Discussion:
[EM] IRV et al v. EPR
(too old to reply)
steve bosworth
2018-07-15 21:55:50 UTC
Permalink
The recent responses to Sennet’s attempt favorably to report some recent successes of RCV (i.e. IRV) prompt me to hope that readers will be willing to test the counter claims of a newly developed voting and counting method for electing multi-winners. This method is fully described in the following published article:

http://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm/

[http://www.jpolrisk.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/rating.jpg]<http://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm/>

Legislatures Elected by Evaluative Proportional ...<http://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm/>
www.jpolrisk.com
This article explains how a new voting method called Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR) fully satisfies the demand that in the best representative democracy, no citizen’s vote would be involuntarily wasted, quantitatively or qualitatively. 2 EPR is intended for voters who are electing members of a legislative body, for example a ...



This method is called Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR). EPR builds upon the arguments for Majority Judgment (MJ)offered by Balinski and Laraki (2010, MIT). For example, when electing all the members of a city council, each EPR citizen is asked to evaluate (not rank) as many of the candidates in the city as she might wish, i.e. to grade each with regard to their fitness for the office: either EXCELLENT, VERY GOOD, GOOD, ACCEPTABLE, POOR, or REJECT. The article explains the relatively simple step by step method by which all these evaluations are counted by hand (or by the algorithm provided). As a result, each citizen’s one vote continues fully to count in the deliberations and decisions of the council. It does this through the weighted vote earned by one of the elected members, i.e. the one winner whom she has helped to elect and judges to be the one most qualified for the office.

Unlike any known variety of plurality, ranking (Condorcet or IRV (RCV, STV, etc.), range, or approving voting methods, only EPR allows each citizen to guarantee that her one vote will continue to count in the council (or legislature). Also, I'd like to offer Abd ul-Rahman Lomax some hope: perhaps the extra appeal of this unique feature of EPR would prompt enough citizens in a state like California to adopt EPR by one of its referenda.

Again, only EPR allows no vote to be wasted as defined by the second paragraph of the article.

What do you think?

I look forward to your feedback.



________________________________



Today's Topics:

1. Re: IRV / RCv advances (Abd ul-Rahman Lomax)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 14:08:24 -0400
From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <***@lomaxdesign.com>
To: election-***@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV / RCv advances
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On 7/14/2018 10:08 AM, Richard Lung wrote:

> [...] Agree completely about score voting. I can't help but feel
> approval voting is essentially a rebranding of cumulative voting. In
> about 1867, John Stuart Mill knew it was only a trifling improvement
> on plurality counting but at least opened peoples minds to alternatives.
I'd question that simply counting all the votes would be a "trifling
improvement." It would have flipped the US presidential election in
2000, almost certainly, and is a no-cost improvement, simple to
implement and easy to understand. In a two-round system, it can provide
substantial flexibility, perhaps even allowing runoffs to have a third
candidate. Counting all the votes would be, again, an improvement over
IRV, allowing voters to equal-rank. But the IRV method, by discarding
votes, is intrinsically flawed, and Bucklin actually worked when used.
The arguments that it didn't work were based on the fact that it wasn't
magic pixie dust. The only system that fixes about everything is Asset,
which hardly gets any consideration at all. My suggestion has been for
EM reformers to suggest Asset for NGOS, since it's really simple, as
well, and creates a deliberative structure, which is far more flexible
-- and functionally democratic -- than pure amalgamation. To be
fail-safe, it could be used in a nomination process, to be actually
ratified for a final result.

Approval -- and most methods -- are plurality methods unless a true
majority of the votes is required for a result. In Australia, in some
places they accomplish that by making it illegal to not completely rank.
In other words, to make a result more "democratic," coerce the voters.
Ah, the things people do to preserve the way things are!
> Re 3.
> Weighted Condorcet pairing arguably offers a back-door that partly
> gets round the Laplace criticism of Condorcet pairing, that it does
> not establish the relative importance of higher and lower preferences,
> in the over-all election count.
> I see Condorcet pairing primarily as a research tool for
> cross-referencing the results of an at-large election with the results
> from sub-elections of one-to-one contests or less minimal partitions.
> Ideally, we would have an election system that does not have to watch
> its back for a Condorcet paradox.
A condorcet paradox is an indication of an incomplete process. Depending
on preference strength, which some Condorcet methods attempt to
estimate, it might be meaningless. But to truly analyse election returns
requires preference strength information. Borda, again, estimates it
with an assumption of full ranking, such that with many candidates, the
"rank distance" would approximate a measure of preference strength.

But the only ballot that actually allows the voters to directly express
preference strength is a score ballot. And then some advocates of other
systems point out Condoret failure, as if that matters when preference
strength is obviously low. It doesn't. And then it is pointed out that
voters may vote "strategically," as if that is dishonest or bad. In a
Score system, there is never any incentive to reverse preference. Voters
decide what preferences matter to them, and will vote accordingly, and a
good overall system will detect situations where is ambiguity, perhaps
due to inaccurate perception of probable results, and will then set up a
runoff.

Instead of working together to create a system that will actually
improve and foster full democracy, we don't, it seems, trust the people
and want them to conform to our own ideas. In other words, same old same
old. The problem with democracy is the damn people!

But democracy is still government by consent, and whenever that fails,
oppression is inevitable. It's only a question of how bad it gets. The
logic that captured me, so many decades ago, is that we need
representation by consent and choice, not by "winners" and "losers." And
that appears to be doable. But who cares enough to try it?

Some. Not yet enough, but it's possible any day. It might only take one
person to make a proposal and carry it through, in one place.

>
> Even an admittedly crude election like IRV (Alternative Vote),
> according to this group, has only come-up with the Burlington case.
> That may have been politically unfortunate. But, if about 150?
> elections have not suffered the paradox, that incidence is not
> statistically significant.

It is possible to show that about one-third of IRV results were not
optimal. This is done by comparing IRV results with top-two runoff
results. If a full-information ballot were used with IRV (it could be
done! Easily!) we would then know. However, actually collecting the data
to determine, definitively, if a voting system is actually working is
not a part of any reform proposal I have seen. The collecting of
information is confused with and considered less important than creating
a result, and I can easily see the counter-argument: what if this causes
the result of an election to be called into question? Won't this damage
our trust in government? I think I have actually seen that argument.

If our trust in government is based in ignorance, it's worse than a bit
of trouble. A simple, coarse-score ballot, with explicit approval
cutoff, would be cheap and easy, and how the actual result is determined
could be explicity declared on the ballot. Providing the additonal
information would be optional. One could vote the ballot, if one
chooses, as vote-for-one. It would all generate useful information, and
could guide future election method decisions.
> The real comparison is how many "Bush beats Gore minus Nader" contests
> are there?

In a two-party system. Duverger's law and party attempts to corner the
electorate create many of them. Look at any close election and at the
participation of minor parties in it. There may be hundreds of these a
year. As well, the existing system tends to suppress minor party
participation. New York has Fusion voting, a step in a direction of
improved democracy. It was proposed for Massachusetts and lost. Who
opposed it?

The "Democratic" party, of course! It lost. So why did people vote
against it? Well, perhaps they trusted their party. After all, isn't our
party the Good Guys? If it's bad for them, surely we don't want it! It
all makes sense until and unless one starts to look more closely, which
most people don't do. And realizing that, Dodgson proposed Asset, which
actually creates, very simply, representative government, with the good
stuff associated with that, while allowing low-level decisions, by
ordinary people who don't want their lives to be about politics, to be
useful and effective.

>
> And how many simple plurality elections make voters act as their own
> returning officers in an implicit ranked choice election, where the
> voter excludes his first preference for Nader, and counts it for
> second preference Gore?
My sense is that many would vote for a third party candidate if they did
not know it would be a wasted vote. It could be trivial to fix that
problem. But we obviously care about something else more. about what?



------------------------------

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End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 169, Issue 8
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Andy Jennings
2018-07-16 17:26:58 UTC
Permalink
Steve,

I like the idea of a PR system based on majority judgment, but have some
concerns with this method. Are you proposing that the different elected
legislators have different voting weights in the legislature? If so, I've
heard that idea before, and I think it's clever but probably unworkable in
practice. I doubt that it would integrate well with the parliamentary
authorities (e.g. Robert's Rules of Order) that legislatures actually use
to get things done.

If not, then I think it's a mistake to eliminate _all_ the voters who gave
the winning grade to the elected candidate. In your example, I dislike
eliminating 17 voters in round 1, for example. I think only one quota of
voters should be eliminated. You could eliminate 10 of the 17 by random
selection and leave the other 7. Or you could down-weight them all by a
factor of 7/17 and deal with fractional ballots remaining.

If it were me, I would fully eliminate any voters who gave a grade strictly
above the critical grade and down-weight the ones who gave exactly the
critical grade by some fraction so that the total amount of voting power
"used up" was equal to one quota. Then, yes, deal with fractional voters.

~ Andrew

On Sun, Jul 15, 2018 at 2:55 PM, steve bosworth <***@hotmail.com>
wrote:

> The recent responses to Sennet’s attempt favorably to report some recent
> successes of RCV (i.e. IRV) prompt me to hope that readers will be willing
> to test the counter claims of a newly developed voting and counting method
> for electing multi-winners. This method is fully described in the
> following published article:
>
> http://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-
> representation-epr-a-new-algorithm/
>
>
> <http://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm/>
> Legislatures Elected by Evaluative Proportional ...
> <http://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm/>
> www.jpolrisk.com
> This article explains how a new voting method called Evaluative
> Proportional Representation (EPR) fully satisfies the demand that in the
> best representative democracy, no citizen’s vote would be involuntarily
> wasted, quantitatively or qualitatively. 2 EPR is intended for voters who
> are electing members of a legislative body, for example a ...
>
>
> This method is called Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR). EPR
> builds upon the arguments for Majority Judgment (MJ)offered by Balinski and
> Laraki (2010, MIT). For example, when electing all the members of a city
> council, each EPR citizen is asked to evaluate (not rank) as many of the
> candidates in the city as she might wish, i.e. to grade each with regard to
> their fitness for the office: either EXCELLENT, VERY GOOD, GOOD,
> ACCEPTABLE, POOR, or REJECT. The article explains the relatively simple
> step by step method by which all these evaluations are counted by hand (or
> by the algorithm provided). As a result, each citizen’s one vote
> continues fully to count in the deliberations and decisions of the council.
> It does this through the weighted vote earned by one of the elected
> members, i.e. the one winner whom she has helped to elect and judges to be
> the one most qualified for the office.
>
> Unlike any known variety of plurality, ranking (Condorcet or IRV (RCV,
> STV, etc.), range, or approving voting methods, only EPR allows each
> citizen to guarantee that her one vote will continue to count in the
> council (or legislature). Also, I'd like to offer Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
> some hope: perhaps the extra appeal of this unique feature of EPR would
> prompt enough citizens in a state like California to adopt EPR by one of
> its referenda.
>
> Again, only EPR allows no vote to be wasted as defined by the second
> paragraph of the article.
>
> What do you think?
>
> I look forward to your feedback.
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. Re: IRV / RCv advances (Abd ul-Rahman Lomax)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 14:08:24 -0400
> From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <***@lomaxdesign.com>
> To: election-***@lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] IRV / RCv advances
> Message-ID: <69bc286e-c970-9f6c-e60a-***@lomaxdesign.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
>
>
> On 7/14/2018 10:08 AM, Richard Lung wrote:
>
> > [...] Agree completely about score voting. I can't help but feel
> > approval voting is essentially a rebranding of cumulative voting. In
> > about 1867, John Stuart Mill knew it was only a trifling improvement
> > on plurality counting but at least opened peoples minds to alternatives.
> I'd question that simply counting all the votes would be a "trifling
> improvement." It would have flipped the US presidential election in
> 2000, almost certainly, and is a no-cost improvement, simple to
> implement and easy to understand. In a two-round system, it can provide
> substantial flexibility, perhaps even allowing runoffs to have a third
> candidate. Counting all the votes would be, again, an improvement over
> IRV, allowing voters to equal-rank. But the IRV method, by discarding
> votes, is intrinsically flawed, and Bucklin actually worked when used.
> The arguments that it didn't work were based on the fact that it wasn't
> magic pixie dust. The only system that fixes about everything is Asset,
> which hardly gets any consideration at all. My suggestion has been for
> EM reformers to suggest Asset for NGOS, since it's really simple, as
> well, and creates a deliberative structure, which is far more flexible
> -- and functionally democratic -- than pure amalgamation. To be
> fail-safe, it could be used in a nomination process, to be actually
> ratified for a final result.
>
> Approval -- and most methods -- are plurality methods unless a true
> majority of the votes is required for a result. In Australia, in some
> places they accomplish that by making it illegal to not completely rank.
> In other words, to make a result more "democratic," coerce the voters.
> Ah, the things people do to preserve the way things are!
> > Re 3.
> > Weighted Condorcet pairing arguably offers a back-door that partly
> > gets round the Laplace criticism of Condorcet pairing, that it does
> > not establish the relative importance of higher and lower preferences,
> > in the over-all election count.
> > I see Condorcet pairing primarily as a research tool for
> > cross-referencing the results of an at-large election with the results
> > from sub-elections of one-to-one contests or less minimal partitions.
> > Ideally, we would have an election system that does not have to watch
> > its back for a Condorcet paradox.
> A condorcet paradox is an indication of an incomplete process. Depending
> on preference strength, which some Condorcet methods attempt to
> estimate, it might be meaningless. But to truly analyse election returns
> requires preference strength information. Borda, again, estimates it
> with an assumption of full ranking, such that with many candidates, the
> "rank distance" would approximate a measure of preference strength.
>
> But the only ballot that actually allows the voters to directly express
> preference strength is a score ballot. And then some advocates of other
> systems point out Condoret failure, as if that matters when preference
> strength is obviously low. It doesn't. And then it is pointed out that
> voters may vote "strategically," as if that is dishonest or bad. In a
> Score system, there is never any incentive to reverse preference. Voters
> decide what preferences matter to them, and will vote accordingly, and a
> good overall system will detect situations where is ambiguity, perhaps
> due to inaccurate perception of probable results, and will then set up a
> runoff.
>
> Instead of working together to create a system that will actually
> improve and foster full democracy, we don't, it seems, trust the people
> and want them to conform to our own ideas. In other words, same old same
> old. The problem with democracy is the damn people!
>
> But democracy is still government by consent, and whenever that fails,
> oppression is inevitable. It's only a question of how bad it gets. The
> logic that captured me, so many decades ago, is that we need
> representation by consent and choice, not by "winners" and "losers." And
> that appears to be doable. But who cares enough to try it?
>
> Some. Not yet enough, but it's possible any day. It might only take one
> person to make a proposal and carry it through, in one place.
>
> >
> > Even an admittedly crude election like IRV (Alternative Vote),
> > according to this group, has only come-up with the Burlington case.
> > That may have been politically unfortunate. But, if about 150?
> > elections have not suffered the paradox, that incidence is not
> > statistically significant.
>
> It is possible to show that about one-third of IRV results were not
> optimal. This is done by comparing IRV results with top-two runoff
> results. If a full-information ballot were used with IRV (it could be
> done! Easily!) we would then know. However, actually collecting the data
> to determine, definitively, if a voting system is actually working is
> not a part of any reform proposal I have seen. The collecting of
> information is confused with and considered less important than creating
> a result, and I can easily see the counter-argument: what if this causes
> the result of an election to be called into question? Won't this damage
> our trust in government? I think I have actually seen that argument.
>
> If our trust in government is based in ignorance, it's worse than a bit
> of trouble. A simple, coarse-score ballot, with explicit approval
> cutoff, would be cheap and easy, and how the actual result is determined
> could be explicity declared on the ballot. Providing the additonal
> information would be optional. One could vote the ballot, if one
> chooses, as vote-for-one. It would all generate useful information, and
> could guide future election method decisions.
> > The real comparison is how many "Bush beats Gore minus Nader" contests
> > are there?
>
> In a two-party system. Duverger's law and party attempts to corner the
> electorate create many of them. Look at any close election and at the
> participation of minor parties in it. There may be hundreds of these a
> year. As well, the existing system tends to suppress minor party
> participation. New York has Fusion voting, a step in a direction of
> improved democracy. It was proposed for Massachusetts and lost. Who
> opposed it?
>
> The "Democratic" party, of course! It lost. So why did people vote
> against it? Well, perhaps they trusted their party. After all, isn't our
> party the Good Guys? If it's bad for them, surely we don't want it! It
> all makes sense until and unless one starts to look more closely, which
> most people don't do. And realizing that, Dodgson proposed Asset, which
> actually creates, very simply, representative government, with the good
> stuff associated with that, while allowing low-level decisions, by
> ordinary people who don't want their lives to be about politics, to be
> useful and effective.
>
> >
> > And how many simple plurality elections make voters act as their own
> > returning officers in an implicit ranked choice election, where the
> > voter excludes his first preference for Nader, and counts it for
> > second preference Gore?
> My sense is that many would vote for a third party candidate if they did
> not know it would be a wasted vote. It could be trivial to fix that
> problem. But we obviously care about something else more. about what?
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Subject: Digest Footer
>
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steve bosworth
2018-07-17 02:27:19 UTC
Permalink
From: ***@gmail.com <***@gmail.com> on behalf of Andy Jennings <***@jenningsstory.com>
Sent: Monday, July 16, 2018 5:26 PM
To: steve bosworth
Cc: election-***@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV et al v. EPR



From Steve to all,

Thank you Andy for responding so quickly. I will respond immediately in line after each of your questions and points.

A: I like the idea of a PR system based on majority judgment, but have some concerns with this method. Are you proposing that the different elected legislators have different voting weights in the legislature?



S: Yes.



A: If so, I've heard that idea before, and I think it's clever but probably unworkable in practice. I doubt that it would integrate well with the parliamentary authorities (e.g. Robert's Rules of Order) that legislatures actually use to get things done.



S: Given that, unlike all the other methods, EPR thoroughly guarantees the principle of one-person-one-vote, I would be very surprised if anyone could sustain the claim that it violates Robert’s Rules of Order. Please explain the specific concerns you have in this regard. Also, even if this principle were incompatible with these rules, I would say: so much the worse for these rules. This would require these rules to be suitably modified. What do you think?



A: If not, then I think it's a mistake to eliminate _all_ the voters who gave the winning grade to the elected candidate. In your example, I dislike eliminating 17 voters in round 1, for example.



S: Perhaps you have misunderstood the count at this point. These 17 voters have not been eliminated. Each of their evaluations of EXCELLENT have been add to elected candidate A, and given her an affirmed evaluation of 17. At the same time, what has been eliminated from the rest of the count at this point is all the other evaluations that these 17 voters have given to any of the other candidates. This is because the one vote of each of these 17 citizens has now been fully counted. To allow their other evaluations to help elect other winners would be to give each of them more than one vote in the council.



A: I think only one quota of voters should be eliminated. You could eliminate 10 of the 17 by random selection and leave the other 7. Or you could down-weight them all by a factor of 7/17 and deal with fractional ballots remaining.



S: Correct my understanding if it is mistaken but I think you are only suggesting the elimination of 10 from being counted for other candidates but keeping them for A’s election? In any case, the idea of randomly or fractionally eliminating or transferring votes violates EPR’s determination to make each citizen’s vote to add entirely to the voting power only of the winner she sees as most fit for the office.



A: If it were me, I would fully eliminate any voters who gave a grade strictly above the critical grade….


S: Again, when you say, ‘eliminate any voters’, you mean keeping only 10 to elect A and using the remaining 7 to help other candidates to be elected. Also, what you mean by ‘the critical grade’ is the quota of 10 in this context.

A: …. and down-weight the ones who gave exactly the critical grade by some fraction so that the total amount of voting power "used up" was equal to one quota. Then, yes, deal with fractional voters.


S: Again, arbitrary quotas and unnecessary fractions must not be used if you want no vote to be wasted, quantitatively or qualitatively, as defined in the 2nd paragraph of the article.



What do you think?

I look forward to your clarifications.

Steve

~ Andrew



________________________________
From: ***@gmail.com <***@gmail.com> on behalf of Andy Jennings <***@jenningsstory.com>
Sent: Monday, July 16, 2018 5:26 PM
To: steve bosworth
Cc: election-***@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV et al v. EPR

Steve,

I like the idea of a PR system based on majority judgment, but have some concerns with this method. Are you proposing that the different elected legislators have different voting weights in the legislature? If so, I've heard that idea before, and I think it's clever but probably unworkable in practice. I doubt that it would integrate well with the parliamentary authorities (e.g. Robert's Rules of Order) that legislatures actually use to get things done.

If not, then I think it's a mistake to eliminate _all_ the voters who gave the winning grade to the elected candidate. In your example, I dislike eliminating 17 voters in round 1, for example. I think only one quota of voters should be eliminated. You could eliminate 10 of the 17 by random selection and leave the other 7. Or you could down-weight them all by a factor of 7/17 and deal with fractional ballots remaining.

If it were me, I would fully eliminate any voters who gave a grade strictly above the critical grade and down-weight the ones who gave exactly the critical grade by some fraction so that the total amount of voting power "used up" was equal to one quota. Then, yes, deal with fractional voters.

~ Andrew

On Sun, Jul 15, 2018 at 2:55 PM, steve bosworth <***@hotmail.com<mailto:***@hotmail.com>> wrote:

The recent responses to Sennet’s attempt favorably to report some recent successes of RCV (i.e. IRV) prompt me to hope that readers will be willing to test the counter claims of a newly developed voting and counting method for electing multi-winners. This method is fully described in the following published article:

http://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm/<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jpolrisk.com%2Flegislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm%2F&data=02%7C01%7C%7Cee03f677ec0e420e95db08d5eb416838%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C636673588511875956&sdata=VRDjUB%2FrblIqCnP8%2Bwsgt%2BqOE7Ha7yC6l0Y%2F5SfGsUw%3D&reserved=0>

[http://www.jpolrisk.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/rating.jpg]<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jpolrisk.com%2Flegislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm%2F&data=02%7C01%7C%7Cee03f677ec0e420e95db08d5eb416838%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C636673588511875956&sdata=VRDjUB%2FrblIqCnP8%2Bwsgt%2BqOE7Ha7yC6l0Y%2F5SfGsUw%3D&reserved=0>

Legislatures Elected by Evaluative Proportional ...<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jpolrisk.com%2Flegislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm%2F&data=02%7C01%7C%7Cee03f677ec0e420e95db08d5eb416838%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C636673588511875956&sdata=VRDjUB%2FrblIqCnP8%2Bwsgt%2BqOE7Ha7yC6l0Y%2F5SfGsUw%3D&reserved=0>
www.jpolrisk.com<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jpolrisk.com&data=02%7C01%7C%7Cee03f677ec0e420e95db08d5eb416838%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C636673588511875956&sdata=sRo1U%2BgMLvHftPnogUDDK6gjLifA13zrJZd8XzrKeWs%3D&reserved=0>
This article explains how a new voting method called Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR) fully satisfies the demand that in the best representative democracy, no citizen’s vote would be involuntarily wasted, quantitatively or qualitatively. 2 EPR is intended for voters who are electing members of a legislative body, for example a ...



This method is called Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR). EPR builds upon the arguments for Majority Judgment (MJ)offered by Balinski and Laraki (2010, MIT). For example, when electing all the members of a city council, each EPR citizen is asked to evaluate (not rank) as many of the candidates in the city as she might wish, i.e. to grade each with regard to their fitness for the office: either EXCELLENT, VERY GOOD, GOOD, ACCEPTABLE, POOR, or REJECT. The article explains the relatively simple step by step method by which all these evaluations are counted by hand (or by the algorithm provided). As a result, each citizen’s one vote continues fully to count in the deliberations and decisions of the council. It does this through the weighted vote earned by one of the elected members, i.e. the one winner whom she has helped to elect and judges to be the one most qualified for the office.

Unlike any known variety of plurality, ranking (Condorcet or IRV (RCV, STV, etc.), range, or approving voting methods, only EPR allows each citizen to guarantee that her one vote will continue to count in the council (or legislature). Also, I'd like to offer Abd ul-Rahman Lomax some hope: perhaps the extra appeal of this unique feature of EPR would prompt enough citizens in a state like California to adopt EPR by one of its referenda.

Again, only EPR allows no vote to be wasted as defined by the second paragraph of the article.

What do you think?

I look forward to your feedback.



________________________________



Today's Topics:

1. Re: IRV / RCv advances (Abd ul-Rahman Lomax)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 14:08:24 -0400
From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <***@lomaxdesign.com<mailto:***@lomaxdesign.com>>
To: election-***@lists.electorama.com<mailto:election-***@lists.electorama.com>
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV / RCv advances
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On 7/14/2018 10:08 AM, Richard Lung wrote:

> [...] Agree completely about score voting. I can't help but feel
> approval voting is essentially a rebranding of cumulative voting. In
> about 1867, John Stuart Mill knew it was only a trifling improvement
> on plurality counting but at least opened peoples minds to alternatives.
I'd question that simply counting all the votes would be a "trifling
improvement." It would have flipped the US presidential election in
2000, almost certainly, and is a no-cost improvement, simple to
implement and easy to understand. In a two-round system, it can provide
substantial flexibility, perhaps even allowing runoffs to have a third
candidate. Counting all the votes would be, again, an improvement over
IRV, allowing voters to equal-rank. But the IRV method, by discarding
votes, is intrinsically flawed, and Bucklin actually worked when used.
The arguments that it didn't work were based on the fact that it wasn't
magic pixie dust. The only system that fixes about everything is Asset,
which hardly gets any consideration at all. My suggestion has been for
EM reformers to suggest Asset for NGOS, since it's really simple, as
well, and creates a deliberative structure, which is far more flexible
-- and functionally democratic -- than pure amalgamation. To be
fail-safe, it could be used in a nomination process, to be actually
ratified for a final result.

Approval -- and most methods -- are plurality methods unless a true
majority of the votes is required for a result. In Australia, in some
places they accomplish that by making it illegal to not completely rank.
In other words, to make a result more "democratic," coerce the voters.
Ah, the things people do to preserve the way things are!
> Re 3.
> Weighted Condorcet pairing arguably offers a back-door that partly
> gets round the Laplace criticism of Condorcet pairing, that it does
> not establish the relative importance of higher and lower preferences,
> in the over-all election count.
> I see Condorcet pairing primarily as a research tool for
> cross-referencing the results of an at-large election with the results
> from sub-elections of one-to-one contests or less minimal partitions.
> Ideally, we would have an election system that does not have to watch
> its back for a Condorcet paradox.
A condorcet paradox is an indication of an incomplete process. Depending
on preference strength, which some Condorcet methods attempt to
estimate, it might be meaningless. But to truly analyse election returns
requires preference strength information. Borda, again, estimates it
with an assumption of full ranking, such that with many candidates, the
"rank distance" would approximate a measure of preference strength.

But the only ballot that actually allows the voters to directly express
preference strength is a score ballot. And then some advocates of other
systems point out Condoret failure, as if that matters when preference
strength is obviously low. It doesn't. And then it is pointed out that
voters may vote "strategically," as if that is dishonest or bad. In a
Score system, there is never any incentive to reverse preference. Voters
decide what preferences matter to them, and will vote accordingly, and a
good overall system will detect situations where is ambiguity, perhaps
due to inaccurate perception of probable results, and will then set up a
runoff.

Instead of working together to create a system that will actually
improve and foster full democracy, we don't, it seems, trust the people
and want them to conform to our own ideas. In other words, same old same
old. The problem with democracy is the damn people!

But democracy is still government by consent, and whenever that fails,
oppression is inevitable. It's only a question of how bad it gets. The
logic that captured me, so many decades ago, is that we need
representation by consent and choice, not by "winners" and "losers." And
that appears to be doable. But who cares enough to try it?

Some. Not yet enough, but it's possible any day. It might only take one
person to make a proposal and carry it through, in one place.

>
> Even an admittedly crude election like IRV (Alternative Vote),
> according to this group, has only come-up with the Burlington case.
> That may have been politically unfortunate. But, if about 150?
> elections have not suffered the paradox, that incidence is not
> statistically significant.

It is possible to show that about one-third of IRV results were not
optimal. This is done by comparing IRV results with top-two runoff
results. If a full-information ballot were used with IRV (it could be
done! Easily!) we would then know. However, actually collecting the data
to determine, definitively, if a voting system is actually working is
not a part of any reform proposal I have seen. The collecting of
information is confused with and considered less important than creating
a result, and I can easily see the counter-argument: what if this causes
the result of an election to be called into question? Won't this damage
our trust in government? I think I have actually seen that argument.

If our trust in government is based in ignorance, it's worse than a bit
of trouble. A simple, coarse-score ballot, with explicit approval
cutoff, would be cheap and easy, and how the actual result is determined
could be explicity declared on the ballot. Providing the additonal
information would be optional. One could vote the ballot, if one
chooses, as vote-for-one. It would all generate useful information, and
could guide future election method decisions.
> The real comparison is how many "Bush beats Gore minus Nader" contests
> are there?

In a two-party system. Duverger's law and party attempts to corner the
electorate create many of them. Look at any close election and at the
participation of minor parties in it. There may be hundreds of these a
year. As well, the existing system tends to suppress minor party
participation. New York has Fusion voting, a step in a direction of
improved democracy. It was proposed for Massachusetts and lost. Who
opposed it?

The "Democratic" party, of course! It lost. So why did people vote
against it? Well, perhaps they trusted their party. After all, isn't our
party the Good Guys? If it's bad for them, surely we don't want it! It
all makes sense until and unless one starts to look more closely, which
most people don't do. And realizing that, Dodgson proposed Asset, which
actually creates, very simply, representative government, with the good
stuff associated with that, while allowing low-level decisions, by
ordinary people who don't want their lives to be about politics, to be
useful and effective.

>
> And how many simple plurality elections make voters act as their own
> returning officers in an implicit ranked choice election, where the
> voter excludes his first preference for Nader, and counts it for
> second preference Gore?
My sense is that many would vote for a third party candidate if they did
not know it would be a wasted vote. It could be trivial to fix that
problem. But we obviously care about something else more. about what?



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Faran, James
2018-07-17 15:56:49 UTC
Permalink
Consider the following possibility. 7 seats to be filled, 70 voters, 36 of which rate candidate A as Excellent, the greatest number of Excellent ratings. Does candidate A then get at least 36 of 70 votes on the council? In that case, candidate A has complete control over any council action requiring a simple majority. The other 34 voters do not have their vote count then as regards such council actions.


Have I misinterpreted the method?


The difficulty with giving council members different weights on their votes is that those different weights are not proportional to power on votes within the council.


Jim Faran

________________________________
From: Election-Methods <election-methods-***@lists.electorama.com> on behalf of steve bosworth <***@hotmail.com>
Sent: Monday, July 16, 2018 10:27 PM
To: election-***@lists.electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Fw: Steve's reply: IRV et al v. EPR


From: ***@gmail.com <***@gmail.com> on behalf of Andy Jennings <***@jenningsstory.com>
Sent: Monday, July 16, 2018 5:26 PM
To: steve bosworth
Cc: election-***@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV et al v. EPR



From Steve to all,

Thank you Andy for responding so quickly. I will respond immediately in line after each of your questions and points.

A: I like the idea of a PR system based on majority judgment, but have some concerns with this method. Are you proposing that the different elected legislators have different voting weights in the legislature?



S: Yes.



A: If so, I've heard that idea before, and I think it's clever but probably unworkable in practice. I doubt that it would integrate well with the parliamentary authorities (e.g. Robert's Rules of Order) that legislatures actually use to get things done.



S: Given that, unlike all the other methods, EPR thoroughly guarantees the principle of one-person-one-vote, I would be very surprised if anyone could sustain the claim that it violates Robert’s Rules of Order. Please explain the specific concerns you have in this regard. Also, even if this principle were incompatible with these rules, I would say: so much the worse for these rules. This would require these rules to be suitably modified. What do you think?



A: If not, then I think it's a mistake to eliminate _all_ the voters who gave the winning grade to the elected candidate. In your example, I dislike eliminating 17 voters in round 1, for example.



S: Perhaps you have misunderstood the count at this point. These 17 voters have not been eliminated. Each of their evaluations of EXCELLENT have been add to elected candidate A, and given her an affirmed evaluation of 17. At the same time, what has been eliminated from the rest of the count at this point is all the other evaluations that these 17 voters have given to any of the other candidates. This is because the one vote of each of these 17 citizens has now been fully counted. To allow their other evaluations to help elect other winners would be to give each of them more than one vote in the council.



A: I think only one quota of voters should be eliminated. You could eliminate 10 of the 17 by random selection and leave the other 7. Or you could down-weight them all by a factor of 7/17 and deal with fractional ballots remaining.



S: Correct my understanding if it is mistaken but I think you are only suggesting the elimination of 10 from being counted for other candidates but keeping them for A’s election? In any case, the idea of randomly or fractionally eliminating or transferring votes violates EPR’s determination to make each citizen’s vote to add entirely to the voting power only of the winner she sees as most fit for the office.



A: If it were me, I would fully eliminate any voters who gave a grade strictly above the critical grade….


S: Again, when you say, ‘eliminate any voters’, you mean keeping only 10 to elect A and using the remaining 7 to help other candidates to be elected. Also, what you mean by ‘the critical grade’ is the quota of 10 in this context.

A: …. and down-weight the ones who gave exactly the critical grade by some fraction so that the total amount of voting power "used up" was equal to one quota. Then, yes, deal with fractional voters.


S: Again, arbitrary quotas and unnecessary fractions must not be used if you want no vote to be wasted, quantitatively or qualitatively, as defined in the 2nd paragraph of the article.



What do you think?

I look forward to your clarifications.

Steve

~ Andrew



________________________________
From: ***@gmail.com <***@gmail.com> on behalf of Andy Jennings <***@jenningsstory.com>
Sent: Monday, July 16, 2018 5:26 PM
To: steve bosworth
Cc: election-***@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV et al v. EPR

Steve,

I like the idea of a PR system based on majority judgment, but have some concerns with this method. Are you proposing that the different elected legislators have different voting weights in the legislature? If so, I've heard that idea before, and I think it's clever but probably unworkable in practice. I doubt that it would integrate well with the parliamentary authorities (e.g. Robert's Rules of Order) that legislatures actually use to get things done.

If not, then I think it's a mistake to eliminate _all_ the voters who gave the winning grade to the elected candidate. In your example, I dislike eliminating 17 voters in round 1, for example. I think only one quota of voters should be eliminated. You could eliminate 10 of the 17 by random selection and leave the other 7. Or you could down-weight them all by a factor of 7/17 and deal with fractional ballots remaining.

If it were me, I would fully eliminate any voters who gave a grade strictly above the critical grade and down-weight the ones who gave exactly the critical grade by some fraction so that the total amount of voting power "used up" was equal to one quota. Then, yes, deal with fractional voters.

~ Andrew

On Sun, Jul 15, 2018 at 2:55 PM, steve bosworth <***@hotmail.com<mailto:***@hotmail.com>> wrote:

The recent responses to Sennet’s attempt favorably to report some recent successes of RCV (i.e. IRV) prompt me to hope that readers will be willing to test the counter claims of a newly developed voting and counting method for electing multi-winners. This method is fully described in the following published article:

http://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm/<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jpolrisk.com%2Flegislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm%2F&data=02%7C01%7C%7Cee03f677ec0e420e95db08d5eb416838%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C636673588511875956&sdata=VRDjUB%2FrblIqCnP8%2Bwsgt%2BqOE7Ha7yC6l0Y%2F5SfGsUw%3D&reserved=0>

[http://www.jpolrisk.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/rating.jpg]<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jpolrisk.com%2Flegislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm%2F&data=02%7C01%7C%7Cee03f677ec0e420e95db08d5eb416838%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C636673588511875956&sdata=VRDjUB%2FrblIqCnP8%2Bwsgt%2BqOE7Ha7yC6l0Y%2F5SfGsUw%3D&reserved=0>

Legislatures Elected by Evaluative Proportional ...<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jpolrisk.com%2Flegislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm%2F&data=02%7C01%7C%7Cee03f677ec0e420e95db08d5eb416838%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C636673588511875956&sdata=VRDjUB%2FrblIqCnP8%2Bwsgt%2BqOE7Ha7yC6l0Y%2F5SfGsUw%3D&reserved=0>
www.jpolrisk.com<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jpolrisk.com&data=02%7C01%7C%7Cee03f677ec0e420e95db08d5eb416838%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C636673588511875956&sdata=sRo1U%2BgMLvHftPnogUDDK6gjLifA13zrJZd8XzrKeWs%3D&reserved=0>
This article explains how a new voting method called Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR) fully satisfies the demand that in the best representative democracy, no citizen’s vote would be involuntarily wasted, quantitatively or qualitatively. 2 EPR is intended for voters who are electing members of a legislative body, for example a ...



This method is called Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR). EPR builds upon the arguments for Majority Judgment (MJ)offered by Balinski and Laraki (2010, MIT). For example, when electing all the members of a city council, each EPR citizen is asked to evaluate (not rank) as many of the candidates in the city as she might wish, i.e. to grade each with regard to their fitness for the office: either EXCELLENT, VERY GOOD, GOOD, ACCEPTABLE, POOR, or REJECT. The article explains the relatively simple step by step method by which all these evaluations are counted by hand (or by the algorithm provided). As a result, each citizen’s one vote continues fully to count in the deliberations and decisions of the council. It does this through the weighted vote earned by one of the elected members, i.e. the one winner whom she has helped to elect and judges to be the one most qualified for the office.

Unlike any known variety of plurality, ranking (Condorcet or IRV (RCV, STV, etc.), range, or approving voting methods, only EPR allows each citizen to guarantee that her one vote will continue to count in the council (or legislature). Also, I'd like to offer Abd ul-Rahman Lomax some hope: perhaps the extra appeal of this unique feature of EPR would prompt enough citizens in a state like California to adopt EPR by one of its referenda.

Again, only EPR allows no vote to be wasted as defined by the second paragraph of the article.

What do you think?

I look forward to your feedback.



________________________________



Today's Topics:

1. Re: IRV / RCv advances (Abd ul-Rahman Lomax)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 14:08:24 -0400
From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <***@lomaxdesign.com<mailto:***@lomaxdesign.com>>
To: election-***@lists.electorama.com<mailto:election-***@lists.electorama.com>
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV / RCv advances
Message-ID: <69bc286e-c970-9f6c-e60a-***@lomaxdesign.com<mailto:69bc286e-c970-9f6c-e60a-***@lomaxdesign.com>>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed


On 7/14/2018 10:08 AM, Richard Lung wrote:

> [...] Agree completely about score voting. I can't help but feel
> approval voting is essentially a rebranding of cumulative voting. In
> about 1867, John Stuart Mill knew it was only a trifling improvement
> on plurality counting but at least opened peoples minds to alternatives.
I'd question that simply counting all the votes would be a "trifling
improvement." It would have flipped the US presidential election in
2000, almost certainly, and is a no-cost improvement, simple to
implement and easy to understand. In a two-round system, it can provide
substantial flexibility, perhaps even allowing runoffs to have a third
candidate. Counting all the votes would be, again, an improvement over
IRV, allowing voters to equal-rank. But the IRV method, by discarding
votes, is intrinsically flawed, and Bucklin actually worked when used.
The arguments that it didn't work were based on the fact that it wasn't
magic pixie dust. The only system that fixes about everything is Asset,
which hardly gets any consideration at all. My suggestion has been for
EM reformers to suggest Asset for NGOS, since it's really simple, as
well, and creates a deliberative structure, which is far more flexible
-- and functionally democratic -- than pure amalgamation. To be
fail-safe, it could be used in a nomination process, to be actually
ratified for a final result.

Approval -- and most methods -- are plurality methods unless a true
majority of the votes is required for a result. In Australia, in some
places they accomplish that by making it illegal to not completely rank.
In other words, to make a result more "democratic," coerce the voters.
Ah, the things people do to preserve the way things are!
> Re 3.
> Weighted Condorcet pairing arguably offers a back-door that partly
> gets round the Laplace criticism of Condorcet pairing, that it does
> not establish the relative importance of higher and lower preferences,
> in the over-all election count.
> I see Condorcet pairing primarily as a research tool for
> cross-referencing the results of an at-large election with the results
> from sub-elections of one-to-one contests or less minimal partitions.
> Ideally, we would have an election system that does not have to watch
> its back for a Condorcet paradox.
A condorcet paradox is an indication of an incomplete process. Depending
on preference strength, which some Condorcet methods attempt to
estimate, it might be meaningless. But to truly analyse election returns
requires preference strength information. Borda, again, estimates it
with an assumption of full ranking, such that with many candidates, the
"rank distance" would approximate a measure of preference strength.

But the only ballot that actually allows the voters to directly express
preference strength is a score ballot. And then some advocates of other
systems point out Condoret failure, as if that matters when preference
strength is obviously low. It doesn't. And then it is pointed out that
voters may vote "strategically," as if that is dishonest or bad. In a
Score system, there is never any incentive to reverse preference. Voters
decide what preferences matter to them, and will vote accordingly, and a
good overall system will detect situations where is ambiguity, perhaps
due to inaccurate perception of probable results, and will then set up a
runoff.

Instead of working together to create a system that will actually
improve and foster full democracy, we don't, it seems, trust the people
and want them to conform to our own ideas. In other words, same old same
old. The problem with democracy is the damn people!

But democracy is still government by consent, and whenever that fails,
oppression is inevitable. It's only a question of how bad it gets. The
logic that captured me, so many decades ago, is that we need
representation by consent and choice, not by "winners" and "losers." And
that appears to be doable. But who cares enough to try it?

Some. Not yet enough, but it's possible any day. It might only take one
person to make a proposal and carry it through, in one place.

>
> Even an admittedly crude election like IRV (Alternative Vote),
> according to this group, has only come-up with the Burlington case.
> That may have been politically unfortunate. But, if about 150?
> elections have not suffered the paradox, that incidence is not
> statistically significant.

It is possible to show that about one-third of IRV results were not
optimal. This is done by comparing IRV results with top-two runoff
results. If a full-information ballot were used with IRV (it could be
done! Easily!) we would then know. However, actually collecting the data
to determine, definitively, if a voting system is actually working is
not a part of any reform proposal I have seen. The collecting of
information is confused with and considered less important than creating
a result, and I can easily see the counter-argument: what if this causes
the result of an election to be called into question? Won't this damage
our trust in government? I think I have actually seen that argument.

If our trust in government is based in ignorance, it's worse than a bit
of trouble. A simple, coarse-score ballot, with explicit approval
cutoff, would be cheap and easy, and how the actual result is determined
could be explicity declared on the ballot. Providing the additonal
information would be optional. One could vote the ballot, if one
chooses, as vote-for-one. It would all generate useful information, and
could guide future election method decisions.
> The real comparison is how many "Bush beats Gore minus Nader" contests
> are there?

In a two-party system. Duverger's law and party attempts to corner the
electorate create many of them. Look at any close election and at the
participation of minor parties in it. There may be hundreds of these a
year. As well, the existing system tends to suppress minor party
participation. New York has Fusion voting, a step in a direction of
improved democracy. It was proposed for Massachusetts and lost. Who
opposed it?

The "Democratic" party, of course! It lost. So why did people vote
against it? Well, perhaps they trusted their party. After all, isn't our
party the Good Guys? If it's bad for them, surely we don't want it! It
all makes sense until and unless one starts to look more closely, which
most people don't do. And realizing that, Dodgson proposed Asset, which
actually creates, very simply, representative government, with the good
stuff associated with that, while allowing low-level decisions, by
ordinary people who don't want their lives to be about politics, to be
useful and effective.

>
> And how many simple plurality elections make voters act as their own
> returning officers in an implicit ranked choice election, where the
> voter excludes his first preference for Nader, and counts it for
> second preference Gore?
My sense is that many would vote for a third party candidate if they did
not know it would be a wasted vote. It could be trivial to fix that
problem. But we obviously care about something else more. about what?



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Kristofer Munsterhjelm
2018-07-17 16:10:31 UTC
Permalink
On 07/17/2018 05:56 PM, Faran, James wrote:
> Consider the following possibility. 7 seats to be filled, 70 voters, 36
> of which rate candidate A as Excellent, the greatest number of Excellent
> ratings. Does candidate A then get at least 36 of 70 votes on the
> council?  In that case, candidate A has complete control over any
> council action requiring a simple majority. The other 34 voters do not
> have their vote count then as regards such council actions.

That is true for unweighted methods as well. If there are enough seats
on the council, then a coalition having a majority of top preferences
get a majority of the council power if that coalition or party fields
enough candidates.

Suppose there are 7 seats to be filled and 70 voters. The Droop quota is
8.75. To get four seats (a majority of the council), a coalition needs
the support of more than 8.75*4=35 voters. If 36 voters rank A1=A2=A3=A4
ahead of everybody else, then any method passing Droop proportionality
must elect these four to the council.

One could say that a party or coalition can never be as united as a
single candidate is, however; for instance, a party might have internal
factions with each wing demanding to have one of the four A-candidates.
In that respect, an unweighted system spreads the power more than a
weighted system does.
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steve bosworth
2018-07-18 00:22:42 UTC
Permalink
Jim, please see below for Steve's answer.


________________________________
From: Faran, James <***@buffalo.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2018 3:56 PM
To: steve bosworth; election-***@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Fw: Steve's reply: IRV et al v. EPR


Consider the following possibility. 7 seats to be filled, 70 voters, 36 of which rate candidate A as Excellent, the greatest number of Excellent ratings. Does candidate A then get at least 36 of 70 votes on the council? In that case, candidate A has complete control over any council action requiring a simple majority. The other 34 voters do not have their vote count then as regards such council actions.


Have I misinterpreted the method?


The difficulty with giving council members different weights on their votes is that those different weights are not proportional to power on votes within the council.


Jim Faran

________________________________

Dear Jim,

Endnote 8 addresses this unlikely but possible result. Its relevant part reads as follows:

[I]f any very popular elected candidate receives more affirmed evaluations than allowed, she is required to transfer her extra affirmed evaluations to the weighted votes of one or more of her trusted fellow councilmembers to avoid any single member having the voting power to dictate to the council. These are the two ways in which EPR incorporates the use of ‘Asset Voting’ after the count by the algorithm has been completed. Of course, these uses of Asset Voting could slightly modify the weighted votes that some of the councilmembers would receive.


[The unpublished but longer version of this endnote adds the following:
However, to prevent any member from having the ability to dictate to the council, no member must retain more than 20% (i.e. 14) of all the weighted votes in the council. Consequently, member A is required to transfer 4 of her 18 affirmed evaluations to at least one of her fellow members. Similarly, member E must transfer one of his 15 affirmed evaluations. This endnote reports that A gave her 4 extra votes to member B, while E gave his extra vote to C.

In these ways, each EPR citizen can guarantee that his or her vote, directly or indirectly, will continue fully to count in the deliberations of the council -– no citizen’s vote need be wasted.


What do you think?

Steve
Andy Jennings
2018-07-21 00:18:42 UTC
Permalink
On Mon, Jul 16, 2018 at 12:35 PM, steve bosworth <***@hotmail.com>
wrote:

> *From:* ***@gmail.com <***@gmail.com> on behalf of Andy
> Jennings <***@jenningsstory.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, July 16, 2018 5:26 PM
> *To:* steve bosworth
> *Cc:* election-***@lists.electorama.com
> *Subject:* Re: [EM] IRV et al v. EPR
>
>
>
> Steve,
>
> Andy,
>
> Thank you for responding so quickly. I will respond immediately in line
> after each of your questions and points.
>
> A: I like the idea of a PR system based on majority judgment, but have
> some concerns with this method. Are you proposing that the different
> elected legislators have different voting weights in the legislature?
>
>
>
> S: Yes.
>
>
>

I looked at the article again and I do see it mentioned that the members
will have votes of different weights on the council. I'm not sure how I
missed it the first time. You may want to consider re-emphasizing it at
the end.




> A: If so, I've heard that idea before, and I think it's clever but
> probably unworkable in practice. I doubt that it would integrate well with
> the parliamentary authorities (e.g. Robert's Rules of Order) that
> legislatures actually use to get things done.
>
>
>
> S: Given that, unlike all the other methods, EPR thoroughly guarantees
> the principle of one-person-one-vote, I would be very surprised if anyone
> could sustain the claim that it violates Robert’s Rules of Order. Please
> explain the specific concerns you have in this regard. Also, even if
> this principle were incompatible with these rules, I would say: so much the
> worse for these rules. This would require these rules to be suitably
> modified. What do you think?
>
>
>


Have you been in a meeting run by Robert's Rules?

There are lots of votes, and each one usually takes less than 10 seconds.
("All in favor say aye. Those opposed say no.") If the majority is
obvious, the chair will say "The ayes have it," or "The noes have it," and
we're done. It relies on everyone's voice being about the same volume and
everyone having an equal vote. I think a voice vote is not really
legitimate in a weighted legislature unless it's unanimous.

If the majority is not obvious to the chair, or is challenged by anyone in
the body, they do a rising vote. ("All those in favor please rise."
Count. "Be seated. Those opposed please rise." Count.) It takes a
minute or less.

How should a weighted legislature do a quick vote?

A) Do a voice vote, and if it's not unanimous then do a rising vote with
everyone holding up a sign with their vote weight, and have someone add up
all the weights instead of just counting the number standing?
B) Do every vote by computer?

Honestly, lots of votes are unanimous, so if a group gets good at it, it
might not add that much time. But with any vote that's close, it's going
to take five minutes instead of one. In any case, that's just the one
thing that's on the top of my head. I've never studied Robert's Rules,
only attended meetings. I'm imagining there are other things in the book
that need to be changed to work with a weighted legislature. Maybe I am
wrong.

I'm all in favor of finding an expert on Robert's Rules, or someone
becoming an expert, to figure out such changes. (Also other changes, like
using other voting systems for making council decisions.) We could also
talk about writing a whole new parliamentary procedure to implement new
things, but then you'd want someone who was even more of an expert in
parliamentary authorities and parliamentary meetings to make sure you're
meeting the needs of a working parliament.




> A: If not, then I think it's a mistake to eliminate _all_ the voters who
> gave the winning grade to the elected candidate. In your example, I
> dislike eliminating 17 voters in round 1, for example.
>
>
>
> S: Perhaps you have misunderstood the count at this point. These 17
> voters have not been eliminated. Each of their evaluations of EXCELLENT
> have been add to elected candidate A, and given her an affirmed evaluation
> of 17. At the same time, what has been eliminated from the rest of the
> count at this point is all the other evaluations that these 17 voters have
> given to any of the other candidates. This is because the one vote of
> each of these 17 citizens has now been fully counted. To allow their other
> evaluations to help elect other winners would be to give each of them more
> than one vote in the council.
>
>
>
> A: I think only one quota of voters should be eliminated. You could
> eliminate 10 of the 17 by random selection and leave the other 7. Or you
> could down-weight them all by a factor of 7/17 and deal with fractional
> ballots remaining.
>
>
>
> S: Correct my understanding if it is mistaken but I think you are you
> are only suggesting the elimination of 10 from being counted for other
> candidates but keeping them for A’s election? In any case, the idea of
> randomly or fractionally eliminating or transferring votes violates EPR’s
> determination to make each citizen’s vote to add entirely to the voting
> power only of the winner she sees as most fit for the office.
>
>
>
> A: If it were me, I would fully eliminate any voters who gave a grade
> strictly above the critical grade
.
>
> S: Again, when you say, ‘eliminate any voters’, you mean keeping only 10
> to elect A and using the remaining 7 to help other candidates to be elected.
> Also, what you mean by ‘the critical grade’ is the quota of 10 in this
> context.
>
> 1.
>
> 
. and down-weight the ones who gave exactly the critical grade by
> some fraction so that the total amount of voting power "used up" was equal
> to one quota. Then, yes, deal with fractional voters.
>
> S: Again, arbitrary quotas and fractions must not be used if you want no
> vote to be wasted, quantitatively or qualitatively.
>
>
>
> What do you think?
>
> I look forward to your clarifications.
>
> Steve
>
> ~ Andrew
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* ***@gmail.com <***@gmail.com> on behalf of Andy
> Jennings <***@jenningsstory.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, July 16, 2018 5:26 PM
> *To:* steve bosworth
> *Cc:* election-***@lists.electorama.com
> *Subject:* Re: [EM] IRV et al v. EPR
>
> Steve,
>
> I like the idea of a PR system based on majority judgment, but have some
> concerns with this method. Are you proposing that the different elected
> legislators have different voting weights in the legislature? If so, I've
> heard that idea before, and I think it's clever but probably unworkable in
> practice. I doubt that it would integrate well with the parliamentary
> authorities (e.g. Robert's Rules of Order) that legislatures actually use
> to get things done.
>
> If not, then I think it's a mistake to eliminate _all_ the voters who gave
> the winning grade to the elected candidate. In your example, I dislike
> eliminating 17 voters in round 1, for example. I think only one quota of
> voters should be eliminated. You could eliminate 10 of the 17 by random
> selection and leave the other 7. Or you could down-weight them all by a
> factor of 7/17 and deal with fractional ballots remaining.
>
> If it were me, I would fully eliminate any voters who gave a grade
> strictly above the critical grade and down-weight the ones who gave exactly
> the critical grade by some fraction so that the total amount of voting
> power "used up" was equal to one quota. Then, yes, deal with fractional
> voters.
>
> ~ Andrew
>
> On Sun, Jul 15, 2018 at 2:55 PM, steve bosworth <***@hotmail.com
> > wrote:
>
> The recent responses to Sennet’s attempt favorably to report some recent
> successes of RCV (i.e. IRV) prompt me to hope that readers will be willing
> to test the counter claims of a newly developed voting and counting method
> for electing multi-winners. This method is fully described in the
> following published article:
>
> http://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-
> proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm/
> <https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jpolrisk.com%2Flegislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm%2F&data=02%7C01%7C%7Cee03f677ec0e420e95db08d5eb416838%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C636673588511875956&sdata=VRDjUB%2FrblIqCnP8%2Bwsgt%2BqOE7Ha7yC6l0Y%2F5SfGsUw%3D&reserved=0>
>
>
> <https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jpolrisk.com%2Flegislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm%2F&data=02%7C01%7C%7Cee03f677ec0e420e95db08d5eb416838%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C636673588511875956&sdata=VRDjUB%2FrblIqCnP8%2Bwsgt%2BqOE7Ha7yC6l0Y%2F5SfGsUw%3D&reserved=0>
> Legislatures Elected by Evaluative Proportional ...
> <https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jpolrisk.com%2Flegislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm%2F&data=02%7C01%7C%7Cee03f677ec0e420e95db08d5eb416838%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C636673588511875956&sdata=VRDjUB%2FrblIqCnP8%2Bwsgt%2BqOE7Ha7yC6l0Y%2F5SfGsUw%3D&reserved=0>
> www.jpolrisk.com
> <https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jpolrisk.com&data=02%7C01%7C%7Cee03f677ec0e420e95db08d5eb416838%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C636673588511875956&sdata=sRo1U%2BgMLvHftPnogUDDK6gjLifA13zrJZd8XzrKeWs%3D&reserved=0>
> This article explains how a new voting method called Evaluative
> Proportional Representation (EPR) fully satisfies the demand that in the
> best representative democracy, no citizen’s vote would be involuntarily
> wasted, quantitatively or qualitatively. 2 EPR is intended for voters who
> are electing members of a legislative body, for example a ...
>
>
> This method is called Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR). EPR
> builds upon the arguments for Majority Judgment (MJ)offered by Balinski and
> Laraki (2010, MIT). For example, when electing all the members of a city
> council, each EPR citizen is asked to evaluate (not rank) as many of the
> candidates in the city as she might wish, i.e. to grade each with regard to
> their fitness for the office: either EXCELLENT, VERY GOOD, GOOD,
> ACCEPTABLE, POOR, or REJECT. The article explains the relatively simple
> step by step method by which all these evaluations are counted by hand (or
> by the algorithm provided). As a result, each citizen’s one vote
> continues fully to count in the deliberations and decisions of the council.
> It does this through the weighted vote earned by one of the elected
> members, i.e. the one winner whom she has helped to elect and judges to be
> the one most qualified for the office.
>
> Unlike any known variety of plurality, ranking (Condorcet or IRV (RCV,
> STV, etc.), range, or approving voting methods, only EPR allows each
> citizen to guarantee that her one vote will continue to count in the
> council (or legislature). Also, I'd like to offer Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
> some hope: perhaps the extra appeal of this unique feature of EPR would
> prompt enough citizens in a state like California to adopt EPR by one of
> its referenda.
>
> Again, only EPR allows no vote to be wasted as defined by the second
> paragraph of the article.
>
> What do you think?
>
> I look forward to your feedback.
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. Re: IRV / RCv advances (Abd ul-Rahman Lomax)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 14:08:24 -0400
> From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <***@lomaxdesign.com>
> To: election-***@lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] IRV / RCv advances
> Message-ID: <69bc286e-c970-9f6c-e60a-***@lomaxdesign.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
>
>
> On 7/14/2018 10:08 AM, Richard Lung wrote:
>
> > [...] Agree completely about score voting. I can't help but feel
> > approval voting is essentially a rebranding of cumulative voting. In
> > about 1867, John Stuart Mill knew it was only a trifling improvement
> > on plurality counting but at least opened peoples minds to alternatives.
> I'd question that simply counting all the votes would be a "trifling
> improvement." It would have flipped the US presidential election in
> 2000, almost certainly, and is a no-cost improvement, simple to
> implement and easy to understand. In a two-round system, it can provide
> substantial flexibility, perhaps even allowing runoffs to have a third
> candidate. Counting all the votes would be, again, an improvement over
> IRV, allowing voters to equal-rank. But the IRV method, by discarding
> votes, is intrinsically flawed, and Bucklin actually worked when used.
> The arguments that it didn't work were based on the fact that it wasn't
> magic pixie dust. The only system that fixes about everything is Asset,
> which hardly gets any consideration at all. My suggestion has been for
> EM reformers to suggest Asset for NGOS, since it's really simple, as
> well, and creates a deliberative structure, which is far more flexible
> -- and functionally democratic -- than pure amalgamation. To be
> fail-safe, it could be used in a nomination process, to be actually
> ratified for a final result.
>
> Approval -- and most methods -- are plurality methods unless a true
> majority of the votes is required for a result. In Australia, in some
> places they accomplish that by making it illegal to not completely rank.
> In other words, to make a result more "democratic," coerce the voters.
> Ah, the things people do to preserve the way things are!
> > Re 3.
> > Weighted Condorcet pairing arguably offers a back-door that partly
> > gets round the Laplace criticism of Condorcet pairing, that it does
> > not establish the relative importance of higher and lower preferences,
> > in the over-all election count.
> > I see Condorcet pairing primarily as a research tool for
> > cross-referencing the results of an at-large election with the results
> > from sub-elections of one-to-one contests or less minimal partitions.
> > Ideally, we would have an election system that does not have to watch
> > its back for a Condorcet paradox.
> A condorcet paradox is an indication of an incomplete process. Depending
> on preference strength, which some Condorcet methods attempt to
> estimate, it might be meaningless. But to truly analyse election returns
> requires preference strength information. Borda, again, estimates it
> with an assumption of full ranking, such that with many candidates, the
> "rank distance" would approximate a measure of preference strength.
>
> But the only ballot that actually allows the voters to directly express
> preference strength is a score ballot. And then some advocates of other
> systems point out Condoret failure, as if that matters when preference
> strength is obviously low. It doesn't. And then it is pointed out that
> voters may vote "strategically," as if that is dishonest or bad. In a
> Score system, there is never any incentive to reverse preference. Voters
> decide what preferences matter to them, and will vote accordingly, and a
> good overall system will detect situations where is ambiguity, perhaps
> due to inaccurate perception of probable results, and will then set up a
> runoff.
>
> Instead of working together to create a system that will actually
> improve and foster full democracy, we don't, it seems, trust the people
> and want them to conform to our own ideas. In other words, same old same
> old. The problem with democracy is the damn people!
>
> But democracy is still government by consent, and whenever that fails,
> oppression is inevitable. It's only a question of how bad it gets. The
> logic that captured me, so many decades ago, is that we need
> representation by consent and choice, not by "winners" and "losers." And
> that appears to be doable. But who cares enough to try it?
>
> Some. Not yet enough, but it's possible any day. It might only take one
> person to make a proposal and carry it through, in one place.
>
> >
> > Even an admittedly crude election like IRV (Alternative Vote),
> > according to this group, has only come-up with the Burlington case.
> > That may have been politically unfortunate. But, if about 150?
> > elections have not suffered the paradox, that incidence is not
> > statistically significant.
>
> It is possible to show that about one-third of IRV results were not
> optimal. This is done by comparing IRV results with top-two runoff
> results. If a full-information ballot were used with IRV (it could be
> done! Easily!) we would then know. However, actually collecting the data
> to determine, definitively, if a voting system is actually working is
> not a part of any reform proposal I have seen. The collecting of
> information is confused with and considered less important than creating
> a result, and I can easily see the counter-argument: what if this causes
> the result of an election to be called into question? Won't this damage
> our trust in government? I think I have actually seen that argument.
>
> If our trust in government is based in ignorance, it's worse than a bit
> of trouble. A simple, coarse-score ballot, with explicit approval
> cutoff, would be cheap and easy, and how the actual result is determined
> could be explicity declared on the ballot. Providing the additonal
> information would be optional. One could vote the ballot, if one
> chooses, as vote-for-one. It would all generate useful information, and
> could guide future election method decisions.
> > The real comparison is how many "Bush beats Gore minus Nader" contests
> > are there?
>
> In a two-party system. Duverger's law and party attempts to corner the
> electorate create many of them. Look at any close election and at the
> participation of minor parties in it. There may be hundreds of these a
> year. As well, the existing system tends to suppress minor party
> participation. New York has Fusion voting, a step in a direction of
> improved democracy. It was proposed for Massachusetts and lost. Who
> opposed it?
>
> The "Democratic" party, of course! It lost. So why did people vote
> against it? Well, perhaps they trusted their party. After all, isn't our
> party the Good Guys? If it's bad for them, surely we don't want it! It
> all makes sense until and unless one starts to look more closely, which
> most people don't do. And realizing that, Dodgson proposed Asset, which
> actually creates, very simply, representative government, with the good
> stuff associated with that, while allowing low-level decisions, by
> ordinary people who don't want their lives to be about politics, to be
> useful and effective.
>
> >
> > And how many simple plurality elections make voters act as their own
> > returning officers in an implicit ranked choice election, where the
> > voter excludes his first preference for Nader, and counts it for
> > second preference Gore?
> My sense is that many would vote for a third party candidate if they did
> not know it would be a wasted vote. It could be trivial to fix that
> problem. But we obviously care about something else more. about what?
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Subject: Digest Footer
>
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> ------------------------------
>
> End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 169, Issue 8
> ************************************************
>
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> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
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Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
2018-07-21 11:54:27 UTC
Permalink
On 7/20/2018 8:18 PM, Andy Jennings wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jul 16, 2018 at 12:35 PM, steve bosworth
> <***@hotmail.com <mailto:***@hotmail.com>> wrote:
>
> *From:****@gmail.com <mailto:***@gmail.com>
> <***@gmail.com <mailto:***@gmail.com>> on behalf of
> Andy Jennings <***@jenningsstory.com
> <mailto:***@jenningsstory.com>>
> *Sent:* Monday, July 16, 2018 5:26 PM
> *To:* steve bosworth
> *Cc:* election-***@lists.electorama.com
> <mailto:election-***@lists.electorama.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [EM] IRV et al v. EPR
>
> Steve,
>
> Andy,
>
> Thank you for responding so quickly.I will respond immediately in
> line after each of your questions and points.
>
> A:I like the idea of a PR system based on majority judgment, but
> have some concerns with this method.  Are you proposing that the
> different elected legislators have different voting weights in the
> legislature?
>
> S:Yes.
>
>
> I looked at the article again and I do see it mentioned that the
> members will have votes of different weights on the council.  I'm not
> sure how I missed it the first time.  You may want to consider
> re-emphasizing it at the end
If taken simply and literally, it's a Really Bad Idea. The concept of a
peer assembly, where all members are equal in voting power and other
rights (such as the right to enter motions, object, etc.) is
fundamental, except in narrow situations. For example, in share
corporations, all shares have equal voting rights, except as otherwise
specified, i.e., some kinds of shares may not have voting rights.
("Preferred shares" may not, oddly enough, but those shares enjoy the
right of preferential distribution on dissolution. The controlling
shares lose in a bankruptcy, less so the preferred shares. It's fair.)

It's basically unnecessary, there is a better way to equalize primary
election votes and decision-making voting power. However, as I have
mentioned, an Assembly has the right to make its own rules and may
create rules allowing, say, tie-breaking votes, or other conditions
where what I've called the"dregs," unassigned votes, may be exercised by
electors or someone chosen by them. "Observer electgors" may be allowed,
and in an enumerated vote, observers may have a fractional vote. This
would only be formally counted on a formal call for enumeration by any
full seat.

Attempts to bind the Assembly by creating rules that the Assembly may
not disregard are actually forms of dictatorship. An Assembly must be
free. Trusting rules in the place of people is, again, a Bad Idea,
primitive thinking. Yes, rule of law was an advance over the arbitrary
exercise of state power, but rule of law is also what I call
the"dictatorship of the past." Consensus organizations run afoul of it
when it is considered to take a consensus to overrule a consensus. It
creates, in actual practice, minority rule, where the status quo favors
a minority. Constitutional systems have this problem, where the
constitution overspecifies procedure.

I've gone around and around on this, and always came to the principle
that the majority always has a right of decision. Sometimes this must be
exercised very carefully, because the goal in democracy should be and
ultimately must be consensus, not mere majority, or the community is
weakened and divided.
> .
>
> A: If so, I've heard that idea before, and I think it's clever but
> probably unworkable in practice.  I doubt that it would integrate
> well with the parliamentary authorities (e.g. Robert's Rules of
> Order) that legislatures actually use to get things done.
>
It could be done, particularly as a tweak. However, the exact
implementation is better left to the Assembly, which has the right to
rule on membership issues. Routinely, a chair may effectively pass a
question or issue a ruling by stating "If there is no objection, X." Any
member may object. If there is no objection, nevertheless, any member
may, at least in the same session, move reconsideration, being
considered part of the majority (unanimity, actually) that approved the
measure.

In a reasonably aggregated Asset Assembly, it would be rare, my opinion,
that much more than a single seat's quota of votes will be dregs. The
election rules may make it easier to compromise for the dregs. If dregs,
electors holding unassigned votes, can function in a limited way, and if
they have the right to withdraw assigned votes, they can safely assign
their remaining votes to some compromise.

The basic Asset idea creates an electoral college whose members are
public, identified voters. It is the electoral college that fully
represents the complete electorate, all that voted, so the Assembly is,
then, properly, a trusted servant of the College. It is in the College
that, literally, *no vote is wasted.* And if a voter wants to go to the
trouble of participating, the voter may register as an elector and
participate, subject to the rules as may be necessary to maintain order.

> S:Given that, unlike all the other methods, EPR thoroughly
> guarantees the principle of one-person-one-vote, I would be very
> surprised if anyone could sustain the claim that it violates
> Robert’s Rules of Order.Please explain the specific concerns you
> have in this regard.Also, even if this principle were incompatible
> with these rules, I would say: so much the worse for these
> rules.This would require these rules to be suitably modified.What
> do you think?
>
>
>
> Have you been in a meeting run by Robert's Rules?
I have served, both as a chair, and as a parliamentarian, though I was
never formally trained. In my view, the duty of the chair is to empower
the members. While I would rule a member out of order, I would also
advise the member how to do what they wanted to do, within the rules.
That had nothing to do with whether or  not I agreed with the member on
this or that issue. It was about empowering the community, in using
deliberative process to maximize consensus, which creates stronger
organizations.

>
> There are lots of votes, and each one usually takes less than 10
> seconds.  ("All in favor say aye.  Those opposed say no.")  If the
> majority is obvious, the chair will say "The ayes have it," or "The
> noes have it," and we're done.  It relies on everyone's voice being
> about the same volume and everyone having an equal vote.  I think a
> voice vote is not really legitimate in a weighted legislature unless
> it's unanimous
So "without objection" would still work. If the exceptions to equal
voting are rare and limited, it could still work, and weighting would
only be done with a roll call vote. Under most rules, I think, that
takes a majority vote, or some rules allow some specified percentage of
the assembly to require a roll call. In a roll call vote, it would be
easy for the clerk to weight votes, even all of them (i.e., if electors
are allowed to vote directly, say by internet voting, then "normally
assigned votes" to seats would be deweighted by that fractional vote,
representing the removed elector.

I strongly advise anyone supporting Asset to keep implementation simple,
leaving tweaks that complete the principle of "no wasted votes" to the
maximum possible, for Assembly rules, later. Right now, we don't have,
in any assembly, anything approaching full representation. Moving to,
say, 95% full would be a revolution.

>
> If the majority is not obvious to the chair, or is challenged by
> anyone in the body, they do a rising vote. ("All those in favor please
> rise."  Count.  "Be seated. Those opposed please rise."  Count.)  It
> takes a minute or less.

Right. Roll call takes slightly longer.

>
> How should a weighted legislature do a quick vote?
>
> A) Do a voice vote, and if it's not unanimous then do a rising vote
> with everyone holding up a sign with their vote weight, and have
> someone add up all the weights instead of just counting the number
> standing?
> B) Do every vote by computer?
No, not every vote, only votes where a roll call is requested, per the
rules. But, yes, using computers. Smart phone app, with terminals
available. Not every kind of issue. Questions of privilege, if a vote is
required, would be decided by the number of persons present and voting.

>
> Honestly, lots of votes are unanimous, so if a group gets good at it,
> it might not add that much time.  But with any vote that's close, it's
> going to take five minutes instead of one.  In any case, that's just
> the one thing that's on the top of my head.  I've never studied
> Robert's Rules, only attended meetings.  I'm imagining there are other
> things in the book that need to be changed to work with a weighted
> legislature. Maybe I am wrong.
Whenever the assembly is so divided that it's close, rush to decision is
a Bad Idea. With an Electoral College, full weighted voting becomes
possible. That's all. If it is merely an Assembly rule, all kinds of
things can be tried with little harm, because the majority can change
the Rules at any time. Asset would create the data and the body of
registered public voters ("electors") to make direct-representative
democracy possible.

Existing election systems and strong-party democracy have created
conditions where we don't trust our representatives. So we want to bind
them with rules, not realizing that they then become experts at evading
restrictive rules. Lack of trust in "politicians" is a core problem, and
it is not solved by "throw the bums out," which simply creates more
politicians appealing to knee-jerk responses. Asset throws the issue of
representation back on the public, totally, and makes the primary issue
one of "whom do you most trust." Period. No other strategy needed, and,
yes, you can vote for your next-door neighbor, or that movie star, or a
professor, or *anyone you choose* -- including yourself, if you want to
spend the time on governmental issues.

(An election code should be free on request, a number that can be
entered on a ballot to designate an elector. Listing the code in a
directory should require a small fee to cover costs. $5? Whatever the
cost is for a single phone-directory type listing in a cheap, newsprint
booklet. An on-line directory of all registered electors should be free,
and accessible from any smartphone. Computer voting stations would have
access to that directory so that voters can verify their entry is the
right person. Canvassed votes would have a listing available showing all
votes by precinct. Some secret ballot election systems allow
identification of the voter for legal purposes. It's done with paper
ballots by having the voter sequence number on the back of the ballot;
when votes are counted, physically, the back is not visible, but if a
need arises to audit the election, the voter can be identified. Details.)

>
> I'm all in favor of finding an expert on Robert's Rules, or someone
> becoming an expert, to figure out such changes.  (Also other changes,
> like using other voting systems for making council decisions.)  We
> could also talk about writing a whole new parliamentary procedure to
> implement new things, but then you'd want someone who was even more of
> an expert in parliamentary authorities and parliamentary meetings to
> make sure you're meeting the needs of a working parliament.
No, we should concentrate on voting methods, our purpose, and leave
Assembly procedure to the Assembly. Have you ever seen a full public
vote on the Rules of a deliberative assembly?

Deliberative assemblies use simple majority rule at present. Weighted
voting is a tweak on that which moves toward "majority" as referring to
majority of the voting public rather than majority of Assembly members.
But I prefer, greatly, to create a "trusted assembly" and empowering
them, fully. In legal matters, I may designate a proxy and I have never
burdened that proxy with many specified "rules." Choose someone you
trust, then *trust them*. Otherwise, life becomes very complicated and
simply doesn't work. Choose well and then trust your choice unless you
have strong reasons, or simply no longer trust the person, then choose
someone else. If I can't find anyone to trust, I'm probably the problem.
Jameson Quinn
2018-07-16 18:09:02 UTC
Permalink
This system as described is very close to being an excellent "Proportional
Majority Judgment" method, but has one key flaw. When a candidate is
elected with more than 1 quota of support, all of their supporting ballots
are marked as used. To give a proportional method and to minimize strategic
incentives, only 1 quota of supporting ballots should be marked as used.
This could be done through some ordering criterion (highest support for
winner/lowest support for others), by proportionally reweighting ballots,
or by using up randomly-chosen ballots; the differences between these three
options would be relatively minor.

This reflects the basic way to transform any single-winner method into a
proportional multi-winner method: find single winners sequentially, and
then for each of those winners, "use up" the one quota of ballots that
"contributed most" to making that candidate the winner. There's room for
judgment calls in defining "contributed most", but other than that this is
a general template that IMO gives an optimal combination of good and
practical from methods as varied as IRV (which becomes STV), MJ, STAR,
Score, approval, Condorcet... in short, almost any single-winner method.

Are all good proportional methods examples of this pattern? I wouldn't go
that far. Delegation and (partial or full) biproportionality are extra
ingredients that can be added, giving possibilities like (Bavarian-style)
MMP, DMP, PLACE, and PAD, all worthy alternatives. But "sequential
allocation methods" using the recipe above should definitely be at least
one of the mainstays of the proportional toolkit.

Jameson

2018-07-15 17:55 GMT-04:00 steve bosworth <***@hotmail.com>:

> The recent responses to Sennet’s attempt favorably to report some recent
> successes of RCV (i.e. IRV) prompt me to hope that readers will be willing
> to test the counter claims of a newly developed voting and counting method
> for electing multi-winners. This method is fully described in the
> following published article:
>
> http://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-
> representation-epr-a-new-algorithm/
>
>
> <http://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm/>
> Legislatures Elected by Evaluative Proportional ...
> <http://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm/>
> www.jpolrisk.com
> This article explains how a new voting method called Evaluative
> Proportional Representation (EPR) fully satisfies the demand that in the
> best representative democracy, no citizen’s vote would be involuntarily
> wasted, quantitatively or qualitatively. 2 EPR is intended for voters who
> are electing members of a legislative body, for example a ...
>
>
> This method is called Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR). EPR
> builds upon the arguments for Majority Judgment (MJ)offered by Balinski and
> Laraki (2010, MIT). For example, when electing all the members of a city
> council, each EPR citizen is asked to evaluate (not rank) as many of the
> candidates in the city as she might wish, i.e. to grade each with regard to
> their fitness for the office: either EXCELLENT, VERY GOOD, GOOD,
> ACCEPTABLE, POOR, or REJECT. The article explains the relatively simple
> step by step method by which all these evaluations are counted by hand (or
> by the algorithm provided). As a result, each citizen’s one vote
> continues fully to count in the deliberations and decisions of the council.
> It does this through the weighted vote earned by one of the elected
> members, i.e. the one winner whom she has helped to elect and judges to be
> the one most qualified for the office.
>
> Unlike any known variety of plurality, ranking (Condorcet or IRV (RCV,
> STV, etc.), range, or approving voting methods, only EPR allows each
> citizen to guarantee that her one vote will continue to count in the
> council (or legislature). Also, I'd like to offer Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
> some hope: perhaps the extra appeal of this unique feature of EPR would
> prompt enough citizens in a state like California to adopt EPR by one of
> its referenda.
>
> Again, only EPR allows no vote to be wasted as defined by the second
> paragraph of the article.
>
> What do you think?
>
> I look forward to your feedback.
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. Re: IRV / RCv advances (Abd ul-Rahman Lomax)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 14:08:24 -0400
> From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <***@lomaxdesign.com>
> To: election-***@lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] IRV / RCv advances
> Message-ID: <69bc286e-c970-9f6c-e60a-***@lomaxdesign.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
>
>
> On 7/14/2018 10:08 AM, Richard Lung wrote:
>
> > [...] Agree completely about score voting. I can't help but feel
> > approval voting is essentially a rebranding of cumulative voting. In
> > about 1867, John Stuart Mill knew it was only a trifling improvement
> > on plurality counting but at least opened peoples minds to alternatives.
> I'd question that simply counting all the votes would be a "trifling
> improvement." It would have flipped the US presidential election in
> 2000, almost certainly, and is a no-cost improvement, simple to
> implement and easy to understand. In a two-round system, it can provide
> substantial flexibility, perhaps even allowing runoffs to have a third
> candidate. Counting all the votes would be, again, an improvement over
> IRV, allowing voters to equal-rank. But the IRV method, by discarding
> votes, is intrinsically flawed, and Bucklin actually worked when used.
> The arguments that it didn't work were based on the fact that it wasn't
> magic pixie dust. The only system that fixes about everything is Asset,
> which hardly gets any consideration at all. My suggestion has been for
> EM reformers to suggest Asset for NGOS, since it's really simple, as
> well, and creates a deliberative structure, which is far more flexible
> -- and functionally democratic -- than pure amalgamation. To be
> fail-safe, it could be used in a nomination process, to be actually
> ratified for a final result.
>
> Approval -- and most methods -- are plurality methods unless a true
> majority of the votes is required for a result. In Australia, in some
> places they accomplish that by making it illegal to not completely rank.
> In other words, to make a result more "democratic," coerce the voters.
> Ah, the things people do to preserve the way things are!
> > Re 3.
> > Weighted Condorcet pairing arguably offers a back-door that partly
> > gets round the Laplace criticism of Condorcet pairing, that it does
> > not establish the relative importance of higher and lower preferences,
> > in the over-all election count.
> > I see Condorcet pairing primarily as a research tool for
> > cross-referencing the results of an at-large election with the results
> > from sub-elections of one-to-one contests or less minimal partitions.
> > Ideally, we would have an election system that does not have to watch
> > its back for a Condorcet paradox.
> A condorcet paradox is an indication of an incomplete process. Depending
> on preference strength, which some Condorcet methods attempt to
> estimate, it might be meaningless. But to truly analyse election returns
> requires preference strength information. Borda, again, estimates it
> with an assumption of full ranking, such that with many candidates, the
> "rank distance" would approximate a measure of preference strength.
>
> But the only ballot that actually allows the voters to directly express
> preference strength is a score ballot. And then some advocates of other
> systems point out Condoret failure, as if that matters when preference
> strength is obviously low. It doesn't. And then it is pointed out that
> voters may vote "strategically," as if that is dishonest or bad. In a
> Score system, there is never any incentive to reverse preference. Voters
> decide what preferences matter to them, and will vote accordingly, and a
> good overall system will detect situations where is ambiguity, perhaps
> due to inaccurate perception of probable results, and will then set up a
> runoff.
>
> Instead of working together to create a system that will actually
> improve and foster full democracy, we don't, it seems, trust the people
> and want them to conform to our own ideas. In other words, same old same
> old. The problem with democracy is the damn people!
>
> But democracy is still government by consent, and whenever that fails,
> oppression is inevitable. It's only a question of how bad it gets. The
> logic that captured me, so many decades ago, is that we need
> representation by consent and choice, not by "winners" and "losers." And
> that appears to be doable. But who cares enough to try it?
>
> Some. Not yet enough, but it's possible any day. It might only take one
> person to make a proposal and carry it through, in one place.
>
> >
> > Even an admittedly crude election like IRV (Alternative Vote),
> > according to this group, has only come-up with the Burlington case.
> > That may have been politically unfortunate. But, if about 150?
> > elections have not suffered the paradox, that incidence is not
> > statistically significant.
>
> It is possible to show that about one-third of IRV results were not
> optimal. This is done by comparing IRV results with top-two runoff
> results. If a full-information ballot were used with IRV (it could be
> done! Easily!) we would then know. However, actually collecting the data
> to determine, definitively, if a voting system is actually working is
> not a part of any reform proposal I have seen. The collecting of
> information is confused with and considered less important than creating
> a result, and I can easily see the counter-argument: what if this causes
> the result of an election to be called into question? Won't this damage
> our trust in government? I think I have actually seen that argument.
>
> If our trust in government is based in ignorance, it's worse than a bit
> of trouble. A simple, coarse-score ballot, with explicit approval
> cutoff, would be cheap and easy, and how the actual result is determined
> could be explicity declared on the ballot. Providing the additonal
> information would be optional. One could vote the ballot, if one
> chooses, as vote-for-one. It would all generate useful information, and
> could guide future election method decisions.
> > The real comparison is how many "Bush beats Gore minus Nader" contests
> > are there?
>
> In a two-party system. Duverger's law and party attempts to corner the
> electorate create many of them. Look at any close election and at the
> participation of minor parties in it. There may be hundreds of these a
> year. As well, the existing system tends to suppress minor party
> participation. New York has Fusion voting, a step in a direction of
> improved democracy. It was proposed for Massachusetts and lost. Who
> opposed it?
>
> The "Democratic" party, of course! It lost. So why did people vote
> against it? Well, perhaps they trusted their party. After all, isn't our
> party the Good Guys? If it's bad for them, surely we don't want it! It
> all makes sense until and unless one starts to look more closely, which
> most people don't do. And realizing that, Dodgson proposed Asset, which
> actually creates, very simply, representative government, with the good
> stuff associated with that, while allowing low-level decisions, by
> ordinary people who don't want their lives to be about politics, to be
> useful and effective.
>
> >
> > And how many simple plurality elections make voters act as their own
> > returning officers in an implicit ranked choice election, where the
> > voter excludes his first preference for Nader, and counts it for
> > second preference Gore?
> My sense is that many would vote for a third party candidate if they did
> not know it would be a wasted vote. It could be trivial to fix that
> problem. But we obviously care about something else more. about what?
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Subject: Digest Footer
>
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Jameson Quinn
2018-07-16 18:10:34 UTC
Permalink
Looks as if Andrew beat me to the punch. I agree with his specific
suggestions.

2018-07-16 14:09 GMT-04:00 Jameson Quinn <***@gmail.com>:

> This system as described is very close to being an excellent "Proportional
> Majority Judgment" method, but has one key flaw. When a candidate is
> elected with more than 1 quota of support, all of their supporting ballots
> are marked as used. To give a proportional method and to minimize strategic
> incentives, only 1 quota of supporting ballots should be marked as used.
> This could be done through some ordering criterion (highest support for
> winner/lowest support for others), by proportionally reweighting ballots,
> or by using up randomly-chosen ballots; the differences between these three
> options would be relatively minor.
>
> This reflects the basic way to transform any single-winner method into a
> proportional multi-winner method: find single winners sequentially, and
> then for each of those winners, "use up" the one quota of ballots that
> "contributed most" to making that candidate the winner. There's room for
> judgment calls in defining "contributed most", but other than that this is
> a general template that IMO gives an optimal combination of good and
> practical from methods as varied as IRV (which becomes STV), MJ, STAR,
> Score, approval, Condorcet... in short, almost any single-winner method.
>
> Are all good proportional methods examples of this pattern? I wouldn't go
> that far. Delegation and (partial or full) biproportionality are extra
> ingredients that can be added, giving possibilities like (Bavarian-style)
> MMP, DMP, PLACE, and PAD, all worthy alternatives. But "sequential
> allocation methods" using the recipe above should definitely be at least
> one of the mainstays of the proportional toolkit.
>
> Jameson
>
> 2018-07-15 17:55 GMT-04:00 steve bosworth <***@hotmail.com>:
>
>> The recent responses to Sennet’s attempt favorably to report some
>> recent successes of RCV (i.e. IRV) prompt me to hope that readers will be
>> willing to test the counter claims of a newly developed voting and counting
>> method for electing multi-winners. This method is fully described in
>> the following published article:
>>
>> http://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-
>> proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm/
>>
>>
>> <http://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm/>
>> Legislatures Elected by Evaluative Proportional ...
>> <http://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-a-new-algorithm/>
>> www.jpolrisk.com
>> This article explains how a new voting method called Evaluative
>> Proportional Representation (EPR) fully satisfies the demand that in the
>> best representative democracy, no citizen’s vote would be involuntarily
>> wasted, quantitatively or qualitatively. 2 EPR is intended for voters who
>> are electing members of a legislative body, for example a ...
>>
>>
>> This method is called Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR). EPR
>> builds upon the arguments for Majority Judgment (MJ)offered by Balinski and
>> Laraki (2010, MIT). For example, when electing all the members of a city
>> council, each EPR citizen is asked to evaluate (not rank) as many of the
>> candidates in the city as she might wish, i.e. to grade each with regard to
>> their fitness for the office: either EXCELLENT, VERY GOOD, GOOD,
>> ACCEPTABLE, POOR, or REJECT. The article explains the relatively simple
>> step by step method by which all these evaluations are counted by hand (or
>> by the algorithm provided). As a result, each citizen’s one vote
>> continues fully to count in the deliberations and decisions of the council.
>> It does this through the weighted vote earned by one of the elected
>> members, i.e. the one winner whom she has helped to elect and judges to be
>> the one most qualified for the office.
>>
>> Unlike any known variety of plurality, ranking (Condorcet or IRV (RCV,
>> STV, etc.), range, or approving voting methods, only EPR allows each
>> citizen to guarantee that her one vote will continue to count in the
>> council (or legislature). Also, I'd like to offer Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
>> some hope: perhaps the extra appeal of this unique feature of EPR would
>> prompt enough citizens in a state like California to adopt EPR by one of
>> its referenda.
>>
>> Again, only EPR allows no vote to be wasted as defined by the second
>> paragraph of the article.
>>
>> What do you think?
>>
>> I look forward to your feedback.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>>
>>
>> Today's Topics:
>>
>> 1. Re: IRV / RCv advances (Abd ul-Rahman Lomax)
>>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> Message: 1
>> Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 14:08:24 -0400
>> From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <***@lomaxdesign.com>
>> To: election-***@lists.electorama.com
>> Subject: Re: [EM] IRV / RCv advances
>> Message-ID: <69bc286e-c970-9f6c-e60a-***@lomaxdesign.com>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
>>
>>
>> On 7/14/2018 10:08 AM, Richard Lung wrote:
>>
>> > [...] Agree completely about score voting. I can't help but feel
>> > approval voting is essentially a rebranding of cumulative voting. In
>> > about 1867, John Stuart Mill knew it was only a trifling improvement
>> > on plurality counting but at least opened peoples minds to alternatives.
>> I'd question that simply counting all the votes would be a "trifling
>> improvement." It would have flipped the US presidential election in
>> 2000, almost certainly, and is a no-cost improvement, simple to
>> implement and easy to understand. In a two-round system, it can provide
>> substantial flexibility, perhaps even allowing runoffs to have a third
>> candidate. Counting all the votes would be, again, an improvement over
>> IRV, allowing voters to equal-rank. But the IRV method, by discarding
>> votes, is intrinsically flawed, and Bucklin actually worked when used.
>> The arguments that it didn't work were based on the fact that it wasn't
>> magic pixie dust. The only system that fixes about everything is Asset,
>> which hardly gets any consideration at all. My suggestion has been for
>> EM reformers to suggest Asset for NGOS, since it's really simple, as
>> well, and creates a deliberative structure, which is far more flexible
>> -- and functionally democratic -- than pure amalgamation. To be
>> fail-safe, it could be used in a nomination process, to be actually
>> ratified for a final result.
>>
>> Approval -- and most methods -- are plurality methods unless a true
>> majority of the votes is required for a result. In Australia, in some
>> places they accomplish that by making it illegal to not completely rank.
>> In other words, to make a result more "democratic," coerce the voters.
>> Ah, the things people do to preserve the way things are!
>> > Re 3.
>> > Weighted Condorcet pairing arguably offers a back-door that partly
>> > gets round the Laplace criticism of Condorcet pairing, that it does
>> > not establish the relative importance of higher and lower preferences,
>> > in the over-all election count.
>> > I see Condorcet pairing primarily as a research tool for
>> > cross-referencing the results of an at-large election with the results
>> > from sub-elections of one-to-one contests or less minimal partitions.
>> > Ideally, we would have an election system that does not have to watch
>> > its back for a Condorcet paradox.
>> A condorcet paradox is an indication of an incomplete process. Depending
>> on preference strength, which some Condorcet methods attempt to
>> estimate, it might be meaningless. But to truly analyse election returns
>> requires preference strength information. Borda, again, estimates it
>> with an assumption of full ranking, such that with many candidates, the
>> "rank distance" would approximate a measure of preference strength.
>>
>> But the only ballot that actually allows the voters to directly express
>> preference strength is a score ballot. And then some advocates of other
>> systems point out Condoret failure, as if that matters when preference
>> strength is obviously low. It doesn't. And then it is pointed out that
>> voters may vote "strategically," as if that is dishonest or bad. In a
>> Score system, there is never any incentive to reverse preference. Voters
>> decide what preferences matter to them, and will vote accordingly, and a
>> good overall system will detect situations where is ambiguity, perhaps
>> due to inaccurate perception of probable results, and will then set up a
>> runoff.
>>
>> Instead of working together to create a system that will actually
>> improve and foster full democracy, we don't, it seems, trust the people
>> and want them to conform to our own ideas. In other words, same old same
>> old. The problem with democracy is the damn people!
>>
>> But democracy is still government by consent, and whenever that fails,
>> oppression is inevitable. It's only a question of how bad it gets. The
>> logic that captured me, so many decades ago, is that we need
>> representation by consent and choice, not by "winners" and "losers." And
>> that appears to be doable. But who cares enough to try it?
>>
>> Some. Not yet enough, but it's possible any day. It might only take one
>> person to make a proposal and carry it through, in one place.
>>
>> >
>> > Even an admittedly crude election like IRV (Alternative Vote),
>> > according to this group, has only come-up with the Burlington case.
>> > That may have been politically unfortunate. But, if about 150?
>> > elections have not suffered the paradox, that incidence is not
>> > statistically significant.
>>
>> It is possible to show that about one-third of IRV results were not
>> optimal. This is done by comparing IRV results with top-two runoff
>> results. If a full-information ballot were used with IRV (it could be
>> done! Easily!) we would then know. However, actually collecting the data
>> to determine, definitively, if a voting system is actually working is
>> not a part of any reform proposal I have seen. The collecting of
>> information is confused with and considered less important than creating
>> a result, and I can easily see the counter-argument: what if this causes
>> the result of an election to be called into question? Won't this damage
>> our trust in government? I think I have actually seen that argument.
>>
>> If our trust in government is based in ignorance, it's worse than a bit
>> of trouble. A simple, coarse-score ballot, with explicit approval
>> cutoff, would be cheap and easy, and how the actual result is determined
>> could be explicity declared on the ballot. Providing the additonal
>> information would be optional. One could vote the ballot, if one
>> chooses, as vote-for-one. It would all generate useful information, and
>> could guide future election method decisions.
>> > The real comparison is how many "Bush beats Gore minus Nader" contests
>> > are there?
>>
>> In a two-party system. Duverger's law and party attempts to corner the
>> electorate create many of them. Look at any close election and at the
>> participation of minor parties in it. There may be hundreds of these a
>> year. As well, the existing system tends to suppress minor party
>> participation. New York has Fusion voting, a step in a direction of
>> improved democracy. It was proposed for Massachusetts and lost. Who
>> opposed it?
>>
>> The "Democratic" party, of course! It lost. So why did people vote
>> against it? Well, perhaps they trusted their party. After all, isn't our
>> party the Good Guys? If it's bad for them, surely we don't want it! It
>> all makes sense until and unless one starts to look more closely, which
>> most people don't do. And realizing that, Dodgson proposed Asset, which
>> actually creates, very simply, representative government, with the good
>> stuff associated with that, while allowing low-level decisions, by
>> ordinary people who don't want their lives to be about politics, to be
>> useful and effective.
>>
>> >
>> > And how many simple plurality elections make voters act as their own
>> > returning officers in an implicit ranked choice election, where the
>> > voter excludes his first preference for Nader, and counts it for
>> > second preference Gore?
>> My sense is that many would vote for a third party candidate if they did
>> not know it would be a wasted vote. It could be trivial to fix that
>> problem. But we obviously care about something else more. about what?
>>
>>
>>
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>
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
2018-07-16 19:21:50 UTC
Permalink
On 2018-07-16 20:09, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> This system as described is very close to being an excellent
> "Proportional Majority Judgment" method, but has one key flaw. When a
> candidate is elected with more than 1 quota of support, all of their
> supporting ballots are marked as used. To give a proportional method and
> to minimize strategic incentives, only 1 quota of supporting ballots
> should be marked as used. This could be done through some ordering
> criterion (highest support for winner/lowest support for others), by
> proportionally reweighting ballots, or by using up randomly-chosen
> ballots; the differences between these three options would be relatively
> minor.
>
> This reflects the basic way to transform any single-winner method into a
> proportional multi-winner method: find single winners sequentially, and
> then for each of those winners, "use up" the one quota of ballots that
> "contributed most" to making that candidate the winner. There's room for
> judgment calls in defining "contributed most", but other than that this
> is a general template that IMO gives an optimal combination of good and
> practical from methods as varied as IRV (which becomes STV), MJ, STAR,
> Score, approval, Condorcet... in short, almost any single-winner method.

Most of those multiwinner methods have unweighted winners. In EPR (as I
understand it), each winner has a different weight in the assembly, and
thus instead of discarding just a quota and then redistributing the
surplus, it's possible to assign more than a quota to a single winner,
who benefits from this "supermajority" by an increased weight.

To use SNTV as an example, suppose you have a Plurality election of the
type:

A: 100
B: 80
C: 30
D: 20

and three to elect. If you use ordinary SNTV, then the voters who voted
for A wasted their votes, since they voted in excess of what was
required to have A win. However, with weighted voting, it's a simple
matter of letting A have a weight of 47.6% of the total vote, B have a
weight of 38.1% and so on.

Suppose e.g. that the A- and B-voters both had D as their second
preference. Unweighted, the wasted votes for A and B deprived D of his
victory, as in SNTV, some fractions of the A- and B-voters could have
strategically voted for D instead to get him above C's count, and that's
what a better method with surplus redistribution would have done anyway.

In a weighted method, the A and B-voters get compensated for C being
elected, in the form of A and B having a greater share of power; and
this is preferable from the point of view of A- and B-voters because
they get to contribute directly to the power of their first choice
candidates instead of having that power go to their second choice.

With all that said, there's another argument that could be made in favor
of doing surplus redistribution, which is that under tactical
nomination, you could get something analogous to surplus redistribution
anyway. If the A-voters consider D to be close to A, then some of them
could vote for D, after which the fixed council size would push C off.
The benefit of reducing C's strength to zero could then make up for A's
relative power being reduced in the council.

A stronger strategy would involve cloning A into A1 and A2 and, instead
of redistributing votes to D, distributing them between A1 and A2. That
produces a more party list-like outcome -- but that strategy would also
be possible under an unweighted multiwinner system.
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Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
2018-07-16 21:14:50 UTC
Permalink
People should be aware of Delegable Proxy, which can create full
representation. There have been proposals for assemblies with variable
voting power, i.e., where those elected to the Assembly cast as many
votes as they received in the election.

However, I prefer to move toward full democracy along this path.

First of all, propose and implement simple Asset Voting in NGOs, where
experience with it can be gained.

Then, as it becomes known that what Asset can do is possible, it can be
proposed for public elections. The rest of this is a plan for an NGO:

1. Use simple asset (vote for one!) with the Hare quota ((i.e., votes/seats)

2. Anyone may register to become an elector. If there are eligible
persons not registered, they may not receive votes in the election, but
may then allow themselves to be chosen for further participation. One of
the Asset strengths is that it can elect candidates who did not receive
any votes in the secret ballot election.\

3. Outside of Questions of Privilege, or related motions (such as
Adjourn) the vote required for any measure to pass is a majority of the
number of seats as was used to define the quota. Seats, then, will
always maximize their own power by cooperating to create the maximum
number of seats. It may be normal for a seat to be vacant, or even
possibly more than one. Electors may still function to represent the
voters until the next election.

4. Having created a fully representative assembly, it is possible to
allow certain kinds of voting directly by electors. It is not necessary
to specify the rules for this at this point, but the basic concept would
be that to make procedural motions and vote on them, one must have a
seat. But measures with lasting effect could be open for internet voting
by electors. If an elector does not vote, the seat's vote counts as full
strength, one full vote (or it could be reported and used as the quota
of votes). If an elector does vote, then the seat's vote is devalued by
the number of votes the elector contributed to the seats that are
normally serving. This is trivial to do with computers, and would all be
open, visible. This could become important where seats are put together
with heavy compromise, from the "dregs," i.e., smaller amounts of
leftover votes not already assigned.

My guess is that direct voting would only be rarely used. It's too much
work to pay attention to the process, except for a few electors, I
suspect, and for a few questions of particular importance for them.
Rather, what I suspect is that voters, and electors especially as public
voters, would focus on finding truly qualifed people to represent them,
people who, if the elector disagrees with them on an issue, might be
inclined to trust the one they chose. After all, they are likely to be
more informed!

Most discussion of voting systems pay little attention to what might be
called collective intelligence, how to enhance it.

My opinion is that any organization that creates a deliberative body
based on Asset will be more likely to prosper. Asset is designed to
foster cooperation, not conflict. It will not magically create it, but
it simply gets rid of the necessity for oppositional campaigning.


On 7/16/2018 3:21 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>
> Most of those multiwinner methods have unweighted winners. In EPR (as
> I understand it), each winner has a different weight in the assembly,
> and thus instead of discarding just a quota and then redistributing
> the surplus, it's possible to assign more than a quota to a single
> winner, who benefits from this "supermajority" by an increased weight.

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