Discussion:
[EM] Voting-System Choice for Polls (Just one more thing I want to say)
Michael Ossipoff
2016-12-18 06:05:35 UTC
Permalink
Before quitting EM & retiring from voting-systems, there's one more thing
I'd like to say:

What's the best voting-system for polls?

Though FBC is important for official political elections, I don't think it
serves a purpose in polls, where the purpose is to get sincere rankings,
and hope that people vote sincere rankings. In polls, the compulsion to
favorite-bury is much less likely.

As I've said, I haven't noticed any sign (top-cycles for 1st place) of
strategy in polls.

I suggest that, for sincere electorates, MAM is the ideal best. That means
it's best for polls at the Condorcet Internet Voting Service, where there's
been no sign of strategy.

But what if you're doing a poll among people who are highly involved in the
subject that you're polling about, and have strong committment to some
alternatives? Like, for example, suppose you're pollng at EM about
voting-systems?

Maybe some members of the electorate will resort to strategy. Especially if
the electorate are a voting-system mailing-lislt.

So you can't really be sure that there'll be no chicken-dilemma defection.

So maybe, instead of MAM, Smith//MMPO should be used.

It is automatically resistant to chicken-dilemma defection.

But, for burial, it isn't as good as MAM. With MAM, a candidate that you, &
sufficiently-many others, don't rank can't beat the CWs by burial.

...but it can in MMPO, though there's a lot of uncertainty & risk in trying
burial in MMPO.

Maybe Smith//MMPO's reliable automatic chicken-dilemma protection is more
important, because defection is easier & less drastic a strategy than
burial.

But maybe MAM's better burial protection is more important, because burial
temptation & opportunity is a lot more common than a chicken-dilemma
situation.

My suggestion: Use both.

Do the count by Smith//MMPO, & by MAM. Of the winners by those 2 methods,
the final winner is the one that pairwise-beats the other.

That's a solid good solution, because:

In the chicken-dilemma example, and also in a burial example, the intended
victim of the offensive strategy pairbeats the perps' candidate.

So, declaring, as winner, the one of those 2 winners that pairbeats the
other is definitely the best solution, if MAM & Smith//MMPO are the best
choices, each of which offers better protection in different ways.

Of course, it's been pointed out that methods that elect the pair-winner,
among the winners by 2 different methods, tend to fail FBC.

But FBC isn't needed in polls, where you want sincere ranking, not
equal-top-ranking.

Michael Ossipoff
Juho Laatu
2016-12-18 11:09:09 UTC
Permalink
Post by Michael Ossipoff
What's the best voting-system for polls?
Mostly exactly the same as for elections. Polls may however often be less competitive than elections. (Although some elections can be less competitive than some polls.) This means that you could emphasize performance with sincere votes more, and put less weight on performance against strategic voters.
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Though FBC is important for official political elections
No, FBC is not important. It is important not to be vulnerable to "betrayal strategies", but that doesn't necessarily mean FBC compliance. :-)
Post by Michael Ossipoff
, I don't think it serves a purpose in polls, where the purpose is to get sincere rankings, and hope that people vote sincere rankings. In polls, the compulsion to favorite-bury is much less likely.
Often so.
Post by Michael Ossipoff
As I've said, I haven't noticed any sign (top-cycles for 1st place) of strategy in polls.
Has somebody sometimes noticed a strategically generated top-cycle or any other cycle in any elections or polls?
Post by Michael Ossipoff
I suggest that, for sincere electorates, MAM is the ideal best. That means it's best for polls at the Condorcet Internet Voting Service, where there's been no sign of strategy.
When strategic intentions are gone, or low enough, one should focus on which candidate is best according to the needs of the society. I have no good idea on what MAM tries to achieve (= what kind of winner to elect) with sincere votes. In some polls Range could be the best (if you want the winner to have high average support), or maybe Approval (= elect the most approved candidate) or some Condorcet (= elect the one who is preferred over the others) method.
Post by Michael Ossipoff
But what if you're doing a poll among people who are highly involved in the subject that you're polling about, and have strong committment to some alternatives? Like, for example, suppose you're pollng at EM about voting-systems?
I guess you are talking about competitive polls here. I.e. EM members are expected not only to have strong opinions on the alternatives but also strong intentions to make their favourite win (by voting strategically).
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Maybe some members of the electorate will resort to strategy. Especially if the electorate are a voting-system mailing-lislt.
Yes, sounds very competitive.
Post by Michael Ossipoff
So you can't really be sure that there'll be no chicken-dilemma defection.
Among this group of people, I'm sure you couldn't be sure of anything :-) , and you should protect yourself against all possible strategies. Or at least against those strategies that EM people are likely to master. That is probably a smaller set than the largest set of all theoretically possible strategies. :-)
Post by Michael Ossipoff
So maybe, instead of MAM, Smith//MMPO should be used.
Ok, now you are talking about highly competitive polls. Why did you introduce Smith set here? Is that to safeguard against strategies? I'm not knowledgeable enough to tell what kind of strategic threats Smith set would eliminate. Maybe you introduced it to have good performance with sincere votes.

This is a sidetrack, but I must note that I'm not a believer in Smith set. My opinion is that it tries to force linearity to group opinions. You can expect that (linear opinions) from individual voters, but in groups there's no need to assume that all the Smith set members would be better than the other candidates (with sincere votes). You can as well think than losses to other candidates are a bad thing, irrespective of whether they occur in cycles or not. Losses within a cycle could be considered worse than losses outside of that cycle.
Post by Michael Ossipoff
It is automatically resistant to chicken-dilemma defection.
But, for burial, it isn't as good as MAM. With MAM, a candidate that you, & sufficiently-many others, don't rank can't beat the CWs by burial.
...but it can in MMPO, though there's a lot of uncertainty & risk in trying burial in MMPO.
Maybe Smith//MMPO's reliable automatic chicken-dilemma protection is more important, because defection is easier & less drastic a strategy than burial.
But maybe MAM's better burial protection is more important, because burial temptation & opportunity is a lot more common than a chicken-dilemma situation.
My suggestion: Use both.
Do the count by Smith//MMPO, & by MAM. Of the winners by those 2 methods, the final winner is the one that pairwise-beats the other.
In the chicken-dilemma example, and also in a burial example, the intended victim of the offensive strategy pairbeats the perps' candidate.
So, declaring, as winner, the one of those 2 winners that pairbeats the other is definitely the best solution, if MAM & Smith//MMPO are the best choices, each of which offers better protection in different ways.
Of course, it's been pointed out that methods that elect the pair-winner, among the winners by 2 different methods, tend to fail FBC.
But FBC isn't needed in polls, where you want sincere ranking, not equal-top-ranking.
I'm not able to take position on how good that combination would be against strategies that might emerge among the EM list voters. The discussed environment is assumed to be very competitive, and I guess there's no difference any more on whether we had a poll or an election. Both would be competitive, and similar methods would be needed to make the system work.

Or actually I do believe that often we do not really need extreme defensive measures, and putting more emphasis on electing the best winner with sincere votes is possible. I mean for example that I have not seen any good general guidance (to regular voters with no exact knowledge on how other voters are going to vote) on how to vote strategically in some very basic Condorcet elections. My best guess is that even if EM list would vote on which single winner election method is the best, using Condorcet, I would not expect people to identify any good strategy that they could use to (effectively, intentionally) manipulate the results and change the winner from the sincere winner to some alternative that they like better.

For these reasons I tend to favour methods that are good with sincere votes, and that are designed to protect us only against some very basic and very obvious strategic voting opportunities. I'm somewhere at the level of "in most cases Condorcet is enough".

BR, Juho
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Michael Ossipoff
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Juho Laatu
2016-12-20 02:50:48 UTC
Permalink
We have no reason to worry about offensive strategy in CIVS polls.
And so MAM is the best choice for CIVS polls. MAM is one of the rank-counts that CIVS supports.
Ok, MAM is a quite decent method. If strategic voting is minimal, I guess you pick the method that gives best results with sincere votes. I'm still lacking good understanding of why exactly MAM would produce best winners with sincere votes.
When offensive strategy is used against the CWs, s/he'll be in the voted Smith-set. That's a good reason to elect from the voted Smith-set, so that the CWs can maybe be rescued.
In theory that might save the CWs in some very rare cases.
I can't say why it's important to guarantee that the winner is in the voted Smith-set, other than that it confers compliance with various criteria, including Mutual-Majority.
That's a good answer since there are situations where one can justify electing from a Smith set that consists of very similar minded clones. The top cycle can be sincere or strategic. The same matrix can however probably be also a result of sincere votes where the Smith set candidates are not clones but a much more competitive group. In such cases it could make sense to elect outside the Smith set. One key point here is that information in the matrix is limited, and it is impossible to say if there are clones, and which preferences are strong and which ones weak.
But, because one member of the voted Smith set will be the CWs, if truncation or burial is being attempted against it (neuter gender because I'm talking about poll-alternatives) then that means that disqualifying non-members of the voted Smith-set narrows the field in a way favorable to the CWs.
It is not possible to tell if there was a CWs. The top loop can be sincere as well (or a result of various good and bad strategies). And the best sincere winner might be also outside the Smith set.
Note that electing outside the Smith set may sometimes also help us, e.g. by making strategic plans void by not electing the (possibly strongly top-looped) favourite of the strategists.
Maybe, but, by pairwise-count standards, electing from the Smith set keeps the winner among the pairwise publicly-favored candidates.
I don't understand your definition of "pairwise publicly-favored candidates". Why can't candidates outside the Smith set be such candidates? I mean situations where the leading candidate outside the Smith set could lose by one vote to all the Smith set members. Losing only marginally to many candidates could be a better result than losing a lot to fewer candidates.
Of course, in an election, when Approval elects the candidate approved, considered satisfactory by the most people, is probably more important than electing the CWs or from the sincere Smith-set.
Also pairwise comparisons can sometimes lead to situations where best candidate (based on those pairwise comparisons) is found outside the Smith set. (see the marginal loss example above)
MAM, by itself would surely, it seems to me, be the best way to find the CWs, for sincere voters.
All Condorcet methods can find the CWs with sincere votes.
I'm sure there will always be some irrational behaviour, but that might be just general noise, and would not influence the election. If some large grouping will use some irrational strategy, and as a result will make the outcome of the election worse from their point of view, maybe they will learn and will vote rationally (sincerely or strategically) in the next election.
If the CWs is in your strong bottom-set, then burial, even when it risks electing a worse member of your strong bottom-set, isn't irrational, if there's _any_ chance of successfully changing the winner to someone in your strong top-set.
If we were using Condorcet, and if the expected CWs were a Repugnocrat, I'd routinely use burial strategy, every time, in hopes of electing a progressive. That's good strategy.
Ok, if your preferences are A >>>>> B > C, and your guess is that B is a CWs, then it would be quite risk free to try to create cycles. It is however quite possible that your vote will be part of the "general noise". Some C supporters could also compromise (= top rank B) if they believe that B's victory is not certain, and some B supporters could rank A lowest if they believe that many A supporters plan to bury B. Many A supporters would not like the idea of increasing the chances of C winning the election. Many voters would vote sincerely since that's what they believe is the right thing to do. There are so many parameters and uncertainty in polls that coherent strategic voting may not be common. It may not be easy to get sufficient number of strategic voters to follow the plan.

I have been asking for generic strategic guidance for Condorcet elections. I think you are close to proposing one rule here. Maybe something like "if you strongly dislike the expected winner, bury it under all such candidates that are not much worse than it". Maybe add "if some of your favourite candidates are expected to beat those candidates". Maybe you can improve my formulation of that possible strategic advice. Maybe simulations could tell if that strategy does more good than harm, or nothing at all (assuming some nice distribution of preference strengths among voters).
One more observation on how I would approach the problem of finding a Condorcet method that is sufficiently strategy proof. I would pick first the Condorcet method that produces best possible results with sincere votes. Then I'd let EM members watch one episode of some soap opera, and then vote on who was the best actor. That would be the first poll. Then they would watch another episode, and vote again in the second poll. Then they would watch one more episode, and cast their final vote. People would be allowed to discuss about their preferences, so that similar minded people would find each others, and they could plan strategies for the final election (and why not also for the polls). People would also be encouraged to publish strategic advice to others. People could also attach information on how they voted strategically in their ballot (note, not after the election but only in the ballot when voting). This whole process would be repeated few times.
But people would then be using counterstrategy agains the declared offensive strategy, and that would make it unrealistic, because in real elections, the voters might not be as adept at counterstrategy.
The strategy would be declared only if the strategists consider that useful. If they don't publish, other voters may not be able to follow the strategy. If they publish, other voters might react to that in many ways. Just like in real elections.

Of course we are talking about a very knowledgeable and possibly also strategic voter community here. In real life elections everything would be one step milder. If some method can survive this test, real life elections could be an easier case.
Why not just, instead, work out hypothetical results out on paper, instead of using actual voting?
Yes, that works in theory. In real life I have seen too many times scenarios where the claimed vulnerabilities are based on having exact information on what the preferences will be at the election day, and ability to change the voting behaviour of all those voters (100%) that would have the strategic interest, and all other voters not changing their behaviour in any way, and not applying any other strategies. That's what I would call hypothetical and unrealistic :-). I created that testing method to reflect the uncertainties that are present in real elections. If you are disciplined enough to put all that information on paper, with all the uncertainties, that's ok too. But the normal line of discussion at EM is not disciplined enough to achieve that.
But, ever since EM started, I've always felt that poll are super useful & valuable, as the only way to find out what it's like to use the various voting-systems. You probably know that I started lots of polls at EM. They've fallen out of fashion, and I consider that regrettable, because you can't fully evaluate & compare voting-systems without actually trying them. Voting in polls, and counting polls.
So yes, I'm in favor of polls at EM. Regrettably no one else is.
Yes, polls can be very helpful. And paper work sometimes too, if disciplined enough.
I have great trust on the skills of people on this mailing list, but so far I have not seen any good strategic guidance for voters or parties in real life Condorcet elections.
Well, I mentioned, above, that I'd routinely use burial strategy when the expected CWs is in my strong bottom-set, in an official Condorcet election.
Yes. If you can, please upgrade my description above to something that you believe to be valid guidance to regular voters. (Alternatively you can give also strategic rules for parties, that may then give further guidance to their supporters).

Here's another one that may work e.g. against some minmax style Condorcet methods. "If some unwanted party/grouping has numerous equally disliked candidates, rank them in a loop in alphabetical order, starting from a random candidate".

BR, Juho
Juho Laatu
2016-12-22 12:58:48 UTC
Permalink
I wrote lengthy answers below. But it seems that we are already pretty close to consensus. My intention has been all the time to talk about ranked preferences only (and sincere votes). The only remaining obvious difference seemed to be in the question of whether the best sincere winner (according to some appropriate criteria) could be found outside the Smith set. The point is that some candidate outside the Smith set can be few votes short of being a CWs (talking about sincere votes here). And at the same time all members of the Smith set can lose with great margin to one/some of the other candidates. They are thus not even near of being CWs, if measured in strength of losses and needed changes in opinions to become a CWs. My claim thus is that a candidate that would have been a CWs, if few voters more would have voted for him, can not really be a very bad candidate. He could actually be the best candidate to elect. And all this considering only the given pairwise preferences, nothing else (no preference strengths, approvals etc.), both within the method and in any arguments on who the best winner might be. Do we agree or disagree on that?

You may well skip the rest of the mail, or read is as FYI only, if you like, since it doesn't add much to what has already been said.
Post by Juho Laatu
Ok, MAM is a quite decent method. If strategic voting is minimal, I guess you pick the method that gives best results with sincere votes. I'm still lacking good understanding of why exactly MAM would produce best winners with sincere votes.
A pairwise defeat is affirmed if it isn't the weakest defeat in a cycle whose other defeats are affirmed.
A alternative wins if it doesn't have an affirmed defeat.
[end of MAM definition]
It couldn't get any more minimal & ideal than that. MAM (unlike Beatpath, etc.) never unnecessarily disregards a pairwise defeat (by electing someone who has the defeat).
In a method based only on pairwise defeats & their strengths, the only thing that should nullify a defeat would be if that defeat is the weakest in a cycle, and if the other defeats in that cycle aren't nullified in that way.
I look at the world from a somewhat different angle here. I don't see what the relevance of beatpaths is in real life.
Beatpath, not MAM, is defined in terms of beatpaths.
But maybe you just mean that a cycle can be called a pair of beatpaths in both directions between 2 candidates.
Yes, sorry, I intended to talk about paths of pairwise losses in general, not one specific way of dealing with them.
The "relevance of cycles in real life?
A pairwise-defeat is voted public preference.
A cycle renders meaningless the defeats in the cycle. Therefore cycles have relevance.
I would say that group opinions may be cyclic. Cyclic opinions may be problematic because it is not very easy to identify the winner, but surely all pairwise defeats are meaningful, also those that are part of a cycle. A cycle can be said to be less meaningful to a society than a pairwise opinion since the needs of the society may be more directly related to questions like "is A better than B" than to questions like "is there a chain of positive preferences from A to B". A path would be directly relevant to a society e.g. if there was a plan to first elect B, then agree to change B to X, then to Y, and finally to A. But usually there is no need for such activities. Cycles can be said to be relevant, as you say, even if the society has no direct interest in them.
I mean that I can not see what difference it makes to the society if there is a chain of defeats with certain strengths, if the target is to elect the best leader or best some other alternative.
Sure, likely the Approval winner is better than the winner by a pairwise-count method.
1. It's possible for a ranking method to provide a convenient, easy & reliable means for avoiding chicken-dilemma.
2. Many people have a psychological need for rankings.
Some people think that they need to elect the CWs, which is easier with a pairwise-count rank method. Some overcompromisers or rival parties would avoid or soften their voting-errors, when voting with rankings.
3. Finding the CWs, via a poll, can be important, because the CWs is typically the best candidate that people can get?
Is there something familiar about this? Oh yes, that's it: This is the same thing that we've both been saying over and over again. But I'm not going to continue doing so.
In my previous mail I tried to emphasize that whatever I said about Smith set and also paths had nothing to do with approval or range style argumentation, and nothing to do with strategic voting. My target was to discuss who is the best winner with sincere votes, taking only pairwise preferences (in the matrix, and optionally also those of individual voters) into account (i.e. no approval considerations etc.). And the key claim was that (depending on what kind of criteria the society has) the best winner could be sometimes found outside the Smith set. This is related to the claim that the winner may be identified also by other means than "breaking cycles".
Beatpaths
....by which you mean cycles, because you presumably want to call a cycle a pair of opposite-direction beatpaths between 2 candidates.
Yes. I note that some of my comments on paths apply to non-cyclic paths too.
seem to serve the need to linearize the opinions of the group
No. Cycles are relevant if pairwise defeats are of interest. A pairwise defeat is a voted public preference.
With "linearization" I mean the activity of "breaking cycles" so that some preferences are "ignored" in order to make one of the candidates "winner without losses". The target seems to be to make group opinions look like individual voter opinions, that we can expect to be always linear. My preference is to accept the fact that group opinions may sometimes be cyclic (nothing wrong with that), and be able to identify the best winner despite of then. That process may not need any "breaking of cycles" / "linearization".
, or to "break cycles", which I think is not in the requirements list of an election or poll.
Nonsense. Defeats in a cycle aren't saying anything about public wishes. Should an election or poll reflect public wishes? :^) There are voting systems that look only at pairwise preferences. MAM is one of them. MAM, for example, has many desirable properties.
But I have no idea what your "reqirements list is (or what is the "best winner" that you keep talking about). But that's ok. It's your business. Far be it for me to tell you what your "requirements list" or "best winner" should be.
Quite possibly your requirements list and your best winner aren't gotten by pairwise-count methods. Fine. You've still got Approval, Score, and Bucklin, all good methods.
Let's talk about pairwise preferences only. If some community needs an election method, I might ask them what kind of a candidate they want to win. They might say that they want a good compromise candidate, or one that is not controversial, one that has only weak opposition, or one that voters would not like to change to numerous other candidates. I exclude opinions like "widely approved" here since we are talking about preferences only. After hearing those requirements of the society I might be able to point out which election method would do what they want it to do. I wold probably tell them what method seems to be the best with sincere votes, but I would address also possibility of strategic voting and possible need to use some other method than the one that provides best results with sincere votes.
That is more like an aesthetic preference, or a mistaken idea that group opinions should be straightened to linear opinions.
If you say so.
I agree that MAM could be seen as aesthetically beautiful, but I thus fail to see the connection to the targets of the election / poll (to find the best winner with sincere votes).
That would depend on your (often referred to but never stated) opinion about what is the target of the election or the best winner.
See above. In principle I let the society tell me what kind of winner they want, and then try to pick the best method for them (covering both sincere votes and possibility of strategic voting). We can also discuss which method is best with sincere votes. A good discussion would include a description of what makes a good candidate (or multiple alternative descriptions).
You (presumably) know what your target for the election/poll is, and what your best winner would be. By all means feel free to implement your opinions, when you choose a voting system!
Or do we all have to abide by your target and your best winner? :^)
In principle I leave it up to the society to tell what they want. But I can give some examples. The simplest to explain is minmax(margins). One definition of it says that (assuming sincere votes) it elects the candidate that needs least number of additional votes to become a CWs. That criterion can be considered to be a valid definition of "best winner" by some society. The society might think that this winner is strong and good leader since he needs only a minimal amount of additional support to make decisions (maybe to thwart the proposals of the former competitors) when in office. This is certainly not the only way to define which candidate is the ideal winner to a society, and there may be additional criteria, but this is one possible target that is easy to meet with one particular method.

(I find it more difficult to create this kind of (real life related) explanations (on who is the best winner) for methods that are based on paths and breaking cycles.)
In comparison for example the target of minmax is much clearer - elect a candidate that people will not oppose too much while he is in office, measured as strength of interest to change him to one of the competitors in opposition.
MinMax has, for years, been widely-regarded as not doing as well as MAM, in a number of ways. But if you like it better, then use it next time you do a poll, or advocate it for electing officeholders where you live.
You have a right to do those things!
Go for it!
Also approval and range are easy to explain from the "possible needs of the society" perspective.
So very true.
Post by Juho Laatu
Additionally, MAM has excellent burial-deterrence & thwarting. That's why I use MAM, in Pairwise-Winner(MAM, Smith,MMPO). ...for MAM's burial-deterrence. But MMPO, & not MAM, is chicken-dilemma defection-proof, which is why I like to combine both of their strategic advantages, in
P(MAM, Smith,MMPO), for polls with possibly offensive-strategic voters.
This is about strategic voting
Are you sure? :^)
Words like "burial" seem to refer to strategic voting scenarios, not to performance with sincere votes.
, not about which method is best with sincere votes.
I said that P(MAM, Smith,MMPO) is for electorates in which offensive strategy would be particularly likely, unless deterred or at least thwarted.
Have we established that yet?
I tried to focus on performance with sincere votes. Performance with strategies is another interesting area of discussion, but I tried to keep the discussion simple and avoid strategic considerations at this point since it seems we did not find common language on the sincere side yet, and the points I wanted to make dealt with performance with sincere votes (= who is the best winner with sincere votes).
MAM is also very good with sincere voting. MAM is a component of
P(MAM, Smith,MMPO).
Not to be counted in favour of MAM in this branch of discussion.
That MAM is good with sincere votes is to be counted in MAM's favor.
Yes. As I said, so far I have seen some elegance / aesthetics in MAM, but I'm not able to translate that to an explanation why MAM would pick the best winner for _some_ society with sincere votes.

One viewpoint to path and cycle breaking based methods is that they provide us with a complete linear order, or at least parts of such ordering, allowing us to visualize the candidates so that there is one candidate at the top, then members of the Smith set, and then the rest. Some of the preferences would be discarded and thrown aside. My point here is that this image might be easy to sell to the public, claiming that the best candidate won. But I still have difficulties explaining to myself why forcing natural cyclic group opinions to a more linear looking graph would be needed to identify the best winner. My example of sometimes finding the best winner outside the Smith set is intended to demonstrate that sometimes a linear ordering like visualization might not make sense at all.
Post by Juho Laatu
I can't say why it's important to guarantee that the winner is in the voted Smith-set, other than that it confers compliance with various criteria, including Mutual-Majority.
That's a good answer since there are situations where one can justify electing from a Smith set that consists of very similar minded clones. The top cycle can be sincere or strategic. The same matrix can however probably be also a result of sincere votes where the Smith set candidates are not clones but a much more competitive group. In such cases it could make sense to elect outside the Smith set. One key point here is that information in the matrix is limited, and it is impossible to say if there are clones, and which preferences are strong and which ones weak.
But, with pairwise-count methods, the number of people voting a preference stands-in as an indication of its importance, imperfect though that may be.
It's important to find out the CWs, because that's the best that anyone can expect to get. Truncation-proof MAM & MMPO still elect the CWs when someone truncates it. MAM's deterrence of burial, improves the likelihood of electing the CWs if there is one--& there usually is one.
Yes. I think in this discussion we focus solely on methods where CWs is considered to be the ideal winner, and preference is measured solely as pairwise comparisons, that in most methods are derived from the pairwise matrix.
That's because, as I've already said many, many times, this thread originated about polls that I conduct with the purpose of finding the CWs.
Ok, approvals are out.
And I claim that under these assumptions some methods can easily justify selecting the winner also outside the Smith set.
...because that will make the method more likely to choose the CWs when there is one? :^)
That example assumed that there is no CWs.
But, as I said, I cordially invite you to use the methods of your choice, for polls, and for your proposals for how to elect officeholders where you reside.
Post by Juho Laatu
But, because one member of the voted Smith set will be the CWs, if truncation or burial is being attempted against it (neuter gender because I'm talking about poll-alternatives) then that means that disqualifying non-members of the voted Smith-set narrows the field in a way favorable to the CWs.
It is not possible to tell if there was a CWs.
True, but if there is one, then it will win even if there's a truncation-caused cycle.
Also some other member of the Smith set might win.
No kidding?
More likely with some methods than others. Choose the manner of selecting from the Smith set accordingly.
But, primarily, do what you want.
And the CWs could be also outside of the Smith set as a result of strategic voting.
No.
Truncation or burial against the CWs will result in a top-cycle that includes the CWs.
You seem to refer to a successful burial of one candidate. Let's say there are three parties of about equal size, L, C and R. One of the C (centre) candidates is a CWs. Both L and R supporters consider other parties to be in their bottom-set, and they follow the strategy that you presented, and bury C candidates under either L or R candidates. It is quite possible that there will be a Smith set that consists of L and R candidates, and CWs is not in this set (since up to 66% of the voters may have buried it).
Post by Juho Laatu
Truncation-proofness is important, even in a sincere electorate, because truncation can be non-strategic (lazy, hurried, principled, etc.).
Here my medicine would be to educate voters to cast fuller votes (to rank at least the potential winners).
If you mean "Try to rank down to the CWs", then that's valid strategy for trying to get the best you can (if that's your goal). You could also say "Rank the best candidates.", or "Rank only your strong top-set."
My general guidance would be to rank at least all those candidates that are considered potential winners. I would not call this a strategy but just a warning against casting a weak vote that would not take position on which one of the (maybe two) strongest candidates should win.
If they truncate for non-strategic reasons, we must assume that their preferences are flat with the rest of the candidates.
No. Maybe they're in a hurry. Maybe they don't want to bother or take the time, even though they have lower preferences too.
But there's no point in assuming what you said, because your "If" is, itself, an unsupported assumption. You don't know that they truncated for nonstrategic reasons.
I wanted to say that the method must treat other truncations the same way it treats "sincere truncations".
It is not possible to tell which voters did that on purpose and which ones by mistake or laziness.
Quite.
Post by Juho Laatu
The top loop can be sincere as well (or a result of various good and bad strategies). And the best sincere winner might be also outside the Smith set.
Certainly, because it would be possible for the alternative satisfactory to the most people to be outside the Smith set. But probably it will usually be the CWs, or in the sincere Smith set if there isn't a CWs.
I wouldn't assume anything on the probability of finding the best winner within or outside the Smith set.
Suit yourself.
In all of our EM polls, Approval, Score elected Condorcet's CWv.
With sincere votes that depends on what our criteria for the best winner are (when there is no CWs). With all kind of strategic and lazy votes, the location of the best winner is even more difficult to guess (it is e.g. possible that multiple groups try to bury the CWs).
Post by Juho Laatu
Note that electing outside the Smith set may sometimes also help us, e.g. by making strategic plans void by not electing the (possibly strongly top-looped) favourite of the strategists.
Maybe, but, by pairwise-count standards, electing from the Smith set keeps the winner among the pairwise publicly-favored candidates.
I don't understand your definition of "pairwise publicly-favored candidates". Why can't candidates outside the Smith set be such candidates?
Because, pairwise is what the Smith set is about. Something outside the Smith set might be more approved than the Smith set members, but it won't be pairwise publicly preferred to them.
I claim that with some pairwise preference based criteria of best winner, the best winner could be outside of the Smith set.
Yes, evidently some pairwise preference based criteria that aren't about pairwise defeats or their strength. Fine. You have a right to value whatever standards you want to, and use whatever polling methods you want to.
I did not assume any other criteria.
In polling, my purpose is finding the CWs (there usually is one).
But you're free to have entirely different goals & purposes. Go for it!
No references to approval or range style thinking needed. The simplest example is minmax (seen as a definition of the ideal winner). See comments above.
Post by Juho Laatu
I mean situations where the leading candidate outside the Smith set could lose by one vote to all the Smith set members. Losing only marginally to many candidates could be a better result than losing a lot to fewer candidates.
Sure, that could be argued on ethical grounds. But pairwise defeats are what's important if you want to avoid an angry majority who prefer someone else to the winner.
And the CWs is important to find, in polls, because it's the best that anyone can get (unless they're a good offensive strategist, in an election or poll using a method vulnerable to that strategy).
Yes, pairwise preferences and CWs are the norm in this discussion. See above.
Post by Juho Laatu
Of course, in an election, when Approval elects the candidate approved, considered satisfactory by the most people, is probably more important than electing the CWs or from the sincere Smith-set.
Also pairwise comparisons can sometimes lead to situations where best candidate (based on those pairwise comparisons) is found outside the Smith set. (see the marginal loss example above)
Yes. looking at the strength of pairwise oppositions instead of at pairwise defeats. But the pairwise defeats have great importance in regards to finding the best that we can get.
The simplest is pairwise margins. You could elect the candidate whose worst pairwise margin is least bad, and that candidate could be outside of the Smith set.
You could do whatever you want to. whatever you think is best.
Not everyone would agree with you about the merits of margins. But don't worry about that. Do it the way that you want to.
Note that I see minmax not only as one of the methods but also as one possible definition of ideal winner with sincere votes (for some society with some set of needs).
Post by Juho Laatu
Many voters would vote sincerely since that's what they believe is the right thing to do.
Voting in way that's more likely to elect someone who won't hurt a lot of people is hardly unethical.
But a society where nobody cheats is highly ethical :-).
Offensive strategy isn't cheating. It complies fully with the voting-rules.
Ok, maybe word "cheat" should be defined that way and some other word should be used instead of it.
All that you've been saying here suggests that you'd be happier with Approval, Score, or Bucklin. As I said, they're fine methods.
Approval et. are out of scope here, as we both agree. :-)
Post by Juho Laatu
Burying someone in your strong bottom-set doesn't need good predictive information.
This sounds like you are talking about a society that has been living too long under a two-party rule
1. The Democrats & Repugnicans aren't two parties. They're one party with two right wings.
2. Parties don't rule in a democracy. The public rule, by electing whom they want to. Of course we don't have democracy. If that's what you meant, then you're quite right. But still, the Democrats & Repubnicans don't "rule". They're pseudodemocratic charade-theater. If you want to find out who rules, then search Google for "Who Rules America, by G. William Domhoff".
Better idea: Just be glad if you have legitimate democracy.
, and where things are either black or white,
You haven't a clue what you're talking about. I reside here. You don't.
Ok, maybe black and black. :-)
Progressives vs Repubugnocrats? It doesn't get any more stark "black or white" than that. But you can't be expected to know that.So maybe you shouldn't be telling me about how it really is :^)
and where people hate to give up that way of thinking
You're completely unclear regarding what "way of thinking" you're talking about. The stark difference between progressive candidates, vs Repugnocratic candidates has nothing to do with "way of thinking". It's simple plain fact. But, again, you can't be expected to know that.
I don't want to make exact claims of any specific society. I just note that people might sometimes visualize the world in a "full spectrum of positive alternatives" way too.
Maybe you need to not be explaining to me about the country in which I reside. Does it occur to you that that's more than a little pretentious, presumptuous & egotistical on your part?
I don't want to be any more specific than that it appears that there is some criticism in the air, including the two-party dominance related aspects.
, and where people therefore will use also more civilised methods like ranked methods as if there were only black and white candidates
It's ridiculous to say that ranked methods are "more civilized".
I should have said "methods that allow also more expressive votes".
As for the candidates here, the Repugnocrats are remarkably consistently uniform in regards to moral character & honesty. The distinction between the progressives & the Repugnocrats is remarkably sharp and ...well...distinct.
"...as if..." ?
It really couldn't be any more starkly "black & white" than it is.
Post by Juho Laatu
Strategy can't do any significant harm if the CWs is in your strong bottom-set.
True for any method when the sincere winner is in the bottom-set.
Quite.
But, as I've said, I doubt that the CWs would be a bottom-set candidate for the 99%.
Good news :-). That might mean that the bottom-set burial behaviour is not common (at least when there is a CWs).

BR, Juho
As I said, in Internet polls, the CWv is usually someone like Jill or Bernie, or Nader.
Now, I'd say that we've both said what we have to say on this matter. I say that, because we've been saying the same things over & over again.
Michael Ossipoff
BR, Juho
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Michael Ossipoff
2016-12-18 20:19:41 UTC
Permalink
It depends on what you mean by polls. If it's just an opinion poll to see
what the likely result will be in an election (so something that isn't in
any way binding itself), it's about more than finding a method that will
produce a winner.
Yes. This isn't a political poll at all. It's an online poll on a
non-political question, to find out what the CWs is, and which alternatives
have majority approval.
You want to be able to see the support of all the candidates, and by
having a method that's just set up for a winner (your suggestion of the
pairwise winner from two different counting methods), you're not going to
achieve what you want to achieve. For this sort of poll, you can use a
variety of different methods and publish all the results
Yes, when the result won't be implemented, then there's no reason why it's
necessary to name the count-method in advance, because the results by
various methods could be given. If there's participation in that poll, I'll
report results by MAM, Approval, & probably Pairwise-Winner (MAM,
Smith,MMPO).

Most likely there won't be strategy, and the CWs will win as CWv.

But sometimes, when there are only a few voters, other methods can be
needed for tiebreaking.

I recently did a poll on voting-systems, and MAM returned a tie between
Approval & Score.

The alternatives were:

Approval
Score
Bucklin
MDDA
MDDAsc
IRV
Benham

But I noticed that Approval did better than Score in its pairwise
comparisons.

1. Approval pairbeat more alternatives than Score did.

2. The sum of Approval's pairwise votes against the other alternatives was
greater than that of Score.

#1 means that Approval beats Score by Copeland.

#2 means that Approval beats Score by a version of Borda.

But #1 & #2 seem to compellingly indicate that Approval beats Score.

Of course there are good reasons to not announce Copeland or Borda as the
count-rule. But, when there's a tie, they point to a winner in a meaningful
way.

Somewhere else, at PoliticalForums, I'm conducting a presidential poll
between Hillary, Jill, Donald, & Gary.

I don't know the winner so far, because someone additional has just voted,
and i haven't yet updated the count.

Though PoliticalForums' Opinion-Polls forum supports Approval, with
balloting, count, & count-display fully automated (voting is by
click-bubble), I instead invited rankings.

Because I wanted people to vote, and because IRV is so popular and
relatively well-known, I designated IRV as the count-rule.

But I'll announce the winner by Approval, Benham & by
Pairwise-Winner (MAM, Smith,MMPO) too.

(I told people to rank only the candidates they approve of.)

I conducted a voting-systems poll there too, and Approval is the winner
there as well.

I'm conducting two voting-system polls: One at PoliticalForums,and one at
CIVS (Condorcet Internet Voting Service).

I emphasize that those two polls, at PoliticalForums & at CIVS, are to find
out how _the general public_ feels about voting-systems. Obviously the
people here at EM, who are not representative of the general public on that
subject, shouldn't vote in those general-public-opinion polls.

But of course feel free to check out the results.

As I said, Approval is the consistent winner, at both polls. Score is
2nd-best at CIVS. It seems to me that, at PoliticalForums, Score is tied
with Plurality. No one but me approved MDDA.

.
But if you're just talking about elections that aren't for public office,
then things are different. Some of these elections can be done online.
Yes, I've got several online polls going, on presidential candidates,
voting-systems, & nonpolitical reform questions.

In the CIVS presidential poll, with 72 votes in, Jill Stein is the CWv
(with Bernie removed from the count).

I invite people at EM to vote in the PoliticalForums presidential poll, if
they want to. Go to PoliticalForums (You can find a link to it via google),
and then go to its Opinion Polls forum. Among the polls there is my
presidential poll.

As I said, of course the voting-system polls are only for the general
public, not for people who are familiar with voting-systems.
And for those that are likely to have an involved electorate that are
likely to be knowledgeable about the system, I would suggest score voting
but with live totals published and changeable votes. So people can enter
their scores, but if the current result suggested they will need to adopt a
more strategic approach, they can change their vote accordingly. The only
other thing I would add is that the end time should probably be in some way
non-deterministic. Otherwise the live updates are likely to be less
effective. People might withhold their vote until the last minute, or have
a completely false vote that they change at the last minute. So you might
have 24 hours guaranteed (or however long is deemed appropriate), and then
it might randomly end with a half life of an hour or something (which could
be longer if the initial guaranteed time is longer).
Yes, that would be a good reliable way to find the CWs. It could be
feasible in a meeting-room, but, for most online polls, it isn't feasible.
For one thing, it's difficult enough to get people to vote once.

Rankings is usually a good way to find out the CWs, and MAM always works
fine at CIVS. But, at a forum where the people are very familiar with the
matter being voted on, and highly committed to some alternative(s), I feel
that it might be better to add Smith,MMPO's defection-proofness, via

Pairwise-Winner (MAM, Smith,MMPO)

or

Pairwise-Winner (MAM, Smith//MMPO)

Any opinions on which would be better?


Mike





------------------------------
*From:* Michael Ossipoff <***@gmail.com>
*To:* EM <election-***@lists.electorama.com>
*Sent:* Sunday, 18 December 2016, 6:05
*Subject:* [EM] Voting-System Choice for Polls (Just one more thing I want
to say)

Before quitting EM & retiring from voting-systems, there's one more thing
I'd like to say:

What's the best voting-system for polls?

Though FBC is important for official political elections, I don't think it
serves a purpose in polls, where the purpose is to get sincere rankings,
and hope that people vote sincere rankings. In polls, the compulsion to
favorite-bury is much less likely.

As I've said, I haven't noticed any sign (top-cycles for 1st place) of
strategy in polls.

I suggest that, for sincere electorates, MAM is the ideal best. That means
it's best for polls at the Condorcet Internet Voting Service, where there's
been no sign of strategy.

But what if you're doing a poll among people who are highly involved in the
subject that you're polling about, and have strong committment to some
alternatives? Like, for example, suppose you're pollng at EM about
voting-systems?

Maybe some members of the electorate will resort to strategy. Especially if
the electorate are a voting-system mailing-lislt.

So you can't really be sure that there'll be no chicken-dilemma defection.

So maybe, instead of MAM, Smith//MMPO should be used.

It is automatically resistant to chicken-dilemma defection.

But, for burial, it isn't as good as MAM. With MAM, a candidate that you, &
sufficiently-many others, don't rank can't beat the CWs by burial.

...but it can in MMPO, though there's a lot of uncertainty & risk in trying
burial in MMPO.

Maybe Smith//MMPO's reliable automatic chicken-dilemma protection is more
important, because defection is easier & less drastic a strategy than
burial.

But maybe MAM's better burial protection is more important, because burial
temptation & opportunity is a lot more common than a chicken-dilemma
situation.

My suggestion: Use both.

Do the count by Smith//MMPO, & by MAM. Of the winners by those 2 methods,
the final winner is the one that pairwise-beats the other.

That's a solid good solution, because:

In the chicken-dilemma example, and also in a burial example, the intended
victim of the offensive strategy pairbeats the perps' candidate.

So, declaring, as winner, the one of those 2 winners that pairbeats the
other is definitely the best solution, if MAM & Smith//MMPO are the best
choices, each of which offers better protection in different ways.

Of course, it's been pointed out that methods that elect the pair-winner,
among the winners by 2 different methods, tend to fail FBC.

But FBC isn't needed in polls, where you want sincere ranking, not
equal-top-ranking.

Michael Ossipoff

----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
C.Benham
2016-12-19 08:14:40 UTC
Permalink
For polls I suggest either Smith//Approval (explicit) or Margins
Sorted Approval (explicit).

And with that ballot information the winners using other methods could
be announced.
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Because I wanted people to vote, and because IRV is so popular and
relatively well-known, I designated IRV as the count-rule.
(I told people to rank only the candidates they approve of.)
That is a bit odd, since IRV meets Later-no-Harm and so there's never
any strategic point in truncating.
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Of course, it's been pointed out that methods that elect the
pair-winner, among the winners by 2 different methods, tend to fail FBC.
And Mono-raise. It usually causes vulnerability (or greater
vulnerability) to Push-over strategy.

Chris Benham
Post by Michael Ossipoff
It depends on what you mean by polls. If it's just an opinion poll
to see what the likely result will be in an election (so something
that isn't in any way binding itself), it's about more than
finding a method that will produce a winner.
Yes. This isn't a political poll at all. It's an online poll on a
non-political question, to find out what the CWs is, and which
alternatives have majority approval.
You want to be able to see the support of all the candidates, and
by having a method that's just set up for a winner (your
suggestion of the pairwise winner from two different counting
methods), you're not going to achieve what you want to achieve.
For this sort of poll, you can use a variety of different methods
and publish all the results
Yes, when the result won't be implemented, then there's no reason why
it's necessary to name the count-method in advance, because the
results by various methods could be given. If there's participation in
that poll, I'll report results by MAM, Approval, & probably
Pairwise-Winner (MAM, Smith,MMPO).
Most likely there won't be strategy, and the CWs will win as CWv.
But sometimes, when there are only a few voters, other methods can be
needed for tiebreaking.
I recently did a poll on voting-systems, and MAM returned a tie
between Approval & Score.
Approval
Score
Bucklin
MDDA
MDDAsc
IRV
Benham
But I noticed that Approval did better than Score in its pairwise
comparisons.
1. Approval pairbeat more alternatives than Score did.
2. The sum of Approval's pairwise votes against the other alternatives
was greater than that of Score.
#1 means that Approval beats Score by Copeland.
#2 means that Approval beats Score by a version of Borda.
But #1 & #2 seem to compellingly indicate that Approval beats Score.
Of course there are good reasons to not announce Copeland or Borda as
the count-rule. But, when there's a tie, they point to a winner in a
meaningful way.
Somewhere else, at PoliticalForums, I'm conducting a presidential poll
between Hillary, Jill, Donald, & Gary.
I don't know the winner so far, because someone additional has just
voted, and i haven't yet updated the count.
Though PoliticalForums' Opinion-Polls forum supports Approval, with
balloting, count, & count-display fully automated (voting is by
click-bubble), I instead invited rankings.
Because I wanted people to vote, and because IRV is so popular and
relatively well-known, I designated IRV as the count-rule.
But I'll announce the winner by Approval, Benham & by
Pairwise-Winner (MAM, Smith,MMPO) too.
(I told people to rank only the candidates they approve of.)
I conducted a voting-systems poll there too, and Approval is the
winner there as well.
I'm conducting two voting-system polls: One at PoliticalForums,and one
at CIVS (Condorcet Internet Voting Service).
I emphasize that those two polls, at PoliticalForums & at CIVS, are to
find out how _the general public_ feels about voting-systems.
Obviously the people here at EM, who are not representative of the
general public on that subject, shouldn't vote in those
general-public-opinion polls.
But of course feel free to check out the results.
As I said, Approval is the consistent winner, at both polls. Score is
2nd-best at CIVS. It seems to me that, at PoliticalForums, Score is
tied with Plurality. No one but me approved MDDA.
.
But if you're just talking about elections that aren't for public
office, then things are different. Some of these elections can be
done online.
Yes, I've got several online polls going, on presidential candidates,
voting-systems, & nonpolitical reform questions.
In the CIVS presidential poll, with 72 votes in, Jill Stein is the CWv
(with Bernie removed from the count).
I invite people at EM to vote in the PoliticalForums presidential
poll, if they want to. Go to PoliticalForums (You can find a link to
it via google), and then go to its Opinion Polls forum. Among the
polls there is my presidential poll.
As I said, of course the voting-system polls are only for the general
public, not for people who are familiar with voting-systems.
And for those that are likely to have an involved electorate that
are likely to be knowledgeable about the system, I would suggest
score voting but with live totals published and changeable votes.
So people can enter their scores, but if the current result
suggested they will need to adopt a more strategic approach, they
can change their vote accordingly. The only other thing I would
add is that the end time should probably be in some way
non-deterministic. Otherwise the live updates are likely to be
less effective. People might withhold their vote until the last
minute, or have a completely false vote that they change at the
last minute. So you might have 24 hours guaranteed (or however
long is deemed appropriate), and then it might randomly end with a
half life of an hour or something (which could be longer if the
initial guaranteed time is longer).
Yes, that would be a good reliable way to find the CWs. It could be
feasible in a meeting-room, but, for most online polls, it isn't
feasible. For one thing, it's difficult enough to get people to vote
once.
Rankings is usually a good way to find out the CWs, and MAM always
works fine at CIVS. But, at a forum where the people are very familiar
with the matter being voted on, and highly committed to some
alternative(s), I feel that it might be better to add Smith,MMPO's
defection-proofness, via
Pairwise-Winner (MAM, Smith,MMPO)
or
Pairwise-Winner (MAM, Smith//MMPO)
Any opinions on which would be better?
Mike
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Sent:* Sunday, 18 December 2016, 6:05
*Subject:* [EM] Voting-System Choice for Polls (Just one more
thing I want to say)
Before quitting EM & retiring from voting-systems, there's one
What's the best voting-system for polls?
Though FBC is important for official political elections, I don't
think it serves a purpose in polls, where the purpose is to get
sincere rankings, and hope that people vote sincere rankings. In
polls, the compulsion to favorite-bury is much less likely.
As I've said, I haven't noticed any sign (top-cycles for 1st
place) of strategy in polls.
I suggest that, for sincere electorates, MAM is the ideal best.
That means it's best for polls at the Condorcet Internet Voting
Service, where there's been no sign of strategy.
But what if you're doing a poll among people who are highly
involved in the subject that you're polling about, and have strong
committment to some alternatives? Like, for example, suppose
you're pollng at EM about voting-systems?
Maybe some members of the electorate will resort to strategy.
Especially if the electorate are a voting-system mailing-lislt.
So you can't really be sure that there'll be no chicken-dilemma defection.
So maybe, instead of MAM, Smith//MMPO should be used.
It is automatically resistant to chicken-dilemma defection.
But, for burial, it isn't as good as MAM. With MAM, a candidate
that you, & sufficiently-many others, don't rank can't beat the
CWs by burial.
...but it can in MMPO, though there's a lot of uncertainty & risk
in trying burial in MMPO.
Maybe Smith//MMPO's reliable automatic chicken-dilemma protection
is more important, because defection is easier & less drastic a
strategy than burial.
But maybe MAM's better burial protection is more important,
because burial temptation & opportunity is a lot more common than
a chicken-dilemma situation.
My suggestion: Use both.
Do the count by Smith//MMPO, & by MAM. Of the winners by those 2
methods, the final winner is the one that pairwise-beats the other.
In the chicken-dilemma example, and also in a burial example, the
intended victim of the offensive strategy pairbeats the perps'
candidate.
So, declaring, as winner, the one of those 2 winners that
pairbeats the other is definitely the best solution, if MAM &
Smith//MMPO are the best choices, each of which offers better
protection in different ways.
Of course, it's been pointed out that methods that elect the
pair-winner, among the winners by 2 different methods, tend to
fail FBC.
But FBC isn't needed in polls, where you want sincere ranking, not
equal-top-ranking.
Michael Ossipoff
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
<http://electorama.com/em>for list info
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
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Michael Ossipoff
2016-12-19 21:28:31 UTC
Permalink
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Because I wanted people to vote, and because IRV is so popular and
relatively well-known, I designated IRV as the count-rule.
(I told people to rank only the candidates they approve of.)
That is a bit odd, since IRV meets Later-no-Harm and so there's never any
strategic point in truncating.
Sure, that was a mis-statement: It was for the _MDDA_ poll that I said to
rank only the candidates the voter approves of. ...not for the IRV poll.

In the IRV poll, I and some others voted a complete ranking.

For the PoliticalForums poll on voting-systems, the alternatives were:

Plurality
Approval
Score
MDDA

I wanted to include a ranking-method. But I only wanted to include 1
ranking-method, because I didn't want to ask participants to read about
more than 1 unfamiliar method or rank-count rule.

I chose MDDA because it (along with MDDAsc) is the best for elections, and
is very briefly-defined--something that can make all the difference in
poll-participation.

And, rather than define a different rank-count for the poll's designated
count-rule, it seemed simpler to just designate MDDA (even though what's
best for elections isn't necessarily best for a poll).
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Of course, it's been pointed out that methods that elect the pair-winner,
among the winners by 2 different methods, tend to fail FBC.
And Mono-raise. It usually causes vulnerability (or greater vulnerability)
to Push-over strategy.
For polls where offensive strategy seems more likely, I'll use:

Pairwise-Winner (MAM, Smith,MMPO)

With the Smith set limiting what can be considered for winning, I don't
think there's any need to let it otherwise change the MMPO count, by
affecting the alternatives' maximum pairwise opposition..

...which could cause some unexpected, unintended results of one's ballot.

Maybe it would be more convenient to just call it:

P(MAM, Smith,MMPO)

By combining MAM's 1st-rate burial-deterrence with MMPO's automatic
reliable chicken-dilemma defection prevention, that seems the best choice
for counting rank-balloting polls, if the goal is to avoid successful
offensive strategy.

But any reasons otherwise are welcome. Because I might sometimes want to
use the best anti-strategy rank-count, I'm interested in any reasons why
P(MAM, Smith,MMPO) could be improved on.

Michael Ossipoff
Post by Michael Ossipoff
Chris Benham
It depends on what you mean by polls. If it's just an opinion poll to see
what the likely result will be in an election (so something that isn't in
any way binding itself), it's about more than finding a method that will
produce a winner.
Yes. This isn't a political poll at all. It's an online poll on a
non-political question, to find out what the CWs is, and which alternatives
have majority approval.
You want to be able to see the support of all the candidates, and by
having a method that's just set up for a winner (your suggestion of the
pairwise winner from two different counting methods), you're not going to
achieve what you want to achieve. For this sort of poll, you can use a
variety of different methods and publish all the results
Yes, when the result won't be implemented, then there's no reason why it's
necessary to name the count-method in advance, because the results by
various methods could be given. If there's participation in that poll, I'll
report results by MAM, Approval, & probably Pairwise-Winner (MAM,
Smith,MMPO).
Most likely there won't be strategy, and the CWs will win as CWv.
But sometimes, when there are only a few voters, other methods can be
needed for tiebreaking.
I recently did a poll on voting-systems, and MAM returned a tie between
Approval & Score.
Approval
Score
Bucklin
MDDA
MDDAsc
IRV
Benham
But I noticed that Approval did better than Score in its pairwise
comparisons.
1. Approval pairbeat more alternatives than Score did.
2. The sum of Approval's pairwise votes against the other alternatives was
greater than that of Score.
#1 means that Approval beats Score by Copeland.
#2 means that Approval beats Score by a version of Borda.
But #1 & #2 seem to compellingly indicate that Approval beats Score.
Of course there are good reasons to not announce Copeland or Borda as the
count-rule. But, when there's a tie, they point to a winner in a meaningful
way.
Somewhere else, at PoliticalForums, I'm conducting a presidential poll
between Hillary, Jill, Donald, & Gary.
I don't know the winner so far, because someone additional has just voted,
and i haven't yet updated the count.
Though PoliticalForums' Opinion-Polls forum supports Approval, with
balloting, count, & count-display fully automated (voting is by
click-bubble), I instead invited rankings.
Because I wanted people to vote, and because IRV is so popular and
relatively well-known, I designated IRV as the count-rule.
But I'll announce the winner by Approval, Benham & by
Pairwise-Winner (MAM, Smith,MMPO) too.
(I told people to rank only the candidates they approve of.)
I conducted a voting-systems poll there too, and Approval is the winner
there as well.
I'm conducting two voting-system polls: One at PoliticalForums,and one at
CIVS (Condorcet Internet Voting Service).
I emphasize that those two polls, at PoliticalForums & at CIVS, are to
find out how _the general public_ feels about voting-systems. Obviously the
people here at EM, who are not representative of the general public on that
subject, shouldn't vote in those general-public-opinion polls.
But of course feel free to check out the results.
As I said, Approval is the consistent winner, at both polls. Score is
2nd-best at CIVS. It seems to me that, at PoliticalForums, Score is tied
with Plurality. No one but me approved MDDA.
.
But if you're just talking about elections that aren't for public office,
then things are different. Some of these elections can be done online.
Yes, I've got several online polls going, on presidential candidates,
voting-systems, & nonpolitical reform questions.
In the CIVS presidential poll, with 72 votes in, Jill Stein is the CWv
(with Bernie removed from the count).
I invite people at EM to vote in the PoliticalForums presidential poll, if
they want to. Go to PoliticalForums (You can find a link to it via google),
and then go to its Opinion Polls forum. Among the polls there is my
presidential poll.
As I said, of course the voting-system polls are only for the general
public, not for people who are familiar with voting-systems.
And for those that are likely to have an involved electorate that are
likely to be knowledgeable about the system, I would suggest score voting
but with live totals published and changeable votes. So people can enter
their scores, but if the current result suggested they will need to adopt a
more strategic approach, they can change their vote accordingly. The only
other thing I would add is that the end time should probably be in some way
non-deterministic. Otherwise the live updates are likely to be less
effective. People might withhold their vote until the last minute, or have
a completely false vote that they change at the last minute. So you might
have 24 hours guaranteed (or however long is deemed appropriate), and then
it might randomly end with a half life of an hour or something (which could
be longer if the initial guaranteed time is longer).
Yes, that would be a good reliable way to find the CWs. It could be
feasible in a meeting-room, but, for most online polls, it isn't feasible.
For one thing, it's difficult enough to get people to vote once.
Rankings is usually a good way to find out the CWs, and MAM always works
fine at CIVS. But, at a forum where the people are very familiar with the
matter being voted on, and highly committed to some alternative(s), I feel
that it might be better to add Smith,MMPO's defection-proofness, via
Pairwise-Winner (MAM, Smith,MMPO)
or
Pairwise-Winner (MAM, Smith//MMPO)
Any opinions on which would be better?
Mike
------------------------------
*Sent:* Sunday, 18 December 2016, 6:05
*Subject:* [EM] Voting-System Choice for Polls (Just one more thing I
want to say)
Before quitting EM & retiring from voting-systems, there's one more thing
What's the best voting-system for polls?
Though FBC is important for official political elections, I don't think it
serves a purpose in polls, where the purpose is to get sincere rankings,
and hope that people vote sincere rankings. In polls, the compulsion to
favorite-bury is much less likely.
As I've said, I haven't noticed any sign (top-cycles for 1st place) of
strategy in polls.
I suggest that, for sincere electorates, MAM is the ideal best. That means
it's best for polls at the Condorcet Internet Voting Service, where there's
been no sign of strategy.
But what if you're doing a poll among people who are highly involved in
the subject that you're polling about, and have strong committment to some
alternatives? Like, for example, suppose you're pollng at EM about
voting-systems?
Maybe some members of the electorate will resort to strategy. Especially
if the electorate are a voting-system mailing-lislt.
So you can't really be sure that there'll be no chicken-dilemma defection.
So maybe, instead of MAM, Smith//MMPO should be used.
It is automatically resistant to chicken-dilemma defection.
But, for burial, it isn't as good as MAM. With MAM, a candidate that you,
& sufficiently-many others, don't rank can't beat the CWs by burial.
...but it can in MMPO, though there's a lot of uncertainty & risk in
trying burial in MMPO.
Maybe Smith//MMPO's reliable automatic chicken-dilemma protection is more
important, because defection is easier & less drastic a strategy than
burial.
But maybe MAM's better burial protection is more important, because burial
temptation & opportunity is a lot more common than a chicken-dilemma
situation.
My suggestion: Use both.
Do the count by Smith//MMPO, & by MAM. Of the winners by those 2 methods,
the final winner is the one that pairwise-beats the other.
In the chicken-dilemma example, and also in a burial example, the intended
victim of the offensive strategy pairbeats the perps' candidate.
So, declaring, as winner, the one of those 2 winners that pairbeats the
other is definitely the best solution, if MAM & Smith//MMPO are the best
choices, each of which offers better protection in different ways.
Of course, it's been pointed out that methods that elect the pair-winner,
among the winners by 2 different methods, tend to fail FBC.
But FBC isn't needed in polls, where you want sincere ranking, not
equal-top-ranking.
Michael Ossipoff
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Toby Pereira
2016-12-20 17:50:45 UTC
Permalink
With this, the changeable score vote won't necessarily find the Condorcet winner, but I think this would be a feature rather than a bug. For example, if there are two frontrunners (A and B) and a "nobody" candidate (C), you might have the following preferences:
49: A>C>B49: B>C>A2: C>A>B
C is the Condorcet winner, but the voters who put this candidate second might still consider them unfit or have no opinion on them. The 98 A or B voters might give zeros initially to both the other two candidates, so then there is unlikely to ever be a strategic push that gets C elected.
Also, even if not everyone is engaged enough to want to change their vote at any point, it should still yield decent results. It does also depend on the type of poll, and I think there would be some online polls that it would be suited to.
Toby


From: Michael Ossipoff <***@gmail.com>
 




And for those that are likely to have an involved electorate that are likely to be knowledgeable about the system, I would suggest score voting but with live totals published and changeable votes. So people can enter their scores, but if the current result suggested they will need to adopt a more strategic approach, they can change their vote accordingly. The only other thing I would add is that the end time should probably be in some way non-deterministic. Otherwise the live updates are likely to be less effective. People might withhold their vote until the last minute, or have a completely false vote that they change at the last minute. So you might have 24 hours guaranteed (or however long is deemed appropriate), and then it might randomly end with a half life of an hour or something (which could be longer if the initial guaranteed time is longer).

Yes, that would be a good reliable way to find the CWs. It could be feasible in a meeting-room, but, for most online polls, it isn't feasible. For one thing, it's difficult enough to get people to vote once.
Michael Ossipoff
2016-12-21 22:40:56 UTC
Permalink
On Wed, Dec 21, 2016 at 3:59 PM, Markus Schulze <
Hallo,
Post by Juho Laatu
It couldn't get any more minimal & ideal than that.
MAM (unlike Beatpath, etc.) never unnecessarily
disregards a pairwise defeat (by electing someone
who has the defeat).
The problem with Mike Ossipoff's argumentation is
that he doesn't define the terms "necessarily" /
"unnecessarily".
Actually, I did.

Shall I explain it again?

A pairwise defeat, by itself, says something. It says that the public have
voted that X is better than Y. They've voted to have X instead of Y.

But what if the X>Y defeat is in a cycle: X>Y>Z>X ?

Say all 3 of those defeat are equal in strength.

(I suggest that the measure of strength be chosen for the best
anti-strategy properties. But it isn't in dispute here--MAM & Beatpath use
the same measure of strength.)

Now, with a cycle of 3 equally-strong defeats, the electorate have said
*nothing* about which alternative would be best, or which one they want.

But say the defeats aren't equal:

We've got 3 defeats, which, taken together, say nothing. Each one those 3
defeats can be truly said to be making the other two meaningless--making
the other two defeats into defeats-in-a-cycle, as opposed to defeats
by which the electorate are saying something.

Of course, if we could disregard one of the defeats, then the other two
would be meaningful statements by the electorate.

Suppose that one defeat, Y>Z, is weaker than the other two.

Each defeat can be regarded as in opposition to the other two. Y>Z prevents
both X>Y & Y>Z from being meaningful statements by the electorate. And each
of X>Y & Z>A prevents Y>Z from being a meaningful statement by the
electorate. And X>Y & Y>Z can also be said, together, to prevent Y>Z from
being a meaningful statement by the electorate.

If they weren't there, it would be, wouldn't it.

So, from the above:

Y>Z nullifies X>Y & Z>A.

and

X>Y & Z>A nullify Y>Z

Which nullifies the other(s) more strongly?

That's right: X>Y & Z>X nullify Y>Z more strongly than Y>Z nullifies X>Y &
Z>A, because they're both stronger than Y>Z.

So Y>Z should be counted as the nullified defeat in that cycle.

Y>Z is nullified by being the weakest defeat in a cycle.

Here's the primary definition of the MAM count:

A defeat is affirmed if it isn't the weakest defeat in a cycle whose other
defeats are affirmed.

[end of definition]

What that's saying is that a defeat is nullified if it is the weakest
defeat in a cycle whose other defeats *are not *nullified by that
definition.

Yes, that's recursive. No, it isn't circular.

The strongest two defeats are automatically not nullified, because it's
impossible for either of them to be the weakest defeat in a cycle. So there
are un-nullified defeats (to which the above definition can refer, when
evaluating the other defeats.).

I'll repeat that:

A defeat is nullified if it's the weakest defeat in a cycle whose other
defeats aren't nullified.

It wouldn't make a whole lot of sense to say that a defeat is nullified (&
therefore disregsrded) because it's the weakest defeat in a cycle some of
whose other defeats, themselves, are nullified (and being disregarded).

But that's what Beatpath does.

Disregarding a publicly-voted preference is undemocratic. It shouldn't be
done unless necessary.

Markus wants to know how I define "necessary".

It's necessary to disregard a defeat if it's nullified by being the weakest
defeat in a cycle (obviously that would be a cycle whose other defeats
aren't themselves disregarded, nullified in that manner).

There, Markus, that's what I mean by "necessary". "Unnecessary" means "not
necessary". (for which, refer to the 1st sentence in this paragraph.)

By that obvious, natural & fair definition, Beatpath unnecessarilly
disregards defeats. Unnecessarily disregards preference statements made by
the public.

That's why, when MAM & Beatpath give different winners, MAM's winner
pairwise-beats Beatpath's winner in the vast majority of instances.
In those instances, where Tideman's ranked pairs method
satisfies this desideratum and the Schulze method
violates this desideratum Mike Ossipoff will say that
the Schulze method _unnecessarily_ violates this
desideratum.
The "desideratum" that I said shouldn't be unnecessarily violated is the
honoring of a publicly-voted preference. I've told what, for that purpose,
"necessarily" means. No, I didn't define "necessary" as "done by MAM".

You're all confused, & you've got it backwards. I told why it can be
accurately said that MAM, and not Beatpath, only disregards a defeat when
it's necessary (where "necessary" isn't defined according to which method
does it.)
And in those instances, where Tideman's ranked pairs
method violates this desideratum and the Schulze method
satisfies this desideratum Mike Ossipoff will say that
the ranked pairs method _necessarily_ violates this
desideratum.
See above.

And, by the way, you're calling MAM "Tideman's Ranked-Pairs method".

Incorrect. I don't advocate Tideman's Ranked-Pairs method.

MAM is different from Tideman's Ranked-Pairs method in at least two
important ways:

1. MAM uses winning-votes (wv) as its measure of defeat-strength.

2. MAM incorporates tiebreaking bylaws that give it desirable
criterion-compliances even with a very small electtorate. ...something that
can be important in polls.

...especially my EM polls :^)

Michael Ossipoff
Markus Schulze
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Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Michael Ossipoff
2016-12-22 03:28:48 UTC
Permalink
Steve Epply did more than adopt wv. Steve added a carefully-devised set of
tie-solutions, to guarantee various criterion-compliances, even with a very
small electorate.

And, as for wv vs margins:

The improvement of wv over margns in incomparably greater than the
difference between Beatpath & Margins.

And, though some might not agree, because it depends on which criteria you
like best, I suggest that the improvement of wv over margins is also
greater than the difference between Beatpath and Smith//Condorcet or
MinMax(wv).

With those 2 improvements, MAM deserves a different name from Tideman RP.

Besides, Maximize Affirmed Majorities is a much more descriptive name than
Ranked-Pairs. (Not that Ranked-Pairs isn't descriptive at all. It just
isn't *as* descriptive.)

Michael Ossipoff
Using winning votes instead of margins doesn't warrant a new name. It's
just a variant of ranked pairs. If I decided my favourite method was
Schulze but with margins (it's not by the way), I would call it Schulze
with margins. I wouldn't come up with a new name for it and present it as a
new invention.
------------------------------
And, by the way, you're calling MAM "Tideman's Ranked-Pairs method".
Incorrect. I don't advocate Tideman's Ranked-Pairs method.
MAM is different from Tideman's Ranked-Pairs method in at least two
1. MAM uses winning-votes (wv) as its measure of defeat-strength.
2. MAM incorporates tiebreaking bylaws that give it desirable
criterion-compliances even with a very small electtorate. ...something that
can be important in polls.
...especially my EM polls :^)
Michael Ossipoff
2016-12-22 03:31:11 UTC
Permalink
Typo:

I said:

The improvement of wv over margns in incomparably greater than the
difference between Beatpath & Margins.

I meant: "...incomparably greater than the difference between Beatpath &
MAM."
Using winning votes instead of margins doesn't warrant a new name. It's
just a variant of ranked pairs. If I decided my favourite method was
Schulze but with margins (it's not by the way), I would call it Schulze
with margins. I wouldn't come up with a new name for it and present it as a
new invention.
------------------------------
And, by the way, you're calling MAM "Tideman's Ranked-Pairs method".
Incorrect. I don't advocate Tideman's Ranked-Pairs method.
MAM is different from Tideman's Ranked-Pairs method in at least two
1. MAM uses winning-votes (wv) as its measure of defeat-strength.
2. MAM incorporates tiebreaking bylaws that give it desirable
criterion-compliances even with a very small electtorate. ...something that
can be important in polls.
...especially my EM polls :^)
Michael Ossipoff
2016-12-22 20:06:29 UTC
Permalink
On Thu, Dec 22, 2016 at 2:27 AM, Markus Schulze <
Hallo,
Election method X satisfies criterion Y if it
never ... unless this can be justified.
That's nice. I didn't define a criterion. I didn't say that I was defining
a criterion.

In many instances, a fault or failing of some methods is pointed out,
described, & discussed long before a criterion is written about it.

A criterion about Beatpath's fault that we're discussing would be a
criterion that applies only to the class of methods that solve cycles by
dropping weakest defeats. ...methods such as MinMax(wv), Smith//MinMax(wv),
SSD, & CSSD, & MAM.

If I refer to that class of methods, I'll call them "Methods that solve
cycles by dropping weakest defeats, in order to result in a candidate not
having a defeat."

I've never liked criteria that only apply to one kind of voting-systems.
I've preferred criteria that apply seamlessly to all methods. So, the
criterion that you're asking for isn't one that I'd be inclined to write.

But, as for what could be said about that, I don't know if I'd call it a
*criterion*. Maybe I'd just call it an obvious fact, an obvious desideratum
for methods that drop weakest defeats in order to result in a candidate not
having a defeat..

You'll say that this is just a re-statement of MAM's rule. But that would
be an unprovable claim about my motivation for saying it. You'll say that I
just wanted to copy MAM's rule, and call it an obvious fact. No, it's the
other way around. This obvious fact is the motivation for MAM. (...& for
Tideman's RP before its MAM refinement.)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For methods that solve cycles by dropping weakest defeats, in order to
result in a candidate not having a defeat:

Quite obviously, there's no reason or justification for dropping a defeat
unless it's the weakest defeat in a cycle whose other defeats don't qualify
in that way for being dropped (and therefore can't be ignored).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In my previous post on this subject, I justified that statement at length.
That statement of obvious fact isn't merely a copying of MAM's rule. It's
the fact that motivated MAM's rule, which is a re-statement of it.

Miichael Ossipoff
If criteria were defined in this manner then, whether
election method X satisfies criterion Y, would only be
a question of the rhetoric skills of the supporters
of this method.
Markus Schulze
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robert bristow-johnson
2016-12-22 18:53:10 UTC
Permalink
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------

Subject: Re: [EM] Voting-System Choice for Polls (Just one more thing I want to say)

From: "Markus Schulze" <***@alumni.TU-Berlin.DE>

Date: Thu, December 22, 2016 2:27 am

To: election-***@lists.electorama.com

--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hallo,
Election method X satisfies criterion Y if it
never ... unless this can be justified.
If criteria were defined in this manner then, whether
election method X satisfies criterion Y, would only be
a question of the rhetoric skills of the supporters
of this method.
Markus Schulze
well, Markus, not only is your knowledge/expertise far exceeding mine, but also is your patience.  i, frankly, could not read through an entire post of Michael's.  but i *did* look for specific responses to concerns that i brought up.
Neither Michael nor Daniel nor even
Warren can answer this simple question in general: As a voter, is it in my political best interest to Approve my second choice or not?  (And if it were Score voting, how much should I score my second choice, assuming I give my first choice a "10"?)
Michael, i don't necessarily
want to see you go, but your forensic (debate) skills simply do not cut the mustard with me.  You are not persuasive and neither volume, nor Alphabet Soup, nor self-confidence does the heavy lifting needed to persuade.

--
r b-j                  ***@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Michael Ossipoff
2016-12-22 07:02:55 UTC
Permalink
On Wed, Dec 21, 2016 at 11:55 PM, Markus Schulze <
Hallo,
Mike Ossipoff is still not giving a definition
for the terms "necessarily" / "unnecessarily".
The definitions of those words can be found in any dictionary.

In my previous post, I explained and justified my use of those words.

Anyone considering a choice between Beatpath & MAM can judge that
justification for hirself.

Sorry if that Markus doesn't like that. He's obviously "grasping at straws".

Experience has made it abundantly clear that Markus will never admit that
he was wrong, and will attempt even the most indefensible arguments & the
most (shall we say) ingenuous techniques to assert his rightness.
What he is doing is: He is giving an explanation
why, in his opinion, those instances where
Tideman's ranked pairs method violates his
desideratum are justifiable.
Markus is, here, repeating what he said before. So I'll repeat my answer:

The "desideratum" referred to is honoring a voted public preference. I
spoke at length, in my previous post, about what could make it necessary to
not do so.

...and yes, "justifiable too".
He does this by
repeating the underlying heuristic of the
ranked pairs method.
Speaking of repeating, Markus is now repeating what he said before, which
I've already answered. Continual dogged repetition of already-answered
arguments & claims is perhaps Markus' favorite tactic.

Alright, I'll answer it one more time, but that's all.

As I said, Markus is all confused, and has it backwards:

When I told about what would make necessary the disregarding of a
pairwise-defeat, I was doing so from basic, widely-agreed principles &
premises. ...starting with a discussion of what a pairwise-defeat says,
and how a cycle affects its meaning.

I wasn't repeating something having its origin in MAM's definition, or
something that has its origin as an argument for MAM. As for what I *was*
telling, I refer you to the paragraph before this one.

Then, after discussing what could (from widely agreed-on principles &
premises--not by a method's rules) obviously make it necessary to disregard
a voted public preference, I quoted the definition of MAM, and pointed out
that MAM's definition and rule regarding "affirmation" are (yes) a
re-statement of that.

...a re-statement of what, for a method that seeks to honor a public
pairwise preference if possible, would make it necessary to disregard a
voted public preference.

That isn't a coincidence. And it doesn't mean that the initial discussion
is just a copying of MAM's rule, or derived from arguments for MAM. It
results from MAM being devised to not avoidably (by the independent obvious
standards, from obvious & widely agreed-on principles & premises) disregard
a voted public preference. That's a person's admitted purpose when
advocating MAM. That's the motivation for MAM's rule.

That's why MAM doesn't unnecessarily disregard a voted public preference (a
pairwise defeat). And that's why, when MAM & Beatpath give different
winners, the MAM winner will be publicly-preferred to Beatpath's winner, in
a large majority of instances (It was probably something like a factor of 4
or 5).

I hope that's clear now. ...but Markus willl again repeat what he said, as
he always does.
However, to be able to check whether an election
method satisfies a criterion it should be
sufficient to know the definition for this method.
It should not be necessary to know and to agree
to the underlying heuristic of this method.
No one's asking Markus to know or agree on the underlying heuristic of MAM.

The initial discussion, about what a pairwise-defeat means, and how being
in a cycle affects its meaning, and, from those things, the matter of what
would nullify a defeat, & what would make it necessary to disregard a
defeat (if a winner must be someone without a defeat)...None of that is
derived from, or has its origin in, MAM's definition or rule, or arguments
for MAM.

The principles & premises, widely agreed-upon, aren't things that Markus
should have any trouble agreeing with.

But Markus will never admit that, and will just keep on repeating his
already-answered arguments and mis-statements, as he always has done, as
his favorite tactic.

...quite in violation of EM's guidelines for conduct.

I have to admit that I'm not enjoying my brief return from retirement from
voting-systems.

I returned to the list because I wanted to mention and ask about

Pairwise-Winner(MAM, Smith,MMPO)

and

Pairwise-Winner(MAM, Smith//MMPO)

...because it seems that at least one of those would be useful for polling
an electorate in which there are likely to be at least some people who are
inclined toward offensive truncation, burial, &/or chicken-dilemma
defection.

That was all I returned for, and I didn't intend to stay and argue with
people.

These interminable arguments with Juho & Markus aren't serving any useful
purpose and don't seem to have a point.

So, as of now, having said what I wanted to say about
P(MAM, Smith,MMPO) & P(MAM, Smith//MMPO), and asked what I wanted to
about them, and allowing time for an answer to my question, I've already
completed the purpose of my temporary return to EM.

...and so, as of right now, I'm concluding this temporary postponement of
my retirement from voting-systems.

If I don't reply to a mesage, it's because I won't be getting mailing-list
messages.

I don't mean any criticism of EM. I think that it serves its purpose well,
as an international forum for discussion of voting-systems. It's just that
I've said what I meant to about voting-systems, and so my participation
here would no longer serve a purpose.

...and least of all to continue repetitious arguments. The arguers can have
the last word.

Heuristic (noun):

A method, procedure or argument that serves as an aid to learning,
discovery or problem-solving, or relates to exploratory problem-solving
techniques that utilize self-eductating techniques (as the evaluation of
feedback) to improve performance.

----------

Ok :^)


Michael Ossipoff
Markus Schulze
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Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Michael Ossipoff
2016-12-22 07:06:20 UTC
Permalink
Typo:

When I said "ingenuous tactics", I meant "disingenuous tactics".

Michael Ossipoff

On Wed, Dec 21, 2016 at 11:55 PM, Markus Schulze <
Hallo,
Mike Ossipoff is still not giving a definition
for the terms "necessarily" / "unnecessarily".
What he is doing is: He is giving an explanation
why, in his opinion, those instances where
Tideman's ranked pairs method violates his
desideratum are justifiable. He does this by
repeating the underlying heuristic of the
ranked pairs method.
However, to be able to check whether an election
method satisfies a criterion it should be
sufficient to know the definition for this method.
It should not be necessary to know and to agree
to the underlying heuristic of this method.
Markus Schulze
----
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