, because the B>C voters would be taking a large risk
that they are helping to put C (alone) over the threshold of majority
approval.
So I don't think either of these ballot sets is likely under U/P, and it
sounds like you agree with that and think it is good (because it deters a
pathological ballot set)? Do you have a stance (or at least, see use in
determining a stance) on how U/P voters in these scenarios should be voting?
Kevin
------------------------------
*Envoyé le :* Dimanche 11 septembre 2016 1h51
*Objet :* [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
43: A
24: B>C
23: C>B
10: D
Under MTA the B and C voters are being completely reasonable: They hope
for majority approval but can still hope for a win if they
don't get it.
Strategy is less likely to produce these ballots under U/P because the B
and C voters are taking a gamble. To get a similar outcome
they have to vote B=C. Anyone who doesn't is functionally defecting!
C: A very good example! Assuming MTA and MCA use Top Ratings scores to
break Approval ties, they both elect the Condorcet winner B.
But both could be shifted to C with a single C-only ballot, even if the
B:C ratio were 46:1 instead of 24:23.
U/P's under-use of the middle ratings slot means that it relies more on
its "majority disqualification" mechanism which seems to make it more
vulnerable to irrelevant ballots, as in the example.
Under U/P, without the irrelevant D ballots, A and D are disqualified and
B is the glorious winner. With them, B and C and D are disqualified and
(without needing
any others to be disqualified) A wins.
This causes me to reject U/P as clearly worse than MTA and MCA. Of the
three I (again) rate MTA as the least bad.
I think MTA is pretty darn good. I still prefer U/P.
I think that scenarios like the above are fundamentally pathological; any
possible winner has only minority approval, so that even assuming all
ballots are semi-honest, any of them could be a true Condorcet loser. Thus,
I believe that it's more important for a system to try to avoid scenarios
like the above, than to try to find a perfect winner in such a scenario. In
43: A
40: B>C
6: C>B
1: C
10: D
... I think that a case can be made for either A or B. After all, they'd
be tied if we try to approximate Score by using truncatable Borda here. But
no serious case can be made for C or D, even though C wins MTA and MCA.
Anyway, I think U/P does a better job trying to discourage the kind of
strategy that would lead to a scenario like the above. And part of that is
the default rule which Chris has criticized.
One possible alternative default rule: ballots alternate between
defaulting to "acceptable" and to "unacceptable". Each ballot clearly
states which default it uses, and there is a place on the ballot to
globally change that default. (I doubt Chris will like this idea, but it is
at least straightforward, explicit, and easy to describe.)
Chris Benham
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Kevin Venzke
2016-09-14 03:39:49 UTC
Permalink
Ok. It took me a little while to conclude that "most" was intended to be the end of that noun phrase. I saw that it had to be, but also wondered whether there was a missing word or something.
This method is sort of like a ratings version of my disqualified plurality method (on a "vote for and against" ballot), which also disqualifies only if there's a full majority. But my method can only elect either the first- or second-place candidate (by "for" votes).
I imagine most voters wouldn't use the middle slot in this method.
Kevin

De : Jameson Quinn <***@gmail.com>
À : C.Benham <***@adam.com.au>
Cc : Kevin Venzke <***@yahoo.fr>; EM <election-***@lists.electorama.com>
Envoyé le : Mardi 13 septembre 2016 8h01
Objet : Re: [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.

Chris is correct. "by most" = "by a majority". Maximum is "the most".
Perhaps I should avoid that word, but I was trying to use small words, as in Randall Munroe's "Thing Explainer".
2016-09-13 6:28 GMT-04:00 C.Benham <***@adam.com.au>:

Kevin,

I take "downvoted by most" to mean down-voted  by most of the voters, meaning down-voted on more than half the ballots.

Your interpretation would be "the most downvoted".

Chris Benham


On 9/13/2016 2:56 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:

Hi Jameson,
"Downvoted by most" means the candidate with the single greatest number of downvotes? This could be the (voted, unique) majority favorite couldn't it?
How does this violate "irrelevant ballots"? I must be misunderstanding it. Does "max amount of upvotes" mean 100% of the voters, or just the greatest number of upvotes that occurs?
I do like antiplurality mechanisms.
Kevin

De : Jameson Quinn <***@gmail.com>
À : Kevin Venzke <***@yahoo.fr>; electionsciencefoundation <***@googlegroups. com>
Cc : EM <election-***@lists. electorama.com>
Envoyé le : Lundi 12 septembre 2016 20h37
Objet : Re: [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.

Here's a new proposed variant of U/P with a simple default:
Voters may rate each candidate as "unacceptable" (downvote), "preferred" (upvote), or "acceptable" (neither). Default is neither.
Any candidate downvoted by most, or with fewer than half the max amount of upvotes, is disqualified, unless that would disqualify everyone. The winner is the remaining candidate with the most upvotes.
The "fewer than half the max" rule prevents dark-horse winners, without resorting to strange defaults. It has no effect on a two-way chicken dilemma. Though in theory it could affect an evenly-balanced three-way chicken dilemma (in a four-way race), I think there's a negligible chance that such a scenario would be so balanced.
I know that Chris doesn't like this method's violation of "irrelevant ballots". Myself, I think that no voters are irrelevant; even if they don't express an opinion between the two frontrunners, they may have one. (True, they may not; but that's not the first assumption I'd make.)
2016-09-12 20:22 GMT-04:00 Kevin Venzke <***@yahoo.fr>:

Hi Jameson,
I think it is a positive thing that the MTA B/C majority coalition can give their sincere preferences (!), while using the strategy they're expected to use (i.e. middle slot as tiebreaker given multiple majorities), without risk of this strategy backfiring. (Voters can accidentally elect the less preferred of B or C, but that is the inescapable chicken dilemma, I would say.)
I have some sympathy for your claim that C should not be able to win with few top ratings. But that sympathy is not tied to Borda counts, it is based on wanting to reduce the truncation incentive for the B voters. This, U/P does not really do, because the B>C voters would be taking a large risk that they are helping to put C (alone) over the threshold of majority approval.
So I don't think either of these ballot sets is likely under U/P, and it sounds like you agree with that and think it is good (because it deters a pathological ballot set)? Do you have a stance (or at least, see use in determining a stance) on how U/P voters in these scenarios should be voting?
Kevin

De : Jameson Quinn <***@gmail.com>
À : EM <election-***@lists. electorama.com>
Envoyé le : Dimanche 11 septembre 2016 1h51
Objet : [EM] Fwd: Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.



2016-09-10 21:26 GMT-04:00 C.Benham <***@adam.com.au>:

On 9/11/2016 5:02 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:


43: A
24: B>C
23: C>B
10: D

Under MTA the B and C voters are being completely reasonable: They hope for majority approval but can still hope for a win if they
don't get it.

Strategy is less likely to produce these ballots under U/P because the B and C voters are taking a gamble. To get a similar outcome
they have to vote B=C. Anyone who doesn't is functionally defecting!


 C: A very good example!   Assuming MTA and MCA use Top Ratings scores to break Approval ties, they both elect the Condorcet winner B.


But both could be shifted to C with a single C-only ballot, even if the B:C ratio were 46:1 instead of 24:23.  

U/P's under-use of  the middle ratings slot means that it relies more on its "majoritydisqualification" mechanism which seems to make it more
vulnerable to irrelevant ballots, as in the example.

Under U/P, without the irrelevant D ballots, A and D are disqualified and B is the glorious winner. With them, B and C and D are disqualified and  (without needing
any others to be disqualified) A wins.

This causes me to reject U/P as clearly worse than MTA and MCA. Of the three I (again) rate MTA as the least bad.


I think MTA is pretty darn good. I still prefer U/P.
I think that scenarios like the above are fundamentally pathological; any possible winner has only minority approval, so that even assuming all ballots are semi-honest, any of them could be a true Condorcet loser. Thus, I believe that it's more important for a system to try to avoid scenarios like the above, than to try to find a perfect winner in such a scenario. In fact, in the related scenario:

43: A
40: B>C 6: C>B
1: C
10: D

... I think that a case can be made for either A or B. After all, they'd be tied if we try to approximate Score by using truncatable Borda here. But no serious case can be made for C or D, even though C wins MTA and MCA.
Anyway, I think U/P does a better job trying to discourage the kind of strategy that would lead to a scenario like the above. And part of that is the default rule which Chris has criticized.
One possible alternative default rule: ballots alternate between defaulting to "acceptable" and to "unacceptable". Each ballot clearly states which default it uses, and there is a place on the ballot to globally change that default. (I doubt Chris will like this idea, but it is at least straightforward, explicit, and easy to describe.)


Chris Benham






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Toby Pereira
2016-09-13 16:19:13 UTC
Permalink
There is also the potential problem - as Chris Benham mentioned previously
- that the default vote is not the bottom rating. Arguably most people who
know how the system works would simply bottom rate candidates as their
default move if they aren't actively positively inclined towards them.
Others who aren't as familiar with the inner workings might not do this, so
arguably it makes it a bit of a two-tier system for voters. And that could
be seen as a failure of simplicity.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Voters may rate each candidate as "unacceptable" (downvote), "preferred"
(upvote), or "acceptable" (neither). Default is neither.
Any candidate downvoted by most, or with fewer than half the max amount of
upvotes, is disqualified, unless that would disqualify everyone. The winner
is the remaining candidate with the most upvotes.
The "fewer than half the max" rule prevents dark-horse winners, without
resorting to strange defaults. It has no effect on a two-way chicken
dilemma. Though in theory it could affect an evenly-balanced three-way
chicken dilemma (in a four-way race), I think there's a negligible chance
that such a scenario would be so balanced.
I know that Chris doesn't like this method's violation of "irrelevant
ballots". Myself, I think that no voters are irrelevant; even if they don't
express an opinion between the two frontrunners, they may have one. (True,
they may not; but that's not the first assumption I'd make.)
Toby Pereira
2016-09-08 22:49:41 UTC
Permalink
This thread is getting increasingly difficult to follow. Am I to take it that the definition in the bit quoted from 9/9/2016 at 12:39 is the latest definition of U/P? As that time is currently in the future for the UK and anywhere west of it (and conveniently 9/9 means the same wherever you go), it should be fairly up-to-date!

But now I see this bit about having a note by candidates' names if they got majority unacceptable in the last election - what is this madness? What does this achieve? Presumably most candidates standing would get majority unacceptable as it would probably be most people's default rating. Obviously it's better than excluding them, but unless I've missed a chunk of conversation, this seems like a fairly arbitrary punishment to hand out to losers.


--------------------------------------------
On Thu, 8/9/16, C.Benham <***@adam.com.au> wrote:

Subject: Re: [EM] Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
To: election-***@lists.electorama.com
Date: Thursday, 8 September, 2016, 20:20


On 9/9/2016
12:39 AM, Jameson Quinn
wrote:



The main advantage of U/P
voting over other systems like MJ or MCA is
simplicity of
description. So I'm going to try to describe
it as simply as
possible.



To vote, you rate each person running as
"preferred",
"acceptable", or
"unacceptable". You can rate any number at
each level.



If more than half of voters rate a person
"unacceptable",
that person can't win, unless the same is
true of all the
people running. Of those remaining, the winner
is the one
rated "preferred" by the most
voters.






C:  By this definition, the U/P method uses a simple
3-slot ballot
just like MTA and MCA.





C:  Again, I'd be interested in seeing a
plausible example
of when U/P doesn't elect the Approval
winner.



Easy.

20: A>>B>C

35: B>A>>C

45: C>>A=B



Threshold in approval is >>. In U/P,
voters are as
expressive as possible.





C: On 3-slot ratings ballots, how are the 20 A
supporters able
to vote one unapproved candidate above the
other?


On the 3-slot ballots, they
vote A>B.
On the 2-slot ballots, they vote A. These are
perfectly
consistent.


C: But above you are suggesting that U/P somehow uses
a both a
2-slot ballot and a 3-slot ballot.  Which is it?



Actually it seems to me that the stripped-down 3-slot
version (if
default rating is "Unacceptable") is
actually the same method

as MTA. "Unacceptable" is just the inverse
of "Approved".  Any
candidate who doesn't get a majority
"Unacceptable" score must

get a majority Approval score.  



I prefer MTA's more positive wording.  In U/P it
seems as though
the middle rating slot doesn't do anything.



Any candidate, including an
incumbent, who had gotten over 50%
"unacceptable" in the prior
election would have a note to that effect next to
their name
on the ballot. (In prior messages, I'd
suggested not allowing
them on the ballot. I now think that allowing them
on, but
with a note, would be
better.)


C: Yes, that is far less draconian, a big improvement,
and not a
big deal.  I suppose there's nothing wrong with a
bit of history.



Chris Benham









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Toby Pereira
2016-09-11 21:55:01 UTC
Permalink
On the exclusion thing (or a not by candidates' names), I suppose arguably it's not really a part of the U/P method, because it's a completely detachable module, and something like it could be applied (or not) to any voting system. It's a bit like winning votes v margins. If someone invents a Condorcet method and says it's to be used with winning votes, then it's still the "same method" if someone uses it with margins.

On a related note, I see people talking about MAM a lot - but as far as I can see it's not really a method. It's just a specific form of ranked pairs!

--------------------------------------------
On Thu, 8/9/16, Toby Pereira <***@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:

Subject: Re: [EM] Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
To: election-***@lists.electorama.com, ***@adam.com.au
Date: Thursday, 8 September, 2016, 23:49

This thread is getting increasingly
difficult to follow. Am I to take it that the definition in
the bit quoted from 9/9/2016 at 12:39 is the latest
definition of U/P? As that time is currently in the future
for the UK and anywhere west of it (and conveniently 9/9
means the same wherever you go), it should be fairly
up-to-date!

But now I see this bit about having a note by candidates'
names if they got majority unacceptable in the last election
- what is this madness? What does this achieve? Presumably
most candidates standing would get majority unacceptable as
it would probably be most people's default rating. Obviously
it's better than excluding them, but unless I've missed a
chunk of conversation, this seems like a fairly arbitrary
punishment to hand out to losers.


--------------------------------------------
On Thu, 8/9/16, C.Benham <***@adam.com.au>
wrote:

Subject: Re: [EM] Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple
3-level method.
To: election-***@lists.electorama.com
Date: Thursday, 8 September, 2016, 20:20


     On 9/9/2016
12:39 AM, Jameson Quinn
       wrote:

       

       The main advantage of U/P
           voting over
other systems like MJ or MCA is
simplicity of
           description.
So I'm going to try to describe
it as simply as
           possible.
           

           
           To vote, you
rate each person running as
"preferred",
         
   "acceptable", or
"unacceptable". You can rate any number at
             each
level.
           

           
           If more than
half of voters rate a person
"unacceptable",
             that
person can't win, unless the same is
true of all the
             people
running. Of those remaining, the winner
is the one
             rated
"preferred" by the most
voters.
           

           
         
       

       C:  By this definition, the
U/P method uses a simple
3-slot ballot
       just like MTA and MCA.

       

       
           
             C: 
Again, I'd be interested in seeing a
plausible example
             of when
U/P doesn't elect the Approval
winner.

             

             Easy.

             20:
A>>B>C

             35:
B>A>>C

             45:
C>>A=B

             

         
   Threshold in approval is >>. In
U/P,
voters are as
         
   expressive as possible.

           
           

         
         C: On 3-slot ratings
ballots, how are the 20 A
supporters able
         to vote one
unapproved candidate above the
other?
       

       On the 3-slot ballots, they
vote A>B.
         On the 2-slot
ballots, they vote A. These are
perfectly
         consistent.
       

       C: But above you are
suggesting that U/P somehow uses
a both a
       2-slot ballot and a 3-slot
ballot.  Which is it?

       

       Actually it seems to me that
the stripped-down 3-slot
version (if
       default rating is
"Unacceptable") is
actually the same method

       as MTA. "Unacceptable" is
just the inverse
of "Approved".  Any
       candidate who doesn't get a
majority
"Unacceptable" score must

       get a majority Approval
score.  

       

       I prefer MTA's more positive
wording.  In U/P it
seems as though
       the middle rating slot
doesn't do anything.

       

       Any candidate, including an
           incumbent, who
had gotten over 50%
"unacceptable" in the prior
           election would
have a note to that effect next to
their name
           on the ballot.
(In prior messages, I'd
suggested not allowing
           them on the
ballot. I now think that allowing them
on, but
           with a note,
would be
better.)
       

       C: Yes, that is far less
draconian, a big improvement,
and not a
       big deal.  I suppose
there's nothing wrong with a
bit of history.

       

       Chris Benham

       

       

     
     

   
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Jameson Quinn
2016-09-13 17:28:31 UTC
Permalink
One of the design goals for this system is to minimize the gap in terms of
voting power between a naive vote and a strategic one. I think that it does
a reasonable job at that; most voters' naive vote will be basically
strategically optimal.

Think of a few realistic voter types:
Major Partisan: One major party is good, the other is bad. Naively, will
upvote the good one, and downvote the bad one.
Minor Partisan: One extreme of left-right spectrum is good, the other is
bad. Naively will upvote a minor party on the good side, downvote major and
minor parties on the bad side.
Status Quo: One major party is good, the other one is OK. Minor parties are
scary. Naturally will upvote one major party, and possibly downvote any
minor parties that look as if they might win.
Anti-establishment: Opposite of status quo. Will upvote a minor party or
two, downvote both major parties.

These naive votes will be strategically optimal in the following cases:

- For any majority coalition of Major and Minor partisans plus status quo
leaners from one side of the spectrum. Also for the minority on the other
side in that case, if they prefer the winning opponent over the non-winning
opponents, which is at least as likely as not.
- For the status quo voters if they thereby manage to disqualify a minor
party candidate who would have won.
- Ditto, for the anti-establishment voters.

They will be non-optimal for:
-people on the losing ideological side, who perhaps should have preferred
the most centrist candidate from the winning side. Note that this is
unstrategic for lack of upvotes, not for lack of downvotes.
-Status quo voters, when their less-preferred major candidate wins, AND
their preferred candidate was not disqualified, AND there are significant
numbers of anti-establishment voters to balance out the status quo ones,
AND they could strategically betray without provoking retaliation from the
other part of the status quo voters. In this case, they're insufficiently
downvoting, as Toby worries about. But all of those conditions make the
scenario sufficiently improbable and also sufficiently low-payoff for the
voters in question that I don't think it matters. And even in this case,
the system is arguably getting the socially-right answer, it's just not
strategically stable.

So I think the middle default will not lead to significant strategic
regret. Voters will usually not have reasons to criticize the system, even
if they don't like the outcome.

2016-09-13 12:19 GMT-04:00 'Toby Pereira' via The Center for Election
Post by Toby Pereira
There is also the potential problem - as Chris Benham mentioned previously
- that the default vote is not the bottom rating. Arguably most people who
know how the system works would simply bottom rate candidates as their
default move if they aren't actively positively inclined towards them.
Others who aren't as familiar with the inner workings might not do this, so
arguably it makes it a bit of a two-tier system for voters. And that could
be seen as a failure of simplicity.
Post by Jameson Quinn
Voters may rate each candidate as "unacceptable" (downvote), "preferred"
(upvote), or "acceptable" (neither). Default is neither.
Any candidate downvoted by most, or with fewer than half the max amount
of upvotes, is disqualified, unless that would disqualify everyone. The
winner is the remaining candidate with the most upvotes.
The "fewer than half the max" rule prevents dark-horse winners, without
resorting to strange defaults. It has no effect on a two-way chicken
dilemma. Though in theory it could affect an evenly-balanced three-way
chicken dilemma (in a four-way race), I think there's a negligible chance
that such a scenario would be so balanced.
I know that Chris doesn't like this method's violation of "irrelevant
ballots". Myself, I think that no voters are irrelevant; even if they don't
express an opinion between the two frontrunners, they may have one. (True,
they may not; but that's not the first assumption I'd make.)
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