Discussion:
IRV vs. plurality
James Green-Armytage
2003-08-04 02:09:53 UTC
Permalink
Dear Eric, and other voting methods fans,
By every measure I consider important, I see no difference between
the two
[plurality and IRV]
. They should both be absolutely avoided.
I reply:
What are the measures that you consider important? Clearly monotonicity
is one, but what are the others?
Even if third parties are unlikely to win, I do not consider it
completely irrelevant that people are enabled to vote for them without
investing all their voting power in doing so. This should improve the
political standing of third parties, allow them access to debates,
matching grants, allows them to gain a foothold, etc. IRV has better
Condorcet efficiency than plurality... I listed a lot more benefits to IRV
over plurality. Are you going to tell me that you read them all and found
every one of them to be completely irrelevant and worthless?
Spoiling can still occur in IRV, but it is much, much easier for it to
happen in plurality.
I am not arguing that IRV is radically better than plurality. I am
arguing that it is at least marginally better, all other factors aside. As
you don't seem to be fond of plurality, I don't see why you are unwilling
to concede that point.
As for IRV, this case clearly shows a tremendous problem with the system.
I reply:
I am well aware of the flaw in IRV that you have presented here, and I
agree that it is quite a serious flaw. I think that my posting makes it
clear that I am aware of such problems.
I am fairly sure that IRV, Condorcet,
and Approval people should try to treat each other as allies rather than
competitors, and that they should not try to strawman or exclude each
others' systems.
While there are at least be some questions regarding Approval vs.
certain versions of Condorcet, I don't there is any argument left in
the support of IRV over these two obviously superior methods.
I reply:
Is this a non-sequitur? I can't entirely see how your paragraph is a
response to the one that you quoted.

Anyway, I was not making that argument. I was arguing that IRV is
superior to plurality.
However, I am admittedly not totally convinced that Approval is superior
to IRV. (It may well be, but nobody has convinced me of it yet.)
Also, I think that a version of IRV that allows for equal rankings would
be better than plain IRV, and would incorporate many of the virtues of
Approval, with the added freedom of voters to differentiate between levels
of support. Aside from monotonicity, I would like to know what other
advantages Approval has over 'equal rankings' IRV.

I will say that I find it rather hard to imagine a normative argument
that Approval is superior to ranked pairs or beatpath Condorcet. I can
certainly accept the idea that Approval has a strong practical advantage
in being easily adoptable (without new equipment, with a relatively easy
voter education effort), but it seems clear that Condorcet allows for much
more thorough communication, and requires much less strategic guesswork on
the part of the voters.
(However, I definitely prefer RP Condorcet (Deterministic #1-wv)...or
whatever Mike O. was calling it...don't have it in front of me at the
moment....over all other single-winner methods I am aware of.)
I reply:
I don't necessarily disagree, but I am curious: what advantages do you
think ranked pairs has over beatpath / CSSD?

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Kevin Venzke
2003-08-04 02:55:52 UTC
Permalink
James,
Post by James Green-Armytage
Dear Eric, and other voting methods fans,
By every measure I consider important, I see no difference between
the two
[plurality and IRV]
. They should both be absolutely avoided.
This is how I feel, incidentally. I'm afraid the IRV/Plurality question is a
little boring for me.
Post by James Green-Armytage
However, I am admittedly not totally convinced that Approval is superior
to IRV. (It may well be, but nobody has convinced me of it yet.)
Also, I think that a version of IRV that allows for equal rankings would
be better than plain IRV, and would incorporate many of the virtues of
Approval, with the added freedom of voters to differentiate between levels
of support. Aside from monotonicity, I would like to know what other
advantages Approval has over 'equal rankings' IRV.
I do believe strategy would be more difficult in the latter. A clueless voter
(such as one who who prefers to strictly rank) might be significantly disadvantaged.

What do you think about MCA? The odds of electing a majority favorite are
increased.
Post by James Green-Armytage
I will say that I find it rather hard to imagine a normative argument
that Approval is superior to ranked pairs or beatpath Condorcet.
There is a possibility that low-utility CW's wouldn't win in Approval. I'm not
sure if that is "normative." (Perhaps someone knows of more reasons.)

I do appreciate your ideas.

Kevin Venzke
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D***@aol.com
2003-08-04 20:54:55 UTC
Permalink
James Green-Armytage asked for people's opinions regarding IRV versus
Plurality.

Not surprisingly, and for reasons I've already stated and won't repeat here,
I feel IRV is greatly superior to plurality ( and Condorcet and approval).


David Gamble
D***@aol.com
2003-08-05 22:43:57 UTC
Permalink
Post by D***@aol.com
James Green-Armytage asked for people's opinions regarding IRV
versus Plurality.
Not surprisingly, and for reasons I've already stated and won't
repeat here, I feel IRV is greatly superior to plurality ( and
Condorcet and approval).
I am always interested in why people feel this way.

Do you have a detailed summary of why you feel way?

For example, why is it the right thing for A to win in this case:

40 A
35 C > B
30 B

when clearly > 60% of the voters preferred B over A?
--
== Eric Gorr ========= http://www.ericgorr.net ========= ICQ:9293199 ===
"Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
benefit and harm." - Sun Tzu
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent... ===


At the risk of repeating myself, my argument against Condorcet can be
summarised as follows:

I do not support Condorcet because I believe that in practice, regardless of
the theoretical and conceptual advantages it may possess, it would be too
favourable towards parties who succeed in positioning themselves in the centre and
correspondingly discriminatory against wing parties.

IRV succeeds, I believe, in striking a balance between the two somewhat
conflicting aims of ensuring that a candidate has majority support ( a candidate
does not win with a minority of the vote because the opposition is split) and
preventing dominance by candidates/parties who position themselves in the
centre.

The example given by Eric is not that realistic ( it is not likely you would
see such a vote set in a real election) and in the normal course of
discussion I would probably counter it with my favourite 49 A>B>C, 3 B>A>C, 48 C>B>A
example with some comment about the importance of first preference
votes/utility, somebody else would them make a comment about how first preference votes
have no significance of themselves and so it goes on .........

Right, now something I haven't mentioned before - Approval Voting.

Approval voting is presented as a cleaner, fairer, more consensual election
method than pluality. It is also presented vis-a-vis Condorcet and IRV as a
simple, easy to understand method. The candidate approved by the most voters wins
and the voting instruction (copied from the Americans for Approval Voting
website) 'Vote for any number of candidates' is easy to understand. It couldn't
be more simple. Except of course it isn't that simple.

To get a reasonable result from Approval voting the voter needs to have at
least a working knowledge of how to vote strategically in an Approval election.
This is my major objection to Approval. I feel that that many, if not a
majority of voters when presented with the Approval question will take the question
at face value and vote for all the candidates they approve of. Very few people
unfamiliar with AV strategy will look at the instruction and think " ah, what
I need to do is approve every candidate whose utility ( to me ) exceeds that
of the candidate most likely to win" or any similar thing. If people do use
strategy it is more likely to be on the level of " well I approve of A,B and C,
oh but if I approve all of them I'll have approved 3 of the 4 candidates on
the ballot, maybe that's too many. Well, I like A and B a lot more than C so
I'll only approve A and B".

Getting back to one of James Green-Armytage's points I feel that IRV
supporters attacking Approval supporters attacking Condorcet supporters in public ( as
opposed to an internet discussion group like this) is the surest way on this
Earth to maintain plurality.

David Gamble
Kevin Venzke
2003-08-06 16:33:37 UTC
Permalink
David,
Post by D***@aol.com
Post by D***@aol.com
40 A
35 C > B
30 B
The example given by Eric is not that realistic ( it is not likely you would
see such a vote set in a real election)
If indeed this example is not realistic, it's because C decided not to run lest
he spoil the election and throw it to A.

This incentive (for C to not run, and B voters to not vote for C) is the first
reason why I find IRV unacceptable.
Post by D***@aol.com
and in the normal course of
discussion I would probably counter it with my favourite 49 A>B>C, 3 B>A>C, 48 C>B>A
example with some comment about the importance of first preference
votes/utility,
But evidently you find such a scenario as unlikely as the Condorcet supporters do.
Post by D***@aol.com
To get a reasonable result from Approval voting the voter needs to have at
least a working knowledge of how to vote strategically in an Approval election.
This is my major objection to Approval.
Well perhaps parties could have "how to vote" cards. That's how IRV strategy
works, isn't it?


Kevin Venzke
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Eric Gorr
2003-08-06 17:04:25 UTC
Permalink
Post by Kevin Venzke
David,
Post by D***@aol.com
Post by D***@aol.com
40 A
35 C > B
30 B
The example given by Eric is not that realistic ( it is not likely you would
see such a vote set in a real election)
If indeed this example is not realistic, it's because C decided
not to run lest he spoil the election and throw it to A.
Is it really not realistic?

It seems to me that it can easily be generated in
genuine elections when there are three or more
parties capable of getting first place votes.
Post by Kevin Venzke
This incentive (for C to not run, and B voters to not vote for C) is the first
reason why I find IRV unacceptable.
There is also an incentive for the C voters to
vote insincerely and rank B first since they may
know their candidate cannot win.
Post by Kevin Venzke
Post by D***@aol.com
and in the normal course of discussion I would probably counter
it with my favourite 49 A>B>C, 3 B>A>C, 48 C>B>A example with
some comment about the importance of first preference
votes/utility,
But evidently you find such a scenario as unlikely as the
Condorcet supporters do.
But, I really don't understand this scenario, assuming voters voted sincerely.

It is clear that the unambiguous winner is B.
This is very different from the example above,
where B should be the winner, but A won the
election.
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Kevin Venzke
2003-08-06 17:50:31 UTC
Permalink
Eric,

Sorry, my message wasn't as clear as it could've been.
Post by Eric Gorr
Post by Kevin Venzke
Post by D***@aol.com
Post by D***@aol.com
40 A
35 C > B
30 B
The example given by Eric is not that realistic ( it is not likely you would
see such a vote set in a real election)
If indeed this example is not realistic, it's because C decided
not to run lest he spoil the election and throw it to A.
Is it really not realistic?
It seems to me that it can easily be generated in
genuine elections when there are three or more
parties capable of getting first place votes.
Yes. What I was aiming at was: if IRV were in place, then the C voters would
have incentive to betray favorite; anticipating this, candidates like C would see
less value in running at all.
Post by Eric Gorr
Post by Kevin Venzke
This incentive (for C to not run, and B voters to not vote for C) is the first
reason why I find IRV unacceptable.
There is also an incentive for the C voters to
vote insincerely and rank B first since they may
know their candidate cannot win.
Excuse me, that is what I was trying to refer to. Actually if B-first voters like
C somewhat, they could of course rank C second.
Post by Eric Gorr
Post by Kevin Venzke
Post by D***@aol.com
and in the normal course of discussion I would probably counter
it with my favourite 49 A>B>C, 3 B>A>C, 48 C>B>A example with
some comment about the importance of first preference
votes/utility,
But evidently you find such a scenario as unlikely as the
Condorcet supporters do.
But, I really don't understand this scenario, assuming voters voted sincerely.
It is clear that the unambiguous winner is B.
This is very different from the example above,
where B should be the winner, but A won the
election.
I hear you. I suppose the response is, "Utility is important, and the first rank
is the only one that threatens to tell us anything about utility." Myself, I don't
see IRV as the solution to this concern, particularly if there's favorite-betrayal
incentive!

Kevin Venzke
***@yahoo.fr


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Adam Tarr
2003-08-06 18:48:15 UTC
Permalink
Post by D***@aol.com
At the risk of repeating myself, my argument against Condorcet can be
I do not support Condorcet because I believe that in practice, regardless
of the theoretical and conceptual advantages it may possess, it would be
too favourable towards parties who succeed in positioning themselves in
the centre and correspondingly discriminatory against wing parties.
Too favorable is, of course, a matter of opinion. There's something
undeniably meaningful about saying a candidate would beat any other
candidate if they were the only two running.
Post by D***@aol.com
IRV succeeds, I believe, in striking a balance between the two somewhat
conflicting aims of ensuring that a candidate has majority support ( a
candidate does not win with a minority of the vote because the opposition
is split)
IRV does nothing of the sort. It simply fails to hand the election to a
candidate with the largest core of support in different cases than
Condorcet. Consider this scenario:

10% FarRight>Right>Centrist>Left>FarLeft
10% Right>FarRight>Centrist>Left>FarLeft
15% Right>Centrist>FarRight>Left>FarLeft
16% Centrist>Right>Left>FarRight>FarLeft
15% Centrist>Left>Right>FarLeft>FarRight
13% Left>Centrist>FarLeft>Right>FarRight
11% Left>FarLeft>Centrist>Right>FarRight
10% FarLeft>Left>Centrist>Right>FarRight

Centrist wins the election in every deterministic voting scheme known to
man, except IRV.
Post by D***@aol.com
I would probably counter it with my favourite 49 A>B>C, 3 B>A>C, 48 C>B>A
example with some comment about the importance of first preference
votes/utility, somebody else would them make a comment about how first
preference votes have no significance of themselves and so it goes on .........
In this scenario, 97% of the voters prefer someone other than B. In order
to win the election, B has to convince 96% of the 97% (i.e. about 99% of
the voters who don't fully support him) to back him with their second place
votes. If the candidate can actually manage that, then he's not some
weasely "weak centrist"; he's a real compromise and has convinced the
electorate of this. The only way you'd ever see an election like this
would be if A,B,and C were all well known, and were all extremely close in
viewpoint, yet still managing to be clearly distinct with A and C slightly
more extreme.

Of course, B doesn't have to convince quite as many people to put him on
their ballot if he has more fist place support. But then he stops looking
so weak, doesn't he?
Post by D***@aol.com
To get a reasonable result from Approval voting the voter needs to have at
least a working knowledge of how to vote strategically in an Approval
election. This is my major objection to Approval. I feel that that many,
if not a majority of voters when presented with the Approval question will
take the question at face value and vote for all the candidates they
approve of. Very few people unfamiliar with AV strategy will look at the
instruction and think " ah, what I need to do is approve every candidate
whose utility ( to me ) exceeds that of the candidate most likely to win"
or any similar thing. If people do use strategy it is more likely to be on
the level of " well I approve of A,B and C, oh but if I approve all of
them I'll have approved 3 of the 4 candidates on the ballot, maybe that's
too many. Well, I like A and B a lot more than C so I'll only approve A and B".
A few responses:

1) People aren't idiots so they will probably only approve one of the
front-runners in a race. Understanding this isn't any harder than
understanding the LO2E problem, which most people are capable of.

2) Parties will tell their supporters how to vote.

3) There are lots of potential strategies, but only the most hairbrained
will actually produce bad results with any consistency. People can mix the
"above average utility" and the "favorite frontrunner plus" and the "above
frontrunner, plus frontrunner maybe" and the "above average expectation"
and the "just like I would vote in plurality" strategies to their heart's
content, and the final results will probably turn out fine.
Post by D***@aol.com
Getting back to one of James Green-Armytage's points I feel that IRV
supporters attacking Approval supporters attacking Condorcet supporters in
public ( as opposed to an internet discussion group like this) is the
surest way on this Earth to maintain plurality.
If there was an IRV movement in my area, I'd do my darndest to argue
against them semi-privately (i.e. not at a city council meeting, hopefully)
and turn them to Condorcet. Most IRV supporters simply aren't aware of
IRV's flaws, after all. But if IRV were on the ballot, I'd vote for it.
Alex Small
2003-08-06 19:16:15 UTC
Permalink
Post by D***@aol.com
At the risk of repeating myself, my argument against Condorcet can be
I do not support Condorcet because I believe that in practice,
regardless of the theoretical and conceptual advantages it may
possess, it would be too favourable towards parties who succeed in
positioning themselves in the centre and correspondingly
discriminatory against wing parties.
Suppose that we have 3 candidates, and voters and candidates mostly fall
along a 1D left-right spectrum. Let's call the candidates Left, Right,
and Middle. Let's also assume (I'll justify this momentarily) that the 3
candidates will always maintain their relative positions. Assume (for the
purposes of this model) that if somebody suddenly went to the other side,
he'd lose credibility. People would compare his track record with his new
stances and he'd be regarded as a liar.

Given the assumption of no role-reversal, Left and Right can guarantee
that Middle won't win an IRV race moving toward the middle. They don't
have to land right on top of Middle, they just have to get close enough to
him so they can steal first-place votes. If I'm slightly left of center,
and Left is also slightly left of center, even if he's to the left of me I
might prefer him to Middle as long as he isn't TOO far from Middle.

This analysis suggests that, as long as most voters/issues/candidates fall
along a 1D spectrum, IRV will maintain a 2-party duopoly with a weak
center trying but failing to win elections. The "weak center" will have
to take a very different position and make the issue space 2D. Maybe go
to the left on social issues and to the right on economic issues. Or
maybe turn "moderation" into its own issue: "We're the reasonable people
who try to do what's right, the others are just stuck in an ideological
vendetta." In any case, going 2D is the only hope for the center if we
use IRV. Only then can the "third party" hope to pick up more first-place
votes.

By contrast, with Condorcet the middle will ALWAYS win if the issues are
1D, unless either the left or right happens to have an outright first
place majority. There will always be 4 types of voters in a 3-way race:

Middle>Left>Right
Middle>Right>Left
Left>Middle>Right
Right>Middle>Left

Unless Left or Right has an outright majority, the 2 Middle factions can
always join with one of the "wings" to defeat the other "wing" pairwise.
Left and Right desperately need to go 2D so they can persuade some people
to vote Left>Right>Middle or Right>Left>Middle (at that point the labels
become less meaningful, but I think everybody knows what I mean).

So Condorcet gives 2 of the 3 parties an incentive to "go 2D" in this
example, while IRV only gives 1 party an incentive to "go 2D" in this
model.

What interests me is that, based on what I hear of politics in other
countries (which is admittedly not a lot), it seems like most countries
have some sort of left-right division. The factions may not have the same
respective stances as the American left and right, but that sort of
division still seems to stand. Even PR doesn't seem to do much to cure
this problem. Of course, I am quite willing (and EAGER!) to be corrected
on this, to be told that my gloomy assessment is false.

If in fact humans get easily trapped in 1D political molds, then maybe IRV
is almost more desirable than Condorcet (commence flaming now). As long
as we're 1D, there will be 2 competitive parties in IRV but Condorcet
might yield single-party monopoly.

So, in summary:

If it's possible for cultures to break out of the 1D political stalemate
then I'm enthusiastically pro-Condorcet. If it isn't possible for the
most part, if fiscally conservative/socially liberal mold-breaking is
impossible, then I may actually be more sympathetic to IRV than I was
previously. (Commence flaming now.)



Alex


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Eric Gorr
2003-08-06 20:46:11 UTC
Permalink
At 12:16 PM -0700 8/6/03, Alex Small wrote:
Well, someone still needs to convince me that the party who was able
to obtain the most broad based support shouldn't be the party that
wins.

Condorcet & Approval appear to be among the best methods that can, on
a very consistent basis, find that broad based support.

Furthermore, the party in the middle may not always win no matter
whether they are 1D or 2D. Politics can be a very fluid thing...the
party in the middle has the same opportunities to make itself hated
by the majority as any other party.
Post by Alex Small
(Commence flaming now.)
Ok.

)
) (( (
( )) )
) ) // (
_ ( __ ( ~->>
,-----' |__,_~~___<'__`)-~__--__-~->> <
| // : | -__ ~__ o)____)),__ - '> >- >
| // : |- \_ \ -\_\ -\ \ \ ~\_ \ ->> - , >>
| // : |_~_\ -\__\ \~'\ \ \, \__ . -<- >>
`-----._| ` -__`-- - ~~ -- ` --~> >
_/___\_ //)_`// | ||] ________
_____[_______]_[~~-_ (.L_/ || _________( )____
[____________________]' `\_,/'/ O ( _ )_
||| / ||| ,___,'./ _ (_ \ \/ / |_| / \ /\ || _)
||| \ |||,'______| (_) (_ \/\/ | | \_/ /--\ .. )
||| / /|| I==|| (______ ________)
||| \ __/_|| __||__ (_________)
-----||-/------`-._/||-o--o---o---
~~~~~'

(Sorry, I couldn't resist.)
--
== Eric Gorr ========= http://www.ericgorr.net ========= ICQ:9293199 ===
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benefit and harm." - Sun Tzu
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent... ===
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Adam Tarr
2003-08-06 21:15:34 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alex Small
So Condorcet gives 2 of the 3 parties an incentive to "go 2D" in this
example, while IRV only gives 1 party an incentive to "go 2D" in this
model.
Doesn't that constitute a strong argument for Condorcet, given your views?

Empirically, we know that politics tend to remain 1-D, with two dominant
parties, in IRV. Maybe Condorcet would be different. My intuition, and
your example. both suggest that Condorcet would lead to parties offering
different permutations of "left" and "right" viewpoints.
Post by Alex Small
What interests me is that, based on what I hear of politics in other
countries (which is admittedly not a lot), it seems like most countries
have some sort of left-right division. The factions may not have the same
respective stances as the American left and right, but that sort of
division still seems to stand. Even PR doesn't seem to do much to cure
this problem.
PR, if adopted in the USA with large districts, would surely lead to some
Libertarian representatives.

Part of the problem is that people are so accustomed to certain views being
packaged together, that they tend to go with the whole lot or none of
them. Call it political socialization, or intellectual laziness; your choice.

-Adam


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Alex Small
2003-08-06 21:35:34 UTC
Permalink
Post by Adam Tarr
Post by Alex Small
So Condorcet gives 2 of the 3 parties an incentive to "go 2D" in this
example, while IRV only gives 1 party an incentive to "go 2D" in this
model.
Doesn't that constitute a strong argument for Condorcet, given your views?
Possibly. The analysis I presented suggests that IRV will keep us in the
1D rut, and Condorcet _might_ get us out of the 1D rut, since IRV can
embrace competition in a 1D issue space, while Condorcet DEMANDS 2D issue
space for meaningful competition.

If Condorcet still fails to enlarge our issue space we have a choice:
Permanent centrist monopoly via Condorcet, or continued competition
between left and right via IRV, with the need to edge out the center
moderating them at least a little. They have to go close enough to the
center to assure themselves more first-place votes.

I suspect that I'd still take the centrist monopoly, at least for a while.
If the centrist monopoly grew stale and corrupt then that would introduce
a second axis to supplement the left-right division: fresh vs. stale.
Post by Adam Tarr
Empirically, we know that politics tend to remain 1-D, with two dominant
parties, in IRV. Maybe Condorcet would be different. My intuition,
and your example. both suggest that Condorcet would lead to parties
offering different permutations of "left" and "right" viewpoints.
That's my hope too. But the thought of centrist monopoly and the contrast
with IRV competition makes me slightly less hostile toward IRV now. Don't
misunderstand me, I'm not going to join CVD or start reciting
anti-Condorcet mantras about "lower choices defeating higher choices."
I'm just seeing a new aspect to the situation. A method can have a few
nice attributes and still be inferior to another method. (I know,
somebody will soon post a vehement denial that IRV can ever have ANY nice
attributes.)
Post by Adam Tarr
PR, if adopted in the USA with large districts, would surely lead to
some Libertarian representatives.
I agree. Hopefully it would also lead to a more moderate party in the
fiscally conservative/socially liberal mold. For that matter, hopefully
it would also lead to a fiscally liberal/socially conservative party.
Having four political sectors instead of the same old left-right would be
far more interesting.



Alex


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Forest Simmons
2003-08-07 01:22:15 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alex Small
Post by Adam Tarr
PR, if adopted in the USA with large districts, would surely lead to
some Libertarian representatives.
I agree. Hopefully it would also lead to a more moderate party in the
fiscally conservative/socially liberal mold. For that matter, hopefully
it would also lead to a fiscally liberal/socially conservative party.
Having four political sectors instead of the same old left-right would be
far more interesting.
Even now "lefties" say that the media have a right wing bias, while
"right wingers" say the media have a left leaning bias.

This difference in perception is partly from different vantage points, but
mainly from concern about different issue axes.

The media are fairly liberal when it comes to identity politics, abortion
rights, gun control, etc. fairly middle of the road on environmental
issues, social spending, etc. But when it comes to foreign policy, etc.
they definitely side with the big bucks.

In fact, they seem to side with the big bucks on every issue that the big
bucks really care about, i.e. any issue that has a potential for a
dramatic influence on climate for big business profits.

That makes sense because the media are largely monopolized by large
corporations with all kinds of big business interests.

Right now we have two big business parties that differ only on issues
that don't bother big business very much, when at all. These two parties
try to focus on these differences and magnify their importance so that we
think we have a big choice to make when we go to the polls.

Note that both Democratic and Republican candidates BOTH get huge backing
from virtually ALL of the large corporations.

The US populace knows that it doesn't make much difference on the big
issues whether a Democrat or Republican gets in, so they stay home and
don't vote.

Gore is more of a war hawk than Bush.

Gore paid lip service to the environment, but when he was in a position to
do something, he sold out just as quickly as Bush.

Neither the Democrats nor the Republicans are anywhere near the center of
the majority of the US populace. What's more, the line connecting them
doesn't come anywhere near that center. The situation looks like this:



Democrat Elite <---- one meter ----> Republican Elite

/\
|
|

one
mile

|
| Libertarians
\/
90 percent of
the US electorate

Greens



The vertical axis represents issues where the interests of big money
conflict directly with the interests of the common people.

The horizontal axis (blown out of proportion as it is by the
politicians and corporate media) represents all other issues lumped
together.

As long as big money controls the elections and has the lobbying power
(money) to control the elected politicians, the situation won't change.

I think that Approval and Condorcet would exert much more pressure towards
the (generalized) median position (about half way between the Greens and
the Libertarians) than would IRV.

The Kemeny order is the permutation of the candidates that minimizes the
average distance from voter permutations (i.e. rankings on their ballots).

Since (where they are defined) medians minimize average distances, we can
say that the Kemeny order is a generalized voter median of candidate
permutation space (i.e. "social order" space).

Note that the Kemeny order always ranks the CW first, when there is one;
indeed Kemeny's method is a Condorcet method.

It follows that (to the degree social order space is an accurate
reflection of issue space) the CW is the candidate who minimizes the
average distance from the voters in issue space.

[In this connection, remember that medians are more stable under
transformations, for example the transformation from social order space to
issue space, than are means (which minimize average SQUARED distances).
Borda minimizes the average squared distance in social order space, but
with a different metric.]

If there is a CW, any other candidate has a greater average distance to
the voters. How can that other candidate claim to better represent the
voters?

Perhaps he can by using a different metric to measure the distance, but I
haven't seen any evidence from IRV supporters that there exists such a
metric, let alone any claim that Kemeny's metric is inferior to another
(like Borda's).

In other words, there doesn't seem to be any variational (i.e.
optimization) principle to support IRV.

Instant Runoff (i.e. IRV) is a simulation of what would probably happen
under actual standard runoff.

In order to carry out the simulation, you have to acquire the voter
preference orders.

But if you are going to require the voters to provide all of that
information for runoff, why not use it to simulate a (more thorough) round
robin tournament? (for which it is completely adequate)

If you buy a truck to carry the corn to your storage silo, why not go
ahead and use it to carry the corn to market, too? If you buy a windmill
to pump water from a well, why not use it to generate electricity, too?
[especially when the generator system and electric pump come with the
windmill at no additional cost]

If there is a CW, and the CW is not the IRV winner, then a majority of the
ballots will show a preference of the CW over the IRV winner, so how can
IRV claim to represent the majority in that case?

Suppose there is no CW, and suppose further that a majority of the ballots
show a preference of the IRV winner over the Ranked Pairs winner. Does
this mean that a majority actually prefers the IRV winner?

Perhaps, IF the IRV ballots are sincere preferences, which is unlikely
when IRV and a good Condorcet method disagree.

That's why few if any on this EM list-serve believe IRV completed
Condorcet to be worth considering seriously.

IRV applied to the Smith set I would be willing to consider (as a way of
pseudo randomizing a choice from the Smith set) :-)

Forest

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Alex Small
2003-08-07 18:21:46 UTC
Permalink
Post by Forest Simmons
Even now "lefties" say that the media have a right wing bias, while
"right wingers" say the media have a left leaning bias.
This difference in perception is partly from different vantage points,
but mainly from concern about different issue axes.
Good point. However, I also think some of it is whining to cover
themselves. Why admit that Gore ran a weak campaign when you can say that
the corporate media was too harsh on him? Why admit that Republicans are
good at making themselves look bad when they can claim that the liberal
media is biased against them?
Post by Forest Simmons
Democrat Elite <---- one meter ----> Republican Elite
/\
|
|
one
mile
|
| Libertarians
\/
90 percent of
the US electorate
Greens
Good point.

It's often observed that every US Presidential election features one
candidate who portrays himself as "mad as all hell and not gonna take it
anymore!" Every four years, without fail, this candidate fails to secure
a major party nomination (although he does secure my vote). Whether or
not he truly cares about the issues that the rest of us care about (a
debatable point) he at least manages to strike a chord. But the
nomination process is controlled by core constituencies, not the other 90%
of us.

Right now it looks like Howard Dean is the champion of people who are "mad
as all hell and not gonna take it anymore!" Whether or not he is an
authentic advocate of "the rest of us" his public persona strikes a chord
among restless Democrats and even some independents (I'm thinking of
voting for him in the primary). In 2000 it was McCain. Whether or not
he's truly an advocate of the little guy (some would dispute that,
although I sympathize with him) he struck a chord.

In 1992 and 1996 it was, ironically, billionaire Ross Perot whose
platform, for good or for ill, was very different from anything on the
table in the major parties. I'm not sure whether anybody really liked (or
even understood) his economic plan. It might have been that we just liked
a feisty and eccentric guy who would go on Larry King with charts to show
how he's gonna fix things instead of parroting tired left or right
rhetoric that's been tested by focus groups and spin doctors.

Contrary to Donald's strategy prescription, I'll make my own prediction:

If we ever use Approval Voting in a Presidential race, at least one
maverick who's "mad as all hell and not gonna take it anymore!" will
attract significant attention. While 80% of the voters will still approve
either Tweedle Dumb or Tweedle Dumber, 60% of the voters will approve the
guy who's gonna "stick it to the Man!"



Alex


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Dave Ketchum
2003-08-08 07:03:39 UTC
Permalink
Post by Alex Small
Post by Adam Tarr
Post by Alex Small
So Condorcet gives 2 of the 3 parties an incentive to "go 2D" in this
example, while IRV only gives 1 party an incentive to "go 2D" in this
model.
Doesn't that constitute a strong argument for Condorcet, given your views?
Possibly. The analysis I presented suggests that IRV will keep us in the
1D rut, and Condorcet _might_ get us out of the 1D rut, since IRV can
embrace competition in a 1D issue space, while Condorcet DEMANDS 2D issue
space for meaningful competition.
Permanent centrist monopoly via Condorcet, or continued competition
between left and right via IRV, with the need to edge out the center
moderating them at least a little. They have to go close enough to the
center to assure themselves more first-place votes.
I suspect that I'd still take the centrist monopoly, at least for a while.
If the centrist monopoly grew stale and corrupt then that would introduce
a second axis to supplement the left-right division: fresh vs. stale.
Post by Adam Tarr
Empirically, we know that politics tend to remain 1-D, with two dominant
parties, in IRV. Maybe Condorcet would be different. My intuition,
and your example. both suggest that Condorcet would lead to parties
offering different permutations of "left" and "right" viewpoints.
--------------------------------


I quote the above as an example of describing IRV and Condorcet as
different methods with characteristics that are cause for choosing between
them.

Makes NO SENSE to me:
Ballots and basic voter instructions are identical (true that for
IRV there can be plots to take advantage of spoilers).
Except for cases involving IRV spoilers, winners are IDENTICAL -
repeat IDENTICAL!!!
Condorcet backers emphasize the IRV spoilers because those are the
major reason for choosing Condorcet over IRV (Condorcet claims simpler
counting of votes as an additional advantage).

So, HOW OFTEN do the IRV spoilers affect results, and is the spoiler
effect desirable to promote? After attending to the candidates with few
votes, which both attend to together (although via different methods):
One or two candidates left - identical since spoilers cannot happen.
More than three left - possible, but I will do three as an example:
A - voted by some.
B - liked by those who dislike A.
BC - these B backers see C as second choice (not usually
mentioned in this example but, when CB exists BC almost certainly will
also exist and I want to mention BC in the discussion).
CB - these B backers like C even better - likely B and C share
basic positions with a minor variation that has caused the two candidates
to exist.

A < B+BC+CB - or A would win.
A > B+BC - or A would lose and leave it to B and C.
A > CB - ditto.
CB > B+BC - or C would lose and B would win.
A > BC+CB - or C would win when B lost.

Thus we have:
A > BC+CB > CB > B+BC - as the case for spoiler.

Note the boundary effect as additional CB votes move the results into the
spoiler area in IRV:
Less CB votes - B wins.
More CB votes - >>>>A<<<< wins!!! - not what the C backers desire!!!
--
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.

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Eric Gorr
2003-08-08 15:08:30 UTC
Permalink
Post by Dave Ketchum
Except for cases involving IRV spoilers, winners are IDENTICAL
- repeat IDENTICAL!!!
Condorcet backers emphasize the IRV spoilers because those are the
major reason for choosing Condorcet over IRV (Condorcet claims
simpler counting of votes as an additional advantage).
What do you mean by IRV Spoilers?

Candidates who run solely for the purpose of splitting the vote?

I think it has already been shown that the winners between IRV and
Condorcet are not identical in more then just these cases.

For example, in many cases, especially ones involving polarizing
issues (i.e. abortion, gun control, etc.) you can have two fairly
equal, but opposing positions with a third option that would win, if
and only if (iff) the two groups at the poles liked it better then
the other end of the pole - which is by no means guaranteed.
--
== Eric Gorr ========= http://www.ericgorr.net ========= ICQ:9293199 ===
"Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
benefit and harm." - Sun Tzu
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent... ===
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Dave Ketchum
2003-08-08 21:26:16 UTC
Permalink
Post by Eric Gorr
Post by Dave Ketchum
Except for cases involving IRV spoilers, winners are IDENTICAL -
repeat IDENTICAL!!!
Condorcet backers emphasize the IRV spoilers because those are the
major reason for choosing Condorcet over IRV (Condorcet claims simpler
counting of votes as an additional advantage).
What do you mean by IRV Spoilers?
Looked to me as the same thing as happens under Plurality:
In 2000, Gore backers griped that Nader got in their way in Florida.
Here, C backers got in the way of B getting an easy win in IRV.
Post by Eric Gorr
Candidates who run solely for the purpose of splitting the vote?
No - could happen, but:
There was general agreement that the Greens had ZERO desire to help
Bush win in 2000, and they debate right now as to how to approach 2004 -
get some visibility (desirable), but help Bush (INTOLERABLE!!!).
Possibilities include campaigning in NY (where they expect Bush to lose
even with this), and not campaigning in swing states (where a third party
could help Bush win if they tried).
I defined my example as what I see as a likely event - MOST of the
electorate is agreed as to being anti-A, while their internal contest
between B and C simply exists, rather than representing a desire to commit
party suicide.
Post by Eric Gorr
I think it has already been shown that the winners between IRV and
Condorcet are not identical in more then just these cases.
I concede below that it can be other than odd cases. As to odd cases:
Markus recently hit us with a demonstration that Condorcet can be
tortured into odd results with paper voters - and doing that particular
torture with real voters seems unbelievable:
Prospect was that A was winning, three more ballots turned up with A
in first rank, and these ballots caused D to win.
Method was to start with a particular method of resolving cycles
(nothing wrong with the method - just provides knowledge for constructing
the torture), provide a 6-member major cycle containing two 3-member minor
cycles, and define vote counts for two pairs connecting the minor cycles
such that lower ranks in the three odd ballots will change which of these
pairs is discarded first, and thus which minor cycle contains the winner.

Turns out the three voters could have succeeded via bullet voting,

BUT, for all they knew without the vote counts in front of them, could

have happened that their lower rank votes were needed to let the A cycle

contain the winner.
Post by Eric Gorr
For example, in many cases, especially ones involving polarizing issues
(i.e. abortion, gun control, etc.) you can have two fairly equal, but
opposing positions with a third option that would win, if and only if
(iff) the two groups at the poles liked it better then the other end of
the pole - which is by no means guaranteed.
OUCH - agreed that with IRV the weakest third is dead and, for the ones you
mention, that is likely to he the neutral third, while Condorcet would see
if a majority would really tolerate neutral in preference to letting their
enemies win (assuming they were unable to win for their end).
--
***@clarityconnect.com http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.

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Donald Davison
2003-08-08 10:09:53 UTC
Permalink
Re: [EM] IRV vs. plurality:

Irving is head and shoulders better than Plurality.

On a scale of one to ten, Irving is a one and Plurality is a ten.

Condorcet is a five.
Bucklin is a six.
Borda is a seven.
Approval is a eight.





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Markus Schulze
2003-08-08 22:05:37 UTC
Permalink
Dear Dave,
Here is a concrete example where the beat path method
(aka Schulze method, aka SSD, aka CSSD) violates the
Participation criterion in a very drastic manner.
04 ABCDEF
02 ABFDEC
04 AEBFCD
02 AEFBCD
02 BFACDE
02 CDBEFA
04 CDBFEA
12 DECABF
08 ECDBFA
10 FABCDE
06 FABDEC
04 FEDBCA
A:B=40:20
A:C=30:30
A:D=30:30
A:E=30:30
A:F=24:36
B:C=34:26
B:D=30:30
B:E=30:30
B:F=38:22
C:D=36:24
C:E=22:38
C:F=30:30
D:E=42:18
D:F=30:30
E:F=32:28
The winner is candidate A.
3 AEFCBD voters are added.
A:B=43:20
A:C=33:30
A:D=33:30
A:E=33:30
A:F=27:36
B:C=34:29
B:D=33:30
B:E=30:33
B:F=38:25
C:D=39:24
C:E=22:41
C:F=30:33
D:E=42:21
D:F=30:33
E:F=35:28
Now, the winner is candidate D.
Thus the 3 AEFCBD voters change the
winner from candidate A to candidate D.
Markus Schulze
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Eric Gorr
2003-08-09 12:14:46 UTC
Permalink
Post by Dave Ketchum
Post by Eric Gorr
Post by Dave Ketchum
Except for cases involving IRV spoilers, winners are
IDENTICAL - repeat IDENTICAL!!!
Condorcet backers emphasize the IRV spoilers because those are
the major reason for choosing Condorcet over IRV (Condorcet claims
simpler counting of votes as an additional advantage).
What do you mean by IRV Spoilers?
In 2000, Gore backers griped that Nader got in their way in Florida.
Here, C backers got in the way of B getting an easy win in IRV.
Just for reference, here is the example again:

40:A>B>C 40:A
35:C>B>A or 35:C>B
30:B>A>C 30:B

You have presented one interpretation, but it is not the only one,
which considering it in a more generic form.

C could simply be a third, unique option, which was least liked by
the broadest number of people.

I am certain there are several other potential spins one can come up
with to explain these (I assume them to be) sincere votes.
Post by Dave Ketchum
Post by Eric Gorr
I think it has already been shown that the winners between IRV and
Condorcet are not identical in more then just these cases.
Markus recently hit us with a demonstration that Condorcet can
be tortured into odd results with paper voters - and doing that
Prospect was that A was winning, three more ballots turned up
with A in first rank, and these ballots caused D to win.
Method was to start with a particular method of resolving
cycles (nothing wrong with the method - just provides knowledge for
constructing the torture), provide a 6-member major cycle containing
two 3-member minor cycles, and define vote counts for two pairs
connecting the minor cycles such that lower ranks in the three odd
ballots will change which of these pairs is discarded first, and
thus which minor cycle contains the winner.
Turns out the three voters could have succeeded via bullet voting,
BUT, for all they knew without the vote counts in front of them, could
have happened that their lower rank votes were needed to let the A cycle
contain the winner.
Here is that example again (in a form so it can be easily fed into my site):

4:A>B>C>D>E>F
2:A>B>F>D>E>C
4:A>E>B>F>C>D
2:A>E>F>B>C>D
2:B>F>A>C>D>E
2:C>D>B>E>F>A
4:C>D>B>F>E>A
12:D>E>C>A>B>F
8:E>C>D>B>F>A
10:F>A>B>C>D>E
6:F>A>B>D>E>C
4:F>E>D>B>C>A
3:A>E>F>C>B>D - the extra three votes

According to my site, there is a tie between A & D with or without
those extra three votes added. The reason is that when I consider the
victories that form the minor cycles, those victories get rejected
because they form cycles.

This clearly seems to be the right thing to do in this case as the
voters have provided no clear information on how they feel between A
& D.

This, unfortunately, does not appear to be an odd case.


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Dave Ketchum
2003-08-09 22:16:41 UTC
Permalink
Post by Eric Gorr
Post by Dave Ketchum
Post by Eric Gorr
Post by Dave Ketchum
Except for cases involving IRV spoilers, winners are IDENTICAL
- repeat IDENTICAL!!!
Condorcet backers emphasize the IRV spoilers because those are the
major reason for choosing Condorcet over IRV (Condorcet claims
simpler counting of votes as an additional advantage).
What do you mean by IRV Spoilers?
In 2000, Gore backers griped that Nader got in their way in Florida.
Here, C backers got in the way of B getting an easy win in IRV.
40:A>B>C 40:A
35:C>B>A or 35:C>B
30:B>A>C 30:B
First you say "here is the example" - and then you present TWO UNEQUAL
examples:
You give B a solid win.
Referenced example has B win via a cycle.
Post by Eric Gorr
You have presented one interpretation, but it is not the only one, which
considering it in a more generic form.
C could simply be a third, unique option, which was least liked by the
broadest number of people.
The referenced example is consistent with C being near to B, rather than
being unique (if unique, likely some As would take an interest in C).
Post by Eric Gorr
I am certain there are several other potential spins one can come up
with to explain these (I assume them to be) sincere votes.
Post by Dave Ketchum
Post by Eric Gorr
I think it has already been shown that the winners between IRV and
Condorcet are not identical in more then just these cases.
Markus recently hit us with a demonstration that Condorcet can be
tortured into odd results with paper voters - and doing that
Prospect was that A was winning, three more ballots turned up
with A in first rank, and these ballots caused D to win.
Method was to start with a particular method of resolving cycles
(nothing wrong with the method - just provides knowledge for
constructing the torture), provide a 6-member major cycle containing
two 3-member minor cycles, and define vote counts for two pairs
connecting the minor cycles such that lower ranks in the three odd
ballots will change which of these pairs is discarded first, and thus
which minor cycle contains the winner.
Turns out the three voters could have succeeded via bullet voting,
BUT, for all they knew without the vote counts in front of them, could
have happened that their lower rank votes were needed to let the A cycle
contain the winner.
4:A>B>C>D>E>F
2:A>B>F>D>E>C
4:A>E>B>F>C>D
2:A>E>F>B>C>D
2:B>F>A>C>D>E
2:C>D>B>E>F>A
4:C>D>B>F>E>A
12:D>E>C>A>B>F
8:E>C>D>B>F>A
10:F>A>B>C>D>E
6:F>A>B>D>E>C
4:F>E>D>B>C>A
3:A>E>F>C>B>D - the extra three votes
According to my site, there is a tie between A & D with or without those
extra three votes added. The reason is that when I consider the
victories that form the minor cycles, those victories get rejected
because they form cycles.
The example was presented by Markus Schulze, designed to give the results
I described, when counting via BEAT PATH method. Clearly you must have
used a different method to get your different results.

I do not like declaring a tie, for we prefer declaring a winner without
tossing a coin when at all possible.

Not clear to me whether an example can be constructed to make beat path
look ugly - such ss making D MUCH preferred over A yet making A win via
order of discarding pairs.
Post by Eric Gorr
This clearly seems to be the right thing to do in this case as the
voters have provided no clear information on how they feel between A & D.
This, unfortunately, does not appear to be an odd case.
Are you saying that six candidates tangled in cycles within a cycle is not
odd - could be common in the books that discuss possibilities, but this
many candidates contending this evenly in real voting looks odd to me.
--
***@clarityconnect.com http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.

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Eric Gorr
2003-08-09 22:59:39 UTC
Permalink
Post by Dave Ketchum
Post by Eric Gorr
Post by Dave Ketchum
Post by Eric Gorr
Post by Dave Ketchum
Except for cases involving IRV spoilers, winners are
IDENTICAL - repeat IDENTICAL!!!
Condorcet backers emphasize the IRV spoilers because those are
the major reason for choosing Condorcet over IRV (Condorcet
claims simpler counting of votes as an additional advantage).
What do you mean by IRV Spoilers?
In 2000, Gore backers griped that Nader got in their way in Florida.
Here, C backers got in the way of B getting an easy win in IRV.
40:A>B>C 40:A
35:C>B>A or 35:C>B
30:B>A>C 30:B
First you say "here is the example" - and then you present TWO
You give B a solid win.
Referenced example has B win via a cycle.
You were talking about IRV & Spoilers here and we were discussing
these equivalent examples which, under IRV, would give the win to A
even though B should win.

I gave the one on the left because you declared the one on the right
to be unrealistic because it was unlikely the A & B backers would not
have second and/or third place choices. I was pointing the same flaw
under IRV can be shown even if the A & B backers provided second and
third place choices.
Post by Dave Ketchum
Post by Eric Gorr
You have presented one interpretation, but it is not the only one,
which considering it in a more generic form.
C could simply be a third, unique option, which was least liked by
the broadest number of people.
The referenced example is consistent with C being near to B, rather
than being unique (if unique, likely some As would take an interest
in C).
In the example above?

C is not near to B. If this were true, the B backers would have voted
C as their second place choice...they didn't. So, something else must
be going on. But, the various spins one can put on this are not
things I find particularity relevant.

It was only the C backers which seemed to like B better then A.
Post by Dave Ketchum
Post by Eric Gorr
Post by Dave Ketchum
Post by Eric Gorr
I think it has already been shown that the winners between IRV
and Condorcet are not identical in more then just these cases.
Markus recently hit us with a demonstration that Condorcet
can be tortured into odd results with paper voters - and doing
Prospect was that A was winning, three more ballots turned up
with A in first rank, and these ballots caused D to win.
Method was to start with a particular method of resolving
cycles (nothing wrong with the method - just provides knowledge
for constructing the torture), provide a 6-member major cycle
containing two 3-member minor cycles, and define vote counts for
two pairs connecting the minor cycles such that lower ranks in the
three odd ballots will change which of these pairs is discarded
first, and thus which minor cycle contains the winner.
Turns out the three voters could have succeeded via bullet voting,
BUT, for all they knew without the vote counts in front of them, could
have happened that their lower rank votes were needed to let the A cycle
contain the winner.
4:A>B>C>D>E>F
2:A>B>F>D>E>C
4:A>E>B>F>C>D
2:A>E>F>B>C>D
2:B>F>A>C>D>E
2:C>D>B>E>F>A
4:C>D>B>F>E>A
12:D>E>C>A>B>F
8:E>C>D>B>F>A
10:F>A>B>C>D>E
6:F>A>B>D>E>C
4:F>E>D>B>C>A
3:A>E>F>C>B>D - the extra three votes
According to my site, there is a tie between A & D with or without
those extra three votes added. The reason is that when I consider
the victories that form the minor cycles, those victories get
rejected because they form cycles.
The example was presented by Markus Schulze, designed to give the
results I described, when counting via BEAT PATH method. Clearly
you must have used a different method to get your different results.
Yes, as I clearly stated, I was using my site and obviously not using
either Beatpath or Basic Condorcet - that left only one option.
Post by Dave Ketchum
I do not like declaring a tie, for we prefer declaring a winner
without tossing a coin when at all possible.
Of course, but this example clearly shows the flaw in the Beatpath
Winner method.
However, in a better RP method, the flaw disappears and a tie is declared.

However, ties can and do happen. How they are resolved is something I
would like to keep out of the scope of the actual vote count method.
Post by Dave Ketchum
Post by Eric Gorr
This clearly seems to be the right thing to do in this case as the
voters have provided no clear information on how they feel between A & D.
This, unfortunately, does not appear to be an odd case.
Are you saying that six candidates tangled in cycles within a cycle
is not odd - could be common in the books that discuss
possibilities, but this many candidates contending this evenly in
real voting looks odd to me.
No, I am saying that it is not odd because there is an unambiguous
result using Ranked Pairs from my site...a tie.

It is an odd case under Beatpath because clearly finding those three
extra votes obviously should not cause D to win, which they do.
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benefit and harm." - Sun Tzu
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Markus Schulze
2003-08-09 15:00:26 UTC
Permalink
Dear Eric,
Post by Eric Gorr
4:A>B>C>D>E>F
2:A>B>F>D>E>C
4:A>E>B>F>C>D
2:A>E>F>B>C>D
2:B>F>A>C>D>E
2:C>D>B>E>F>A
4:C>D>B>F>E>A
12:D>E>C>A>B>F
8:E>C>D>B>F>A
10:F>A>B>C>D>E
6:F>A>B>D>E>C
4:F>E>D>B>C>A
3:A>E>F>C>B>D - the extra three votes
According to my site, there is a tie between A & D with or without
those extra three votes added. The reason is that when I consider the
victories that form the minor cycles, those victories get rejected
because they form cycles.
This clearly seems to be the right thing to do in this case as the
voters have provided no clear information on how they feel between A
& D.
Which election method did you use so that you got a tie between A and D?

Markus Schulze
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Eric Gorr
2003-08-09 15:09:52 UTC
Permalink
Post by James Green-Armytage
Dear Eric,
Post by Eric Gorr
4:A>B>C>D>E>F
2:A>B>F>D>E>C
4:A>E>B>F>C>D
2:A>E>F>B>C>D
2:B>F>A>C>D>E
2:C>D>B>E>F>A
4:C>D>B>F>E>A
12:D>E>C>A>B>F
8:E>C>D>B>F>A
10:F>A>B>C>D>E
6:F>A>B>D>E>C
4:F>E>D>B>C>A
3:A>E>F>C>B>D - the extra three votes
According to my site, there is a tie between A & D with or without
those extra three votes added. The reason is that when I consider the
victories that form the minor cycles, those victories get rejected
because they form cycles.
This clearly seems to be the right thing to do in this case as the
voters have provided no clear information on how they feel between A
& D.
Which election method did you use so that you got a tie between A and D?
http://www.ericgorr.net/condorcet

This is what Mike O. was calling Ranked Pairs Condorcet (Deterministic #1).

I verified that we were computing the same matrix and then worked out
the results by hand as well.
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Alex Small
2003-08-09 23:19:17 UTC
Permalink
Post by Dave Ketchum
Except for cases involving IRV spoilers, winners are
IDENTICAL - repeat IDENTICAL!!!
So, Dave seemed to be asserting that it will be very rare that IRV and
Condorcet give different results in real elections.

How about this


35 A>B>C
36 C>B>A
16 B>C>A
13 B>A>C

B is the Condorcet winner. C is the IRV winner. This is a simple case of
Left, Right, and Center, with Center having the fewest first-place votes.
If Left and Right can moderate their stances without losing credibility
they can always make sure that Center has the fewest first-place votes.

So it would seem pretty realistic to have plenty of cases where IRV and
Condorcet will give different results. If Left and Right just become more
moderate they can win over voters who were undecided between Left and
Center or Right and Center. (OK, voters sufficiently close to Center will
still list Center as their favorite, but the point is that Left and Right
can at least poach a good number of voters.

Anyway, whatever one might think of IRV and Condorcet, I have to question
the assertion that IRV and Condorcet will rarely give different results.
I just gave a very plausible example corresponding to a standard
left-right situation.



Alex


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Markus Schulze
2003-08-11 21:50:37 UTC
Permalink
Dear Eric,
Post by Dave Ketchum
The example was presented by Markus Schulze, designed to
give the results I described, when counting via BEAT PATH
method. Clearly you must have used a different method to
get your different results. I do not like declaring a tie,
for we prefer declaring a winner without tossing a coin
when at all possible.
Yes, as I clearly stated, I was using my site and obviously
not using either Beatpath or Basic Condorcet - that left
only one option. This example clearly shows the flaw in the
Beatpath Winner method. However, in a better RP method, the
flaw disappears and a tie is declared.
Here is a concrete example where Tideman's ranked pairs method
violates the Participation criterion in a very drastic manner.

Situation 1:

03 ACBED
12 ACEBD
07 BADCE
02 CEBDA
03 DABCE
09 DCBEA
01 DEBAC
05 EACBD
10 EBDAC
01 ECBDA
03 EDCAB
04 EDCBA

A:B=26:34
A:C=41:19
A:D=27:33
A:E=25:35
B:C=21:39
B:D=40:20
B:E=22:38
C:D=23:37
C:E=36:24
D:E=20:40

The ranked pairs winner is A.

Situation 2:

3 ADBCE voters are added.

A:B=29:34
A:C=44:19
A:D=30:33
A:E=28:35
B:C=24:39
B:D=40:23
B:E=25:38
C:D=23:40
C:E=39:24
D:E=23:40

Now, the ranked pairs winner is E.

Markus Schulze
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Eric Gorr
2003-08-12 12:23:00 UTC
Permalink
Post by Markus Schulze
Here is a concrete example where Tideman's ranked pairs method
violates the Participation criterion in a very drastic manner.
(In a form for my site)

03:A>C>B>E>D
12:A>C>E>B>D
07:B>A>D>C>E
02:C>E>B>D>A
03:D>A>B>C>E
09:D>C>B>E>A
01:D>E>B>A>C
05:E>A>C>B>D
10:E>B>D>A>C
01:E>C>B>D>A
03:E>D>C>A>B
04:E>D>C>B>A
03:A>D>B>C>E - the extra votes - call this line 'L'

If L was <= 2, A still wins
If L is 3 or 4, E wins
If L is 5, 6 or 7, B wins
If L is 8 or 9 there is a tie between A & B
If L is >= 10, A wins

But, why should it surprise anyone that discovered votes could change
the winner?
It seems to me that in every election system this would be true.

What seems clear, based on votes, is that the voting population is
quite confused on who should win.

In any of these cases, once all of the sincere votes were tallied,
did someone win who, unambiguously, should not have won? This answer
would appear to be no, whereas, in the case of IRV, the answer is
often yes.



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Markus Schulze
2003-08-12 13:13:42 UTC
Permalink
Dear Eric,
Post by Markus Schulze
Here is a concrete example where Tideman's ranked pairs method
violates the Participation criterion in a very drastic manner.
But, why should it surprise anyone that discovered votes could
change the winner? It seems to me that in every election system
this would be true.
But when you don't see any problems with that example showing that
Tideman's ranked pairs method violates the Participation criterion
in a very drastic manner, then why do you see problems with that
example showing that my beat path method violates the Participation
Post by Markus Schulze
Of course, but this example clearly shows the flaw in the
Beatpath Winner method. However, in a better RP method, the flaw
disappears.
(...)
It is an odd case under Beatpath because clearly finding those
three extra votes obviously should not cause D to win, which
they do.
Markus Schulze
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Eric Gorr
2003-08-12 13:23:18 UTC
Permalink
Post by James Green-Armytage
Dear Eric,
Post by Markus Schulze
Here is a concrete example where Tideman's ranked pairs method
violates the Participation criterion in a very drastic manner.
But, why should it surprise anyone that discovered votes could
change the winner? It seems to me that in every election system
this would be true.
But when you don't see any problems with that example showing that
Tideman's ranked pairs method violates the Participation criterion
in a very drastic manner, then why do you see problems with that
example showing that my beat path method violates the Participation
No longer believe that to be true having had more opportunity to
think things through.

The Participation Criterion seems useless.

You should never force everyone who can vote to vote nor decide that
the only valid election is only that in which everyone has voted and
all votes were properly counted.

This is asking for a level of perfection that is impossible to reach.

Of course, I am still open to having my mind changed again.

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Rob Speer
2003-08-12 20:07:42 UTC
Permalink
Post by Eric Gorr
The Participation Criterion seems useless.
It seems to me like a generalization of monotonicity. It seems difficult
to satisfy, but not useless.

Just because your favorite method fails a criterion doesn't mean it's
useless. You sound like Donald Saari, in the chapter of "Chaotic
Elections" where he explains why the Condorcet criterion is useless
because it disagrees with his lovely mathematical structures that he
designed for the Borda Count. Or like every dissertation on voting
theory with a chapter that attempts to discredit Arrow's Theorem.

Ranked Pairs is my favorite method, too, but if there were something
like Ranked Pairs that satisfied Participation, I'd prefer that.
Post by Eric Gorr
You should never force everyone who can vote to vote nor decide that
the only valid election is only that in which everyone has voted and
all votes were properly counted.
Where does "forcing people to vote" enter into it? Wouldn't it be good
if voters knew that voting couldn't make the result worse from their
point of view?
Post by Eric Gorr
This is asking for a level of perfection that is impossible to reach.
Do you have an Impossibility Theorem to back that up?
--
Rob Speer

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Eric Gorr
2003-08-12 20:57:52 UTC
Permalink
Post by Rob Speer
Post by Eric Gorr
The Participation Criterion seems useless.
It seems to me like a generalization of monotonicity.
Yes...and I am rethinking my stance on monotonicity as well.
Post by Rob Speer
It seems difficult to satisfy, but not useless.
Again, I believe it is.

Any decision can only be based on the information at hand (this
includes intuition, etc.), knowing full well that should some
previously unknown information come to light, the decision could very
well change.

Arguing that the decision should never have the potential to change
based on different information seems wrong.

What I am beginning to move towards now is something along the lines of...

based on the information at hand, will an election method will
select an obviously wrong winner, like IRV will in this case:

40 A
35 C > B
30 B

and other cases like it.

It would also make a huge difference on how easy it would be to
manipulate a method via insincere votes, adding clones and perhaps
others things not coming to mind at the moment.
Post by Rob Speer
Wouldn't it be good if voters knew that voting couldn't make the
result worse from their point of view?
Well, what matters is what the group as a whole thinks...and that
decision is based upon all of the combined information to which an
individual voter can contribute.

Adding those three votes resulted in a different group decision.

Furthermore, it is possible that for every election method an
individual voter can make the result worse from their point of view.
For Approval, it would be not selecting the cutoff at the right spot.
We've already seen cases for IRV. I would imagine modifying the
preferences of the last three voters, A could be made to win...but I
haven't played with that.



So, convince me I wrong.

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Markus Schulze
2003-08-12 20:37:46 UTC
Permalink
Dear Rob,
Post by Rob Speer
Do you have an Impossibility Theorem to back that up?
Do you mean something like Herve Moulin's proof that the
Condorcet criterion and the participation criterion are
incompatible? (Herve Moulin, "Condorcet's Principle Implies
the No Show Paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 45,
p. 53-64, 1988)

Markus Schulze
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Markus Schulze
2003-08-13 08:33:08 UTC
Permalink
Dear Eric,
Post by Eric Gorr
Furthermore, it is possible that for every election method an
individual voter can make the result worse from their point of view.
For Approval, it would be not selecting the cutoff at the right spot.
When Approval Voting is being used, then it is not possible that a
voter makes the result worse from his point of view.

The participation criterion is also met e.g. by FPP and Borda.

Markus Schulze
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Eric Gorr
2003-08-13 12:51:57 UTC
Permalink
Post by James Green-Armytage
Dear Eric,
Post by Eric Gorr
Furthermore, it is possible that for every election method an
individual voter can make the result worse from their point of view.
For Approval, it would be not selecting the cutoff at the right spot.
When Approval Voting is being used, then it is not possible that a
voter makes the result worse from his point of view.
If a voter sets the cutoff in the wrong spot and approves and option
they really did not want to see win, but then causes that option to
win, they have made the result worse from their point of view.
--
== Eric Gorr ========= http://www.ericgorr.net ========= ICQ:9293199 ===
"Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
benefit and harm." - Sun Tzu
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent... ===
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James Green-Armytage
2003-08-13 14:47:50 UTC
Permalink
Post by Eric Gorr
If a voter sets the cutoff in the wrong spot and approves and option
they really did not want to see win, but then causes that option to
win, they have made the result worse from their point of view.
I don't think so, assuming that they will also be approving all of the
candidates whom they like better than that candidate. So the addition of
their ballot won't help the less-liked candidate beat any of the
more-liked candidates -- it will be neutral in that regard. Thus it will
make the outcome neither better nor worse from their point of view.

James

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Eric Gorr
2003-08-13 14:53:04 UTC
Permalink
Post by James Green-Armytage
Post by Eric Gorr
If a voter sets the cutoff in the wrong spot and approves and option
they really did not want to see win, but then causes that option to
win, they have made the result worse from their point of view.
I don't think so, assuming that they will also be approving all of the
candidates whom they like better than that candidate. So the addition of
their ballot won't help the less-liked candidate beat any of the
more-liked candidates -- it will be neutral in that regard. Thus it will
make the outcome neither better nor worse from their point of view.
Who says it was less-liked by the majority of the population?

We are talking about only a few voters or even just a single voters
point of view.
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== Eric Gorr ========= http://www.ericgorr.net ========= ICQ:9293199 ===
"Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
benefit and harm." - Sun Tzu
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent... ===
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James Green-Armytage
2003-08-13 15:41:13 UTC
Permalink
03 AB
01 C
Now, either A or B is going to win.
However, there is one last ballot to count. The person casting this
ballot would greatly prefer that A wins, but sets the cutoff to
include B.
A & B still tie.
Tie is resolved in B's favor.
That voter ended up with a worse result from their point of view by
participating and setting the cutoff in the wrong place.
Eric, I don't understand. If the person doesn't vote, then there is a tie
between A and B. If the person does vote, there is still a tie between A
and B. I don't understand how the person's vote made the result any worse
from their point of view.

Here is a definition of the participation criterion (from Markus, I think)
that I dredged up from an earlier posting:

"The participation criterion says that the participation in the election
by a same-voting group of voters should never worsen (due to the opinion
of this group) the result of the elections"

So, if you *delete* the ballots cast by those voters altogether, it
changes the outcome to something they prefer. This is the test of the
participation criterion; if this can happen given rational votes, then the
method fails the criterion.

The criterion does not deal with this: If you *change* the ballots cast by
those voters, it changes the outcome to something they prefer. This is not
a statement of the participation criterion; it is another issue altogether.

James

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Eric Gorr
2003-08-13 17:02:44 UTC
Permalink
Post by James Green-Armytage
03 AB
01 C
Now, either A or B is going to win.
However, there is one last ballot to count. The person casting this
ballot would greatly prefer that A wins, but sets the cutoff to
include B.
A & B still tie.
Tie is resolved in B's favor.
That voter ended up with a worse result from their point of view by
participating and setting the cutoff in the wrong place.
Eric, I don't understand. If the person doesn't vote, then there is a tie
between A and B. If the person does vote, there is still a tie between A
and B. I don't understand how the person's vote made the result any worse
from their point of view.
They wanted to give a clear win to A.
They instead allowed B to win by setting the cutoff in the wrong spot.
Post by James Green-Armytage
"The participation criterion says that the participation in the election
by a same-voting group of voters should never worsen (due to the opinion
of this group) the result of the elections"
Right.

The voter participated and got a worse result because the cutoff was
in the wrong spot.
Post by James Green-Armytage
So, if you *delete* the ballots cast by those voters altogether, it
changes the outcome to something they prefer. This is the test of the
participation criterion; if this can happen given rational votes, then the
method fails the criterion.
If you delete the ballot and then determine the winner, A could
win...which is what they prefer.

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James Green-Armytage
2003-08-13 17:42:02 UTC
Permalink
Post by Eric Gorr
Post by James Green-Armytage
"The participation criterion says that the participation in the election
by a same-voting group of voters should never worsen (due to the opinion
of this group) the result of the elections"
Right.
The voter participated and got a worse result because the cutoff was
in the wrong spot.
A worse result than if they had voted differently, but not a worse result
than if they had not participated at all.
Post by Eric Gorr
Post by James Green-Armytage
So, if you *delete* the ballots cast by those voters altogether, it
changes the outcome to something they prefer. This is the test of the
participation criterion; if this can happen given rational votes, then
the
Post by James Green-Armytage
method fails the criterion.
If you delete the ballot and then determine the winner, A could
win...which is what they prefer.
A's chances of winning are not any better without the ballot than with it.
The voter gets no advantage from staying home.

You are making us repeat ourselves.

Approval passes the criterion. That doesn't necessarily mean that Approval
is a marvelous voting method, as plurality passes it too, etc. But you
don't have the option of redefining the criterion, it is what it is,
whether you think it is valuable or not.

James

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Dave Ketchum
2003-08-13 15:31:02 UTC
Permalink
Post by Eric Gorr
Post by James Green-Armytage
Dear Eric,
Post by Eric Gorr
Furthermore, it is possible that for every election method an
individual voter can make the result worse from their point of view.
For Approval, it would be not selecting the cutoff at the right spot.
When Approval Voting is being used, then it is not possible that a
voter makes the result worse from his point of view.
If a voter sets the cutoff in the wrong spot and approves and option
they really did not want to see win, but then causes that option to win,
they have made the result worse from their point of view.
The other side of that coin is setting the cutoff too high, above a
mediocre candidate, thus causing the mediocre candidate to lose to
someone this voter considers to be a true reject.
--
***@clarityconnect.com http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.

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James Green-Armytage
2003-08-13 15:44:54 UTC
Permalink
Post by Dave Ketchum
The other side of that coin is setting the cutoff too high, above a
mediocre candidate, thus causing the mediocre candidate to lose to
someone this voter considers to be a true reject.
Again, this is not an issue of the participation criterion. Deleting that
voters ballot does not help the outcome from his point of view, although
changing it might.

James

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Dave Ketchum
2003-08-14 17:48:45 UTC
Permalink
Post by Dave Ketchum
Post by Eric Gorr
Post by James Green-Armytage
Dear Eric,
Post by Eric Gorr
Furthermore, it is possible that for every election method an
individual voter can make the result worse from their point of view.
For Approval, it would be not selecting the cutoff at the right spot.
When Approval Voting is being used, then it is not possible that a
voter makes the result worse from his point of view.
If a voter sets the cutoff in the wrong spot and approves and option
they really did not want to see win, but then causes that option to
win, they have made the result worse from their point of view.
The other side of that coin is setting the cutoff too high, above a
mediocre candidate, thus causing the mediocre candidate to lose to
someone this voter considers to be a true reject.
This inspired a LOT of static.


The static refers to a previous discussion about participation, which Eric
presumably was familiar with.

I was responding ONLY to the post I was reading. For that, after Eric
made his second comment about cutoff, mine was simply consistent in noting
that an Approval voter can have set the cutoff too high, just as well as
too low - in both cases the topic I see is whether the voter, after the
votes get counted, could wish to have made a different decision as to cutoff.
--
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Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.

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Stephane Rouillon
2003-08-14 19:55:09 UTC
Permalink
Please someone,

just create a cut-off criteria that approval fails so everybody
can agree approval fails that criteria and passes the so-called
"participation" criteria. So we can move to something else...

You are all right, just define different criterias with different
terminology even if the name of other criterias do not fit
your own common sense.

Steph
Post by Dave Ketchum
Post by Dave Ketchum
Post by Eric Gorr
Post by James Green-Armytage
Dear Eric,
Post by Eric Gorr
Furthermore, it is possible that for every election method an
individual voter can make the result worse from their point of view.
For Approval, it would be not selecting the cutoff at the right spot.
When Approval Voting is being used, then it is not possible that a
voter makes the result worse from his point of view.
If a voter sets the cutoff in the wrong spot and approves and option
they really did not want to see win, but then causes that option to
win, they have made the result worse from their point of view.
The other side of that coin is setting the cutoff too high, above a
mediocre candidate, thus causing the mediocre candidate to lose to
someone this voter considers to be a true reject.
This inspired a LOT of static.
The static refers to a previous discussion about participation, which Eric
presumably was familiar with.
I was responding ONLY to the post I was reading. For that, after Eric
made his second comment about cutoff, mine was simply consistent in noting
that an Approval voter can have set the cutoff too high, just as well as
too low - in both cases the topic I see is whether the voter, after the
votes get counted, could wish to have made a different decision as to cutoff.
--
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
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Markus Schulze
2003-08-13 15:22:04 UTC
Permalink
Dear Eric,
Post by Eric Gorr
Post by James Green-Armytage
If a voter sets the cutoff in the wrong spot and approves an option
they really did not want to see win, but then causes that option to
win, they have made the result worse from their point of view.
I don't think so, assuming that they will also be approving all of the
candidates whom they like better than that candidate. So the addition
of their ballot won't help the less-liked candidate beat any of the
more-liked candidates -- it will be neutral in that regard. Thus it
will make the outcome neither better nor worse from their point of view.
Who says it was less-liked by the majority of the population?
We are talking about only a few voters or even just a single voters
point of view.
Suppose that the original winner of Approval Voting is candidate A
who has got N_old(A) approvals. Suppose that the additional voter
approves candidate B who has originally got N_old(B) approvals. In so far
as candidate A is the original winner, it must be N_old(A) >= N_old(B).

If the additional voter prefers the original winner to candidate B
then this voter will also approve the original winner, so that
N_new(A) = N_old(A) + 1 and N_new(B) = N_old(B) + 1. Therefore,
N_new(A) >= N_new(B) so that candidate A is still the winner of
Approval Voting.

Markus Schulze
----
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Markus Schulze
2003-08-13 15:42:37 UTC
Permalink
Dear Dave,
Post by Dave Ketchum
The other side of that coin is setting the cutoff too high, above
a mediocre candidate, thus causing the mediocre candidate to lose
to someone this voter considers to be a true reject.
When Approval Voting is being used, then it is not possible that
an additional voter changes the winner from a candidate this voter
approves to a candidate this voter doesn't approve. Therefore,
independently of whether the cutoff is too low or too high
this voter never makes the result worse from his point of view.

Markus Schulze
----
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
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